The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Part 106

JURISDICTION OF THE _RES_

As applied by the Supreme Court in cases involving concurrent jurisdiction the principle of comity means that when the jurisdiction of a court and the right of a plaintiff to prosecute a suit therein have attached and when a court has acquired constructive possession of property, such jurisdiction cannot be taken away or obstructed by proceedings in another court, nor can the possession of the property be disturbed by proceedings in another court; and the court which has first acquired jurisdiction of the cause or the possession of the _res_ has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the case and all controversies relating thereto, provided that the subject matter of the suit, the remedies sought, and the parties to it are the same, and provided further that it is not necessary for the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction in order to enforce the supremacy of the Const.i.tution and laws of the United States.[655]

STATE INTERFERENCE BY INJUNCTION WITH FEDERAL JURISDICTION

It has long been settled as a general rule that State courts have no power to enjoin proceedings or judgments of the federal courts.[656] In United States ex rel. Riggs _v._ Johnson County[657] this rule was attributed to no paramount jurisdiction of the federal courts, but rather to the complete independence of the State and federal courts in their spheres of action. Like many of the rules governing federal-state court relations, this rule is not absolute, as shown by a case arising in Pennsylvania. Two surviving trustees had filed an account for themselves and a deceased trustee in a court of common pleas.

Thereafter, two of the five beneficiaries sued the two trustees and the deceased trustee in a federal district court, charging mismanagement and praying for an accounting and rest.i.tution and removal of the trustees.

The Supreme Court held that the State court upon the filing of the account acquired jurisdiction over the trust _quasi in rem_ exclusively and therefore sustained the State court's injunction restraining the parties from further proceeding in the federal court while simultaneously holding that the district court could not enjoin the parties from proceeding in the State court.[658] The power of a State court to enjoin parties from proceeding in a federal court obviously does not include that of enjoining a federal court.

FEDERAL INTERFERENCE BY INJUNCTION WITH STATE JURISDICTION

The discretion of the federal courts to enjoin proceedings in State courts has not been left exclusively to doctrines of comity, for since 1793 the federal courts have been prohibited by statute from restraining proceedings in State courts.[659] Initially this statute was applied with strict literalness in condemning attempts by the lower federal courts to enter exceptions to it,[660] but gradually the Supreme Court began to interpret the provision as not prohibitive of all injunctions.

First, it has been held that an injunction will lie against proceedings in a State court to protect the lawfully acquired jurisdiction of a federal court against impairment or defeat.[661] This exception is notably applicable to cases where the federal court has taken possession of property which it may protect by injunction from interference by State courts.[662] Second, in order to prevent irreparable damages to persons and property the federal courts may restrain the legal officers of a State from taking proceedings in State courts to enforce State legislation alleged to be unconst.i.tutional.[663] Nor does the prohibition of -- 265 of the Judicial Code [28 U.S.C.A. -- 2283] prevent injunctions restraining the execution of judgments in State courts obtained by fraud,[664] the restraint of proceedings in State courts in cases which have been removed to the federal courts,[665] nor, until lately, to proceedings in State courts to relitigate issues previously adjudicated and finally settled by decrees of a federal court.[666]

In Toucey _v._ New York Life Insurance Co.,[667] Justice Frankfurter, as spokesman for the Court, reviewed earlier cases and in effect overruled the exception of suits designed to relitigate issues previously adjudicated by a federal court, and held that a suit for injunction would not lie to restrain a proceeding in a State court on the ground that the claim had been previously adjudicated. In so doing he placed this issue in its proper context of _res judicata_. In addition he went beyond the requirements of the case at bar to cast doubts upon the exception of suits brought to enjoin the execution of judgments of State courts obtained by fraud. Furthermore, by regarding the exception of suits restraining proceedings in State courts in cases which had been removed to the federal courts as emanating from the removal acts, Justice Frankfurter concluded that only one exception had been made by judicial construction to -- 265, [28 U.S.C.A. -- 2283]

namely, that permitting injunction of proceedings in State courts to protect the possession of property previously acquired.[668] The rule of this case was extended on the same day to forbid an injunction to restrain proceedings in a State court in support of jurisdiction previously begun earlier and still pending in the federal court.[669]

Federal Injunctions of State Official Action

Injunctions by federal courts restraining State officials from enforcing unconst.i.tutional State statutes const.i.tute an indirect interference with State courts and a serious obstruction to the administration of public policy. From Osborn _v._ Bank of the United States,[670] which was the first case in which an injunction was used to restrain State action under an unconst.i.tutional statute, to Ex parte Young[671] the Supreme Court established firmly the rule that jurisdiction exists in the federal courts to restrain the enforcement of unconst.i.tutional State statutes and to enjoin State officials charged with the duty of enforcing State laws from bringing criminal or civil proceedings to enforce an invalid statute. Until Ex parte Young, the Court had been careful to sustain the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts to enjoin the enforcement of unconst.i.tutional State legislation only after a finding of unconst.i.tutionality,[672] but Ex parte Young abandoned this rule by holding that the enforcement of a State statute by the attorney general of the State through proceedings in State courts could be enjoined pending the determination of its const.i.tutionality.

Ex Parte Young

Although a suit to restrain the attorney general of a State from proceeding in the courts of the State to enforce a State law not declared unconst.i.tutional would seem effectively to stay proceedings in a State court, Justice Peckham drew a distinction between the power to enjoin the attorney general and other law officers as individuals and a suit against a State court on the ground that the former does not include the "power to prevent any investigation or action by a grand jury. The latter body is part of the machinery of a criminal court, and an injunction against a State court would be a violation of the whole scheme of our Government."[673] Justice Harlan, not convinced by this distinction, characterized the suit as an attempt "_to tie the hands_ of the _State_ so that it could not in any manner or by any mode of proceeding _in its own courts_, test the validity of the statutes and orders in question."[674]

Although the rigor of the rule of Ex parte Young has been mitigated by subsequent decisions[675] and the mode of its exercise somewhat narrowed by statute, it has not been overruled and remains a source of friction in federal-state relations. Simultaneously, however, -- 266 (_see_ note 2 above[Transcriber's Note: Reference is to footnote 674 of Article III.]) has been construed strictly as designed "to secure the public interest in 'a limited cla.s.s of cases of special importance,'"[676] and not "a measure of broad social policy to be construed with great liberality, but as an enactment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied as such."[677]

STATE INTERFERENCE BY _HABEAS CORPUS_ PROCEEDINGS WITH FEDERAL JURISDICTION

The most spectacular type of State court interference with federal courts has been their use of the writ of _habeas corpus_ to release persons in federal custody. Between 1815 and 1861, judges in nine State courts a.s.serted the right to release persons in federal custody,[678]

and the issue was not finally settled until 1859, when Ableman _v._ Booth[679] was decided. Here a Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court first released a prisoner held by a United States commissioner on charges of violating the fugitive slave law. After the trial, conviction, and sentence of the defendant, the State supreme court issued a second writ of _habeas corpus_ and after hearing ordered the release of the prisoner. The national Supreme Court then issued a writ of error to the State court which refused to make a return. In an opinion based in part on national supremacy and in part on dual sovereignty, Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the Court, laid down the absolute rule that no State court has the power to release prisoners held in custody under the authority of the United States.[680]

Notwithstanding the strong language of the Court in Ableman _v._ Booth, the Wisconsin courts thirteen years later again a.s.serted the power to release persons in federal custody by directing the release of an enlisted soldier in the custody of a recruiting officer of the United States Army. Once again the Court held that a State court has no authority to issue a writ of _habeas corpus_ for the release of persons held under the authority or claim and color of authority of the United States. Justice Field for the Court went on to lay down the generalization that neither government "can intrude with its judicial process into the domain of the other, except so far as such intrusion may be necessary on the part of the National Government to preserve its rightful supremacy in cases of conflict of authority."[681]

FEDERAL INTERFERENCE BY REMOVAL AND _HABEAS CORPUS_

Another potential source of friction between State and federal courts is the use of the writ of _habeas corpus_ or of removal proceedings in the federal courts to release persons from State custody. As has already been indicated the rule of national supremacy deprives the courts of the States of any power to release persons held in federal custody. Recourse to _habeas corpus_ or removal proceedings in the federal courts to release persons in the custody of State courts is governed by statute and comity. The Judiciary Act of 1789[682] conferred jurisdiction upon the federal courts to issue writs of _habeas corpus_ to release persons in State custody only for the purpose of having them appear as witnesses in federal proceedings. The same act also provided for the removal before trial into a federal court of civil cases arising under the laws of the United States. Both branches of this jurisdiction were broadened as a result of the nullification movement in South Carolina so as to make either removal or _habeas corpus_ available to persons held in State custody for any act done or omitted in pursuance of the laws of the United States.[683] These recourses were in 1842 made available to aliens restrained by State authority in violation of their international rights,[684] and in 1867 to all persons restrained in violation of the Const.i.tution, laws, or treaties of the United States.[685] In substance all these acts still remain on the statute book.[686]

Of these provisions the most important are those governing the release of persons held under State authority for an act done or omitted under federal authority and persons held in violation of the Const.i.tution, laws, or treaties of the United States. In the leading case of Tennessee _v._ Davis,[687] decided in 1880, the question was faced of their const.i.tutionality. Davis was a federal revenue officer who, in the discharge of his duties, killed a man, and was arraigned by Tennessee for murder. He thereupon applied for removal of his case to a federal court under the act of 1867. To Tennessee's evocation of the doctrine of State sovereignty, the Court rejoined with a ringing a.s.sertion of the principle of National Supremacy. Subsequently, the same provisions have been construed to procure the release of a deputy United States marshal from State custody for killing a man while protecting a Justice of the Supreme Court under a Presidential order which was regarded as a "law"

of the United States;[688] the release of an election official held under State authority for perjury on the ground that jurisdiction to punish a false witness belonged to the federal courts in this instance;[689] and the release of a collector of internal revenue held in Kentucky for his refusal to file copies of his official papers with a State court.[690] Similarly, the governor of a national home for disabled soldiers was released from Ohio custody for serving oleomargarine in the home in violation of an Ohio statute.[691] A more extreme exercise of _habeas corpus_ jurisdiction is ill.u.s.trated by Hunter _v._ Wood[692] where a ticket agent of a railroad held in State custody for an overcharge on a ticket was released because prior to his trial in the State court, a United States circuit court had enjoined the enforcement of the statute. The element common to all of these cases is the supremacy of the National Government and the inability of the States through judicial proceedings or otherwise to obstruct the enforcement of federal authority. The doctrine of comity is inapplicable in this category of cases.

COMITY AS A PRINCIPLE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

On the other hand, in Ex parte Royall,[693] decided in 1886, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in the above category of cases involved no duty to release persons from State custody but only a discretion to do so. Such discretion, the Court declared, "should be exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between the courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Const.i.tution."[694] In pursuance of these principles the Court has subsequently formulated rules to the effect that mere error in the prosecution and trial of a suit cannot confer jurisdiction upon a federal court to review the proceedings upon a writ of _habeas corpus_;[695] that the writ of _habeas corpus_ cannot be subst.i.tuted for the writ of error, however serious the errors committed by the State court;[696] that except in extreme and urgent cases the federal courts will not discharge a prisoner in State custody prior to final disposition of the case in the State courts, where the prisoner must first exhaust all State remedies; and even after the State courts have acted, the federal courts will usually leave the prisoner to the usual and orderly procedure of appeal to the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court will, in the exercise of a sound discretion, issue a writ of mandamus to compel a federal court to remand to a State court a prosecution of a federal officer removed to it, when it appears that the officer in question, in seeking removal, failed to make a candid, specific, and positive explanation of his relation to the transaction giving rise to the crime for which he was indicted.[697]

Because of the care with which the discretion to issue writs of _habeas corpus_ and to grant removals has been exercised by the federal courts to release persons from State custody there has been a minimum of friction in this area of federal-state relations, in contrast to that produced by their extensive use of injunctions to restrain the enforcement of State statutes. In Wade _v._ Mayo,[698] Justice Murphy cited the statistics of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts which revealed that during the fiscal years of 1943, 1944, and 1945, there was an average of 451 _habeas corpus_ pet.i.tions filed each year in federal district courts by persons in State custody, and that of these pet.i.tions, an average of only six per year resulted in a reversal of the conviction and the release of the prisoner.

COMITY AS COOPERATION

Moreover, cold comity may become on occasion warm cooperation between the two systems of courts. In Ponzi _v._ Fessenden,[699] the matter at issue was the authority of the Attorney General of the United States to consent to the transfer on a writ of _habeas corpus_ of a federal prisoner to a State court to be there put on trial upon indictments there pending against him. The Court, speaking by Chief Justice Taft, while conceding that there was no express statutory authority for such action, sustained it. Said the Chief Justice: "We live in the jurisdiction of two sovereignties, each having its own system of courts to declare and enforce its laws in common territory. It would be impossible for such courts to fulfil their respective functions without embarra.s.sing conflict unless rules were adopted by them to avoid it. The people for whose benefit these two systems are maintained are deeply interested that each system shall be effective and unhindered in its vindication of its laws. The situation requires, therefore, not only definite rules fixing the powers of the courts in cases of jurisdiction over the same persons and things in actual litigation, but also a spirit of reciprocal comity and mutual a.s.sistance to promote due and orderly procedure."[700]

EARLY USE OF STATE COURTS IN ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL LAW

The final phase of the relation of State courts has to do with their administration of federal law. Although it is the general rule that Congress cannot vest the judicial power of the United States in courts other than those created in pursuance of article III,[701] it has from the beginning of the National Government left to the State courts wide areas of jurisdiction which it might have vested exclusively in the federal courts, section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 offering the supreme ill.u.s.tration. But going far beyond that, in the latter years of the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth, Congress provided that suits by the National Government itself for fines, forfeitures, and penalties imposed by the revenue laws might be brought in State courts of competent jurisdiction as well as in the federal courts.[702] The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,[703] the Naturalization Act of 1795,[704] and the Alien Enemies Act of 1798,[705] all imposed positive duties on State courts to enforce federal law. In 1799 the State courts were vested with jurisdiction to try criminal offenses against federal laws.[706] Extensive reliance was placed on State courts for the enforcement of the Embargo Acts;[707] and the act of March 3, 1815,[708] vested in State or county courts within or directly adjoining a federal tax-collection district cognizant "of all complaints, suits and prosecutions for taxes, duties, fines, penalties, and forfeitures."

Retreat From This Practice

The indifference, however, of the State courts in New England to the Embargo Acts, the later hostility of courts in the northern States to the Fugitive Slave Act, and the refusal of courts in other States to administer federal law on the general principle that the courts of no nation are bound to enforce the penal laws of another,[709] all combined to produce strong sentiments against the use of State courts to administer federal law. These sentiments came in time to be incorporated in dissenting opinions,[710] and in 1842 in Prigg _v._ Pennsylvania[711]

the Court definitely ruled that the States could not be compelled to enforce federal law. However, it was later held that this ruling did not prevent Congress from authorizing State courts to administer federal law or the action taken by them, if they choose to do so, from being valid.[712]

Resumption of the Practice

Near the end of the nineteenth century and afterwards Congress resumed its earlier practice of vesting concurrently the enforcement of federally created rights in the State and federal courts. The administration of Indian lands and the determination of rights to inherit allotted lands[713] marked the beginning of the restoration of the use of State courts to apply federal law, and the Federal Employers'

Liability Act of 1908[714] carried the practice further, not only by vesting concurrent jurisdiction in suits arising under the act, in State courts but also in prohibiting the removal of cases begun in State courts to the federal courts. Soon afterwards the Connecticut courts in a compensation case applied the State's common law rules of liability contrary to the federal act and held that Congress could not require a State court to grant a remedy which local law did not permit. The Connecticut courts further held that enforcement of the federal act was contrary to the public policy of the State.[715] This decision was overruled in the Second Employers' Liability Cases,[716] where it was held on the basis of national supremacy that rights arising under the act can be enforced "as of right, in the courts of the States when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion."

Subsequently, the Supreme Court has held that the rights created under this statute cannot be defeated by forms of local practice and that it is the duty of the Supreme Court to construe allegations in a complaint a.s.serting a right under the liability act in order to determine whether a State court has denied a right of trial guaranteed by Congress.[717]

STATE OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE FEDERAL LAW

The issue of State obligation to administer federal law was presented most recently by Testa _v._ Katt.[718] This case arose out of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,[719] which provided that persons who had been overcharged in violation of the act or, in the alternative, the Price Administrator, could sue for treble damages in any court of competent jurisdiction. On the ground that one sovereign cannot enforce the penal laws of another, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that the State courts had no jurisdiction of such suits. a.s.suming for the purposes of the case that the treble damage provision, was "penal" in nature, Justice Black for a unanimous Court proceeded to lay to rest the principle that a State court is not bound to enforce federal criminal law as an a.s.sumption flying "in the face of the fact that the States of the Union const.i.tute a nation" and one which disregarded the supremacy clause. Justice Black also pointed to early acts of Congress and early decisions of the Supreme Court as establis.h.i.+ng the rule that "State courts do not bear the same relation to the United States as they do to foreign countries."[720] The Prigg case, though not overruled expressly, was ignored save for its citation in a footnote.[721]

RIGHT OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS TO RESORT TO FEDERAL COURTS

In a series of cases the Court has been called upon to adjudicate between the power of a State to exclude foreign corporations from doing a purely domestic business within its borders and the right of such foreign corporations to resort to the federal courts. After deciding first one way and then the other, on the basis of some highly refined distinctions,[722] it finally, in 1922, came out unqualifiedly for the latter right. This was in Terral _v._ Burke Construction Co.,[723] in which an Arkansas statute requiring the cancellation of the license of a foreign corporation to do business in the State, upon notice that such corporation had removed a case to a federal court, was p.r.o.nounced void.

At the same time all contrary decisions were explicitly overruled.

Clause 3. The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. _See_ Amendment VI, pp. 878-881.

Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

Treason

The provisions and phraseology of this section are derived from the English Statute of Treasons enacted in 1351, in the reign of Edward III,[724] as an expression of grievance against the application of the doctrine of constructive treasons by the common law courts. The const.i.tutional definition is, of course, much more restrictive than the enumeration of treasons in the English statute, but like that statute, it is emphatically a limitation on the power of government to define treason and to prove its existence. The rigid and exclusive definition of treason takes from Congress all power to define treason and prescribes limitations on the power to prescribe punishment thereupon.