The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Part 141

[4] McLaughlin, A Const.i.tutional History of the United States, 203 (1936).

[5] Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Const.i.tution, 19 (1896).

[6] Annals of Congress, I, 424, 433.

[7] Monongahela Navigation Co. _v._ United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893).

[8] Ames, _op. cit._, 184, 185 (1896).

[9] Annals of Congress, 1, 755.

[10] Ibid.

[11] 7 Pet. 243 (1833); Lessee of Livingston _v._ Moore, 7 Pet. 469 (1833); Permoli _v._ New Orleans, 3 How. 589, 609 (1845); Fox _v._ Ohio, 5 How. 410 (1847); Smith _v._ Maryland, 18 How. 71 (1855); Withers _v._ Buckley, 20 How. 84 (1858); Pervear _v._ Ma.s.sachusetts, 5 Wall. 475 (1867); Twitch.e.l.l _v._ Pennsylvania, 7 Wall. 321 (1869).

[12] 20 Wall. 655, 669 (1875).

[13] Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Harv.

L. Rev., 431, 436 (1926).

[14] Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873); Spies _v._ Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887); O'Neil _v._ Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); Maxwell _v._ Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Patterson _v._ Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); Twining _v._ New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).

[15] Hurtado _v._ California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).

[16] Ibid. 534, 535.

[17] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. _v._ Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).

[18] _See_ Twining _v._ New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Adamson _v._ California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).

[19] _See_ Gitlow _v._ New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Beauharnais _v._ Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288 (1952).

AMENDMENT 1

RELIGION, FREE SPEECH, ETC.

Page Absorption of Amendment I into the Fourteenth Amendment 757 "An establishment of religion" 758 "No preference" doctrine 758 "Wall of separation" doctrine 759 Zorach Case 762 Permissible monetary aids to religion 763 Free exercise of religion; dimensions 764 Parochial schools 765 Free exercise of religion; federal restraints 765 Free exercise of religion; State and local restraints 766 Free exercise of religion; obligations of citizens.h.i.+p 768 Freedom of speech and press 769 Blackstonian background 769 Effect of Amendment I on the common law 769 Amendment XIV and Blackstone 771 Clear and present danger rule, meaning 772 Contrasting operation of the common law rule 772 Emergence of the clear and present test 773 Gitlow and Whitney Cases 775 Acceptance of the clear and present danger test 777 Police power and clear and present danger 777 Public order 777 Public morals 779 Picketing and clear and present danger 781 Contempt of court and clear and present danger 783 Freedom of speech and press in public parks and streets 784 Censors.h.i.+p 786 Clear and present danger test: judicial diversities 788 Taxation 792 Federal restraints on freedom of speech and press 792 Regulations of Business and Labor Activities 792 Regulation of political activities of federal employees 793 Legislative protection of the armed forces and the war power 794 Loyalty regulations: The Douds Case 794 The Case of the Eleven Communists 795 Subversive organizations 801 Recent state legislation 801 Loyalty tests 801 Group libel 802 Censors.h.i.+p of the mails 804 Rights of a.s.sembly and pet.i.tion 805 Restraints on the right of pet.i.tion 806 The Cruikshank Case 807 Hague _v._ C.I.O. 808 Recent cases 809 Lobbying and the right of pet.i.tion 810

RELIGION, FREE SPEECH, ETC.

Amendment 1

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to a.s.semble, and to pet.i.tion the Government for a redress of grievances.

Absorption of Amendment I Into the Fourteenth Amendment

Eventually the long sought protection for certain substantive personal rights was obtained by identifying them with the "liberty" which States cannot take away without due process of law. The s.h.i.+ft in the Court's point of view was made known quite casually in Gitlow _v._ New York,[1]

where, although affirming a conviction for violation of a State statute prohibiting the advocacy of criminal anarchy, it declared that: "For present purposes we may and do a.s.sume that freedom of speech and of the press--which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress--are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'

protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."[2] This dictum became, two years later, accepted doctrine when the Court invalidated a State law on the ground that it abridged freedom of speech contrary to the due process clause of Amendment XIV.[3] Subsequent decisions have brought the other rights safeguarded by the First Amendment, freedom of religion,[4] freedom of the press,[5] and the right of peaceable a.s.sembly,[6] within the protection of the Fourteenth. In consequence of this development the cases dealing with the safeguarding of these rights against infringement by the States are included in the ensuing discussion of the First Amendment.

An Establishment of Religion

THE "NO PREFERENCE" DOCTRINE

The original proposal leading to the First Amendment was introduced into the House of Representatives by James Madison, and read as follows: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or wors.h.i.+p, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretence, infringed."[7] This was altered in the House to read: "Congress shall make no law establis.h.i.+ng religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience."[8] In the Senate the above formula was replaced by the following; "Congress shall make no law establis.h.i.+ng articles of religion."[9] The conference committee of the two houses adopted the House proposal, but with the neutral term "respecting an establishment," etc., taking the place of the original sweeping ban against any law "establis.h.i.+ng religion."[10]

Explaining this phraseology, in his Commentaries, Story a.s.serted that the purpose of the amendment was not to discredit the then existing State establishments of religion, but rather "to exclude from the National Government all power to act on the subject." He wrote: "The situation, * * *, of the different States equally proclaimed the policy as well as the necessity of such an exclusion. In some of the States, episcopalians const.i.tuted the predominant sect; in others, presbyterians; in others, congregationalists; in others, quakers; and in others again, there was a close numerical rivalry among contending sects. It was impossible that there should not arise perpetual strife and perpetual jealousy on the subject of ecclesiastical ascendency, if the national government were left free to create a religious establishment. The only security was in extirpating the power. But this alone would have been an imperfect security, if it had not been followed up by a declaration of the right of the free exercise of religion, and a prohibition (as we have seen) of all religious tests. Thus, the whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the State governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice and the State const.i.tutions; and the Catholic and the Protestant, the Calvinist and the Arminian, the Jew and the Infidel, may sit down at the common table of the national councils without any inquisition into their faith or mode of wors.h.i.+p."[11]

For the rest, Story contended, the no establishment clause, while it inhibited Congress from giving preference to any denomination of the Christian faith, was not intended to withdraw the Christian religion as a whole from the protection of Congress. He said: "Probably at the time of the adoption of the Const.i.tution, and of the amendment to it now under consideration, the general if not the universal sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state so far as was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience and the freedom of religious wors.h.i.+p. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation."[12] As late as 1898 Cooley expounded the no establishment clause as follows: "By establishment of religion is meant the setting up or recognition of a state church, or at least the conferring upon one church of special favors and advantages which are denied to others (citing 1 Tuck. Bl. Com. App. 296; 2 _id._, App. Note G.). It was never intended by the Const.i.tution that the government should be prohibited from recognizing religion, * * * where it might be done without drawing any invidious distinctions between different religious beliefs, organizations, or sects."[13]

THE "WALL OF SEPARATION" DOCTRINE

In 1802 President Jefferson wrote a letter to a group of Baptists in Danbury, Connecticut in which he declared that it was the purpose of the First Amendment to build "a wall of separation between Church and State,"[14] and in Reynolds _v._ United States,[15] the first Anti-Mormon Case, Chief Justice Waite, speaking for the unanimous Court, characterized this as "almost an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment," one which left Congress "free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."[16] Recently the Court has given Jefferson's "almost authoritative" p.r.o.nouncement a greatly enlarged application. Speaking by Justice Black, a sharply divided Court sustained in 1947 the right of local authorities in New Jersey to provide free transportation for children attending parochial schools,[17] but accompanied its holding with these warning words, which appear to have had the approval of most of the Justices: "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pa.s.s laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.

Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or inst.i.tutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.

Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, partic.i.p.ate in the affairs of any religious organizations of groups and _vice versa_."[18] And a year later a nearly unanimous Court overturned on the above grounds a "released time" arrangement under which the Champaign, Illinois Board of Education agreed that religious instruction should be given in the local schools to pupils whose parents signed "request cards." The cla.s.ses were to be conducted during regular school hours in the school building by outside teachers furnished by a religious council representing the various faiths, subject to the approval or supervision of the superintendent of schools. Attendance records were kept and reported to the school authorities in the same way as for other cla.s.ses; and pupils not attending the religious-instruction cla.s.ses were required to continue their regular secular studies.[19]

Said Justice Black, speaking for the Court: "Here not only are the State's tax-supported public school buildings used for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The State also affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious cla.s.ses through use of the State's compulsory public school machinery.

This is not separation of Church and State."[20]

Justice Frankfurter presented a concurring opinion for himself and Justices Jackson, Rutledge and Burton. "We are all agreed," it begins, "that the First and Fourteenth Amendments have a secular reach far more penetrating in the conduct of Government than merely to forbid an 'established church.'"[21] What ensues is a well doc.u.mented account of the elimination of sectarianism from the American school system which is reinterpreted as a fight for the secularization of public supported education.[22] Facing then the emergence of the "released time"

expedient,[23] Justice Frankfurter characterizes it as a "conscientious attempt to accommodate the allowable functions of Government and the special concerns of the Church within the framework of our Const.i.tution."[24] Elsewhere in his opinion he states: "Of course, 'released time' as a generalized conception, undefined by differentiating particularities, is not an issue for Const.i.tutional adjudication. * * * The substantial differences among arrangements lumped together as 'released time' emphasize the importance of detailed a.n.a.lysis of the facts to which the Const.i.tutional test of Separation is to be applied. How does 'released time' operate in Champaign?"[25] And again: "We do not consider, as indeed we could not, school programs not before us which, though colloquially characterized as 'released time,'

present situations differing in aspects that may well be const.i.tutionally crucial. Different forms which 'released time' has taken during more than thirty years of growth include programs which, like that before us, could not withstand the test of the Const.i.tution; others may be found unexceptionable."[26] Justice Jackson added further reservations of his own as follows: "We should place some bounds on the demands for interference with local schools that we are empowered or willing to entertain. * * * It is important that we circ.u.mscribe our decision with some care."[27]

In a dissenting opinion Justice Reed took exception to the extended meaning given to the words "an establishment of religion." "The phrase 'an establishment of religion,'" said he, "may have been intended by Congress to be aimed only at a state church. When the First Amendment was pending in Congress in substantially its present form, 'Mr. Madison said, he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to wors.h.i.+p G.o.d in any manner contrary to their conscience.' Pa.s.sing years, however, have brought about the acceptance of a broader meaning, although never until today, I believe, has this Court widened its interpretation to any such degree as holding that recognition of the interest of our nation in religion, through the granting, to qualified representatives of the princ.i.p.al faiths, of opportunity to present religion as an optional, extracurricular subject during released school time in public school buildings, was equivalent to an establishment of religion."[28] He further pointed out that "the Congress of the United States has a chaplain for each House who daily invokes divine blessings and guidance for the proceedings. The armed forces have commissioned chaplains from early days. They conduct the public services in accordance with the liturgical requirements of their respective faiths, ash.o.r.e and afloat, employing for the purpose property belonging to the United States and dedicated to the services of religion. Under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, eligible veterans may receive training at government expense for the ministry in denominational schools. The schools of the District of Columbia have opening exercises which 'include a reading from the Bible without note or comment, and the Lord's Prayer.'"[29]

THE ZORACH CASE; THE McCOLLUM CASE LIMITED

In a decision handed down July 11, 1951 the New York Court of Appeals, one Judge dissenting, sustained the "released time" program of that State, distinguis.h.i.+ng it from the one condemned in the McCollum Case as follows: "In the New York City program there is neither supervision nor approval of religious teachers and no solicitation of pupils or distribution of cards. The religious instruction must be outside the school building and grounds. There must be no announcement of any kind in the public schools relative to the program and no comment by any princ.i.p.al or teacher on the attendance or non-attendance of any pupil upon religious instruction. All that the school does besides excusing the pupil is to keep a record--which is not available for any other purpose--in order to see that the excuses are not taken advantage of and the school deceived, which is, of course, the same procedure the school would take in respect of absence for any other reason."[30] On appeal this decision was sustained by the Supreme Court, six Justices to three.[31] Said Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority: "We are a religious people whose inst.i.tutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to wors.h.i.+p as one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an att.i.tude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Const.i.tution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe. Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular inst.i.tutions to force one or some religion on any person. But we find no const.i.tutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence. The government must be neutral when it comes to compet.i.tion between sects. It may not thrust any sect on any person. It may not make a religious observance compulsory. It may not coerce anyone to attend church, to observe a religious holiday, or to take religious instruction. But it can close its doors or suspend its operations as to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuary for wors.h.i.+p or instruction. No more than that is undertaken here."[32]

A few weeks earlier, moreover, the Court had indicated an intention to scrutinize more closely the basis of its jurisdiction in this cla.s.s of cases. This occurred in a case in which the question involved was the validity of a New Jersey statute which requires the reading at the opening of each public school day of five verses of the Old Testament.[33] The Court held that appellant's interest as taxpayers was insufficient to const.i.tute a justiciable case or controversy, while as to the alleged rights of the child involved the case had become moot with her graduation from school.[34]

PERMISSIBLE MONETARY AIDS TO RELIGION

In 1899 the Court held that an agreement between the District of Columbia and the directors of a hospital chartered by Congress for erection of a building and treatment of poor patients at the expense of the District was valid despite the fact that the members of the Corporation belonged to a monastic order or sisterhood of a particular church.[35] It has also sustained a contract made at the request of Indians to whom money was due as a matter of right, under a treaty, for the payment of such money by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the support of Indian Catholic schools.[36] In 1930 the use of public funds to furnish nonsectarian textbooks to pupils in parochial schools of Louisiana was sustained,[37] and in 1947, as we have seen, the case of public funds for the transportation of pupils attending such schools in New Jersey.[38] In the former of these cases the Court cited the State's interest in secular education even when conducted in religious schools; in the latter its concern for the safety of school children on the highways; and the National School Lunch Act,[39] which aids all school children attending tax-exempt schools can be similarly justified. The most notable financial concession to religion, however, is not to be explained in this way, the universal practice of exempting religious property from taxation. This unquestionably traces back to the idea expressed in the Northwest Ordnance that Government has an interest in religion as such.

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION: DIMENSIONS

The First Amendment "was intended to allow every one under the jurisdiction of the United States to entertain such notions respecting his relations to his Maker and the duties they impose as may be approved by his judgment and conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments in such form of wors.h.i.+p as he may think proper, not injurious to the equal rights of others, and to prohibit legislation for the support of any religious tenets, or the modes of wors.h.i.+p of any sect. The oppressive measures adopted, and the cruelties and punishments inflicted, by the governments of Europe for many ages, to compel parties to conform, in their religious beliefs and modes of wors.h.i.+p, to the views of the most numerous sect, and the folly of attempting in that way to control the mental operations of persons, and enforce an outward conformity to a prescribed standard, led to the adoption of (this) amendment."[40] "The const.i.tutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of wors.h.i.+p. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of wors.h.i.+p as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,--freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be."[41]