The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Part 144

Justice Frankfurter's lengthy concurring opinion premises "the right of a government to maintain its existence--self preservation." This, he says, is "the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty," citing The Federalist No. 41, and certain cases.[218] A little later he raises the question, "But how are competing interests to be a.s.sessed?" and answers: "Full responsibility for the choice cannot be given to the courts.

Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable, within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence. History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the pa.s.sions of the day and a.s.sume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures.

Primary responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete in the situation before us of necessity belongs to the Congress. The nature of the power to be exercised by this Court has been delineated in decisions not charged with the emotional appeal of situations such as that now before us. We are to set aside the judgment of those whose duty it is to legislate only if there is no reasonable basis for it."[219] But a difficulty exists, to wit, in the clear and present danger doctrine. He says: "In all fairness, the argument [of defendants] cannot be met by reinterpreting the Court's frequent use of 'clear' and 'present' to mean an entertainable 'probability.' In giving this meaning to the phrase 'clear and present danger,' the Court of Appeals was fastidiously confining the rhetoric of opinions to the exact scope of what was decided by them. We have greater responsibility for having given const.i.tutional support, over repeated protests, to uncritical libertarian generalities. Nor is the argument of the defendants adequately met by citing isolated cases. * * * The case for the defendants requires that their conviction be tested against the entire body of our relevant decisions."[220]

Turning then to the cases Justice Frankfurter exclaims at last: "I must leave to others the ungrateful task of trying to reconcile all these decisions."[221] The nearest precedent was Gitlow _v._ New York.[222]

Here "we put our respect for the legislative judgment in terms which, if they were accepted here, would make decision easy. * * * But it would be disingenuous to deny that the dissent in _Gitlow_ has been treated with the respect usually accorded a decision."[223] But the case at bar was a horse of a different color. "In contrast, there is ample justification for a legislative judgment that the conspiracy now before us is a substantial threat to national order and security,"[224] which seems to be in essential agreement with the position of the Chief Justice and his three a.s.sociates. Justice Frankfurter concludes with a homily on the limitations which the nature of judicial power imposes, on the power of judicial review. He says: "Can we then say that the judgment Congress exercised was denied it by the Const.i.tution? Can we establish a const.i.tutional doctrine which forbids the elected representatives of the people to make this choice? Can we hold that the First Amendment deprives Congress of what it deemed necessary for the Government's protection? To make validity of legislation depend on judicial reading of events still in the womb of time--a forecast, that is, of the outcome of forces at best appreciated only with knowledge of the topmost secrets of nations--is to charge the judiciary with duties beyond its equipment.

We do not expect courts to p.r.o.nounce historic verdicts on bygone events.

Even historians have conflicting views to this day on the origin and conduct of the French Revolution. It is as absurd to be confident that we can measure the present clash of forces and their outcome as to ask us to read history still enveloped in clouds of controversy. * * * The distinction which the Founders drew between the Court's duty to pa.s.s on the power of Congress and its complementary duty not to enter directly the domain of policy is fundamental. But in its actual operation it is rather subtle, certainly to the common understanding. Our duty to abstain from confounding policy with const.i.tutionality demands preceptive humility as well as self-restraint in not declaring unconst.i.tutional what in a judge's private judgment is unwise and even dangerous."[225]

Justice Jackson's opinion emphasizes the conspiratorial element of the case, and is flatfooted in rejecting the 'clear and present danger' test for this type of case. He writes: "The 'clear and present danger' test was an innovation by Mr. Justice Holmes in the _Schenck Case_, reiterated and refined by him and Mr. Justice Brandeis in later cases, all arising before the era of World War II revealed the subtlety and efficacy of modernized revolutionary techniques used by totalitarian parties. In those cases, they were faced with convictions under so-called criminal syndicalism statutes aimed at anarchists but which, loosely construed, had been applied to punish socialism, pacifism, and left-wing ideologies, the charges often resting on far-fetched inferences which, if true, would establish only technical or trivial violations. They proposed 'clear and present danger' as a test for the sufficiency of evidence in particular cases. I would save it, unmodified, for application as a 'rule of reason' in the kind of case for which it was devised. When the issue is criminality of a hot-headed speech on a street corner, or circulation of a few incendiary pamphlets or parading by some zealots behind a red flag, or refusal of a handful of school children to salute our flag, it is not beyond the capacity of the judicial process to gather, comprehend, and weigh the necessary materials for decision whether it is a clear and present danger of substantive evil or a harmless letting off of steam. It is not a prophecy, for the danger in such cases has matured by the time of trial or it was never present. The test applies and had meaning where a conviction is sought to be based on a speech or writing which does not directly or explicitly advocate a crime but to which such tendency is sought to be attributed by construction or by implication from external circ.u.mstances. The formula in such cases favors freedoms that are vital to our society, and, even if sometimes applied too generously, the consequences cannot be grave. But its recent expansion has extended, in particular to Communists, unprecedented immunities. Unless we are to hold our Government captive in a judge-made verbal trap, we must approach the problem of a well-organized, nation-wide conspiracy, such as I have described, as realistically as our predecessors faced the trivialities that were being prosecuted until they were checked with a rule of reason. I think reason is lacking for applying that test to this case."[226] And again, "What really is under review here is a conviction of conspiracy, after a trial for conspiracy, on an indictment charging conspiracy, brought under a statute outlawing conspiracy. With due respect to my colleagues, they seem to me to discuss anything under the sun except the law of conspiracy. One of the dissenting opinions even appears to chide me for 'invoking the law of conspiracy.' As that is the case before us, it may be more amazing that its reversal can be proposed without even considering the law of conspiracy. The Const.i.tution does not make conspiracy a civil right. The Court has never before done so and I think it should not do so now. Conspiracies of labor unions, trade a.s.sociations, and news agencies have been condemned, although accomplished, evidenced and carried out, like the conspiracy here, chiefly by letter-writing, meetings, speeches and organization. Indeed, this Court seems, particularly in cases where the conspiracy has economic ends, to be applying its doctrines with increasing severity.

While I consider criminal conspiracy a dragnet device capable of perversion into an instrument of injustice in the hands of a partisan or complacent judiciary, it has an established place in our system of law, and no reason appears for applying it only to concerted action claimed to disturb interstate commerce and withholding it from those claimed to undermine our whole Government. * * *"[227]

The dissenters were Justices Black and Douglas. The former reiterated his position in Bridges _v._ California; the latter italicized Justice Brandeis' dictum in the Whitney Case: "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."[228] The answer would seem to be that education had not in fact prevented the formation of the conspiracy for entering into which the eleven defendants were convicted. If that be deemed a danger at all, it was certainly a clear and present one. Both dissenters, in fact, ignore the conspiracy element.

SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS

In a series of cases[229] in which certain organizations sued the Attorney General for declaratory or injunctive relief looking to the deletion of their names from a list of organizations designated by him to be subversive, the Court reversed holdings of the courts below which had denied relief. Two Justices thought the order not within the President's Executive Order No. 9835, which lays down a procedure for the determination of the loyalty of federal employees or would-be-employees. Justice Black thought the Attorney General had violated Amendment I and that the President's order const.i.tuted a Bill of Attainder. He and Justices Frankfurter and Jackson also held that the Attorney General had violated due process of law in having failed to give the pet.i.tioners notice and hearing. Justice Reed, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice and Justice Minton, dissented, a.s.serting that the action of the Court const.i.tuted an interference with the discretion of the executive in the premises.

RECENT STATE LEGISLATION

Loyalty Tests

The decision in Dennis _v._ United States,[230] taken in conjunction with those in the two Douds[231] Cases, put the clear and present danger rule on the defensive in the field of federal legislation. Substantially contemporaneous holdings in the field of state action may reflect a similar trend. In Garner _v._ Los Angeles Board,[232] the Court sustained the right of a munic.i.p.ality to bar from employment persons who advise, advocate, or teach the violent overthrow of the government, or who are members of, or become affiliated with any group doing so, and to exact a loyalty oath of its employees. In Adler _v._ Board of Education[233] the Court sustained the Civil Service Law of New York as implemented by the so-called Feinberg Law of 1949.[234] The former makes ineligible in any public school any member of an organization advocating the overthrow of government by force, violence, or any unlawful means.

The Feinberg Law requires the Board of Regents of the State (1) to adopt and enforce rules for the removal of ineligible persons; (2) to promulgate a list of banned organizations; (3) to make members.h.i.+p in any such organization prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment in the public schools. Referring to the Garner Case above, Justice Minton, for the Court, said: "We adhere to that case. A teacher works in a sensitive area in the schoolroom. There he shapes the att.i.tude of young minds towards the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. It must preserve the integrity of the schools. That the school authorities have the right and the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society, cannot be doubted. One's a.s.sociates, past and present, as well as one's conduct, may properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty.

From time immemorial, one's reputation has been determined in part by the company he keeps. In the employment of officials and teachers of the school system, the state may very properly inquire into the company they keep, and we know of no rule, const.i.tutional or otherwise, that prevents the state, when determining the fitness and loyalty of such persons, from considering the organizations and persons with whom they a.s.sociate."[235]

Group Libel

In 1952 in Beauharnais _v._ Illinois[236] the Court sustained an Illinois statute which makes it a crime to exhibit in a public place any publication which "portrays depravity, criminality, unchast.i.ty, or lack of virtue of a cla.s.s of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion"

or which "exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy." The act was treated by the State Supreme Court as a form of criminal libel, with the result that defense by truth of the utterance was not under Illinois law available unless the publication was also shown to have been made "with good motives and with justifiable ends." So construed, the Court held, the Act did not violate liberty of speech and press as guaranteed to the States by Amendment XIV. Said Justice Frankfurter:

"If an utterance directed at an individual may be the object of criminal sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same utterance directed at a defined group, unless we can say that this is a wilful and purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State."[237] Pointing then to Illinois' bad record in the matter of race riots, he continued: "In the face of this history and its frequent obligato of extreme racial and religious propaganda, we would deny experience to say that the Illinois legislature was without reason in seeking ways to curb false or malicious defamation of racial and religious groups, made in public places and by means calculated to have a powerful emotional impact on those to whom it was presented. 'There are limits to the exercise of these liberties [of speech and of the press]. The danger in these times from the coercive activities of those who in the delusion of racial or religious conceit would incite violence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive others of their equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is emphasized by events familiar to all. These and other transgressions of those limits the States appropriately may punish.' * * * It is not within our competence to confirm or deny claims of social scientists as to the dependence of the individual on the position of his racial or religious group in the community. It would, however, be arrant dogmatism, quite outside the scope of our authority in pa.s.sing on the powers of a State, for us to deny that the Illinois legislature may warrantably believe that a man's job and his educational opportunities and the dignity accorded him may depend as much on the reputation of the racial and religious group to which he w.i.l.l.y-nilly belongs, as on his own merits. This being so, we are precluded from saying that speech concededly punishable when immediately directed at individuals cannot be outlawed if directed at groups with whose position and esteem in society the affiliated individual may be inextricably involved."[238]

CENSORs.h.i.+P OF THE MAILS: FRAUD ORDER

By legislation adopted in 1879 and 1934 Congress has specified certain conditions upon which a publication shall be admitted to the valuable second-cla.s.s mailing privilege, one of which provides as follows: Except as otherwise provided by law, the conditions upon which a publication shall be admitted to the second-cla.s.s are as follows: "* * * _Fourth._ It must be originated and published for the dissemination of information of a public character, or devoted to literature, the sciences, arts, or some special industry, and having a legitimate list of subscribers; * * * nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to admit to the second-cla.s.s rate regular publications designed primarily for advertising purposes, or for free circulation, or for circulation at nominal rates."[239] In Hannegan _v._ Esquire, Inc.,[240] the Court sustained an injunction against an order of the Postmaster General which suspended a permit to Esquire Magazine on the ground that it did not "contribute to the public good and the public welfare." Said Justice Douglas for the Court: "* * * a requirement that literature or art conform to some norm prescribed by an official smacks of an ideology foreign to our system. The basic values implicit in the requirements of the Fourth condition can be served only by uncensored distribution of literature. From the mult.i.tude of competing offerings the public will pick and choose. What seems to one to be trash may have for others fleeting or even enduring values. But to withdraw the second-cla.s.s rate from this publication today because its contents seemed to one official not good for the public would sanction withdrawal of the second-cla.s.s rate tomorrow from another periodical whose social or economic views seemed harmful to another official. The validity of the obscenity laws is recognized that the mails may not be used to satisfy all tastes, no matter how perverted. But Congress has left the Postmaster General with no power to prescribe standards for the literature or the art which a mailable periodical disseminates."[241] In Donaldson _v._ Read Magazine,[242] however, the Court sustained a Court order forbidding the delivery of mail and money orders to a magazine conducting a puzzle contest which the Postmaster-General had found to be fraudulent. Freedom of the press, said the Court, does not include the right to raise money by deception of the public.

The Rights of a.s.sembly and Pet.i.tion

The right of pet.i.tion took its rise from the modest provision made for it in chapter 61 of Magna Carta (1215).[243] To this meagre beginning Parliament itself and its procedures in the enactment of legislation, the equity jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor, and proceedings against the Crown by "pet.i.tion of right" are all in some measure traceable.

Thus, while the King summoned Parliament for the purpose of supply, the latter--but especially the House of Commons--pet.i.tioned the King for a redress of grievances as its price for meeting the financial needs of the Monarch; and as it increased in importance it came to claim the right to dictate the form of the King's reply, until in 1414 Commons boldly declared themselves to be "as well a.s.senters as pet.i.tioners." Two hundred and fifty years later, in 1669, Commons further resolved that every commoner in England possessed "the inherent right to prepare and present pet.i.tions" to it "in case of grievance," and of Commons "to receive the same" and to judge whether they were "fit" to be received.

Finally Chapter 5 of the Bill of Rights of 1689 a.s.serted the right of the subjects to pet.i.tion the King and "all commitments and prosecutions for such pet.i.tioning to be illegal."[244]

Historically, therefore, the right of pet.i.tion is the primary right, the right peaceably to a.s.semble a subordinate and instrumental right, as if Amendment I read; "the right of the people peaceably to a.s.semble" _in order to_ "pet.i.tion the government."[245] Today, however, the right of peaceable a.s.sembly is, in the language of the Court, "cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental * * * [It] is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political inst.i.tutions,--principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. * * * The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who a.s.sist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question * * * is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purposes; not as to the relation of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Const.i.tution protects."[246] Furthermore, the right of pet.i.tion has expanded. It is no longer confined to demands for "a redress of grievances," in any accurate meaning of these words, but comprehends demands for an exercise by the government of its powers in furtherance of the interests and prosperity of the pet.i.tioners, and of their views on politically contentious matters.

RESTRAINTS ON THE RIGHT OF PEt.i.tION

The right of pet.i.tion recognized by Amendment I first came into prominence in the early 1830's, when pet.i.tions against slavery in the District of Columbia began flowing into Congress in a constantly increasing stream, which reached its climax in the winter of 1835.

Finally on January 28, 1840, the House adopted as a standing rule: "That no pet.i.tion, memorial, resolution, or other paper praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or any State or Territories of the United States in which it now exists, shall be received by this House, or entertained in any way whatever." Thanks to the efforts of John Quincy Adams this rule was repealed five years later, after Adams'

death.[247] For many years now the rules of the House of Representatives have provided that members having pet.i.tions to present may deliver them to the Clerk and the pet.i.tions, except such as, in the judgment of the Speaker, are of an obscene or insulting character, shall be entered on the Journal and the Clerk shall furnish a transcript of such record to the official reporters of debates for publication in the Record.[248]

Even so pet.i.tions for the repeal of the espionage and sedition laws and against military measures for recruiting resulted, in World War I, in imprisonment.[249] Processions for the presentation of pet.i.tions in the United States have not been particularly successful. In 1894 General c.o.xey of Ohio organized armies of unemployed to march on Was.h.i.+ngton and present pet.i.tions, only to see their leaders arrested for unlawfully walking on the gra.s.s of the capitol. The march of the veterans on Was.h.i.+ngton in 1932 demanding bonus legislation was defended as an exercise of the right of pet.i.tion. The administration, however, regarded it as a threat against the const.i.tution and called out the army to expel the bonus marchers and burn their camps. For legal regulation of lobbying activities, _see_ below.

THE CRUIKSHANK CASE

The right of a.s.sembly was first pa.s.sed upon by the Supreme Court in 1876 in the famous case of United States _v._ Cruikshank et al.[250] The case arose on indictments under section 6 of the so-called Enforcement Act of May 30, 1870,[251] which read as follows: "That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any provision of this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Const.i.tution or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same, such persons shall be held guilty of felony, etc."

The indictments charged the defendants with having deprived certain citizens of their right to a.s.semble together peaceably with other citizens "for a peaceful and lawful purpose." The court held that this language was insufficient inasmuch as it did not specify that the attempted a.s.sembly was for a purpose connected with the National Government. As to the right of a.s.sembly the Court, speaking by Chief Justice Waite, went on to declare: "The right of the people peaceably to a.s.semble for the purpose of pet.i.tioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the National Government, is an attribute of national citizens.h.i.+p, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to pet.i.tion for a redress of grievances.

If it had been alleged in these counts that the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case would have been within the statute, and within the scope of the sovereignty of the United States. Such, however, is not the case. The offence, as stated in the indictment, will be made out, if it be shown that the object of the conspiracy was to prevent a meeting for any lawful purpose whatever."[252]

HAGUE _v._ COMMITTEE OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

In this case[253] the question at issue was the validity of a Jersey City ordinance requiring the obtaining of a permit for a public a.s.sembly in or upon the public streets, highways, public parks, or public buildings of the city and authorizing the director of public safety, for the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly a.s.semblage, to refuse to issue a permit when after investigation of all the facts and circ.u.mstances pertinent to the application he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a permit. Two Justices held that in the circ.u.mstances of the case the ordinance violated the right of certain citizens of the United States to a.s.semble to discuss certain privileges which they enjoyed as such, to wit, their rights and privileges under the National Labor Relations Act.[254] Said Justice Roberts, expressing this point of view: "The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied. We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance quoted in Note 1 void upon its face. It does not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly a.s.semblage.' It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a subst.i.tute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right."[255] Two other Justices invoked also the due process clause of Amendment XIV, thereby claiming the right of a.s.sembly for aliens as well as citizens. Said Justice Stone, who expressed this view: "I think respondents' right to maintain it does not depend on their citizens.h.i.+p and cannot rightly be made to turn on the existence or non-existence of a purpose to disseminate information about the National Labor Relations Act. It is enough that pet.i.tioners have prevented respondents from holding meetings and disseminating information whether for the organization of labor unions or for any other lawful purpose."[256] Both Justices were in agreement that freedom of speech and freedom of a.s.sembly were claimable only by natural persons, and not by corporations.[257] Two Justices dissented on the basis of Davis _v._ Ma.s.sachusetts.[258]

RECENT CASES

In Bridges _v._ California[259] it was held that a telegram addressed to the Secretary of Labor strongly criticizing the action of a State court in a pending case was privileged under this amendment as an exercise of the right of pet.i.tion. In Thomas _v._ Collins[260] a statute requiring registration before solicitation of union members.h.i.+p was found to violate the right of peaceable a.s.sembly. But a closely divided Court subsequently sustained an order of a State Employment Relations Board forbidding work stoppages by the calling of special union meetings during working hours.[261] Finally, a divided Court held June 4, 1951, that a combination to break up by force and threats of force of a meeting called for the purpose of adopting a resolution against the Marshall Plan did not afford a right of action against the conspirators under the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871.[262] While the complaint alleged that the conspiracy was entered into for the purpose of depriving the plaintiffs as citizens of the United States of their right "peaceably to a.s.semble for the purpose of discussing and communicating upon national public issues," the Ku Klux Act was found not to extend to violations of that right except by State acts depriving persons of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. But the Court, perhaps significantly, left open the question whether Congress can protect such rights against private action. "It is not for this Court," remarked Justice Jackson sententiously, "to compete with Congress or attempt to replace it as the Nation's law-making body."[263]

LOBBYING AND THE RIGHT OF PEt.i.tION

Today lobbying is frequently regarded as the most important expression of the right of pet.i.tion. During the last half century lobbying has reached tremendous proportions; and there have been four Congressional investigations of such activities, the latest by a Committee of the House of Representatives. Meantime, in 1946 Congress pa.s.sed the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, under which more than 2,000 lobbyists have registered and 495 organizations report lobbying contributions and expenditures.[264] Recently doubts have been cast upon the const.i.tutionality of this statute by two decisions of lower federal courts sitting in the District of Columbia. According to the District Court therein, to subject a person, whose "princ.i.p.al purpose * * * is to aid" in the defeat or pa.s.sage of legislation and who violates this Act by failing to file a detailed accounting, to a penalty entailing a three-year prohibition from lobbying is to deprive such person of his const.i.tutional rights of freedom of speech and pet.i.tion.[265] Insofar as Congress legitimately may regulate lobbying, its powers in relation thereto have been declared not to extend to "indirect lobbying by the pressure of public opinion on the Congress." The latter was deemed to be "the healthy essence of the democratic process."[266]

Notes

[1] 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

[2] Ibid. 666.

[3] Fiske _v._ Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).

[4] Cantwell _v._ Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

[5] Near _v._ Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

[6] De Jonge _v._ Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).

[7] Annals of Congress, 434 (1789-1791).

[8] Records of the United States Senate, Sept. 9, 1789, United States Archives, cited in Appellees Brief in McCollum _v._ Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).