The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Part 81

AGREEMENTS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Article 43 of the United Nations Charter provides: "1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, a.s.sistance, and facilities, including rights of pa.s.sage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and a.s.sistance to be provided. 3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective const.i.tutional processes."[269] This time the Senate did not boggle over the word "agreement."

The United Nations Partic.i.p.ation Act

The United Nations Partic.i.p.ation Act of December 20, 1945 implements these provisions as follows: "The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or agreements with the Security Council which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution, providing for the numbers and types of armed forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of facilities and a.s.sistance, including rights of pa.s.sage, to be made available to the Security Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with article 43 of said Charter. The President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of the Congress to make available to the Security Council on its call in order to take action under article 42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special agreement or agreements the armed forces, facilities, or a.s.sistance provided for therein: _Provided_, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as an authorization to the President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities, or a.s.sistance in addition to the forces, facilities, and a.s.sistance provided for in such special agreement or agreements."[270]

The Executive Establishment

"OFFICE"

"An office is a public station, or employment, conferred by the appointment of government," and "embraces the ideas of tenure duration, emolument, and duties."[271]

"AMBa.s.sADORS AND OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS"

The term "amba.s.sadors and other public ministers," comprehends "all officers having diplomatic functions, whatever their t.i.tle or designation."[272] It was originally a.s.sumed that such offices were established by the Const.i.tution itself, by reference to the Law of Nations, with the consequence that appointments might be made to them whenever the appointing authority--the President and Senate--deemed desirable.[273] During the first sixty-five years of the Government Congress pa.s.sed no act purporting to create any diplomatic rank, the entire question of grades being left with the President. Indeed, during the administrations of Was.h.i.+ngton, Adams and Jefferson, and the first term of Madison, no mention occurs in any appropriation act even, of ministers of a specified rank at this or that place, but the provision for the diplomatic corps consisted of so much money "for the expenses of foreign intercourse," to be expended at the discretion of the President.

In Madison's second term the practice was introduced of allocating special sums to the several foreign missions maintained by the Government, but even then the legislative provisions did not purport to curtail the discretion of the President in any way in the choice of diplomatic agents.

In 1814, however, when President Madison appointed, during a recess of the Senate, the Commissioners who negotiated the Treaty of Ghent the theory on which the above legislation was based was drawn into question.

Inasmuch, it was argued, as these offices had never been established by law, no vacancy existed to which the President could const.i.tutionally make a recess appointment. To this argument it was answered that the Const.i.tution recognizes "two descriptions of offices altogether different in their nature, authorized by the const.i.tution--one to be created by law, and the other depending for their existence and continuance upon contingencies. Of the first kind, are judicial, revenue, and similar offices. Of the second, are Amba.s.sadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls. The first description organize the Government and give it efficacy. They form the internal system, and are susceptible of precise enumeration. When and how they are created, and when and how they become vacant, may always be ascertained with perfect precision. Not so with the second description. They depend for their original existence upon the law, but are the offspring of the state of our relations with foreign nations, and must necessarily be governed by distinct rules. As an independent power, the United States have relations with all other independent powers; and the management of those relations is vested in the Executive."[274]

By the opening section of the act of March 1, 1855, it was provided that "from and after the thirtieth day of June next, the President of the United States shall, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint representatives of the grade of envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary," with a specified annual compensation for each, "to the following countries, * * *" In the body of the act was also this provision: "The President shall appoint no other than citizens of the United States, who are residents thereof, or who shall be abroad in the employment of the Government at the time of their appointment, * * *."[275] The question of the interpretation of the act having been referred to Attorney General Cus.h.i.+ng, he ruled that its total effect, aside from its salary provisions, was recommendatory only. It was "to say, that if, and whenever, the President shall, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain, or to Sweden, the compensation of that minister shall be so much and no more."[276]

This line of reasoning is today only partially descriptive of facts. The act of March 2, 1909, provides that new amba.s.sadors.h.i.+ps may be created only with the consent of Congress,[277] while the Foreign Service Act of 1924[278] organizes the foreign service, both its diplomatic and its consular divisions, in detail as to grades, salaries, appointments, promotions, and in part as to duties. Theoretically the act leaves the power of the President and Senate to appoint consular and diplomatic officials intact, but in practice the vast proportion of the selections are made in conformance with the civil service rules.

PRESIDENTIAL DIPLOMATIC AGENTS

What the President may have lost in consequence of the intervention of Congress in this field, he has made good through his early conceded right to employ, in the discharge of his diplomatic function, so-called "special," "personal," or "secret" agents without consulting the Senate.

When President Jackson's right to resort to this practice was challenged in the Senate in 1831, it was defended by Edward Livingston, Senator from Louisiana, to such good purpose that Jackson made him Secretary of State. "The practice of appointing secret agents," said Livingston, "is coeval with our existence as a nation, and goes beyond our acknowledgment as such by other powers. All those great men who have figured in the history of our diplomacy, began their career, and performed some of their most important services in the capacity of secret agents, with full powers. Franklin, Adams, Lee, were only commissioners; and in negotiating a treaty with the Emperor of Morocco, the selection of the secret agent was left to the Ministers appointed to make the treaty; and, accordingly, in the year 1785, Mr. Adams and Mr.

Jefferson appointed Thomas Barclay, who went to Morocco and made a treaty, which was ratified by the Ministers at Paris.

"These instances show that, even prior to the establishment of the Federal Government, secret plenipotentiaries were known, as well in the practice of our own country as in the general law of nations: and that these secret agents were not on a level with messengers, letter-carriers, or spies, to whom it has been found necessary in argument to a.s.similate them. On the 30th March, 1795, in the recess of the Senate, by letters patent under the great broad seal of the United States, and the signature of their President, (that President being George Was.h.i.+ngton,) countersigned by the Secretary of State, David Humphreys was appointed commissioner plenipotentiary for negotiating a treaty of peace with Algiers. By instructions from the President, he was afterwards authorized to employ Joseph Donaldson as agent in that business. In May, of the same year, he did appoint Donaldson, who went to Algiers, and in September of the same year concluded a treaty with the Dey and Divan, which was confirmed by Humphreys, at Lisbon, on the 28th November in the same year, and afterwards ratified by the Senate on the ---- day of ----, 1796, and an act pa.s.sed both Houses on 6th May, 1796, appropriating a large sum, twenty-five thousand dollars annually, for carrying it into effect."[279]

The precedent afforded by Humphrey's appointment without reference to the Senate has since been multiplied many times, as witness the mission of A. Dudley Mann to Hanover and other German states in 1846, of the same gentleman to Hungary in 1849, of Nicholas Trist to Mexico in 1848, of Commodore Perry to j.a.pan in 1852, of J.H. Blount to Hawaii in 1893.[280] The last named case is perhaps the extremest of all. Blount, who was appointed while the Senate was in session but without its advice and consent, was given "paramount authority" over the American resident minister at Hawaii and was further empowered to employ the military and naval forces of the United States, if necessary to protect American lives and interests. His mission raised a vigorous storm of protest in the Senate, but the majority report of the committee which was created to investigate the const.i.tutional question vindicated the President in the following terms: "A question has been made as to the right of the President of the United States to dispatch Mr. Blount to Hawaii as his personal representative for the purpose of seeking the further information which the President believed was necessary in order to arrive at a just conclusion regarding the state of affairs in Hawaii.

Many precedents could be quoted to show that such power has been exercised by the President on various occasions, without dissent on the part of Congress or the people of the United States. * * * These precedents also show that the Senate of the United States, though in session, need not be consulted as to the appointment of such agents, * * *"[281] For recent decades the continued vitality of the practice is attested by such names as Colonel House, late Norman H. Davis, who filled the role of "amba.s.sador at large" for a succession of administrations of both parties, and Professor Philip Jessup, Mr.

Averell Harriman, and other "amba.s.sadors at large" of the Truman administration.

How is this practice to be squared with the express words of the Const.i.tution? Apparently, by stressing the fact that such appointments or designations are ordinarily merely temporary and for special tasks, and hence do not fulfill the tests of "office" in the strict sense.

(_See_ p. 445). In the same way the not infrequent practice of Presidents of appointing Members of Congress as commissioners to negotiate treaties and agreements with foreign governments may be regularized, notwithstanding the provision of article I, section 6, clause 2 of the Const.i.tution, which provides that "no Senator or Representative shall, * * *, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created," during his term; and no officer of the United States, "shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."[282] The Treaty of Peace with Spain, the treaty to settle the Behring Sea controversy, the treaty establis.h.i.+ng the boundary line between Canada and Alaska, were negotiated by commissions containing Senators and Representatives.

CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF OFFICES

That the Const.i.tution distinguishes between the creation of an office and appointment thereto for the generality of national offices has never been questioned. The former is _by law_, and takes place by virtue of Congress's power to pa.s.s all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers which the Const.i.tution confers upon the government of the United States and its departments and officers. As incidental to the establishment of an office Congress has also the power to determine the qualifications of the officer, and in so-doing necessarily limits the range of choice of the appointing power. First and last, it has laid down a great variety of qualifications, depending on citizens.h.i.+p, residence, professional attainments, occupational experience, age, race, property, sound habits, and so on. It has required that appointees be representative of a political party, of an industry, of a geographic region, or of a particular branch of the Government. It has confined the President's selection to a small number of persons to be named by others.[283] Indeed, it has contrived at times to designate a definite eligibility, thereby virtually usurping the appointing power.[284]

CONDUCT IN OFFICE

Furthermore, Congress has very broad powers in regulating the conduct in office of officers and employees of the United States, especially regarding their political activities. By an act pa.s.sed in 1876 it prohibited "all executive officers or employees of the United States not appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, * * * from requesting, giving to, or receiving from, any other officer or employee of the Government, any money or property or other thing of value for political purposes."[285] The validity of this measure having been sustained,[286] the substance of it, with some elaborations, was incorporated in the Civil Service Act of 1883.[287] By the Hatch Act[288] all persons in the executive branch of the Government, or any department or agency thereof, except the President and Vice President and certain "policy determining" officers, are forbidden to "take an active part in political management or political campaigns," although they are still permitted to "express their opinions on all political subjects and candidates." In the United Public Workers _v._ Mitch.e.l.l[289] these provisions were upheld as "reasonable" against objections based on Amendments I, V, IX, and X.

THE LOYALTY ISSUE

By section 9A of the Hatch Act of 1939, it is made "* * * unlawful for any person employed in any capacity by any agency of the Federal Government, whose compensation, or any part thereof, is paid from funds authorized or appropriated by any act of Congress, to have members.h.i.+p in any political party or organization which advocates the overthrow of our const.i.tutional form of government in the United States."[290] In support of this provision the 79th Congress in its second session incorporated in its appropriation acts a series of clauses which forbid the use of any of the funds appropriated to pay the salary of any person who advocates, or belongs to an organization which advocates, the overthrow of the Government by force; or any person who strikes, or who belongs to an organization of Government employees which a.s.serts the right to strike against the Government.[291] The apparent intention of this proviso is to lay down a rule by which the appointing and disbursing authorities will be bound. Since Congress has the conceded power to lay down the qualifications of officers and employees of the United States; and since few people would contend that officers or employees of the National Government have a const.i.tutional right to advocate its overthrow or to strike against it, the above proviso would seem to be entirely const.i.tutional. President Truman's "Loyalty Order"--Executive Order 9835--of March 21, 1947[292] is an outgrowth in part of this legislation.

LEGISLATION INCREASING DUTIES OF AN OFFICER

Finally, Congress may devolve upon one already in office additional duties which are germane to his office without thereby "rendering it necessary that the inc.u.mbent should be again nominated and appointed."

Such legislation does not const.i.tute an attempt by Congress to seize the appointing power.[293]

"INFERIOR OFFICERS"; "EMPLOYEES"

Except the President and the Vice President all persons in the civil service of the National Government are appointive, and fall into one of three categories, those who are appointed by the President, "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate"; inferior officers, whose appointment Congress has vested by law "in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments"; and employees, a term which is here used in a peculiar sense. Ordinarily it denotes one who stands in a contractual relations.h.i.+p to his employer, but here it signifies all subordinate officials of the National Government receiving their appointments at the hands of officials who are not specifically recognized by the Const.i.tution as capable of being vested by Congress with the appointing power.[294] Inferior officers are usually officers intended to be subordinate to those in whom their appointment is vested;[295] but the requirement is by no means absolute.[296]

STAGES OF APPOINTMENT PROCESS

Nomination

The Const.i.tution appears to distinguish three stages in appointments by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The first is the "nomination" of the candidate by the President alone; the second is the a.s.sent of the Senate to the candidate's "appointment"; and the third is the final appointment and commissioning of the appointee, by the President.[297]

Senate Approval

The fact that the power of nomination belongs to the President alone prevents the Senate from attaching conditions to its approval of an appointment, such as it may do to its approval of a treaty. In the words of an early opinion of the Attorney General: "The Senate cannot originate an appointment. Its const.i.tutional action is confined to the simple affirmation or rejection of the President's nominations, and such nominations fail whenever it rejects them. The Senate may suggest conditions and limitations to the President, but it cannot vary those submitted by him, for no appointment can be made except on his nomination, agreed to without qualification or alteration."[298] This view is borne out by early opinion[299] as well as by the record of practice under the Const.i.tution.

When Senate Consent Is Complete

Early in January, 1931 the Senate requested President Hoover to return its resolution notifying him that it advised and consented to certain nominations to the Federal Power Commission. In support of its action the Senate invoked a long-standing rule permitting a motion to reconsider a resolution confirming a nomination within "the next two days of actual executive session of the Senate" and the recall of the notification to the President of the confirmation. The nominees involved having meantime taken the oath of office and entered upon the discharge of their duties, the President responded with a refusal, saying: "I cannot admit the power in the Senate to encroach upon the executive functions by removal of a duly appointed executive officer under the guise of reconsideration of his nomination." The Senate thereupon voted to reconsider the nominations in question, again approving two of the nominees, but rejecting the third, against whom it instructed the District Attorney of the District of Columbia to inst.i.tute _quo warranto_ proceedings in the Supreme Court of the District. In United States _v._ Smith[300] the Supreme Court overruled the proceedings on the ground that the Senate had never before attempted to apply its rule in the case of an appointee who had already been installed in office on the faith of the Senate's initial consent and notification to the President. In 1939 the late President Roosevelt rejected a similar demand by the Senate, action which was not challenged.[301]

Section 3. The President * * * shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

Commissioning the Officer

This, as applied in practice, does not mean that he is under const.i.tutional obligation to commission those whose appointments have reached that stage, but merely that it is he and no one else who has the power to commission them, which he may do at his discretion. The sealing and delivery of the commission is, on the other hand, by the doctrine of Marbury _v._ Madison, in the case both of appointees by the President and Senate and by the President alone, a purely ministerial act which has been lodged by statute with the Secretary of State and the performance of which may be compelled by mandamus unless the appointee has been in the meantime validly removed.[302] By an opinion of the Attorney General many years later, however, the President, even after he has signed a commission, still has a _locus poenitentiae_ and may withhold it; nor is the appointee in office till he has his commission.[303] This is probably the correct doctrine.[304]