Journal Of A Voyage To Brazil Part 3

The direct effects upon Brazil of the first thirteen years of the revolutionary war in Europe were confined to some slight disputes regarding the boundaries of the Portuguese and French Guiana, and concerning the limits of which, there was an article in Lord Cornwallis's negotiations with France, or rather the peace of Amiens in 1802.

The indirect effects were greater. Being a good deal left to themselves, the colonists had leisure to discover what sort of cultivation and crops suited best with the climate, and were fittest for the market; and some branches of industry were introduced, and others improved, to the great advantage of the province. Foreign s.h.i.+ps, and even fleets, had also begun to resort thither[18]: so that, though the ports had as yet been closed against foreign traders, the entrance of men of war, and such merchant s.h.i.+ps as could find no others to refit in, introduced a virtual freedom, which it would afterwards have been impossible not to have confirmed.

[Note 18: That under Sir H. Popham, on Sir D. Baird's expedition to the Cape of Good Hope, for instance, in 1805, and that of the French admiral, Guillaumez, in 1806.]

The court of Portugal meanwhile, as if infatuated by the negotiations of France, consented to buy a disgraceful neutrality at the price of 1,000,000 of livres or 40,000_l._ per month, besides granting free entrance to French woollens into the kingdom.

It was in vain that frequent representations were made to the ministry at Lisbon on the subject; that the armament at Bayonne, and the refusal of Spain to forbid the pa.s.sage of French troops through her territories, were pointed out. The Portuguese forces were marched to the sea-coast, as if they apprehended an invasion from England; thus leaving the kingdom defenceless on the land side, and the ports were shut against English commerce, by a proclamation, dated 20th October, 1807. But the importance of Portugal to England, as neutral ground, or, in the event of a French government in Spain, as a point whence to attack the great enemy, was such, that the resentment which at another time would certainly have been openly declared, was suppressed; but a strong squadron was always kept up off the coast, partly to watch the proceedings on sh.o.r.e, partly to prevent the Portuguese vessels from coming out of port, and joining the French and Spaniards.

While this system of watchfulness was kept up in Europe, the English ministry was not less attentive to the designs of France on the South American colonies. As long as Spain and Portugal continued to pay the enormous price in money for their neutrality, which France had demanded, the views of Napoleon were better answered than they could have been by the possession of all their territory and all their colonies. But the moment in which they should become unable or unwilling to pay that price, would of course be that of aggression and invasion. So early as 1796, Mr. Pitt had contemplated the advantages that must arise to Britain from the possession of a port in South America, and particularly in the Rio de la Plata, nor did he ever afterwards lose sight of it.

Some circ.u.mstances occurred in December, 1804, to draw his attention, particularly towards the subject, inasmuch as he had intelligence that France was about to attempt to seize on one of the Spanish settlements on the first opportunity. But we were then at peace with Spain, and however willing to prevent such an aggression on the part of France, and to a.s.sist General Miranda in his intended expedition to South America, it was impossible to co-operate with him, as he earnestly pressed the ministry to do, although the advantage to England of securing such a market for her manufactures was clearly perceived. Among the officers who had been most confidentially consulted by Mr. Pitt, on the practicability of obtaining a settlement on the La Plata, was Sir Home Popham; and it was probably his knowledge of the views so long entertained by that minister, that induced him to take the hazardous step, of leaving the Cape of Good Hope so soon after it had been occupied by the English forces, in 1806, and taking Buenos Ayres without orders to that effect. His immediate motive was, the intelligence he had procured, that the squadron of the French admiral, Guillaumez, had intentions of touching on the coast of Brazil, entering the La Plata, and, if possible, seizing, or forming a settlement there; and some North Americans whom he had met, encouraged the undertaking, by observing, that to throw open the ports of South America would be a common benefit to all commercial nations, but particularly to England.[19]

[Note 19: For the political and commercial views entertained with regard to the a.s.sisting Miranda, or obtaining for England a port in South America, see Lord Melville's evidence on the court martial on Sir Home Popham.]

In 1806, the demonstrations of hostilities against Portugal on the part of France were so evident, that Lord Rosslyn was despatched thither on a special mission, in which Lord St. Vincent and General Simcoe were joined with him. His instructions from Mr. Fox, then prime minister, were to lay before the ministry of Lisbon, the imminent danger which threatened the country, and to offer a.s.sistance in men, money, and stores from England, to put Portugal in a state of defence, in case the government should decide on a vigorous and effective resistance. If, on the other hand, Portugal should think itself too weak to contend with France, the idea that had once occurred to King Don Alfonso of emigrating to Brazil, and there establis.h.i.+ng the capital of the empire, was to be revived, and promises made of a.s.sistance and protection for that purpose. If, however, Portugal insisted on rejecting a.s.sistance in either case, the troops under General Simcoe were to be landed, the strong forts on the Tagus occupied by them, and the fleet was to enter the river and secure the Portuguese s.h.i.+ps and vessels, taking care to impress the government and people with the feeling that this was done from regard to the nation, and by no means for the sake of selfish aggrandis.e.m.e.nt on the part of England. It appears, however, that the French preparations for the invasion were not at that time so far advanced as had been imagined, and at the earnest entreaty of the court of Lisbon, the troops and the fleet were withdrawn from the Tagus.

On the 8th of August, the next year, however, (1807) Mr. Rayneval, the French charge d'affaires at Lisbon, received orders from his court to declare to the Prince Regent of Portugal, that if by the first of September he did not declare war against England, and send back the English minister, recalling the Portuguese amba.s.sador from London, and did not seize all the English residents, confiscate their property, and shut the ports of the kingdom against the English; and lastly, if he did not, without delay, unite his armies and fleets with those of the rest of the continent against England, he had orders to demand his pa.s.sports and to declare war.

The Conde de Barca, then prime minister, was certainly aware of the preparations of the French government. But with that obstinate blindness which sometimes seems to possess men like a fate, he persisted in regarding them only as measures to intimidate and hara.s.s England. This n.o.bleman had been amba.s.sador at the court of St. Petersburg, and on his recall to take the first place in the cabinet at Lisbon, he was ordered to go by sea to London, and thence to Portugal, but he chose to perform the journey by way of Paris, where he saw and conversed both with Napoleon and Talleyrand. There cannot be the least doubt but that he was duped by those able men. Many considered him as a traitor. But the vanity of the Conde, who always said he had gone to judge of these men by his own eyes, though it makes him weaker, makes him less wicked, and was, perhaps, the true spring of his actions. He it was who carried the measures for the detention of the English, the confiscation of their property, and the shutting the ports against English commerce: adopting, in short, the whole of the continental system. The very day before Junot was to reach Lisbon, however, a Paris newspaper, written in antic.i.p.ation of the event, announced that "_The House of Braganza no longer reigned_," and that its members were reduced to the common herd of ex-princes, &c., giving no very favourable description of them, and holding out no very flattering expectations for the future. This completely opened the Prince Regent's eyes, and he consented to that step, which D. John IV. and Don Jose had contemplated, namely, the transferring the seat of his empire to his Transatlantic possessions.

This was in the month of November, 1807, but the events of that month, the most interesting that had occurred to Portugal since the revolution that had placed Braganza on the throne of his ancestors, will be best understood by the following extracts from the despatches received by the British ministry from Lord Strangford and from Sir Sydney Smith at the time. On the 29th November, 1807, His Lords.h.i.+p writes, after mentioning the Prince's departure for Brazil:--

"I had frequently and distinctly stated to the cabinet of Lisbon, that in agreeing not to resent the exclusion of British commerce from the ports of Portugal, His Majesty had exhausted the means of forbearance; that in making that concession to the peculiar circ.u.mstances of the Prince Regent's situation, His Majesty had done all that friends.h.i.+p and the remembrance of ancient alliance could justly require; but that a single step beyond the line of modified hostility, thus most reluctantly consented to, must necessarily lead to the extremity of actual war.

"The Prince Regent, however, suffered himself for a moment to forget that, in the present state of Europe, no country could be permitted to be an enemy to England with impunity, and that however much His Majesty might be disposed to make allowance for the deficiency of means possessed by Portugal of resistance to the power of France, neither his own dignity nor the interests of his people would permit His Majesty to accept that excuse for a compliance with the full extent of her unprincipled demands. On the 8th inst. His Royal Highness was induced to sign an order for the detention of the few British subjects, and of the inconsiderable portion of British property which yet remained at Lisbon.

On the publication of this order, I caused the arms of England to be removed from the gates of my residence, demanded my pa.s.sports, presented a final remonstrance against the recent conduct of the court of Lisbon, and proceeded to the squadron commanded by Sir Sydney Smith, which arrived off the coast of Portugal some days after I had received my pa.s.sports, and which I joined on the 17th inst.

"I immediately suggested to Sir Sydney Smith the expediency of establis.h.i.+ng the most rigorous blockade at the mouth of the Tagus; and I had the high satisfaction of afterwards finding that I had thus antic.i.p.ated the intentions of His Majesty: for despatches (which I received on the 23d) directing me to authorise that measure, in case the Portuguese government should pa.s.s the bounds which His Majesty had thought fit to set to his forbearance, and attempt to take any further step injurious to the honour or interests of Great Britain."--

----"I resolved, therefore, to proceed forthwith to ascertain the effect produced by the blockade of Lisbon, and to propose to the Portuguese government, as the only condition upon which that blockade should cease, the alternative (stated by you) either of surrendering the fleet to His Majesty, or of immediately employing it to remove the Prince Regent and his family to the Brazils."--

"I accordingly requested an audience of the Prince Regent, together with due a.s.surances of protection and security; and upon receiving His Royal Highness's answers I proceeded to Lisbon on the 27th, in His Majesty's sloop Confiance, bearing a flag of truce. I had immediately most interesting communications with the court of Lisbon, the particulars of which shall be detailed in a future despatch. It suffices to mention in this place, that the Prince Regent wisely directed all his apprehensions to a French army, and all his hopes to a British fleet: that he received the most explicit a.s.surances from me that His Majesty would generously overlook those acts of unwilling and momentary hostility to which His Royal Highness's consent had been extorted; and that I promised to His Royal Highness, on the faith of my sovereign, that the British squadron before the Tagus should be employed to protect his retreat from Lisbon, and his voyage to the Brazils.

"A decree was published yesterday, in which the Prince Regent announced his intention of retiring to the city of Rio de Janeiro until the conclusion of a general peace, and of appointing a regency to transact the administration of government at Lisbon, during His Royal Highness's absence from Europe."

Sir Sydney Smith writes on the first of December the following letter to the admiralty:--

His Majesty's s.h.i.+p Hibernia, 22 leagues west of the Tagus, Dec. 1, 1807.

"Sir,

"In a former despatch, dated 22d November, with a postscript of the 26th, I conveyed to you, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the proofs contained in various doc.u.ments of the Portuguese government, being so much influenced by terror of the French arms as to have acquiesced to certain demands of France operating against Great Britain. The distribution of the Portuguese force was made wholly on the coast, while the land side was left totally unguarded.

British subjects of all descriptions were detained; and it therefore became necessary to inform the "Portuguese government, that the case had arisen, which required, in obedience to my instructions, that I should declare the Tagus in a state of blockade."

(_Sir Sydney then repeats part of Lord Strangford's despatch._)

"On the morning of the 29th, the Portuguese fleet came out of the Tagus with His Royal Highness the Prince of Brazil, and the whole of the royal family of Braganza on board, together with many of his faithful councillors and adherents, as well as other persons attached to his present fortunes.

"This fleet of eight sail of the line, four frigates, two brigs, and one schooner[20], with a crowd of large armed merchant s.h.i.+ps arranged itself under the protection of that of His Majesty, while the firing of a reciprocal salute of twenty-one guns announced the friendly meeting of those, who but the day before were on terms of hostility, the scene impressing every beholder (except the French army on the hills) with the most lively emotions of grat.i.tude to Providence, that there yet existed a power in the world able, as well as willing, to protect the oppressed.--I have, &c.

"W. SYDNEY SMITH."

[Note 20: _List of the Portuguese Fleet that came out of the Tagus on the 29th of November, 1807._

Guns. Commanded by

Principe Real 84, Adm. Manoel da Cunha.

Capt. Manoel da Canto.

Rainha de Portugal 74, Capt. Francisco Manoel Soetomayor.

_The Princess Dowager and younger daughters came in this s.h.i.+p._

Conde Henrique 74, Capt. Jose Maria de Almeida.

Medusa 74, Capt. Henrique de Souza Prego.

Affonso d'Abuquerque 64, Capt Ignacio da Costa Quinatella.

_The Queen and family in this s.h.i.+p._

D. Joam de Castro 64, Capt. Don Manoel Juan Souca.

Principe do Brazil 74, Capt. Garcao.

Martim de Freitas 64, Capt. Don Manoel Menezes.

FRIGATES.

Minerva 44, Capt. Rodrigo Lobo.

Golfinho 36, Capt. Luiz d'Acunha.

Urania 32, Capt. Tancos, Conde de Viana.

Cherua Princesa S.S. 20, Commanded by a lieutenant.

BRIGS.

Voador 22, Lieut. Fs. Maximilian.

Vinganca 20, Capt. Nicolas Kytten.

Gaivota 22.

SCHOONER.

Curiosa 12, _Hoisted French colours and deserted._

Of these vessels, the _Martin Freitas_ is now the _Pedro Primero_. The _Principe Real_ is the receiving s.h.i.+p at Rio. The _Rainha de Portugal_ is at Lisbon, as well as the Conde Henrique. The _Medusa_ is the sheer hulk at Rio. The three other line-of-battle s.h.i.+ps either broke up or about to be so. Of the frigates, the Minerva was taken by the French in India. The Golfinho is broken up, and the _Urania_ was wrecked on the Cape de Verde Islands. The Voador is now a corvette. The Vinganca is broke up, and the Gaivoto is now the Liberal.