Doctrine Of The Will Part 10

"What is it?" One answers, "It is a man." That is my opinion. Another: "It is a horse." That is my judgment. Another still says, "I differ from you all. It is an ox." That is my notion. Now, what are these opinions, judgments, and notions? Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence?

By no means. The Intelligence cannot affirm at all, under such circ.u.mstances. They are nothing in reality, but mere _a.s.sumptions_ of the Will. A vast majority of the so called opinions, beliefs, judgments, and notions among men, and all where _error_ is found, are nothing but a.s.sumptions of the Will.

a.s.sumptions are sometimes based upon real affirmations of the Intelligence, and sometimes not. Suppose the individuals above referred to approach the object, till qualities are given which are peculiar to the horse. The Judgment at once cla.s.sifies the object accordingly. As soon as this takes place, they all exclaim, "well, it is a horse." Here are a.s.sumptions again, but a.s.sumptions based upon real affirmations of the Intelligence. In the former instance we had a.s.sumptions based upon no such affirmations.

False a.s.sumptions do not always imply moral guilt. Much of the necessary business of life has no other basis than prudent or imprudent _guessing_. When the farmer, for example, casts any particular seed into the ground, it is only by balance of probabilities that he often determines, as far as he does or can determine, what is best; and not unfrequently is he necessitated to a.s.sume and act, when all probabilities are so perfectly balanced, that he can find no reasons at all for taking one course in distinction from another. Yet no moral guilt is incurred when one is necessitated to act in some direction, and when all available light has been sought and employed to determine the direction which is best.

As false a.s.sumptions, however, often involve very great moral guilt, it may be important to develope some of the distinguis.h.i.+ng characteristics of a.s.sumptions of this cla.s.s.

1. All a.s.sumptions involve moral guilt, which are in opposition to the real and positive affirmations of the Intelligence. As the Will may a.s.sume in the absence of such affirmations, and in the direction of them, so it may in opposition to them. When you have carried a man's Intellect in favor of a given proposition, it is by no means certain that you have gained his a.s.sent to its truth. He may still a.s.sume, that all the evidence presented is inadequate, and consequently refuse to admit its truth. When the Will thus divorces itself from the Intelligence, guilt of no ordinary character is incurred. Men often express their convictions of the guilt thus incurred, by saying to individuals, "You are bound to admit that fact or proposition as true.

You are already convinced. What excuse have you for not yielding to that conviction?" Yet individuals will often do fatal violence to their intellectual and moral nature, by holding on to a.s.sumptions, in reality known to be false.

2. a.s.sumptions involve moral guilt which are formed without availing ourselves of all the light within our reach as the basis of our a.s.sumptions. For us to a.s.sume any proposition, or statement, to be true or false, in the absence of affirmations of the Intelligence, as the basis of such a.s.sumptions, when adequate light is available, involves the same criminality, as a.s.sumptions in opposition to the Intelligence.

Hence we often have the expression in common life, "You had no right to form a judgment under such circ.u.mstances. You were bound, before doing it, to avail yourself of all the light within your reach."

3. _Positive_ a.s.sumptions, without intellectual affirmations as their basis, equally positive, involve moral guilt of no ordinary character.

As remarked above, we are often placed in circ.u.mstances in which we are necessitated to act in some direction, and to select some particular course without any perceived reasons in favor of that one course in distinction from another. Now while _action_ is proper in such a condition, it is not proper to make a positive a.s.sumption that the course selected is the best. Suppose, that all the facts before my mind bearing upon the character of a neighbor, are equally consistent with the possession, on his part, of a character either good or bad. I do violence to my intellectual and moral nature, if, under such circ.u.mstances, I make the a.s.sumption that his character is either the one or the other, and especially, that it is the latter instead of the former. How often do flagrant transgressions of moral rect.i.tude occur in such instances!

PRE-JUDGMENTS.

A few remarks are deemed requisite on this topic. A pre-judgment is an a.s.sumption, that a proposition or statement is true or false, before the facts, bearing upon the case, have been heard. Such a.s.sumptions are generally cla.s.sed under the term prejudice. Thus it is said of individuals, that they are prejudiced in favor or against certain persons, sentiments, or causes. The real meaning of such statements is, that individuals have made a.s.sumptions in one direction or another, prior to a hearing of the facts of the case, and irrespective of such facts.

INTELLECT NOT DECEIVED IN PRE-JUDGMENTS.

It is commonly said, that such prejudices, or pre-judgments, blind the mind to facts of one cla.s.s, and render it quick to discern those of the other, and thus lead to a real mis-direction of the Intelligence. This I think is not a correct statement of the case. Pre-judgments may, and often do, prevent all proper investigation of a subject. In this case, the Intelligence is not deceived at all. In the absence of real data, it can make no positive affirmations whatever.

So far also as pre-judgments direct attention from facts bearing upon one side of a question, and to those bearing upon the other, the Intelligence is not thereby deceived. All that it can affirm is the true bearing of the facts actually presented. In respect to those not presented, and consequently in respect to the real merits of the whole case, it makes no affirmations. If an individual forms an opinion from a partial hearing, that opinion is a mere a.s.sumption of Will, and nothing else.

THE MIND HOW INFLUENCED BY PRE-JUDGMENTS.

But the manner in which pre-judgments chiefly affect the mind in the hearing of a cause, still remains to be stated. In such pre-judgments, or a.s.sumptions, an a.s.sumption of this kind is almost invariably included, to wit: that all facts of whatever character bearing upon one side of the question, are wholly indecisive, while all others bearing upon the other side are equally decisive. In pre-judging, individuals do not merely pre-judge the real merits of the case, but the character of all the facts bearing upon it. They enter upon the investigation of a given subject, with an inflexible determination to treat all the facts and arguments they shall meet with, according to previous a.s.sumptions.

Let the clearest light poured upon one side of the question, and the reply is, "After all, I am not convinced," while the most trivial circ.u.mstances conceivable bearing upon the other side, will be seized upon as perfectly decisive. In all this, we do not meet with the operations of a deceived Intelligence, but of a "deceived heart," that is, of a depraved Will, stubbornly bent upon verifying its own unauthorized, pre-formed a.s.sumptions. Such a.s.sumptions can withstand any degree of evidence whatever. The Intelligence did not give them existence, and it cannot annihilate them. They are exclusively creatures of Will, and by an act of Will, they must be dissolved, or they will remain proof against all the evidence which the tide of time can roll against them.

INFLUENCES WHICH INDUCE FALSE a.s.sUMPTIONS.

The influences which induce false and unauthorized a.s.sumptions, are found in the strong action of the Sensibility, in the direction of the appet.i.tes, natural affections, and the different propensities, as the love of gain, ambition, party spirit, pride of character, of opinion, &c. When the Will has long been habituated to act in the direction of a particular propensity, how difficult it is to induce the admission, or a.s.sumption, that action in that direction is wrong! The difficulty, in such cases, does not, in most instances, lie in convincing the Intelligence, but in inducing the Will to admit as true what the Intelligence really affirms.

CASES IN WHICH WE ARE APPARENTLY, THOUGH NOT REALLY, MISLED BY THE INTELLIGENCE.

As there are cases of this kind, it is important to mark some of their characteristics. Among these I cite the following:

1. The qualities of a particular object, actually perceived, as in the case above cited, may be common to a variety of cla.s.ses which we know, and also to others which we do not know. On the perception of such qualities, the Intelligence will suggest those cla.s.ses only which we know, while the particular object perceived may belong to a cla.s.s unknown. If, in such circ.u.mstances, a positive a.s.sumption, as to what cla.s.s it does belong, is made, a wrong a.s.sumption must of necessity be made. The _Intelligence_ in this case is not deceived. It places the Will, however, in such a relation to the object, that if a positive a.s.sumption is made, it must necessarily be a wrong one. In this manner, mult.i.tudes of wrong a.s.sumptions arise.

2. When facts are before the mind, an _explanation_ of them is often desired. In such circ.u.mstances, the Intelligence may suggest, in explanation, a number of hypotheses, which hypotheses may be all alike false. If a positive a.s.sumption is made in such a case, it must of necessity be a false one; because it must be in the direction of some one hypothesis before the mind at the time. Here, also, the Intelligence necessitates a wrong a.s.sumption, if any is made. Yet it is not itself deceived; because it gives no positive affirmations as the basis of positive a.s.sumptions. In such circ.u.mstances, error very frequently arises.

3. _Experience_ often occasions wrong a.s.sumptions, which are attributed incorrectly to real affirmations of the Intelligence. A friend, for example, saw an object which presented the external appearance of the apple. He had never before seen those qualities, except in connection with that cla.s.s of objects. He a.s.sumed, at once, that it was a real apple; but subsequently found that it was an artificial, and not a real one. Was the Intelligence deceived in this instance? By no means. That faculty had never affirmed, that those qualities which the apple presents to the eye, never exist in connection with any other object, and consequently, that the apple must have been present in the instance given. _Experience_, and not a positive affirmation of the Intelligence, led to the wrong a.s.sumption in this instance. The same principle holds true, in respect to a vast number of instances that might be named.

4. Finally, the Intelligence may not only make positive affirmations in the presence of qualities perceived, but it may affirm _hypothetically_, that is, when a given proposition is _a.s.sumed_ as true, the Intelligence may and will present the logical _antecedents_ and _consequents_ of that a.s.sumption. If the a.s.sumption is false, such will be the character of the antecedents and consequents following from it. An individual, in tracing out these antecedents and consequents, however, may mistake the hypothetical, for the real, affirmations of the Intelligence. One wrong a.s.sumption in theology or philosophy, for example, may give an entire system, all of the leading principles of which are likewise false. In tracing out, and perfecting that system, how natural the a.s.sumption, that one is following the _real_, and not the _hypothetical_, affirmations of the Intelligence! From this one source an infinity of error exists among men.

In an enlarged Treatise on mental science, the subject of the present chapter should receive a much more extensive elucidation than could be given to it in this connection. Few subjects would throw more clear light over the domains of truth and error than this, if fully and distinctly elucidated.

In conclusion, I would simply remark, that one of the highest attainments in virtue which we can conceive an intelligent being to make, consists in a continued and vigorous employment of the Intelligence in search of the right, the just, the true, and the good, in all departments of human investigation; and in a rigid discipline of the Will, to receive and treat, as true and sacred, whatever the Intelligence may present, as possessed of such characteristics, to the full subjection of all impulses in the direction of unauthorized a.s.sumptions.

CHAPTER XIV.

LIBERTY AND SERVITUDE.

LIBERTY OF WILL AS OPPOSED TO MORAL SERVITUDE.

THERE are, among others, two senses of the term Liberty, which ought to be carefully distinguished from each other. In the first sense, it stands opposed to Necessity; in the second, to what is called Moral Servitude. It is in the last sense that I propose to consider the subject in the present Chapter. What, then, is Liberty as opposed to Moral Servitude? _It is that state in which the action of Will is in harmony with the Moral Law, with the idea of the right, the just, the true, and the good, while all the propensities are held in perfect subordination--a state in which the mind may purpose obedience to the law of right with the rational hope of carrying that determination into accomplishment_. This state all mankind agree in calling a state of moral freedom. The individual who has attained to it, is not in servitude to any propensity whatever. He "rules his own spirit." He is the master of himself. He purposes the good, and performs it. He resolves against the evil, and avoids it. "Greater," says the maxim of ancient wisdom, "is such a man than he that taketh a city."

Moral Servitude, on the other hand, is _a state in which the Will is so ensnared by the Sensibility, so habituated to subjection to the propensities, that it has so lost the prerogative of self-control, that it cannot resolve upon action in the direction of the law of right, with any rational expectation of keeping that resolution_. The individual in this condition "knows the good, and approves of it, yet follows the bad." "The good that he would (purposes to do), he does not, but the evil that he would not (purposes not to do), that he does." All men agree in denominating this a state of Moral Servitude. Whenever an individual is manifestly governed by appet.i.te, or any other propensity, by common consent, he is said to be a slave in respect to his propensities.

The reason why the former state is denominated Liberty, and the latter Servitude, is obvious. Liberty, as opposed to Servitude, is universally regarded as a good in itself. As such, it is desired and chosen.

Servitude, on the other hand, may be submitted to, as the least of two evils. Yet it can never be desired and chosen, as a good in itself.

Every man who is in a state of servitude, is there, in an important sense, against his Will. The _state_ in which he is, is regarded as in itself the greatest of evils, excepting those which would arise from a vain attempt at a vindication of personal freedom.

The same principle holds true in respect to Moral Liberty and Servitude.

When any individual contemplates the idea of the voluntary power rising to full dominion over impulse of every kind, and acting in sublime harmony with the pure and perfect law of rect.i.tude, as revealed in the Intelligence, every one regards this as a state, of all others, the most to be desired and chosen as a good in itself. To enter upon this state, and to continue in it, is therefore regarded as a realization of the idea of Liberty in the highest and best sense of the term. Subjection to impulse, in opposition to the pure dictates of the Intelligence, to the loss of the high prerogative of "ruling our own spirits," on the other hand, is regarded by all men as in itself a state the most abject, and least to be desired conceivable. The individual that is there, cannot but despise his own image. He, of necessity, loathes and abhors himself.

Yet he submits to self-degradation rather than endure the pain and effort of self-emanc.i.p.ation. No term but Servitude, together with others of a kindred import, expresses the true conception of this state. No man is in a state of Moral Servitude from choice--that is, from choice of the state as a good in itself. The _state_ he regards as an evil in itself. Yet, in the exercise of free choice, he is there, because he submits to self-degradation rather than vindicate his right to freedom.

REMARKS.

MISTAKE OF GERMAN METAPHYSICIANS.

1. We notice a prominent and important mistake common to metaphysicians, especially of the German school, in their Treatises on the Will. Liberty of Will with them is Liberty as distinguished from Moral Servitude, and not as distinguished from Necessity. Hence, in all their works, very little light is thrown upon the great idea of Liberty, which lies at the foundation of moral obligation, to wit: Liberty as distinguished from Necessity. "A free Will," says Kant, "and a Will subjected to the Moral Law, are one and identical." A more capital error in philosophy is not often met with than this.

MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE RACE.

2. In the state of Moral Servitude above described, the Bible affirms all men to be, until they are emanc.i.p.ated by the influence of the Remedial System therein revealed--a truth affirmed by what every man experiences in himself, and by the entire ma.s.s of facts which the history of the race presents. Where is the individual that, unaided by an influence out of himself, has ever attained to a dominion over his own spirit? Where is the individual that, without such an influence, can resolve upon acting in harmony with the law of pure benevolence, with any rational hope of success? To meet this great want of human nature; to provide an influence adequate to its redemption, from what the Scriptures, with great propriety, call the "bondage of corruption," is a fundamental design of the Remedial System.

CHAPTER XV.

LIBERTY AND DEPENDENCE.

COMMON IMPRESSION.

A VERY common impression exists,--an impression universal among those who hold the doctrine of Necessity,--that the doctrine of Liberty, as maintained in this Treatise, renders man, really, in most important respects, independent of his Creator, and therefore, tends to induce in the mind, that spirit of haughty independence which is totally opposite and antagonistic to that spirit of humility and dependence which lies at the basis of all true piety and virtue. If this is the real tendency of this doctrine, it certainly const.i.tutes an important objection against it. If, on the other hand, we find in the nature of this doctrine, essential elements totally destructive of the spirit of pride and self-confidence, and tending most strongly to induce the opposite spirit,--a spirit of humility and dependence upon the grace proffered in the Remedial System; if we find, also, that the doctrine of Necessity, in many fundamental particulars, lacks these benign tendencies, we have, in such a case, the strongest evidence in favor of the former doctrine, and against the latter. The object of the present Chapter, therefore, is to _elucidate the tendency of the doctrine of Liberty to destroy the spirit of pride, haughtiness, and self-dependence, and to induce the spirit of humility and dependence upon Divine Grace_.

SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE DEFINED.

Before proceeding directly to argue this question, we need to settle definitely the meaning of the phrase _spirit of dependence_. The _conviction_ of our dependence is one thing. The _spirit_ of dependence is quite another. What is this spirit? In its exercise, the mind _rests in voluntary dependence upon the grace of G.o.d_. The heart is fully set upon doing the right, and avoiding the wrong, while the mind is in the voluntary exercise of _trust_ in G.o.d for "grace whereby we may serve Him acceptably." The _spirit_ of dependence, then, implies obedience actually commenced. The question is, does the belief of the doctrine of Liberty tend intrinsically to induce the exercise of this spirit? In this respect, has it altogether a superiority over the doctrine of Necessity?

DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY TENDS NOT TO INDUCE THE SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE.