The Struggle Between President Johnson And Congress Over Reconstruction Part 4

The convention met at the time appointed, with representatives present from all the lately insurrectionary States.[141] James Speed of Kentucky, Attorney-General until July 18, was elected permanent chairman. For purposes of co-operation, the Northern States had been invited to send delegations, and all responded. Thus the convention was as truly national as the "National Union" convention of August 14 had been. It was decided, however, that for the purpose of rendering the declaration of the Southern Unionists more significant, the Northern and Southern Unionists should hold their sessions separately, and Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania was accordingly elected chairman of the Northern section.

The resolutions of the Southern section were reported by Governor Hamilton of Texas, chairman of the committee on resolutions, and they naturally endorsed the action of Congress in its entirety.[142] While demanding the restoration of the States, they declared Johnson's policy to be "unjust, oppressive, and intolerable," and that restoration under his "inadequate conditions" would only magnify "the perils and sorrows of our condition."

They agreed to support Congress and to endeavor to secure the ratification of the 14th Amendment. Congress alone had power to determine the political status of the States and the rights of the people, "to the exclusion of the independent action of any and every other department of the Government." "The organizations of the unrepresented States, a.s.suming to be state governments, not having been legally established," were declared "not legitimate governments until reorganized by Congress." In addition to these resolutions, an address "from the loyal men of the South to their fellow-citizens of the United States," was prepared and adopted after the formal adjournment of the convention.[143] This reaffirmed, in far stronger terms, the condemnation of President Johnson, specifying many ways in which he had wrought injury to them, and closing with the following significant and powerful declaration: "We affirm that the loyalists of the South look to Congress with affectionate grat.i.tude and confidence, as the only means to save us from persecution, exile and death itself; and we also declare that there can be no security for us or our children, there can be no safety for the country against the fell spirit of slavery, now organized in the form of serfdom, unless the Government, by national and appropriate legislation, enforced by national authority, shall confer on every citizen in the States we represent the American birthright of impartial suffrage and equality before the law. This is the one all-sufficient remedy. This is our great need and pressing necessity."[144]

A third convention of the year was the Cleveland convention of soldiers and sailors,[145] organized on September 17, with General Wood of the regular army as chairman. This convention was composed of supporters of the administration, and, like the National Union convention, contained a considerable proportion of Democrats. The resolutions endorsed those of the National Union convention, and declared that "our object in taking up arms to suppress the late rebellion was to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Const.i.tution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the States unimpaired."

The great ma.s.s of the soldiers, however, were earnest supporters of Congress, and the results of the Cleveland convention were disappointing to its originators; its princ.i.p.al effect was to create great enthusiasm over the anti-administration convention of soldiers and sailors, which met in Pittsburg on September 25 and 26.[146] This demonstration was intended to offset whatever influence the Cleveland convention might have had over the people, and it proved wonderfully effective. It was estimated that at least twenty-five thousand old soldiers were in the city at the time. The cause for this enthusiastic support is not difficult to find. The policy of the administration appealed to the moderates--those who wished as rapid a restoration to former conditions as possible, and those who were most influenced by the appeal to so-called justice. The majority of the soldiers, on the contrary, those who had made the greatest sacrifices for their country, were the most sensitive concerning the results of their sacrifices. Thoroughly accustomed to the thought of their great accomplishments, the manumission of the slaves and the preservation of the integrity of national power, they were keen to resent any steps which they thought tended toward the annulling of these results. With this natural bias, the arguments which the congressional party brought to bear upon them were accepted with enthusiasm; and many of the leaders went into the political campaign to be followed by the same soldiers who had followed them through their military campaigns. The convention, however, was in no sense a convention of officers. While the permanent president, Jacob D.

c.o.x, of Ohio,[147] had been a general of volunteers, the temporary chairman, L. E. Dudley, had been a private, and the majority of the offices of the convention were filled by men below the rank of lieutenant.

As was to be expected from the nature of the convention, the feeling against the administration was stronger and declared in more impa.s.sioned tones than in the previous anti-administration convention. Its influence upon the country was correspondingly greater. The army, recognized at this time as the great preserver of the commonwealth, had great influence over all cla.s.ses of citizens. The anti-administration conventions, the New Orleans ma.s.sacre, and the violent attacks on Congress by the President while "swinging around the circle," a.s.sured the triumph of the congressional party.

The resolutions adopted at Pittsburgh were presented by General Butler.[148] They were emphatic in tone, commencing with the declaration that "the action of the present Congress in pa.s.sing the pending const.i.tutional amendment is wise, prudent, and just," and that it was unfortunate that it was not received in the proper spirit, the terms being the mildest "ever granted to subdued rebels." The President's policy was declared to be "as dangerous as it is unwise," and "if consummated it would render the sacrifices of the nation useless." The power "to pa.s.s all acts of legislation that are necessary for the complete restoration of the Union" was declared to rest in Congress. The declaration of the President to the committee of the National Union convention, that he could have made himself dictator through the Freedmen's Bureau, aided by the army and navy, was characterized as an insult to "every soldier and sailor in the Republic." The obligation of the soldiers and sailors to the loyal men of the South was acknowledged; and it was added: "We will stand by and protect with our lives, if necessary, those brave men who remain true to us when all around are false and faithless."

This, the most successful of the four conventions, completed the remarkable series of national gatherings organized for effect on the State elections. They were all characterized by frankness of statement, and by clear recognition of the points at issue. But, as frequently happens in political campaigns, the most important incidents were those which were not designed to affect national issues. The riot at New Orleans was intended, by its partic.i.p.ants, to affect only Louisiana politics, yet all the Southern States were compelled to share the responsibility. The same thing was true of all other incidents through which the South manifested, during these critical months, an unwillingness to accept the political results of the war.

5. The fall elections resulted in a decisive victory for the congressional policy, which secured a two-thirds majority in both houses. The protests of the President were shown to lack popular support, and his vetoes in the coming sessions were to be considered as merely one necessary step in the legislative formality of pa.s.sing a bill. The country had decreed that Johnson could not have a voice in legislation. The campaign had been in all respects disastrous to the President. The support which he had received was mainly drawn from the Democratic party, and was of a half-hearted nature; for, however nearly they agreed in theory, the fact still remained that he was nominally a Republican President, and that almost all of his patronage was bestowed upon Republicans. He had thrown out decided hints that he would reverse his policy. For example, in St.

Louis, on September 8, he said: "I believe in the good old doctrine advocated by Was.h.i.+ngton, Jefferson and Madison--of rotation in office.

These people who have been enjoying these offices seem to have lost sight of this doctrine. I believe that one set of men have enjoyed the emoluments of office long enough. They should let another portion of the people have a chance. * * * Congress says he [the President] shall not turn them out, and they are trying to pa.s.s laws to prevent it being done.

Well, let me say to you, if you will stand by me in this action (cheers), if you will stand by me in trying to give the people a fair chance--soldiers and citizens--to partic.i.p.ate in these offices, G.o.d being willing I will kick them out. * * * G.o.d willing, with your help, I will veto their measures whenever any of them come to me."[149] But all this failed to give him that which he prided himself so much on having, the support of the people; and, so far as reconstruction was concerned, his influence was ended by the fall elections of 1866.

6. While such was the general result of the campaign, the South voted to sustain the President's policy. The fact that Johnson had taken direct issue with Congress, and was actively supporting Democratic principles, had a wonderful influence upon the South. The papers enthusiastically prophesied the complete overthrow of the Republican party. They reasoned that the enormous patronage of the President would ensure him a following so powerful that its coalition with Democracy could not but result in victory. Then, they reasoned, it would only be necessary to wait until the convening of the 40th Congress, when the obnoxious amendment would be discredited and the States readmitted to the possession of all their rights and privileges without further delay or conditions. They utterly failed to realize the injury which their discriminative legislation, the New Orleans riots, the widely spread reports of cruelty and oppression, and the defiant att.i.tude of their press, had inflicted on their cause.

They only saw that the administration and Congress were estranged, and believed that to be a sure indication of final success.

In this frame of mind they came to the polls, and in all the Southern States overwhelming Democratic majorities evidenced the popular sentiment among the dominant cla.s.ses. Accordingly, when the State legislatures convened, the 14th amendment was rejected almost unanimously in all except Tennessee, which had ratified it in July. Delaware, Maryland and Kentucky, the border Union States, also rejected the amendment, allying themselves with the Southern cause. Twenty-one of the remaining twenty-four States ratified the amendment, endorsing thereby the action of Congress.[150]

Iowa, Nebraska and California did not act upon the amendment at this time.

Had Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner been able to persuade Congress to adopt their theory of the status of the Southern States, the amendment would have been a.s.sumed to be a part of the Const.i.tution, as twenty-one States were more than three-quarters of twenty-seven, the total number of States represented in Congress. But the majority of congressmen were never able to adopt, in its entirety, the theory that the rebellion had utterly destroyed the States and left them mere territory. It preferred to accomplish the same result by less violent means. The legislation enacted as a result of the att.i.tude of the South towards the amendment practically treated the States as conquered territory, yet they were counted in determining the ratification of both the 13th and the 14th amendment.

The defiant att.i.tude taken by the Southern legislatures was a grave mistake. The most of them did not convene until Congress was again in session, after the defeat of the administration, and when they should have been able to see that their only hope was in submission. But the South, ever too ready to act first and consider the consequences afterwards, only saw in the proposed amendment an insult to the white race and an injustice to their leaders. That they should be asked deliberately to inflict upon themselves this punishment, seemed a humiliation which self-respect could permit them only to spurn. They did not stop to realize that the rejection of these terms would cause measures still more severe to be enacted.

CHAPTER V.

THE CONGRESSIONAL THEORY FULLY DEVELOPED.

1. The second session of the 39th Congress opened with its members in a far different frame of mind from that in which they had a.s.sembled in 1865.

Then they had approached their work with hesitation; their plans were not formulated; they could not know how far the country would sustain them in their opposition to the President. Now, in the flush of victory, their policy sustained, the President discredited, with their two-thirds majority in both houses unbroken, they were prepared to proceed to enact legislation which not only should secure that which had been accomplished already, but also should settle finally the problem of reconstruction, and place the President in a position where he could do no harm.[151]

Much curiosity had been felt as to the att.i.tude which Johnson would take in his annual message. He believed thoroughly in the righteousness of his cause, and had such implicit confidence in the unerring judgment of the people that he had deemed it impossible that his policy would be repudiated. The results of the election were a great disappointment to him, and some had believed that he would introduce into the message the abuse which he had so unsparingly inflicted upon Congress during the campaign. The message, however, contained nothing approaching virulence, but on the contrary was a doc.u.ment eminently creditable to the President.[152] It restated in a powerful way the const.i.tutional position of the administration, and defended its actions in a dignified yet spirited manner. The fearlessness of his att.i.tude was characteristic; the argumentative brilliancy of its presentation was unsurpa.s.sed. Unmindful of the fact that Congress had a.s.sembled to complete the overthrow of his policy of reconstruction, he reminded Congress that "the Const.i.tution of the United States makes it the duty of the President to recommend to the consideration of Congress" such measures as he shall judge necessary or expedient. "* * * I know," he said, "of no measure more imperatively demanded by every consideration of national interest, sound policy, and equal justice, than the admission of loyal members from the now unrepresented States. * * * The interests of the nation are best to be promoted by the revival of fraternal relations, the complete obliteration of our past differences, and the re-inauguration of all pursuits of peace."[153] The message closed with the request: "Let us endeavor to preserve harmony between the co-ordinate departments of the Government, that each in its proper sphere may cordially co-operate with the other in securing the maintenance of the Const.i.tution, the preservation of the Union, and the perpetuity of our free inst.i.tutions."

Unfortunately for the country, there could be no harmony "between the co-ordinate departments of the Government," where there was such fundamental disagreement. Neither side proposed to retreat an inch from the stand taken, and the message served no other purpose than to leave a very excellent state paper as a memento of the session.

The Joint Committee on Reconstruction[154] was immediately re-appointed by a concurrent resolution. Only one change was necessary--Mr. Grider, of Kentucky, one of the minority members, had died during the recess of Congress, and in his place Mr. Hise, of the same State, was appointed. The committee immediately resumed its labors, and proceeded to frame a bill "for the more efficient government of the rebel States." The developments of the last three months had created a sentiment favorable to more stringent conditions of re-admission, and the action of the various Southern legislatures, who were rejecting the 14th amendment during this period, served as a further stimulus to vigorous action.

2. Several weeks elapsed before the committee was willing to adopt any definite plan. Finally, on February 4, 1867, Mr. Williams reported from the committee, a bill to the Senate;[155] it was referred back to the committee, and was formally reported to the House by Mr. Stevens on the 6th.[156]

The preamble to the bill declared that in the absence of legal State governments there was no adequate protection for person and property, and that therefore it was necessary to enforce peace and good order until loyal State governments could be established. To this end "the so-called States shall be divided into military districts," five in number, Virginia to const.i.tute the first, North Carolina and South Carolina the second, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida the third, Mississippi and Arkansas the fourth, and Louisiana and Texas the fifth. The General of the Army was "to a.s.sign to the command of each of said districts an officer of the regular army not below the rank of brigadier-general, and to detail a sufficient force to enable such officer to enforce his authority." The officer in command of a district was to have complete authority to protect the civil rights of all, suppress insurrection and preserve order. To a.s.sist him he could employ civil or military tribunals at his discretion, but no capital punishment, imposed by a military tribunal, should be executed without the approval of the officer in charge of the district. Writs of _habeas corpus_ should not be issued by federal courts or judicial officers except on endors.e.m.e.nt of some commissioned officer in the district.

The discussion of the bill began on the day following its introduction.

Mr. Stevens, with his usual impetuosity, wished for an immediate vote. The bill seemed more moderate to him than the South deserved, and with the large Republican majority intent upon some such legislation, he could see no reason for delay. The bill was clearly worded and all could understand it perfectly. But there was an influential element that preferred to make haste slowly, and many hours were given up to debate before the final pa.s.sage of the bill by the House, on February 20.

The measure certainly was exceedingly radical as it was reported from the committee. As Mr. Le Blond, of Ohio, said: "It strikes at the civil governments in those States. It ignores State lines. It destroys their civil governments. It breaks down the judicial system in those States."[157] The distrust of the President was evidenced by empowering General Grant to appoint the commanders of the military districts, ignoring the President as commander-in-chief of the army. Most important of all, the bill as it stood was the action of a conquering power over conquered territory. It provided for an indefinite military control over the territory, and specified no mode in which a State might free herself from the onerous conditions. It was not a measure of reconstruction; it was a measure of subjugation.

Of course none of its supporters had the slightest idea of its being more than a temporary measure, but even temporary measures must be considered in all their aspects. Their idea was that expressed by Mr. Brandegee of Connecticut when he said: "It holds those revolted communities in the grasp of war until the rebellion shall have laid down its spirit, as two years ago it formally laid down its arms."[158]

Mr. Bingham took an active part in the opposition to the adoption of the bill as it stood. Representing the more conservative branch of the anti-administration party, he suggested on the opening day of the discussion amendments which would make the bill more desirable. On February 12 he submitted an amendment, the essential features of which were finally adopted, but which encountered the fiercest opposition and was only carried when compromise between the House and the Senate was found to be impossible. His amendment provided as conditions for re-admitting a State to representation in Congress: Ratification of the 14th amendment; such modification of State const.i.tution and laws as would make them conform to that amendment; a const.i.tutional provision for negro suffrage; and the approval of the const.i.tution by Congress as republican in form and consistent with the Const.i.tution and laws of the United States.

Mr. Blaine proposed an amendment similar in its aim to that of Mr.

Bingham, who accepted it as a subst.i.tute. But the House was opposed to providing any loop-holes by which the States could escape the provisions of the act. The feeling that the South had been weighed in the balance and found wanting, that its whole att.i.tude was that of defiance, and that it would endeavor to undo all that had been done as soon as it could obtain an opportunity, was sufficiently strong to defeat an attempt to refer the bill to the Judiciary Committee with instructions to incorporate the amendment. Instead, a subst.i.tute measure, introduced by Mr. Stevens, which differed but little from the original bill, pa.s.sed the House on February 13.[159]

The great struggle now began in the Senate, where the Blaine amendment was moved by Mr. Johnson of Maryland, on February 15. There was an influential element which feared that its adoption would utterly nullify the object of the bill--to govern the States until they could be re-admitted with safety. Their objections were based on the same principles that had proved fatal to the amendment in the House. "I see," said Senator Howard, "in this amendment a fatal snare by which we shall be deceived in the end, by which we are to be deluded into a premature re-admission of the rebel States in such a manner as to make us ultimately repent of our folly and rashness. * * * It is a snare by which increased representation from the rebel States may come into Congress, * * while we have no security at all that the extended elective franchise will be continued in the rebel States to the black population. They can disfranchise them whenever they see fit after having secured increased representation."[160]

The Senate, more conservative than the House, could not muster such a strong opposition to the amendment. It was rejected, but rejected in order to open the way for another amendment in the form of a subst.i.tute bill, which was moved by Senator Sherman.[161] The subst.i.tute had been agreed upon in a Republican caucus, and was accordingly carried. Its first four sections contained nearly all the features of the original bill; it subst.i.tuted "President" for "General," in the second section, and, in place of the provision against writs of _habeas corpus_, the fourth section simply enacted that "all persons put under military arrest by virtue of this act shall be tried without unnecessary delay, and no cruel or unusual punishment shall be inflicted." The fifth section contained the features proposed in the Bingham and Blaine amendments, amplified in a manner satisfactory to the majority of the Senatorial caucus. The conditions of readmission were as follows: The adoption of a const.i.tution in conformity with the Const.i.tution of the United States, and the ratification of the 14th amendment. The const.i.tution, which must be examined and approved by Congress, must be framed by a convention of delegates chosen by "the male citizens of said State twenty-one years of age and upwards, of whatever race, color, or previous condition, who have been resident in the State for one year previous to the day of such election, except such as may be disfranchised for partic.i.p.ation in the rebellion, or for felony at common law;" must give the elective franchise to all qualified as electors for the delegates; and must be ratified by a majority of the persons voting on ratification, and qualified as such electors. To this the proviso was added that no person disqualified by the 14th amendment from holding office should be chosen as a delegate to the convention or vote for members of it. One more amendment to the bill was made on motion of Senator Doolittle. This added as a proviso to the fourth section: "That no sentence of death under the provisions of this act shall be carried into effect without the approval of the President."

The bill was returned to the House in this form, the Senate having pa.s.sed it at six o'clock Sunday morning, February 17. The margin of time that could be used without permitting the bill to be killed by a "pocket veto"

was now very limited, but the House refused to concur in the amendment and called for a committee of conference, February 19. The Senate insisted on its amendment and the bill was again returned to the House, which on the following day concurred in the Senate amendment, but added an amendment of its own proposed by Mr. Wilson, of Iowa, and amended on motion of Mr. Sh.e.l.labarger.[162] This amendment, const.i.tuting the sixth section of the bill, was speedily concurred in by the Senate, and on February 20, 1867, the bill was finally pa.s.sed and ready for the President's veto.

The sixth section, so hurriedly tacked on to the bill, was of no slight importance, as it declared in legal form the _status_ of the Southern governments, and clinched the qualifications for the elective franchise.

It provided that "until the people of said rebel States shall be by law admitted to representation in the Congress of the United States, any civil governments which may exist therein shall be deemed provisional only, and in all respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States at any time to abolish, modify, control, or supersede the same; and in all elections to any office under such provisional governments all persons shall be ent.i.tled to vote, and none others, who are ent.i.tled to vote under the provisions of the fifth section of this act; and no person shall be eligible to any office under any such provisional governments who would be disqualified from holding office under the provisions of the third article of said const.i.tutional amendment."[163]

As had been expected, Johnson withheld his veto as long as it was possible for him to do so without permitting the bill to become a law, not returning the bill until March 2.[164] This was done in the hope that the minority, by dilatory proceedings, might prevent action on the veto before the adjournment, on March 4, and so prevent the bill from becoming a law. But the plan failed, and the bill was immediately pa.s.sed, "the objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding."

The veto message embodied an exhaustive review of the bill, a criticism of its "cruelty," and an attack upon its const.i.tutionality. It denied the statement in the preamble that "no legal State governments or adequate protection for life or property," existed in these ten States, and declared that "the establishment of peace and good order is not its real object. * * * The military rule which it establishes is plainly to be used, not for any purpose of order or for the prevention of crime, but solely as a means of coercing the people into the adoption of principles and measures to which it is known that they are opposed, and upon which they have an undeniable right to exercise their own judgment." The despotic authority given to the commander of a district was vigorously denounced, and all the humane provisions of the bill were declared to depend upon the will of the commander, who could nullify them and oppress the people without limitations of any kind. "It reduces the whole population of the ten States--all persons, of every color, s.e.x and condition, and every stranger within their limits--to the most abject and degrading slavery."

But aside from its injustice, Johnson went on to argue, the measure was unconst.i.tutional and could not legally be carried into execution. In a time of peace martial law could not be established, in proof of which statement he quoted from the decision of the Supreme Court, in _Ex parte_ Milligan, defining military jurisdiction. The denial of the right of trial by jury and of the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ was not counterbalanced by the poor privilege of trial "without unnecessary delay." In defiance of the const.i.tutional prohibition of bills of attainder, "here is a bill of attainder against nine millions of people at once"--a legislative enactment "based upon an accusation so vague as to be scarcely intelligible, and found to be true upon no credible evidence."

The primary purpose of the bill, to compel these States "by force to the adoption of organic laws and regulations which they are unwilling to accept if left to themselves," was in itself unconst.i.tutional. "The Federal Government has no jurisdiction, authority, or power to regulate such subjects for any State."

Respecting the legality of the state governments, the important point was made that if they were illegal, their ratification of the 13th amendment could not have been legal. The message closed with an appeal for restoration "by simple compliance with the plain requirements of the Const.i.tution."

Taken as a whole, the message unquestionably contained many strong arguments against the bill, and was virtually a summary of the arguments advanced by the minority in Congress. But the struggle had pa.s.sed beyond the province of unbiased debate, and each side was equally determined not to yield any point. A measure open to the most serious suspicions regarding its const.i.tutionality, was pa.s.sed by an inflexible majority, settled in the belief that the condition of the South required the measure, and that the Const.i.tution must accordingly be stretched to cover the case.

Those supporters of the bill who were recognized as the most careful in their judgments confidently a.s.serted that that portion of it establis.h.i.+ng the military districts contained nothing that could not have been carried out legally by the government as a military measure, without the formality of enacting the bill. The insurrectionary States would legally remain in a condition of insurrection until Congress should formally declare the insurrection to be at end. Consequently martial law could const.i.tutionally prevail, trial by jury and the writ of _habeas corpus_ be suspended, and civil government utilized as an aid to military rule, to any extent that might seem advisable to the general in charge. The claim that the measure amounted to an enormous bill of attainder was immediately dismissed as absurd, as no corruption of blood or forfeiture of estates was involved, and the whole measure was avowedly temporary, to cease as soon as the State should comply with the conditions of reconstruction.

Congress felt justified in pa.s.sing the bill over the veto, and accordingly the general process of reconstruction was established with conditions far more onerous than had been intended in the first session of the 39th Congress. The provisions of the act immediately went into force, and the commanders of the districts were appointed on March eleventh.

3. The bill was conceded by all its supporters to be incomplete. It provided for the establishment of districts and the governing of these districts by military law, and it was hoped that the immediate crying need of a strong government to enforce order and prevent the continuance of the oppression of the freedmen was satisfied. This done, they could proceed more deliberately to the enactment of measures which would provide the mechanism for carrying out the provisions of the fifth section. The adjournment of the 39th Congress at noon of March 4 prevented any action until the next Congress; but preparation had been made for such an emergency by an act which provided that in future each Congress should convene upon the adjournment of its predecessor.[165]

The 40th Congress at once settled down to work upon the problem. Chief Justice Chase prepared a bill which was used as a basis for the discussion. Senator Wilson and others modified the bill to some extent, and introduced it in the Senate on March 7.[166] The same bill, slightly modified, was introduced in the House.[167] Considerable trouble was experienced in agreeing upon the details of the bill, but on March 19 both houses finally adopted a compromise proposed by a committee of conference.

The veto message of the President was received four days later; the bill was immediately pa.s.sed over the veto and became a law.[168]

As finally pa.s.sed, the bill was ent.i.tled: "An Act supplementary to an Act ent.i.tled, 'An Act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States,' pa.s.sed March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and to facilitate restoration." It enacted that the commanding general in each district should cause a registration to be made before September 1, 1867, of those ent.i.tled to vote under the original act, and should require all registering to take the following oath: "I, ---- do solemnly swear (or affirm) in the presence of Almighty G.o.d, that I am a citizen of the State of ----; that I have resided in said State for ---- months next preceding this day, and now reside in the county of ----, or the parish of ----, in said State (as the case may be); that I am twenty-one years old; that I have not been disfranchised for partic.i.p.ation in any rebellion or civil war against the United States, nor for felony committed against the laws of any State or of the United States; that I have never been a member of any State legislature, nor held any executive or judicial office in any State and afterwards engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof; that I have never taken an oath as a member of Congress of the United States, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Const.i.tution of the United States, and afterwards engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof; that I will faithfully support the Const.i.tution and obey the laws of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, encourage others so to do, so help me G.o.d."[169] After the completion of the registration in any State, it was provided that there should be held, after at least thirty days' public notice by the commanding general, an election of delegates "to a convention for the purpose of establis.h.i.+ng a const.i.tution and civil government for such State loyal to the Union." This convention was to consist of the same number of members as the most numerous branch of the State legislature in 1860.[170]

Those voting at the election of delegates were also to vote for or against the holding of the convention, and it was not to be held if a majority of the ballots was cast against it, or if a majority of the registered voters failed to vote on the question. Boards were to be appointed by the commanding general to superintend the registration and election, and make returns to him of the results of the election. The convention was required to a.s.semble at a place and time appointed by the commanding general, by a notice to be given by him within sixty days from the date of election; and to frame a const.i.tution according to the provisions of the original and the present act. The const.i.tution so framed was then to be submitted to the registered voters at an election conducted by officials who were to be appointed by the commanding general, and who were to make returns to him. In case the const.i.tution was ratified "by a majority of the votes of the registered electors qualified as herein specified, cast at said election (at least one-half of all the registered voters voting upon the question of such ratification)," it was provided that the president of the convention should "transmit a copy of the same, duly certified, to the President of the United States, who shall forthwith transmit the same to Congress," and that, if Congress should be satisfied that all the provisions of the acts were carried out, and that no force or fraud was used, and should approve the const.i.tution, the State should "be declared ent.i.tled to representation, and senators and representatives shall be admitted therefrom as therein provided." It was further provided that all elections in the States mentioned in the original act should, during the operation of that act, be by ballot; that the officials in charge of the registration and elections must take the "iron-clad" oath of July 2, 1862[171] that the expenses incurred by the commanding generals in carrying out the act should be paid out of the treasury, but that the state conventions should provide for the levying of taxes to pay other expenses.[172]

The veto message on this bill was much shorter than that on the original reconstruction measure. The President said: "No consideration could induce me to give my approval to such an election law for any purpose, and especially for the great purpose of framing the const.i.tution of a State.

If ever the American citizen should be left to the free exercise of his own judgment, it is when he is engaged in the work of forming the fundamental law under which he is to live." He animadverted upon the extreme looseness of the provisions in regard to the registration boards, and upon the great powers vested in them. The main objections to the bill were of course those which he had stated in the veto of March 2.