The Iraq Study Group Report Part 2

The Facilities Protection Service poses additional problems. Each Iraqi ministry has an armed unit, ostensibly to guard the ministry's infrastructure. All together, these units total roughly 145,000 uniformed Iraqis under arms. However, these units have questionable loyalties and capabilities. In the ministries of Health, Agriculture, and Transportation--controlled by Moqtada al-Sadr--the Facilities Protection Service is a source of funding and jobs for the Mahdi Army.

One senior U.S. official described the Facilities Protection Service as "incompetent, dysfunctional, or subversive." Several Iraqis simply referred to them as militias.

The Iraqi government has begun to bring the Facilities Protection Service under the control of the Interior Ministry. The intention is to identify and register Facilities Protection personnel, standardize their treatment, and provide some training. Though the approach is reasonable, this effort may exceed the current capability of the Interior Ministry.

Operation Together Forward II

In a major effort to quell the violence in Iraq, U.S. military forces joined with Iraqi forces to establish security in Baghdad with an operation called "Operation Together Forward II," which began in August 2006. Under Operation Together Forward II, U.S. forces are working with members of the Iraqi Army and police to "clear, hold, and build" in Baghdad, moving neighborhood by neighborhood. There are roughly 15,000 U.S. troops in Baghdad.

This operation--and the security of Baghdad--is crucial to security in Iraq more generally. A capital city of more than 6 million, Baghdad contains some 25 percent of the country's population. It is the largest Sunni and s.h.i.+a city in Iraq. It has high concentrations of both Sunni insurgents and s.h.i.+te militias. Both Iraqi and American leaders told us that as Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq.

The results of Operation Together Forward II are disheartening.

Violence in Baghdad--already at high levels--jumped more than 43 percent between the summer and October 2006. U.S. forces continue to suffer high casualties. Perpetrators of violence leave neighborhoods in advance of security sweeps, only to filter back later. Iraqi police have been unable or unwilling to stop such infiltration and continuing violence. The Iraqi Army has provided only two out of the six battalions that it promised in August would join American forces in Baghdad. The Iraqi government has rejected sustained security operations in Sadr City.

Security efforts will fail unless the Iraqis have both the capability to hold areas that have been cleared and the will to clear neighborhoods that are home to s.h.i.+te militias. U.S. forces can "clear" any neighborhood, but there are neither enough U.S. troops present nor enough support from Iraqi security forces to "hold"

neighborhoods so cleared. The same holds true for the rest of Iraq.

Because none of the operations conducted by U.S. and Iraqi military forces are fundamentally changing the conditions encouraging the sectarian violence, U.S. forces seem to be caught in a mission that has no foreseeable end.

2. Politics

Iraq is a sovereign state with a democratically elected Council of Representatives. A government of national unity was formed in May 2006 that is broadly representative of the Iraqi people. Iraq has ratified a const.i.tution, and--per agreement with Sunni Arab leaders--has initiated a process of review to determine if the const.i.tution needs amendment.

The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and key players within the government too often act in their sectarian interest. Iraq's s.h.i.+a, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders frequently fail to demonstrate the political will to act in Iraq's national interest, and too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern effectively. The result is an even weaker central government than the const.i.tution provides.

There is widespread Iraqi, American, and international agreement on the key issues confronting the Iraqi government: national reconciliation, including the negotiation of a "political deal" among Iraq's sectarian groups on Const.i.tution review, de-Baathification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, the future of Kirkuk, and amnesty; security, particularly curbing militias and reducing the violence in Baghdad; and governance, including the provision of basic services and the rollback of pervasive corruption. Because Iraqi leaders view issues through a sectarian prism, we will summarize the differing perspectives of Iraq's main sectarian groups.

Sectarian Viewpoints

The s.h.i.+a, the majority of Iraq's population, have gained power for the first time in more than 1,300 years. Above all, many s.h.i.+a are interested in preserving that power. However, fissures have emerged within the broad s.h.i.+a coalition, known as the United Iraqi Alliance.

s.h.i.+a factions are struggling for power--over regions, ministries, and Iraq as a whole. The difficulties in holding together a broad and fractious coalition have led several observers in Baghdad to comment that s.h.i.+a leaders are held "hostage to extremes." Within the coalition as a whole, there is a reluctance to reach a political accommodation with the Sunnis or to disarm s.h.i.+te militias.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has demonstrated an understanding of the key issues facing Iraq, notably the need for national reconciliation and security in Baghdad. Yet strains have emerged between Maliki's government and the United States. Maliki has publicly rejected a U.S. timetable to achieve certain benchmarks, ordered the removal of blockades around Sadr City, sought more control over Iraqi security forces, and resisted U.S. requests to move forward on reconciliation or on disbanding s.h.i.+te militias.

Sistani, Sadr, Hakim

The U.S. deals primarily with the Iraqi government, but the most powerful s.h.i.+a figures in Iraq do not hold national office. Of the following three vital power brokers in the s.h.i.+a community, the United States is unable to talk directly with one (Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani) and does not talk to another (Moqtada al-Sadr).

GRAND AYATOLLAH ALI AL-SISTANI: Sistani is the leading s.h.i.+te cleric in Iraq. Despite staying out of day-to-day politics, he has been the most influential leader in the country: all major s.h.i.+a leaders have sought his approval or guidance. Sistani has encouraged a unified s.h.i.+a bloc with moderated aims within a unified Iraq. Sistani's influence may be waning, as his words have not succeeded in preventing intra-s.h.i.+a violence or retaliation against Sunnis.

ABDUL AZIZ AL-HAKIM: Hakim is a cleric and the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the largest and most organized s.h.i.+a political party. It seeks the creation of an autonomous s.h.i.+a region comprising nine provinces in the south. Hakim has consistently protected and advanced his party's position. SCIRI has close ties with Iran.

MOQTADA AL-SADR: Sadr has a large following among impoverished s.h.i.+a, particularly in Baghdad. He has joined Maliki's governing coalition, but his Mahdi Army has clashed with the Badr Brigades, as well as with Iraqi, U.S., and U.K. forces. Sadr claims to be an Iraqi nationalist.

Several observers remarked to us that Sadr was following the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon: building a political party that controls basic services within the government and an armed militia outside of the government.

Sunni Arabs feel displaced because of the loss of their traditional position of power in Iraq. They are torn, unsure whether to seek their aims through political partic.i.p.ation or through violent insurgency.

They remain angry about U.S. decisions to dissolve Iraqi security forces and to pursue the "de-Baathification" of Iraq's government and society. Sunnis are confronted by paradoxes: they have opposed the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq but need those forces to protect them against s.h.i.+a militias; they chafe at being governed by a majority s.h.i.+a administration but reject a federal, decentralized Iraq and do not see a Sunni autonomous region as feasible for themselves.

Has.h.i.+mi and Dhari

The influence of Sunni Arab politicians in the government is questionable. The leaders.h.i.+p of the Sunni Arab insurgency is murky, but the following two key Sunni Arab figures have broad support.

tariq al-has.h.i.+mi: Has.h.i.+mi is one of two vice presidents of Iraq and the head of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni Muslim bloc in parliament. Has.h.i.+mi opposes the formation of autonomous regions and has advocated the distribution of oil revenues based on population, a reversal of de-Baathification, and the removal of s.h.i.+te militia fighters from the Iraqi security forces. s.h.i.+te death squads have recently killed three of his siblings.

sheik harith al-dhari: Dhari is the head of the Muslim Scholars a.s.sociation, the most influential Sunni organization in Iraq. Dhari has condemned the American occupation and spoken out against the Iraqi government. His organization has ties both to the Sunni Arab insurgency and to Sunnis within the Iraqi government. A warrant was recently issued for his arrest for inciting violence and terrorism, an act that sparked bitter Sunni protests across Iraq.

Iraqi Kurds have succeeded in presenting a united front of two main political blocs--the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurds have secured a largely autonomous Kurdish region in the north, and have achieved a prominent role for Kurds within the national government. Barzani leads the Kurdish regional government, and Talabani is president of Iraq.

Leading Kurdish politicians told us they preferred to be within a democratic, federal Iraqi state because an independent Kurdistan would be surrounded by hostile neighbors. However, a majority of Kurds favor independence. The Kurds have their own security forces--the peshmerga--which number roughly 100,000. They believe they could accommodate themselves to either a unified or a fractured Iraq.

Barzani and Talabani

Kurdish politics has been dominated for years by two figures who have long-standing ties in movements for Kurdish independence and self-government.

Ma.s.sOUD BARZANI: Barzani is the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the President of the Kurdish regional government. Barzani has cooperated with his longtime rival, Jalal Talabani, in securing an empowered, autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. Barzani has ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and raising of Kurdish flags in Kurdish-controlled areas.

JALAL TALABANI: Talabani is the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the President of Iraq. Whereas Barzani has focused his efforts in Kurdistan, Talabani has secured power in Baghdad, and several important PUK government ministers are loyal to him. Talabani strongly supports autonomy for Kurdistan. He has also sought to bring real power to the office of the presidency.

Key Issues

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. Prime Minister Maliki outlined a commendable program of national reconciliation soon after he entered office.

However, the Iraqi government has not taken action on the key elements of national reconciliation: revising de-Baathification, which prevents many Sunni Arabs from partic.i.p.ating in governance and society; providing amnesty for those who have fought against the government; sharing the country's oil revenues; demobilizing militias; amending the const.i.tution; and settling the future of Kirkuk.

One core issue is federalism. The Iraqi Const.i.tution, which created a largely autonomous Kurdistan region, allows other such regions to be established later, perhaps including a "s.h.i.+'astan" comprising nine southern provinces. This highly decentralized structure is favored by the Kurds and many s.h.i.+a (particularly supporters of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim), but it is anathema to Sunnis. First, Sunni Arabs are generally Iraqi nationalists, albeit within the context of an Iraq they believe they should govern. Second, because Iraq's energy resources are in the Kurdish and s.h.i.+a regions, there is no economically feasible "Sunni region." Particularly contentious is a provision in the const.i.tution that shares revenues nationally from current oil reserves, while allowing revenues from reserves discovered in the future to go to the regions.

The Sunnis did not actively partic.i.p.ate in the const.i.tution-drafting process, and acceded to entering the government only on the condition that the const.i.tution be amended. In September, the parliament agreed to initiate a const.i.tutional review commission slated to complete its work within one year; it delayed considering the question of forming a federalized region in southern Iraq for eighteen months.

Another key unresolved issue is the future of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in northern Iraq that is home to substantial numbers of Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. The Kurds insisted that the const.i.tution require a popular referendum by December 2007 to determine whether Kirkuk can formally join the Kurdish administered region, an outcome that Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk staunchly oppose. The risks of further violence sparked by a Kirkuk referendum are great.

Iraq's leaders often claim that they do not want a division of the country, but we found that key s.h.i.+a and Kurdish leaders have little commitment to national reconciliation. One prominent s.h.i.+a leader told us pointedly that the current government has the support of 80 percent of the population, notably excluding Sunni Arabs. Kurds have fought for independence for decades, and when our Study Group visited Iraq, the leader of the Kurdish region ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and the raising of Kurdish flags. One senior American general commented that the Iraqis "still do not know what kind of country they want to have." Yet many of Iraq's most powerful and well-positioned leaders are not working toward a united Iraq.

SECURITY. The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in support of national reconciliation. s.h.i.+te leaders must make the decision to demobilize militias. Sunni Arabs must make the decision to seek their aims through a peaceful political process, not through violent revolt. The Iraqi government and Sunni Arab tribes must aggressively pursue al Qaeda.