Readings on Fascism and National Socialism Part 13

Preparation for future wars must not stop at the creation, equipment and training of an efficient army, but must go on to train the minds of the whole people for the war and must employ all the resources of science to master the conditions governing the war itself and the possibility of endurance.

In 1914 we had a first-cla.s.s army, but our scientific mobilization was bad, and the mobilization of men's minds a thing undreamed of. The unveiling of war memorials, parades of war veterans, flag-waggings, fiery speeches and guard-mounting are not of themselves enough to prepare a nation's mind for the dangers that threaten. Conviction is always more lasting than enthusiasm.

... Such teaching is necessary at a time and in a world in which countries are no longer represented by monarchs or a small aristocracy or by a specialist army, but in which the whole nation, from the commander-in-chief to the man in the ranks, from the loftiest thought to the simplest wish, from corn to coal, from the treasury vaults to the last trouser-b.u.t.ton, must be permeated through and through with the idea of national defense, if it is to preserve its national ident.i.ty and political independence. The science of national defense is not the same as military science; it does not teach generals how to win battles or company commanders how to train recruits. Its lessons are addressed first and foremost to the whole people. It seeks to train the popular mind to heroism and war and to implant in it an understanding of the nature and prerequisite conditions of modern warfare. It teaches us about countries and peoples, especially our own country and its neighbors, their territories and economic capacity, their communications and their mentality--all for the purpose of creating the best possible conditions for waging future wars in defense of the national existence.[122]

Infiltration Tactics

The n.a.z.is, while entirely without scruple in the pursuit of their objectives, endeavor whenever possible to give their actions the cloak of legality. This procedure was followed in Germany to enable them to gain control of the Government of the Reich and in their foreign policy up to September 1, 1939. It has been a cardinal principle of the n.a.z.is to avoid the use of force whenever their objectives may be attained in another manner and they have a.s.siduously studied their enemies in an effort to discover the weak points in their structure which will enable the n.a.z.is to accomplish their downfall. The preceding pages have demonstrated that the n.a.z.is have contributed practically nothing that is original to German political thought. By the use of unscrupulous, deceitful, and uninhibited tactics, however, they have been able to realize many of the objectives which had previously existed only in theory.

The Weimar Const.i.tution provided the n.a.z.is with a convenient basis for the establishment of the totalitarian state. They made no effort to conceal their intention of taking advantage of the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic in order to attain power. On April 30, 1928 Dr.

Goebbels wrote in his paper _Der Angriff_:

We enter Parliament in order to supply ourselves, in the a.r.s.enal of democracy, with its own weapons. We become members of the Reichstag in order to paralyze the Weimar sentiment with its own a.s.sistance. If democracy is so stupid as to give us free tickets and salaries for this bear's work, that is its affair ...[123]

And later in the same article:

We do not come as friends, nor even as neutrals. We come as enemies. As the wolf bursts into the flock, so we come.[124]

Hitler expressed the same idea on September 1, 1933, when, looking back upon the struggle for political power in Germany, he wrote:

This watchword of democratic freedom led only to insecurity, indiscipline, and at length to the downfall and destruction of all authority. _Our opponents' objection that we, too, once made use of these rights, will not hold water; for we made use of an unreasonable right, which was part and parcel of an unreasonable system, in order to overthrow the unreason of this system._[125]

Discussing the rise to power of the n.a.z.is, Huber (doc.u.ment 1, _post_ p. 155) wrote in 1939:

The parliamentary battle of the NSDAP had the single purpose of destroying the parliamentary system from within through its own methods. It was necessary above all to make formal use of the possibilities of the party-state system but to refuse real cooperation and thereby to render the parliamentary system, which is by nature dependent upon the responsible cooperation of the opposition, incapable of action.[126]

As its parliamentary strength increased, the party was able to achieve these aims:

It was in a position to make the formation of any positive majority in the Reichstag impossible.... Thus the NSDAP was able through its strong position to make the Reichstag powerless as a lawgiving and government-forming body.[127]

The same principle was followed by Germany in weakening and undermining the governments of countries which it had chosen for its victims. While it was. .h.i.tler's policy to concentrate on only one objective at a time, German agents were busy throughout the world in ferreting out the natural political, social, and economic cleavages in various countries and in broadening them in order to create internal confusion and uncertainty. Foreign political leaders of Fascist or authoritarian persuasion were encouraged and often liberally subsidized from n.a.z.i funds. Control was covertly obtained over influential newspapers and periodicals and their editorial policies shaped in such a way as to further n.a.z.i ends. In the countries Germany sought to overpower, all the highly developed organs of n.a.z.i propaganda were utilized to confuse and divide public opinion, to discredit national leaders and inst.i.tutions, and to induce an unjustified feeling of confidence in the false a.s.sertions of n.a.z.i leaders disclaiming any aggressive intentions.

One of the most important features introduced by the n.a.z.is into German foreign policy was the appreciation of the value of Germans living abroad and their organization as implements of the Reich for the attainment of objectives in the field of foreign policy. This idea was applied by the n.a.z.is to all the large colonies of Germans which are scattered throughout the world. The potential usefulness of these colonies was early recognized by the men in Hitler's immediate entourage, several of whom were so-called _Auslandsdeutsche_ who had spent many years of their life abroad and were familiar with foreign conditions and with the position and influence of German groups in foreign countries. Of particular importance in this group were Rudolf Hess, the Fuhrer's Deputy, who was primarily responsible for elaborating the policy which utilized the services of Germans abroad, and Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, the leader of the Foreign Organization, who was responsible for winning over these Germans to n.a.z.iism and for their organization in groups which would serve the purposes of the Third Reich.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 94: Feder, _op. cit._, p. 18.]

[Footnote 95: Gauweiler, _op. cit._, pp. 149-151.]

[Footnote 96: _Mein Kampf_, pp. 727-728.]

[Footnote 97: _Ibid._, pp. 735-736.]

[Footnote 98: Scurla, _op. cit._, p. 21.]

[Footnote 99: _Ibid._, pp. 21-22.]

[Footnote 100: _Ibid._, p. 23.]

[Footnote 101: _Der Parteitag der Freiheit_ (official record of the 1935 party congress at Nuremberg: Munich, 1935), p. 27.]

[Footnote 102: _Mein Kampf_, p. 743.]

[Footnote 103: _Ibid._, pp. 754-755.]

[Footnote 104: _Ibid._, pp. 437-438.]

[Footnote 105: Rosenberg, _Wesen, Grundsatze und Ziele der NSDAP_, p.

48.]

[Footnote 106: _London Times_, Sept. 26, 1939, p. 9.]

[Footnote 107: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 108: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 109: _My New Order_, p. 592.]

[Footnote 110: _Ibid._, pp. 669-671.]

[Footnote 111: _Ibid._, p. 687.]

[Footnote 112: Goebbels, _op. cit._, p. 6.]

[Footnote 113: _Mein Kampf_, p. 252.]

[Footnote 114: _Ibid._, p. 197.]

[Footnote 115: _Ibid_., p. 198.]

[Footnote 116: _Ibid._, p. 200.]

[Footnote 117: _Ibid._, pp. 200-201.]

[Footnote 118: _Ibid._, p. 202.]

[Footnote 119: _Ibid._, p. 203.]

[Footnote 120: _Ibid._, p. 273.]

[Footnote 121: _Ibid._, p. 129.]

[Footnote 122: Banse, _Germany Prepares for War_ (New York, 1934), pp.

348-349.]

[Footnote 123: Goebbels, _Der Angriff: Aufsatze aus der Kampfzeit_ (Munich, 1936), p. 71.]

[Footnote 124: _Ibid._, p. 73.]