The History of the Thirteen Colonies of North America 1497-1763 Part 13

Governor William Burnet had therefore to find the requisite funds out of his own pocket; and although the fort proved of vital importance to New York, he was never fully repaid. In May 1727, Burnet wrote to the Board of Trade and Plantations, "I have this spring sent up workmen to build a stone house of strength at a place called Oswego, at the mouth of the Onondaga River, where our princ.i.p.al trade with the far Nations is carried on. I have obtained the consent of the Six Nations to build it."[272] The establishment of this fort was a great blow to the French, who encouraged the Indians to drive out the English, but only received the reply, "Cha.s.sez-les toi-meme."[273] As a counterpoise they built Fort Rouille at Toronto, but Oswego remained as a bastion against French aggression and as a lucrative trading station with the Indians until captured by Montcalm.[274]

Even earlier than the foundation of Oswego the French had tried to establish themselves, in 1726, opposite Crown Point, where Lake Champlain contracts to the width of a river; but for the moment they were deterred by the strong opposition of Ma.s.sachusetts. New Hamps.h.i.+re also claimed this territory, and while, with their usual jealousy, the two colonies "were quarrelling for the bone, the French ran away with it."[275] French aggression continued, and in 1731 they seized Crown Point itself, at the instigation of the celebrated Chevalier Saint Luc de la Corne, and named it Fort St Frederic. The point was claimed by the colony of New York, but here again the settlers were too much engrossed in their chronic dispute with New Jersey to take any effective measures to prevent the loss. It was utterly futile for the New Yorkers and New Englanders to protest that the fort was a menace to British territory, for they had neither the will nor the common-sense to place petty domestic jealousies on one side and unite in driving back the French.

The English found, by the year 1750, that owing to their supineness, France had succeeded in building forts at Niagara, Detroit, Michillimackinac, La Baye, Maumee, on the Wabash, St Joseph and Fort Chartres. These may have been loose and uncertain links, but they had great possibilities, and they at least connected Canada and Louisiana, and gave some appearance of the possibility of a French North America.

It seems strange that the aggressive conduct of one of the newest kingdoms in Europe should have a dire effect upon the New World; but so it was. The determination of Frederic of Prussia to aggrandise himself at the expense of Austria, caused, in 1744, the torch to be rekindled in North America, and packs of howling savages carried rapine and murder along the borderland of New France and New England. The war actually began in America in May 1744 when Duquesnel, the Governor of Louisburg, overpowered the small outpost of Canso in Acadia. The people of Ma.s.sachusetts realised that to them the transference of Acadia to the French would mean a serious loss, and so planned "an enterprise second to none in colonial history."[276]

Louisburg was a menace to all the northern British colonies, and the New Englanders had been both exasperated and alarmed by the action of its governor. The fortification itself was built upon the famous system of Vauban; it had cost 30,000,000 livres, and had taken twenty-five years to complete. Strong as this fortification was from without, owing to mutinous spirits it contained all the elements of weakness within. The honour of proposing an attack upon this scourge and curse of New England probably rests on William Vaughan, who at that period was interested in the fis.h.i.+ng industry and dwelt at Damariscotta, Maine. Governor s.h.i.+rley lent a willing ear to the daring proposal. He had, as a young barrister, come to Ma.s.sachusetts in 1731, and within ten years had by his tact and cleverness been appointed chief magistrate of his colony. He laboured under the delusion that he was a military genius, and thought to prove his powers by engaging in this scheme. The Ma.s.sachusetts a.s.sembly, however, composed for the most part of grave merchants and stolid rustics, refused to undertake anything so risky and expensive. Boston and other coast towns, knowing well what a harbour of refuge Louisburg had proved to all hunters on the ocean, pet.i.tioned ardently that Vaughan's plan should be executed; and at length, after many difficulties, it was agreed that the settlers should make this one supreme effort. History immediately repeated itself, and the colonies showed their habitual want of union; and although s.h.i.+rley appealed to them as far south as Pennsylvania, all with one accord made excuse, except Connecticut, New Hamps.h.i.+re, and Rhode Island. Once again, therefore, the burden of defeating France fell upon the New England settlements. William Pepperell, a merchant of Maine, was placed in command of the colonial land force. He came of Devons.h.i.+re stock, was a colonel of militia, and fortunately possessed of good sound common-sense, for he had practically no military experience. The naval commander was Admiral Warren, who was well disposed to the American colonists, as he had married an American lady and owned property on both Manhattan Island and the banks of the Mohawk River. He was a good sailor, and in later years won for himself some renown in an engagement against the French in European waters.

Colonel Pepperell was willingly followed by colonists of st.u.r.dy character, still replete with Puritan ideas, and still further encouraged by the motto given to them by the Evangelical preacher, George Whitefield, "Nil desperandum, Christo duce."[277] On April 30, 1745, the New England force arrived within striking distance of Louisburg. The town itself was oblong in shape, built upon a tongue of land upon which the fortifications were erected with a due east aspect.

The troops of France were composed for the most part of brave men, but they were in a state of disaffection, and their new commander, Duchambon, was pusillanimous in his decisions. The whole garrison, consisting of regulars and militia, was well under two thousand men; while the colonial army comprised four thousand in all. This superiority of force was immediately discounted by the privations undergone by the besiegers; and it has been computed that only half the army was really fit for action. The mutinous state of the French was but a poor match for the peculiar mixture of youthful impetuosity and religious fervour which stirred the colonials. A force under Vaughan occupied the Grand Battery, and still further encouragement was given by Admiral Warren's capture, on May 18, of the _Vigilant_, a French man-of-war of 64 guns, bringing supplies. One who took part in the siege writes, "Providence has signally smiled, and I doubt not the campaign will be crowned with success. I am willing to undergo anything for the good of our cause."[278] The chief danger which threatened the settlers was relief from New France, but this came too late to be of any service to the garrison.

After an unsuccessful attempt against the battery on the little island at the mouth of the harbour, both Pepperell and Warren agreed that their best move would be a final a.s.sault upon the fortification. The French dreaded the effects of such an action; they were already worn out by fatigue and anxiety; the town was shattered in every direction by shot and sh.e.l.l. "Never," Pepperell wrote to s.h.i.+rley, "was a place more mal'd with cannon and sh.e.l.l."[279] Rather than sustain the horrors of a wild attack which might lead to ruthless ma.s.sacre, Duchambon thought it better to accept the generous terms offered, and, on June 17th, capitulated. The town was taken over by Warren and Pepperell, and all praise must be given to the latter for the splendid way in which he preserved discipline amongst his colonials, who were forbidden to reward themselves, for their weary weeks of hards.h.i.+p, by loot and plunder. The capture of Louisburg was one of the greatest events of the War of the Austrian Succession; and historians are agreed that the success of the enterprise was almost entirely due to the courage and perseverance of the New Englanders, though they are ready to give all praise to Warren and his seamen. It was a remarkable feat, and it must ever be regarded as one of the most ill.u.s.trious actions in American history. The Bostonians welcomed the news with joy; their brethren, they believed, had gone forth against the enemies of the Lord, and, like the Israelites of old, returned victorious. The grim Puritan had shown that though a man of peace, he was still able, when called upon, to smite the idolaters hip and thigh.

Governor s.h.i.+rley's schemes did not stop short at the capture of the key of the St Lawrence. After Louisburg had been garrisoned by regular troops, he intended to attack Canada. This plan failed, and he therefore turned his attention to the more feasible scheme of capturing Crown Point; but this also proved abortive. In the meantime the French made a counter-expedition from La Roch.e.l.le under the Duc d'Auville. From the outset the scheme was doomed: D'Auville died; his second in command, D'Estournel, committed suicide; while his successor, the Marquis de la Jonquiere, was thoroughly defeated by Admirals Anson and Warren off Cape Finisterre.

The struggle in which the colonists had shown such gallantry slowly dragged to a close. Neither to Great Britain, nor to France had there been much gain in those six years of warfare: the glory belonged to the men of New England, who, in particular, realised the danger of the French Empire in the West. They had learnt by experience the peril that menaced them, and s.h.i.+rley and Pepperell had done their best to remove that danger by direct attack. In England the enormous value of Cape Breton Island and Louisburg was not fully understood. George II. is traditionally reported to have said that Cape Breton was not his to return to France for it belonged to the people of Boston. This in a sense was true; it had been won by the men of New England and it would appear on the surface that it was for them to keep or restore that frowning outpost in the Atlantic. Peace, however, was most necessary at the moment, though it was only a breathing s.p.a.ce in the colossal struggle of the eighteenth century; and it was realised that this peace could only be obtained by the cession of this fortification in exchange for our East Indian territory at Madras. The possibility of the growth of an Indian Empire never dawned upon the settlers in the West. They felt that this small speck in an Eastern land was nothing in comparison with the Dunkirk of North America. The New England colonies had done their best; they had given their men and their money to accomplish a great task. Their lack of unity had often stood in their way, but on the occasion of the capture of Louisburg the Puritan brotherhood had succeeded without the help of either Quaker or southern confederates; they had earned for themselves the respect of their contemporaries and the admiration of their descendants. Unfortunately, however, the abandonment of Louisburg "under the pressure of diplomatic necessity was in the eyes of the colonists an unscrupulous betrayal, and a manifest proof of total indifference to colonial interests. It gave a sting to the words of colonial demagogues and cut the sinews of colonial loyalty."[280]

FOOTNOTES:

[255] Parkman, _Half a Century of Conflict_, vol. i. p. 79.

[256] _Ibid._

[257] Parkman, _Half a Century of Conflict_, i. p. 139.

[258] Parkman, _Half a Century of Conflict_, i. p. 144.

[259] _Ibid._

[260] Parkman, _Half a Century of Conflict_, i. p. 144.

[261] Parkman, _Half a Century of Conflict_, vol. i. p. 161.

[262] _Ibid._, p. 157.

[263] Parkman, _Half a Century of Conflict_, vol. i. pp. 166, 167.

[264] Walker, _Journal_, Introduction.

[265] Swift, _Journal to Stella_, October 16, 1711.

[266] Parkman, _Half a Century of Conflict_, vol. i. p. 169.

[267] _Ibid._, p. 182.

[268] Prowse, _History of Newfoundland_ (1896), p. 258.

[269] Wrong, translator and editor of _Lettre d'un habitant de Louisburg_, p. 26.

[270] Parkman, _Half a Century of Conflict_, vol. i. p. 183.

[271] The Five Nations were sometimes called the Six Nations after being joined by the Tuscaroras.

[272] O'Callaghan, _Doc. Hist. of New York_, vol. i. p. 447.

[273] Parkman, _Half a Century of Conflict_, vol. ii. p. 54.

[274] See p. 266.

[275] Mitch.e.l.l, _Contest in America_, p. 22.

[276] Lucas, _Hist. Geo. of Brit. Colonies, Canada_, part i. p. 198.

[277] _Belknap_, vol. ii. p. 160.

[278] Samuel Curwen, _Journal and Letters_, p. 13.

[279] Doyle, _The Colonies under the House of Hanover_ (1907), p. 532.

[280] Doyle, _The Colonies under the House of Hanover_ (1907), p. 534.

CHAPTER XII

THE CLIMAX: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN ENGLISH AND FRENCH COLONISTS

"If we can remove the turbulent Gallics the seat of Empire might be transferred to America."[281] Such were the characteristically pompous words of John Adams, which nevertheless contained something of the spirit that animated a few of the thinking colonists in their final struggle with the power of France. The Conquest of Canada liberated the settlers of the Thirteen Colonies from a state of continuous and watchful alarm; but it also increased their att.i.tude of resistance to interference on the part of England, and was an undoubted cause of the American War of Independence. The actual conquest was, however, due to British commanders, and more than half the troops employed consisted of British regulars. It is not intended to belittle the work of the colonials, for without them many of the stirring scenes which took place between 1750 and 1763 could never have been enacted; but without the discipline and experience of English leaders the great task could never have been accomplished, because of the hopeless internal jealousies of these quarrelsome communities. In the last chapter it has been shown that the burden of the war with the French fell upon the New England group, and in the period now under discussion the men of Ma.s.sachusetts also played an active part; but, whereas the rapine and murder had been confined to the northern border, the stress of warfare now fell upon the western frontiers of the more southern States, and New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia were called upon to take a serious share in the great struggle. It had long been seen that these provinces as they grew in size must necessarily extend their borders, and the men from Pennsylvania and Virginia must come into hostile contact with the Canadian backwoodsmen who had pushed into the valley of the Ohio.

It is during this period that the want of unity between the Thirteen Colonies is more clearly evidenced than even in previous years. New York was torn by internal factions, and the history of that colony would have been infinitely more sad had it not been that its fighting contingent was led by the redoubtable William Johnson. The state of Pennsylvania was actually worse than that of New York; it was "a sanctuary for sloth, cowardice, and sordid self-interest. The humanity of Penn, the peace principles of the early Quakers, were a cloak behind which the factious and indolent citizen with no sense of public responsibility could always screen himself."[282] The Pennsylvanians were as callous, during this colossal epoch, as if the war had been on the plains of Germany, and were not only inert themselves but endeavoured to neutralise the action of the other Colonies, so that they have earned the reputation of selfishness and disloyalty. Maryland was not like Pennsylvania in its open refusal to help; its att.i.tude was one of indifference, which was partly due to n.i.g.g.ardliness, and partly to the fact that it was safely screened by the colonies of Pennsylvania and Virginia. The latter colony has been severely blamed for the ineffective a.s.sistance rendered during the war. It is urged with truth that the inhabitants consisted of the very men who should have composed a fine fighting force, but that the Virginian youth exhibited an astounding supineness in following the gallant Was.h.i.+ngton. There are, however, two reasons that may be found as partial excuses for the unpatriotic att.i.tude of the Virginian settlers.

The first was an ever-present dread of a slave insurrection if the militia left the colony; while the second is to be found in the irascible temper of the governor, Robert Dinwiddie.

The year after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the French governor of Canada, La Galissoniere, had sent Celeron de Bienville to register the claims of France to the Ohio valley, and thus carry on the great scheme of shutting in the English settlers behind the Alleghany Mountains. The demonstration was purely peaceful, and for the next three years nothing serious came of it. Galissoniere resigned his government to De la Jonquiere, who, in turn, was succeeded by the Marquis Duquesne. In the meantime, in 1750, the Virginian traders, for the most part, had formed the Ohio Company for the exploiting of that rich valley. The work of this corporation was not of a successful character, owing to the jealousies between Virginia and Pennsylvania, both colonies trying to s.h.i.+ft the burden of fort building on to the shoulders of the other. The French, seeing their opportunity, began to teach these bickering colonials those bitter lessons which were at last to be an indirect cause of their union. In June of 1752, the Miami Indians, a confederacy friendly towards the English, were attacked; their town was burnt, and their chief killed. This was not a mere raid upon an insignificant group of Redskins' wigwams, but was the outward and visible sign of the aggressive policy of Duquesne towards the advanced English traders in the Ohio valley. In the spring of the next year, a veteran French officer, Marin, established, by means of two forts, communication between the Great Lakes and the sources of the Ohio. This, indeed, was a direct act of trespa.s.s upon that debatable land lying on the borders of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, and was a heavy blow at the Ohio Company and their trading station at Fort c.u.mberland. The French intrusion aroused the wrath of William s.h.i.+rley of Ma.s.sachusetts, and also of the cross-grained Governor Dinwiddie, of Virginia. Ill-tempered though the latter was, he possessed clear judgment and tenacity of purpose, and from this moment worked strenuously for the welfare of the colonies against the French.

In November 1753, George Was.h.i.+ngton, then a young land-surveyor, but already fairly prominent among the Virginians, was despatched to warn off the French trespa.s.sers. He found that what had formerly been an English trading station at Venango had been converted into a French Canadian outpost. Resistance was obviously necessary; and Dinwiddie embarked upon a zealous military policy, calling upon the Governors of Ma.s.sachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the Carolinas to a.s.sist in preventing the Governor of Canada becoming the master of the valley of the Ohio. Virginia responded cheerfully to the Governor's appeal, and subscribed 10,000; North Carolina gave a small sum and sent a few soldiers; South Carolina and New York also sent a contingent of militiamen; but Pennsylvania refused both men and money.

Dinwiddie did what he could by despatching, in February 1754, a small force to build a blockhouse at the junction of the Monongahela and the Alleghany Rivers. The settlers were overpowered by the Canadians in April, and the fort which was erected was the work of French hands, and was called after the Canadian Governor, Fort Duquesne. With a party of Virginians, Was.h.i.+ngton was ordered to take this fresh example of Canadian insolence, then under the command of Contrecoeur. His lieutenant, Jumonville, was killed in a sortie or scouting expedition, but even with this advantage Was.h.i.+ngton's little army was outnumbered.

He was forced to retreat, first to Fort Necessity, and after a nine hours' fight, across the Alleghany Mountains.

The campaign of 1754 had been utterly disastrous for the English settlers, but it only encouraged the indefatigable Robert Dinwiddie to further efforts. He saw that "if the misfortune attending our forces has aroused the spirit of our neighbouring colonies, it has done more than probably a victory could have effected."[283] He now did his best to still further arouse the united enthusiasm of the Middle and Southern colonies, and so stirred the a.s.sembly of Virginia that it voted 20,000.

The defeat of Was.h.i.+ngton also gave a stimulus to a movement towards unity that had already been made in the autumn of 1753. The delegates of the seven colonies of Ma.s.sachusetts, New Hamps.h.i.+re, Rhode Island, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, had met in friendly conference at Albany, and had listened to Benjamin Franklin's great scheme of union, under which a colonial Council of forty-eight members was to be formed, each colony supplying members according to its population. This Council was to have very important powers and privileges, including those of declaring peace or war. Had Franklin's statesmanlike proposals met with the general acceptance of the colonies, North America would have become one great self-governing community, having more independent powers than any of the present-day colonies of Great Britain. The time, however, was not yet ripe; the colonies were still too jealous of their own petty rights and privileges; and those who were acting for the welfare of the English in America did not at the moment wish to rush into some great revolutionary change in the const.i.tution, but desired rather a firm att.i.tude of resistance to the French aggressions in the Ohio valley. Dinwiddie found the task difficult enough. He wrote to the Governor of Pennsylvania that the colonies "seemed satisfied to leave the French at full liberty to perpetrate their utmost designs to their ruin."[284] But he did not despair, and asked help from New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the Carolinas, and received encouraging replies from all the governors, except Glen of South Carolina. In his excellent work he was ably supported by William s.h.i.+rley of Ma.s.sachusetts, who, at this time, was working strenuously to stir the home government to realise the danger that threatened the Thirteen Colonies.

The combined efforts of these two men were not in vain; and although there was peace in Europe, two regiments were sent out under Major-General Braddock in January 1755. Edward Braddock has been the subject of much controversy; his character has been torn to pieces by different historians, and certainly the records point to a man of a curious combination of magnanimity and brutality. When in command at Gibraltar, he was adored by his men; whereas in America, Horace Walpole speaks of him as "a very Iroquois."[285] William s.h.i.+rley, son of the Governor of Ma.s.sachusetts, said "We have a general most judiciously chosen for being disqualified for the service he is employed in, in almost every respect."[286] This view is upheld by Burke, who wrote of him as "abounding too much in his own sense for the degree of military knowledge he possessed."[287] It is, however, extremely doubtful if the terrible disaster a.s.sociated with his name can be entirely attributed to the general's own personal character, and recent writers have shown that the charge of utter incompetence cannot be satisfactorily sustained.[288]

Braddock's forces landed at Hampton, Virginia, in February 1755; and a colonial conference was at once held at Alexandria. This important meeting was attended by six of the colonial governors, including the most patriotic and energetic, Dinwiddie, s.h.i.+rley, and Sharpe. They concluded that four practically simultaneous expeditions should be made against the French. The English general was to march against Fort Duquesne; two forces were to converge on Crown Point from a base of operations at Albany; while the fourth effort, under s.h.i.+rley, was to be made against the French conspirators in Acadia.

The English regiments, the 44th and 48th, were reinforced by two hundred and fifty Virginian rangers, and by small detachments from New York, Maryland, and the Carolinas. The force supplied by the wealthy colony of Virginia was utterly inadequate; while Pennsylvania, as usual, sent no aid in the way of troops, and only voted a sum of money to be collected with such difficulty that it was practically valueless. George Was.h.i.+ngton, at that time recovering from a severe illness, was requested by Braddock to accompany him as one of his aide-de-camps. After a series of delays, on July 3rd Braddock unexpectedly fell in with a French force under Beaujeu on the right bank of the river Monongahela, about eight miles from Fort Duquesne. The majority of the enemy were Indians trained to forest fighting, while the English, accustomed to European methods, fought in a solid ma.s.s, their red coats affording an excellent target for their invisible foes. Braddock fought with heroic perseverance; four horses were shot under him, and it was only when he saw the approaching failure of the ammunition, and that his men were exhibiting distinct signs of panic, that he gave the order to retreat. At that moment he was mortally wounded. "I cannot describe the horror of that scene," wrote Lieutenant Leslie of the 44th, three weeks after the battle: "no pen could do it. The yell of the Indians is fresh on my ear, and the terrific sound will haunt me to the hour of my dissolution."[289] The disaster was immediately attributed to the incompetence of Braddock. The colonials naturally praised the conduct of the Virginian detachment, the members of which had had the common-sense to conceal themselves behind trees, and fought the Indians after their own methods. Thus Was.h.i.+ngton wrote: "The Virginia companies behaved like men and died like soldiers";[290] but there can be no doubt that Was.h.i.+ngton and other settlers were prejudiced against the English general and were filled with contempt for his scheme of fighting. They never took into consideration that Braddock's failure was partly due to the delay caused by the quarrels between Pennsylvania and Virginia, and partly owing to the utterly worthless horses supplied to him by the colonial authorities for his transports. Where Braddock's great mistake lay was in the belief that "it was better to be defeated in conformity with orthodox methods than to win by conduct which seemed lacking in courage, and by imitating the hitherto unknown tactics of colonials and barbarians."[291]