Rising Tide. Part 20

James Butler in particular would make that determination. He was not an intellectual like his brother, the Tulane professor and graduate of the Sorbonne, yet he believed that he too dealt with large questions, with the infrastructure of society, power, money, and character. Indeed, he sat at the nexus of these things. He headed the only southern bank listed as one of the world's largest. His wife was queen of the Mystic Club. He chaired the city's Citizens Flood Relief Committee. He and John Parker represented Louisiana on the Tri-State Flood Control Committee, an ad hoc group but one that also included LeRoy Percy, representing Mississippi, and Governor John Martineau, representing Arkansas. Together these few men would sit down with Hoover and plan the long-term federal response to the flood, a response that would be enormously far-reaching.

Butler also controlled what happened to the thousands of victims of the artificial creva.s.se. The Red Cross and Hoover had refused all responsibility for them, declaring them the city's business entirely. And the city left it to Butler. Without any legal authority, he chose an executive committee from the larger Citizens Committee to decide what the city should do. But he found even this executive committee too c.u.mbersome. Instead, he met with an even smaller and less formal group each morning at 8 A.M. A.M. in his office, and on weekends at his home. This group included Rudolph Hecht, president of the Hibernia Bank, J. Blanc Monroe, and H. Generes Dufour. Butler, Hecht, and, later, Monroe, the attorney and banker who was representing the city in regard to reparations for the refugees, all served on the Board of Liquidation. Dufour, Hecht's one real friend, was the board's attorney. in his office, and on weekends at his home. This group included Rudolph Hecht, president of the Hibernia Bank, J. Blanc Monroe, and H. Generes Dufour. Butler, Hecht, and, later, Monroe, the attorney and banker who was representing the city in regard to reparations for the refugees, all served on the Board of Liquidation. Dufour, Hecht's one real friend, was the board's attorney.

They and their peers had always run the city sub rosa; now they ran it for all to see, a.s.suming even ceremonial duties. When Will Rogers offered to give a benefit performance in New Orleans, it was not the mayor but Butler who accepted, expressing "my sincere appreciation of your most generous offer." Now they began to press their weight against, enfold, and suffocate those people and inst.i.tutions under their control.

Butler had already created the Emergency Clearing House Publicity Committee to handle public relations for the city. The committee's first move was to bully businesses within New Orleans. Such bullying had a long history. A month before the levee was dynamited, the a.s.sociation of Commerce had rebuked ninety-two firms that bought postage stamps outside the city, thereby removing the money from the local economy. As the river was rising, several companies had tried to slash their inventories. When the Otis Mahogany Company failed to get flood insurance, it told customers around the nation "we have decided to cut our prices for a few days to move out quickly a good volume of mahogany lumber, so if anything should happen our flood loss would be minimized." The publicity committee warned Otis, "This kind of letter...is apt to cause New Orleans considerable harm." The rebuke was written on New Orleans Clearing House a.s.sociation stationery, a veiled threat that banks would hold the company accountable. The publicity committee attacked even such New Orleans boosters as Walter Parker, a board member of the a.s.sociation of Commerce and executive director of the Safe River Committee, who was admonished for sending clients of the brokerage firm Fenner & Beane an estimate of the reparations New Orleans would owe. Meanwhile, local newspaper editors were advised, "[A]ny announcements or developments tending to improve the popular impression of conditions here should be given prominent headlines." The papers all promptly began running repeated headlines, "City Out of Danger."

Then the public relations machine turned outward in an extraordinary effort to convince the world that New Orleans had never been threatened by the Mississippi River. The publicity committee had already distributed Butler's affirmation of the city's safety to 2,100 banks and investment firms, scheduled repeated broadcasts of Army engineers stating that the city was in no danger, and forced Moody's Investors Service to correct a wire it had sent. As the crisis receded, the committee contacted 265 conventions held around the country in May and June, informing them that the city had never been in danger and requesting them to pa.s.s flood control resolutions. It also distributed feature stories to 300 trade journals, wired every Chamber of Commerce in the United States, sent out 40,000 reprints of statements by General Jadwin that the city was safe, contacted the Kiwanis, Rotary, the Lions, dozens of real estate boards, and urged every large company in the city to write its clients around the world, informing them of "facts." And sometimes the committee made threats. As W. K. Seago, a sugar broker, warned one man, "New Orleans is...generously helping those in actual suffering in the flooded areas and we commend her example to her TRADUCERS reminding them that their day of reckoning will come and that while the mills of the G.o.ds grind slowly they GRIND EXCEEDING SMALL."

Simultaneously, the New Orleans committee also pressured the media directly. The St. Bernard Voice St. Bernard Voice had been complaining that the dynamiting was unnecessary, that St. Bernard and Plaquemines were being sacrificed for "the financial interests" who worried only about investor confidence. The reporters traveling with Hoover believed it. As natural creva.s.ses far upriver proved that the dynamiting had been unnecessary, editorials from Springfield, Ma.s.sachusetts, to Kalamazoo, Michigan, began to criticize the city. The had been complaining that the dynamiting was unnecessary, that St. Bernard and Plaquemines were being sacrificed for "the financial interests" who worried only about investor confidence. The reporters traveling with Hoover believed it. As natural creva.s.ses far upriver proved that the dynamiting had been unnecessary, editorials from Springfield, Ma.s.sachusetts, to Kalamazoo, Michigan, began to criticize the city. The Memphis Commercial-Appeal Memphis Commercial-Appeal wrote mockingly of "New Orleans 'Babbitry.'... If New Orleans is ever flooded the world will not know it unless there is some outside newspaper man there. The newspapers of New Orleans have not told their own people the actual situation. It's business depression that's feared. Many leaders of the town had much rather take a chance at loss of life and destruction of property than face the possibility of the grain market slumping a couple of notches, the price of cotton falling 50 to 100 points, or New Orleans stocks going under the least of a strain." wrote mockingly of "New Orleans 'Babbitry.'... If New Orleans is ever flooded the world will not know it unless there is some outside newspaper man there. The newspapers of New Orleans have not told their own people the actual situation. It's business depression that's feared. Many leaders of the town had much rather take a chance at loss of life and destruction of property than face the possibility of the grain market slumping a couple of notches, the price of cotton falling 50 to 100 points, or New Orleans stocks going under the least of a strain."

The city's financial interests responded aggressively enough that the Memphis Commercial-Appeal Memphis Commercial-Appeal apologized and agreed to print no more such stories. Then the city began to reach out. Butler's committee had already wrung promises of cooperation from every national newsreel company. Now it contracted with two clipping services covering hundreds of papers, each of which was "carefully reviewed for mis-statements." It got corrections printed by the apologized and agreed to print no more such stories. Then the city began to reach out. Butler's committee had already wrung promises of cooperation from every national newsreel company. Now it contracted with two clipping services covering hundreds of papers, each of which was "carefully reviewed for mis-statements." It got corrections printed by the New York Times New York Times, the New York Sun, Literary Digest New York Sun, Literary Digest, the Atlanta Journal Atlanta Journal, the Cincinnati Enquirer Cincinnati Enquirer, the Birmingham News Birmingham News, United Press, and dozens of others. Alvin Howard, a director of the Times-Picayune Times-Picayune, informed. Butler that "the famous writer" Richard Child was in town writing for the Sat.u.r.day Evening Post Sat.u.r.day Evening Post. He suggested that top businessmen and journalists contact him and try to influence the story. They did.

And the committee asked Jim Thomson to help. Through his national political connections and owners.h.i.+p of papers in Virginia as well as New Orleans, he was well known in the newspaper community. He convinced executives of the wire services to cooperate and wrote to Editor and Publisher Editor and Publisher, a trade magazine for newspaper executives, the Southern Newspaper Publishers a.s.sociation, and elsewhere that "a citizens committee representing all of the business interests of New Orleans has asked me to attempt to get before the news and picture editors throughout the United States a correction of several unfortunate and damaging impressions that experts feared for the safety of the city of New Orleans itself."

There was one other effort to improve the city's image. The a.s.sociation of Commerce, whose leading members all served on Butler's Citizens Committee, had a budget of $130,000 in 1927, along with a surplus of $78,000 in its treasury. It donated $500 to the Red Cross flood relief fund. It spent $605 honoring Hoover at a luncheon. In advance of that luncheon, the a.s.sociation demanded that the police clear beggars from downtown streets. It later reported: "Superintendent of Police Healy inaugurated and carried forward an intensive campaign against beggars during the entire month. The effort resulted in 21 arrests."

BUT IF THE CITY succeeded in convincing the nation that, despite its insistence upon dynamiting the levee downriver to relieve pressure on itself, it had never been in danger, it was creating resentment in its neighbors. succeeded in convincing the nation that, despite its insistence upon dynamiting the levee downriver to relieve pressure on itself, it had never been in danger, it was creating resentment in its neighbors.

The New Iberia Enterprise New Iberia Enterprise thanked "the n.o.ble and unselfish manner in which our sister towns have responded to our appeal in distress, and rushed trucks and men and cowboys with their own mounts to plunge headlong into the thick of the great rescue work,...risking their lives." From New Orleans they had gotten nothing. "What a contrast to our own metropolis, boasting the greatest population of the South, conspicuous by her failure to respond! Not a single truck, which bore the name of New Orleans! How her great dailies have played up our calamity to the world in advance of the flood, while they proclaimed their own security, purchased at so dear a price." thanked "the n.o.ble and unselfish manner in which our sister towns have responded to our appeal in distress, and rushed trucks and men and cowboys with their own mounts to plunge headlong into the thick of the great rescue work,...risking their lives." From New Orleans they had gotten nothing. "What a contrast to our own metropolis, boasting the greatest population of the South, conspicuous by her failure to respond! Not a single truck, which bore the name of New Orleans! How her great dailies have played up our calamity to the world in advance of the flood, while they proclaimed their own security, purchased at so dear a price."

Even the board of the a.s.sociation of Commerce conceded "in the mind of a great many of the country people New Orleans was only concerned with its own safety during the recent high water period." In response, it planned a new publicity campaign "to see if we cannot overcome the feeling that exists between the city and the country.... Unless we [are] able to sell the city to the country the city will always be the loser when it comes to legislation."

Perhaps this effort might have yielded at least some success, but then the city, through Butler and the men with whom he met daily, began to hammer against the refugees.

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE.

J. BLANC M MONROE was not a large man, but his reach embraced all New Orleans. He was the city's leading attorney, made all important decisions for the Whitney Bank-although he was only a board member-and ruled Carnival as Comus. Physically, he resembled LeRoy Percy in his prime, distinguished-looking, his hair just turning to gray, not tall but broad-shouldered and immaculately dressed, with a presence that emanated from his self-confidence and intensity. Like LeRoy Percy, he was direct, tenacious, fierce, and, when he chose to be, charming. In both there was coldness, arrogance, smallness, and pride of family. Monroe's sister Kitty was the city's social arbiter and leading hostess and married to a Harvard friend of Will Percy; Will ushered at their wedding. was not a large man, but his reach embraced all New Orleans. He was the city's leading attorney, made all important decisions for the Whitney Bank-although he was only a board member-and ruled Carnival as Comus. Physically, he resembled LeRoy Percy in his prime, distinguished-looking, his hair just turning to gray, not tall but broad-shouldered and immaculately dressed, with a presence that emanated from his self-confidence and intensity. Like LeRoy Percy, he was direct, tenacious, fierce, and, when he chose to be, charming. In both there was coldness, arrogance, smallness, and pride of family. Monroe's sister Kitty was the city's social arbiter and leading hostess and married to a Harvard friend of Will Percy; Will ushered at their wedding.

In more important ways, however, they did not resemble each other at all. LeRoy had helped build a society; Monroe merely reflected one. LeRoy had ambitions of empire; Monroe had not so much ambition as expectation, expectation that the world would bend to him.

Monroe's ancestors included two presidents, James Monroe and James Polk, one on each side of his family. His father, Frank Adair Monroe, chief justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, had represented both Jefferson Davis and James Eads, and, like his friend Edward Dougla.s.s White, chief justice of the United States Supreme Court, had served as president of the Louisiana Club. Blanc Monroe so frequently argued cases before his father, who never recused himself, that the state legislature once considered a bill requiring recusal when a lawyer argued a case before a judge who was closely related. At a hearing on the bill, a state senator asked one witness, "You're talking about Blanc Monroe, aren't you?" Came the reply: "That's right! That's the son of a b.i.t.c.h I'm talking about."

Not surprisingly, given his position at the pinnacle of his society, Monroe considered the world nearly perfect. Even as a young man, in an 1899 commencement speech at Tulane University, he did not question the order of things. His subject was the legacy of the Spanish-American War, a legacy controversial enough that Speaker of the House Thomas "Czar" Reed, probably the strongest Speaker in American history, resigned from Congress to protest it. Yet Monroe gave no hint of doubt, perspective, or depth of comprehension when he proclaimed: "Into the fiercely contested struggle for empire the 'draught' of the Anglo-Saxon race is forcing us.... [Other] powers suddenly loom up as neighbors to be jostled against and outranked in the race for trade.... [T]he eagle's claws establish our claims to prestige and consideration.... We are powerless to resist the spirit of Americanism which exacts from us not exertion merely but the grandest efforts of our broadest men. We realize that we must indeed take up the white man's burden."

Monroe's power came from his ability, his personal force, and his business and social connections. The combination of him and his law partner Monte Lemann made the firm Monroe & Lemann a formidable one. Lemann was Jewish, had a national reputation, was a close friend and Harvard cla.s.smate of Felix Frankfurter, would brief Franklin Roosevelt on Louisiana politics and Huey Long, and once declined appointment as a judge to the U.S. Court of Appeals. In terms of legal scholars.h.i.+p and argument, Lemann was a better lawyer than Monroe. Yet Monroe dominated the law firm, shouted at a.s.sociates, once even publicly rebuked his partner for ordering a book for the law firm, a matter of a few dollars, without asking him.

Monroe was also "social," which in New Orleans means Carnival. Not only was he once Comus, but the Atlanteans, one of the most prestigious krewes, was called "a wholly-owned subsidiary of Blanc Monroe." Lemann, being Jewish, of course never received an invitation to any Carnival event.

But if Monroe used his connections and advantages, he did not rely upon them. He worked ferociously. No one could outwork him. His eyes could chill a man. He sent bills for his time to doctors who kept him waiting. He threatened to tow the cars of people who parked in front of his house. He drove people and bullied them. An attorney who knew him well said, "I've never seen a meeting he was in that he did not dominate."

Butler had picked Blanc Monroe to represent the city, to represent the money, regarding reparations. Not only did Monroe embody the city's establishment, but he had back-channel connections to St. Bernard Parish. Monroe had already made Sheriff Doc Meraux a director of the Whitney Bank, one of the most conservative banks in the South, though, as another board member put it, Meraux "was tres ordinaire tres ordinaire." (In the 1990s the financial magazine Barron's Barron's noted that the Whitney was "doing business exactly the way it had a century earlier. It offered no credit cards, had no automatic teller machines,...made the loans it did extend on a handshake, all under a thick coat of secrecy.") The day the decision was made to dynamite the levee, Meraux was given $5,000 by the Whitney through an intermediary, and later he filed a claim for $235,000 in reparations. noted that the Whitney was "doing business exactly the way it had a century earlier. It offered no credit cards, had no automatic teller machines,...made the loans it did extend on a handshake, all under a thick coat of secrecy.") The day the decision was made to dynamite the levee, Meraux was given $5,000 by the Whitney through an intermediary, and later he filed a claim for $235,000 in reparations.

Monroe could make a deal when it served his purpose or fight when that served his purpose. When he fought, he was relentless, yielding nothing. He was the perfect choice for Butler to unleash upon the city's adversaries-the victims of the dynamiting.

NEW O ORLEANS had publicly promised that citizens of St. Bernard and Plaquemines would suffer no loss. The mayor, the city council, the levee board, the presidents of every bank, every major business, of the a.s.sociation of Commerce, the Cotton Exchange, the Board of Trade, and leading individuals had all pledged their civic and personal honor that this would be so. had publicly promised that citizens of St. Bernard and Plaquemines would suffer no loss. The mayor, the city council, the levee board, the presidents of every bank, every major business, of the a.s.sociation of Commerce, the Cotton Exchange, the Board of Trade, and leading individuals had all pledged their civic and personal honor that this would be so.

In theory, the Reparations Commission, on which St. Bernard and Plaquemines had four votes to the city's three, with two men chosen by the governor, was to guarantee fair treatment of the victims. Commission chairman was Ernest Lee Jahncke, a Tulane cla.s.smate of Monroe who owned a s.h.i.+pyard. He was also one of three Americans on the International Olympic Committee and a fine sailor-later an a.s.sistant secretary of the navy, he preferred the t.i.tle of "Commodore," given him by the Southern Yacht Club, to "Mr. Secretary." A man of principle, he would later oppose sending a U.S. Olympic team to n.a.z.i Germany in 1936, and at the commission's first meeting he declared: "The words of the people of this city and of the state are pledged to the complete recompense of those who have lost their homes and property to save the city of New Orleans from grave danger. It is the function of this committee to see that full justice is done in every instance, and it will do so."

But the Reparations Commission would have no power. Indeed, when it first convened, Butler called it to order, even though he did not serve on it. He then dropped into the background, but he, Monroe, Hecht, and Dufour-the few men whom Butler had chosen and with whom he met each day-determined how the city met its moral commitment. Without consulting the mayor or a single member of either the levee board or the city council, these few men decided everything.

Butler, Monroe, Hecht, and Dufour decided to use the Orleans Levee Board, whose members were appointed by the governor, as the vehicle to pay reparations. They decided that the levee board would issue bonds to pay them. They decided the millage. They decided that Blanc Monroe would represent the city and the levee board in all reparations work. Only after the decisions were made did they inform public officials of them. (Typically, Butler invited the levee board president to a private meeting, informed him that Monroe was to be hired by the levee board, and the board president then told other board members, "The business interests suggested Mr. J. Blanc Monroe be appointed as Special Counsel of the Board"; by unanimous vote, the board promptly did so.) More important, Butler and his colleagues decided how to handle the nearly 10,000 refugees. Roughly half stayed with friends or relatives; the city housed the rest in a warehouse lined with cots. At first, the city met its obligations well enough. Butler created subcommittees to handle food, employment, transportation, even education for the children. But as expenses rose and the Red Cross refused help, a new realism informed decisions.

The first indication of this new realism came when the members of the food subcommittee asked for "guidance" in a meeting with Butler, Monroe, and Hecht in Room 326 of the Ca.n.a.l Bank Building, that plush conference room with leather-backed chairs, the long table, and s.h.i.+ning objets d'art. The subcommittee chairman explained that his subcommittee did not consider the refugees "as objects of charity. They are for the most part industrious, self-supporting and self-respecting citizens who were forced to leave, on short notice, their homes and possessions that the city of New Orleans be saved. They are crowded into the city without adequate housing, ready cash, or disinterested a.s.sistance except from the committee.... They [cannot] be cared for by herding in concentration camps without having a heritage of bitterness toward our city which will be long remembered." But food expenses alone were running $20,000 a week, far above what they had expected. It was only the middle of May, and the flood would likely cover the two parishes deep into August, three months away. What should their policy toward relief be?

Butler, Hecht, and Monroe decided that "relief be granted only people who had been placed in necessitous circ.u.mstances." More significantly, to cut costs, they would have John Legier, a New Orleans banker on the Reparations Commission, offer a resolution "to deduct from personal damage claims the amounts extended by way of relief for parties claiming damages."

Any money given the displaced refugees, even for food or housing, would be deducted from their settlements.

The commission promptly pa.s.sed this resolution; the governor's appointees, both of whom came from New Orleans, joined the city's representatives, outvoting those from St. Bernard and Plaquemines 5 to 4. By then Butler and Monroe had taken effective control of the entire reparations process.

THE REPARATIONS PROCESS began when a flood victim filed a claim. If he or she could not reach agreement with Monroe, who technically represented the Orleans Levee Board, the Reparations Commission theoretically served as an arbitrator. The commission's decision could be appealed to the courts. But in fact Monroe dominated the entire system. He did so chiefly because he had, literally, written the commission's rules. He had done so even though the commission had its own legal adviser in Percy Saint, attorney general of Louisiana, and its own staff. And in procedure-in the rules-lay power. Monroe used it. began when a flood victim filed a claim. If he or she could not reach agreement with Monroe, who technically represented the Orleans Levee Board, the Reparations Commission theoretically served as an arbitrator. The commission's decision could be appealed to the courts. But in fact Monroe dominated the entire system. He did so chiefly because he had, literally, written the commission's rules. He had done so even though the commission had its own legal adviser in Percy Saint, attorney general of Louisiana, and its own staff. And in procedure-in the rules-lay power. Monroe used it.

First, the rules stated that the firm of Monroe & Lemann would decide whether to reject a claim or settle it. (Monroe and two a.s.sistants actually did nearly all the work; his partner had little involvement.) If a claimant protested Monroe's decision to the commission itself, the commission relied heavily on the factual findings of Monroe.

Second, Monroe prevented small claimants from having legal representation. After two attorneys spoke to several claimants about representing them on a contingency basis, he, Dufour, and Esmond Phelps had the state bar a.s.sociation threaten them with disbarment. Saint, the attorney general, then promised publicly that for claimants who wanted an attorney, "[v]olunteer legal services will be obtained." A resulting headline read, "Legal Advice for Refugees to be Gratis." But after several attorneys offered to work pro bono for the refugees, Monroe, Dufour, Phelps, and others again went to the bar a.s.sociation and had it decree that such work would be "unethical" and, again, cause for disbarment. The commission, with Jahncke voting with the representatives from St. Bernard and Plaquemines, then voted to hire an attorney to help claimants. Monroe, Butler, and Dufour promptly had Saint "state the legal objections to this policy." The idea of hiring an attorney for the claimants was killed.

Third, and most important, the rules stipulated that no partial payments be made. This contradicted the policy the Reparations Commission had announced at its very first meeting, when, recognizing that few refugees had savings and even fewer had an income, it had formally resolved that "a man may file his claim as his losses become provable." Jahncke himself promised, "If a man receives forty percent of the claim immediately, he will receive sixty percent more as soon as humanly possible."

Monroe's prohibition of partial payments was an extraordinarily powerful weapon. Claims were divided into "schedules," with each schedule covering a different kind of loss-crops, equipment, housing, etc. The rules stated that once a given schedule was filed, it could not be amended; no further loss on that schedule could be added. Claimants who wanted money quickly had to limit their claim to losses they could prove while water still covered their property; after the water drained away, if more damage was found, they would get no compensation. If Monroe disputed part of a claimed loss, the claimant received nothing for that schedule. Even if Monroe accepted as valid part of the claim, the claimant received nothing. Only a complete settlement of a schedule released any money.

Most refugees needed money desperately. By refusing partial payments, Monroe was starving them into submission.

A FEW WEEKS FEW WEEKS after the levee was dynamited, Butler estimated that claims would total $6 million. Hecht estimated them at $6 million. They were both wrong. Claims would exceed $30 million. The figures made Monroe and Butler even more rigid, even more suffocating. after the levee was dynamited, Butler estimated that claims would total $6 million. Hecht estimated them at $6 million. They were both wrong. Claims would exceed $30 million. The figures made Monroe and Butler even more rigid, even more suffocating.

Typical was the case of Sigmund Tarnok, owner of a large nursery, who needed operating capital to reopen his business but resisted a settlement offer. Tarnok's attorneys brought to Monroe an independent estimate of losses confirming their claim, b.u.t.tressed it with statements from two leading young businessmen whom Monroe knew, and even convinced Monte Lemann to write him a note saying, "There may possibly be something in [Tarnok's] contention."

Monroe ignored his own partner's plea, and replied to Tarnok with a threat: "[I]f the case is reopened...I promise I will oppose with every obstacle the payment of one penny to the Tarnok Company." Tarnok accepted a settlement of 19 cents on the dollar.

It was not only Tarnok whom Monroe pushed; he pushed everyone, and he pushed hard. The creva.s.se had drowned or driven away millions of muskrats and minks, and wiped out at least two full seasons of trapping. Several thousand trappers had been making between $3,000 and $8,000 each per season; a handful made even more. Compensating them could cost millions of dollars. So Monroe squeezed again. With Butler's approval, he had the state conservation commission review the trappers' claims. Trappers paid a tax on each pelt; many evaded it. If the state examined their claims, the trappers would have to minimize their losses or expose themselves to prosecution for tax evasion. One of the first trappers audited had s.h.i.+pped 15,000 pelts, worth from $25,000 to $35,000, out of state to avoid taxes. A group of trappers went to court to block further state review. The State of Louisiana fought the lawsuit; Monroe himself argued the case for it. He won.

Monroe pushed so hard, and won so often, that his victories themselves became a problem. On June 21, nearly two months after the creva.s.se, the chairman of the food subcommittee raised a question "ill.u.s.trated [by] an aged negress." She had settled for and received $27, but "her home is under water. The payment of the claim does not relieve your committee of the necessity of supplying her with food."

Butler, Hecht, and Monroe discussed the situation at length at a weekend meeting in Butler's home on St. Charles Avenue. They sat comfortably in the solarium where Butler so often sat in solitude surrounded by objects that reminded him of his plantation. The street was lined with great mansions; indeed, Butler's was modest compared to his neighbors, but upstairs in his wife's bedroom was the Carnival gown that earlier that year had cost $15,000. The issue was a serious one. Paying any money to a claimant after a claim had been settled might establish a dangerous precedent. Still, they could not starve these people. Believing they were being generous, they decided to feed any refugee who received a settlement of less than $100 but could not return home.

Within a few weeks their tolerance expired. A group of black refugees pleaded for an extension of food payments, explaining that the marshes from which they had earned income-they had gathered moss and sold it as mattress filling-were waist-deep in mud. But for these people, aid had ended. They were informed, "As long as we continue to feed you, you are not going to work."

Earlier, Monroe had decided another case of extraordinary relief. It had involved the Ca.n.a.l Bank, so Butler had recused himself from the decision. Monroe had approved a payment of $850 to reimburse Butler's bank, the largest one in the South, for the use of its yacht Lurline Lurline.

THE CREVa.s.sE VICTIMS fought back. Not all claimants were powerless. Some did have lawyers and political connections. Meanwhile, the Reparations Commission itself had begun to balk at Monroe's bullying and excesses. For some of those whom New Orleans had flooded out, the issue was survival. And they had the weight of the promises the city had made behind them. fought back. Not all claimants were powerless. Some did have lawyers and political connections. Meanwhile, the Reparations Commission itself had begun to balk at Monroe's bullying and excesses. For some of those whom New Orleans had flooded out, the issue was survival. And they had the weight of the promises the city had made behind them.

Fifty-seven of New Orleans' leading citizens had pledged full compensation to the people of Plaquemines and St. Bernard. Butler himself had called the reparations "a moral obligation undertaken by each and every" one of those fifty-seven signatories. Each one of them had affirmed that moral obligation not only to the governor and the victims, but to the Mississippi River Commission, to the secretary of war, to the secretary of commerce, and to the president of the United States. Throughout the state, the city was being accused of breaking its word. Governor Simpson, who had been so reluctant to allow the creva.s.se, was well aware of the outrage among the victims.

Simpson had already declared his candidacy for reelection. In a few days, Huey Long would announce his candidacy for the same post. Long was already castigating the "plutocrats," the "self-appointed" rulers of the state-the men like Butler and Monroe. Already, Long and Monroe detested each other; five years earlier Long, then utilities commissioner, had threatened to throw Monroe in jail for contempt. Politics compelled Simpson to intervene for the creva.s.se victims. So did his own sense of decency. But Butler and Monroe still held a trump card. They seemed unaware of the implications of playing it.

CHAPTER THIRTY.

ON M MONDAY EVENING, July 25, 8 P.M. P.M., one more meeting was held in the Ca.n.a.l Bank's Room 326. Much had already happened in that room. Now, in its restrained elegance, gathered the political power of the state and the economic power of the city; the two powers would confront each other here. The confrontation would mark the peak of the power of New Orleans and its bankers. It also marked an exercise of power that was not atypical in the America of the time, although in few places was it as blatant as in New Orleans; such uses of power were beginning to ignite a larger political storm.

Governor Simpson had requested the meeting, hoping to find a solution to the partial-payments problem. Representing New Orleans were Butler, Monroe, Hecht, Dufour, and Lonnie Pool, along with the chairmen of Butler's subcommittees, Mayor O'Keefe, three city councilmen, and the levee board. A dozen men represented St. Bernard and Plaquemines, including Manuel Molero and four others a.s.sociated with his Acme Fur Company, which owned 127,000 acres of the finest trapping land in the world. Between them sat the Reparations Commission.

Simpson convened the meeting and got directly to the point: "I have requested the Executive Committee of the Citizens Flood Committee and the members of the Reparations Commission to get together to consider certain objections that the claimants have to Regulation No. 7 of the rules and regulations adopted by the Reparations Commission."

C. A. Hartman, a member of the Reparations Commission, spoke first. He ran a large plant at Braithwaite-where the trappers had met at the baseball diamond to try to block the dynamiting-and had 400 men working now, even with part of his plant still underwater. The creva.s.se had caused tremendous losses and he was desperate for working capital. He explained, "The claim which we tried to enter in full was to May 31 and was not subject to additions or losses for the period covered." But Monroe had refused even to accept the claim. To get anything Hartman would have to forgo compensation for losses after May 31-despite the fact that as of this day, July 25, water still covered part of his operation.

As a result of Monroe's refusal, he continued, New Orleans banks would loan him nothing. His business was starving for capital, and, he said, many others were suffering in similar circ.u.mstances. He reminded those in the room of the promises made before the creva.s.se. Virtually every person in the room had pledged that no harm would come to residents of St. Bernard and Plaquemines. But harm had come to them. Then he turned to Simpson: "We ask you, as Governor of the State, by whose authority the Caernarvon creva.s.se was created, to give whatever a.s.sistance is in your power in behalf of all individuals or corporations for similar claims."

Then Hugh Wilkinson spoke. The Wilkinsons were the dark sheep of the city's fine families. One hundred twenty-five years before, James Wilkinson and W. C. C. Claiborne had accepted Louisiana for the United States from the French. Ever since, the Claiborne name had been second to none in the state. But James Wilkinson had been court-martialed for his involvement in Aaron Burr's treason. Though acquitted, neither he nor his descendants were ever fully accepted in the city. Now Hugh Wilkinson frequently represented the outsiders in New Orleans against the insiders. In this instance, he represented Molero, who faced devastating losses. There would be no fur season this year, and almost certainly none the next. In the meantime, the company had spent thousands of dollars building rafts covered with clumps of marsh gra.s.s in the hope of saving some muskrats. Monroe was refusing reimburs.e.m.e.nt for even these moneys. Wilkinson argued: "It is manifestly impossible to file, under oath, a complete claim which would reasonably estimate the amount of loss to the company. We simply need operating capital to meet our maturing obligations"-the company owed $124,000-"and unless this is furnished to us by some means, we are faced with ruin. If the company cannot file a partial claim we are going to be wiped out." Then he too turned to the governor and pleaded, "In behalf of all the people of that section of the State of Louisiana, we come to you for help."

The Reparations Commission itself concurred. Jahncke, the chairman, sided with the victims and their representatives. They were five votes, a majority. Yet they could effect nothing. They were supposed to have power, but they had none. Voting to change the rule meant nothing. The commission itself had no money. The cash to pay claims came from the New Orleans banks, which were loaning claimants 80 percent of their settlements. The commission could not order the banks to make these loans. The banks did what Butler's executive committee told them to do.

Simpson turned to Butler for a response. Butler had one well prepared. He had met with the other members of his executive committee at seven-thirty that morning in his office next door to this room and, looking down upon the city of New Orleans, settled upon his answer. In that meeting they had privately agreed that they had a fiduciary responsibility to the City of New Orleans. If they allowed partial payments, then claimants could drag out their claims indefinitely and settlements would become infinitely more difficult. The Reparations Commission could make any policy statement it wanted. The banks would continue to pay nothing for partial settlements.

Butler now was hardly so blunt. Instead, he spoke of his eagerness to do what was right and his concern for the difficulties of the victims. But he was unyielding. The meeting continued for hours. Tall, gangly, cadaverous, Butler finally concluded it solemnly: "I want you all to know that as far as the New Orleans Committee is concerned, that we want to pay every just claim as promptly as possible and that we do not want any suffering afflicted upon anyone, but the money with which these claims will be paid is not our money. We have got to satisfy the members of the Orleans Levee Board."

Butler was being disingenuous. Every man in the room knew it. Butler's group had repeatedly made decisions that directly involved the levee board without consulting any member of it. Only five days earlier the board had "respectfully" asked Butler to provide minutes of his meetings so the board could doc.u.ment the expenditure of public money it had given him to care for the refugees. He had refused. The levee board chairman had then explained to his colleagues that Butler "did not want to give out too much information for if the people in the country found out there might be trouble at the polls." The board took no offense and promptly voted Butler's committee another $50,000; in total, it would give Butler $340,000.

Now Butler stated: "Since we are administering public money, we have got to be very careful, and we have got to be guided by the opinion of Mr. Monroe, representing the city of New Orleans.... I can only say we will be very happy if we can find some solution of this problem, and we will do all we can to that end, but we want to say to you frankly that we cannot have a solution that is going in any way to run counter to the advice of...Mr. Monroe as to what procedure can be worked out."

The meeting was over. Butler and Monroe had conceded nothing.

THE FIGHT had not been over principle; it had been over money and control. Less than a week later Butler agreed to make a partial payment to a single claimant, the British-owned Louisiana Southern Railroad, which went from New Orleans sixty miles downriver to Point a la Hache. No representative of the road had bothered to attend the July 25 meeting. Its attorney was George Janvier, who had a better way of making its case. His father had been president of the Boston Club, chairman of the state Democratic Party, and Butler's mentor and predecessor as president of the Ca.n.a.l Bank; when the senior Janvier had left the Board of Liquidation, Butler had also filled that seat. In a file of Butler's correspondence with a hundred people, only Janvier addressed him as "Jim." It was also in the city's interest to rebuild the railroad; without it virtually no one else in the two parishes could rebuild. On August 3, Butler and Janvier met in Butler's office. Though the railroad did not file a complete schedule, New Orleans banks loaned it the money for repairs. had not been over principle; it had been over money and control. Less than a week later Butler agreed to make a partial payment to a single claimant, the British-owned Louisiana Southern Railroad, which went from New Orleans sixty miles downriver to Point a la Hache. No representative of the road had bothered to attend the July 25 meeting. Its attorney was George Janvier, who had a better way of making its case. His father had been president of the Boston Club, chairman of the state Democratic Party, and Butler's mentor and predecessor as president of the Ca.n.a.l Bank; when the senior Janvier had left the Board of Liquidation, Butler had also filled that seat. In a file of Butler's correspondence with a hundred people, only Janvier addressed him as "Jim." It was also in the city's interest to rebuild the railroad; without it virtually no one else in the two parishes could rebuild. On August 3, Butler and Janvier met in Butler's office. Though the railroad did not file a complete schedule, New Orleans banks loaned it the money for repairs.

Then came a final deal. In early September, Simpson called the state legislature into special session to pa.s.s a const.i.tutional amendment to authorize legally, if retroactively, the Reparations Commission and to govern judicial procedure for cases about the Caernarvon creva.s.se. In the weeks since the July 25 meeting, creva.s.se victims had focused what political power they had on getting the legislature to force New Orleans to compensate them fairly. Immediately before the legislature convened, the St. Bernard Voice St. Bernard Voice bitterly complained: "The City of New Orleans promised and pledged itself to stand the loss and to repay each individual his actual damage. But the city is not doing this. The city's reparation committee has been cutting and slas.h.i.+ng each claim in half and less than half, even though these claims be absolutely accurate and justified.... Not one claimant is satisfied with his 'settlement.'" It then pleaded, "Here is an opportunity for a New Orleans newspaper, unafraid to lose some prestige with the bankers and financiers, to ascertain the true facts and publish the real story of the manner in which the city is repaying the residents of St. Bernard Parish." bitterly complained: "The City of New Orleans promised and pledged itself to stand the loss and to repay each individual his actual damage. But the city is not doing this. The city's reparation committee has been cutting and slas.h.i.+ng each claim in half and less than half, even though these claims be absolutely accurate and justified.... Not one claimant is satisfied with his 'settlement.'" It then pleaded, "Here is an opportunity for a New Orleans newspaper, unafraid to lose some prestige with the bankers and financiers, to ascertain the true facts and publish the real story of the manner in which the city is repaying the residents of St. Bernard Parish."

The Voice Voice was a tiny paper, but this time its audience was state legislators. Hugh Wilkinson, a state senator, distributed a copy to every member of the legislature. was a tiny paper, but this time its audience was state legislators. Hugh Wilkinson, a state senator, distributed a copy to every member of the legislature.

The next day the New Orleans papers, far from taking up the Voice's Voice's appeal, fired back. Thomson's appeal, fired back. Thomson's Item Item and and Tribune Tribune ran identical headlines: "Orleans to Make Good on Pay Promise; Banks Loan Currency Without Collateral Other than Spoken Word...History records few instances of voluntary offers such as this." The ran identical headlines: "Orleans to Make Good on Pay Promise; Banks Loan Currency Without Collateral Other than Spoken Word...History records few instances of voluntary offers such as this." The New Orleans States New Orleans States bragged, "New Orleans Makes Good on Flood Pledge; Pays Claims Although Not Liable Under Law." The bragged, "New Orleans Makes Good on Flood Pledge; Pays Claims Although Not Liable Under Law." The Times-Picayune Times-Picayune proclaimed, "City Keeps Faith a.s.suming Burden...[t]hough under no legal obligations to pay for the losses of Plaquemines and St. Bernard citizens." proclaimed, "City Keeps Faith a.s.suming Burden...[t]hough under no legal obligations to pay for the losses of Plaquemines and St. Bernard citizens."

New Orleans legislators made sure all these papers were widely distributed as well. The Voice Voice, a weekly, could not respond.

Meanwhile, Butler had asked Dufour and Esmond Phelps to draft legislative language that a New Orleans legislator introduced. It stipulated that in any lawsuits the report of the Reparations Commission "shall be prima facie evidence of the facts." In addition, any suit would be tried without a jury in Orleans Parish-the City of New Orleans-and any appeal also had to remain in Orleans Parish.

Wilkinson had his own ideas about the wording of the legislation and drafted language that said victims would be "justly, fairly and fully compensated for losses sustained." He planned to offer his language as an amendment in committee. City representatives lobbied desperately against it, arguing that the amendment would cost the city $15 million. The day before the committee was to vote, a state senator repeated that figure on the senate floor. Wilkinson sprang to his feet, shouting, "That statement is not true! It has been widely circulated by Mr. Blanc Monroe. I object to the claims of those people in St. Bernard and Plaquemines from being prejudiced."

The fight intensified. The lieutenant governor appointed a St. Bernard representative to fill a vacancy on the committee considering the amendment. Wilkinson pushed hard, demanding equity. Butler had O'Keefe "send word to New Orleans delegates to stand firm for the Act as drawn." Still, New Orleans Senator William Davey, offended over the deduction of the cost of food and housing from the victims' settlements, seemed swayed. Butler and Hecht asked Robert Ewing, the New Orleans ward leader and owner of the New Orleans States New Orleans States as well as papers in Monroe and Shreveport, to "exercise his influence with Mr. Davey" and legislatures from outside the city. as well as papers in Monroe and Shreveport, to "exercise his influence with Mr. Davey" and legislatures from outside the city.

That evening Monroe, Hecht, Phelps, and Dufour sat down with Wilkinson and Davey. They insisted that they wanted to avoid a fight, and be fair. Didn't Wilkinson know he could not win? Wilkinson conceded that, though he believed he could win in committee, he did not know what would happen on the floor. If he lost there, he threatened to sue as individuals each person who had signed the agreement promising reparations. But perhaps they could work something out. Well past midnight they were still talking, and finally an agreement was struck. Wilkinson's client, Molero's Acme Fur Company, would get $1.5 million, as well as money to pay its debts. Individual trappers, however, would have to fend for themselves.

The next day Wilkinson did not even offer his language. Without any debate whatsoever, by voice vote, the committee pa.s.sed the legislation written by Dufour and Phelps. The State Senate and House, also without debate and by voice vote, did likewise, then immediately adjourned.

A few days later, after it was too late for any harmful political repercussions, Monroe moved against the trappers again. Trappers actually farmed their tracts of land, bred the animals they trapped, raised them, fed them, cared for them just as a farmer cared for chickens. But Monroe and Butler had the state commissioner of conservation claim all trapping animals as the property of the state. Thus trappers could not claim any losses for them.

To an audience of no one who mattered, the St. Bernard Voice St. Bernard Voice sneered: "The owner or lessee of marsh lands has been making $3000 to $8000 during each trapping season...[but] 'Muskrats are the property of the state,' says the law. And our levee-cutting neighbors in New Orleans hide themselves behind it. It was well enough to order trappers out of their homes and to destroy the muskrats on the marsh lands, for which trappers paid princely prices and, in many cases, on which there rest heavy mortgages, but when it comes to tiding them over until their lands are replenished, that is another question and side-stepping is in order for 'Brutus is an honorable man' and muskrats are the property of the state." sneered: "The owner or lessee of marsh lands has been making $3000 to $8000 during each trapping season...[but] 'Muskrats are the property of the state,' says the law. And our levee-cutting neighbors in New Orleans hide themselves behind it. It was well enough to order trappers out of their homes and to destroy the muskrats on the marsh lands, for which trappers paid princely prices and, in many cases, on which there rest heavy mortgages, but when it comes to tiding them over until their lands are replenished, that is another question and side-stepping is in order for 'Brutus is an honorable man' and muskrats are the property of the state."

IN S ST. BERNARD and Plaquemines Parishes, total claims, including those that Monroe refused to accept for consideration, reached $35 million. Those he did allow to be filed totaled $12,491,041. He agreed to settlements totaling $3,897,276-but then deducted nearly $1,000,000 from these settlements for feeding and housing the claimants while they were homeless, leaving roughly $2.9 million that the city paid. Of this, $1.5 million went to Molero's company. Five other large claimants, including the Louisiana Southern Railroad, received a total of $600,000. That left roughly $800,000 to divide between 2,809 claimants, who received an average of $284 each to compensate for, in many cases, having their homes and livelihoods destroyed and having their lives disrupted for months. An additional 1,024 claimants received nothing; not a single trapper was offered any compensation for trapping losses. and Plaquemines Parishes, total claims, including those that Monroe refused to accept for consideration, reached $35 million. Those he did allow to be filed totaled $12,491,041. He agreed to settlements totaling $3,897,276-but then deducted nearly $1,000,000 from these settlements for feeding and housing the claimants while they were homeless, leaving roughly $2.9 million that the city paid. Of this, $1.5 million went to Molero's company. Five other large claimants, including the Louisiana Southern Railroad, received a total of $600,000. That left roughly $800,000 to divide between 2,809 claimants, who received an average of $284 each to compensate for, in many cases, having their homes and livelihoods destroyed and having their lives disrupted for months. An additional 1,024 claimants received nothing; not a single trapper was offered any compensation for trapping losses.

The two parishes were dest.i.tute. In November 1926, trappers had gathered more than a hundred pelts a day; a year and a half after the flood, in November 1928, they were lucky to collect six. In Delacroix, the trapping center, families were literally starving. A newspaperwoman who knew the area well demanded that the a.s.sociation of Commerce help these people, and threatened to write "a very good feature story for several New York newspapers" if it did not.

Monroe replied to her. He made no mention of the fact that New Orleans had forced the dynamiting of the levee and caused their loss. But he did tell her that New Orleans had been generous: "The disastrous floods of 1927 did incalculable damage to many thousands of persons in the Mississippi Delta and out of these many thousands of persons none were compensated for their losses save the inhabitants of St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes. The compensation of the people of these parishes was a purely voluntary act on the part of the State of Louisiana and the Orleans Levee Board."

Five hundred twenty-six claimants sued over two issues. Sixty-two suits involved the question of damages discovered after a claim had been filed. Monroe had refused to accept any such claims. The special court created by Dufour and Phelps' legislation, located in New Orleans and with New Orleans judges, decreed, "We have viewed with patience and forbearance the attempts of many claimants to foist groundless claims upon the people of New Orleans, but we must confess that these...ravel our nerves." The court gave the plaintiffs, the victims, nothing. Appeals courts affirmed the judgment.

The remaining suits involved the question of lost income, as opposed to damaged property. It would cover the trappers. In three test cases involving Herman Burkhardt, Alfred Oliver, and Claude Foret, a trapper and two laborers, lower courts rejected the claims and found "no cause of action."

Their attorney was Leander Perez. Arguing before the state supreme court, he established his clients' losses. He read into the record newspaper quotations of Butler and others affirming their moral and legal commitment to compensate victims for all losses. He presented the pledges signed by the bankers, by the mayor and city council, by the levee board, and argued that those pledges had the force of a legal contract.

Then Monroe began. He quoted Simpson's statement when he announced plans to dynamite the levee: "'I am impressed with the danger, and I am determined to avert it. The people in the affected area will be removed to safety and properly cared for. No lives will be sacrificed.... The damage to property resulting from this act will be paid for.'" Monroe insisted that it was only for property property that compensation would be paid. Then he dismissed all the pledges made by all the leaders of New Orleans, arguing, "The const.i.tutional amendment fixes definitely the rights and obligations of the plaintiff and defendant herein." The amendment took precedence over the proclamations of moral obligation, of pledges of honor, of signed doc.u.ments. All of that, he insisted, was "irrelevant to this case." that compensation would be paid. Then he dismissed all the pledges made by all the leaders of New Orleans, arguing, "The const.i.tutional amendment fixes definitely the rights and obligations of the plaintiff and defendant herein." The amendment took precedence over the proclamations of moral obligation, of pledges of honor, of signed doc.u.ments. All of that, he insisted, was "irrelevant to this case."

On December 2, 1929, the supreme court rendered its decision on the two cases. The justices stated that although the city had demanded the break, "the act of creating the creva.s.se nevertheless remained the act of the State, through its Governor, in the exercise of its police power.... [A]s observed by counsel for defendant, the sole liability of the Orleans Levee District for the results of the creva.s.se is the liability voluntarily a.s.sumed for it by the Legislature and people of the state, when they pa.s.sed and adopted the const.i.tutional amendment cited above."