Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute Part 5

The third, or Dera-Ismail-Khan-Sargo-Ghazni, route pa.s.ses through a region less frequented than those mentioned, and is not thought sufficiently difficult for detailed description. Pa.s.sing due west, through seventy miles of mountain gorges dest.i.tute of supplies or forage, it debouches, through the Gomal Pa.s.s, into a more promising country, in which forage may be obtained. At this point it branches to Ghazni, Kandahar, and Pis.h.i.+n respectively. A road exists from Mooltan, crossing the Indus at Dera-Ghazi-Khan, Mithunkot, Rajanpur, Rojan, Lalgos.h.i.+, Dadur to Quetta, and was utilized by General Biddulph, from whose account of his march from the Indus to the Helmund, in 1879, is gleaned the following. The main point of concentration for the British forces, either from India or from England via Kurrachee is thus minutely described.

"The western frontier of India is, for a length of 600 miles, bounded by Biluchistan and territories inhabited by Biluch tribes, and for 300 miles Biluch country intervenes between our border and Afghanistan. The plains of the Punjab and Sind run along the boundary of Biluchistan, and at a distance of from 25 to 50 miles the Indus pursues a course, as far down as Mithunkot, from north to south, and then winds south-west through a country similar to that of Egypt. A belt of cultivation and beyond that the desert . . .

this line of hills (the Eastern Sulimani) extends as a continuous rampart with the plains running up to the foot of the range, and having an elevation of 11,000 feet at the Tukl-i-Suliman, and of 7,400 near Fort Munro (opposite Dera-Ghazi-Khan), gradually diminishes in height and dwindles away till it is lost in the plains near Kusmore, at a point 12 miles from the Indus. The strip of low-land country on the west bank of the Indus up to the foot of the hills is called the _Derajat_. It is cut up and broken by torrents, the beds of which are generally dry wastes, and the country is, except at a few places where permanent water is found, altogether sterile and hot. If we view the physical aspect looking north and north-west from Jacobabad, we notice a wide bay of plains extending between the broken spur of the Sulimani, and a second range of hills having a direction parallel to the outer range. This plain is called the Kachi, extends in an even surface for 150 miles from the Indus at Sukkur, and is bounded on the north by successive spurs lying between the two great ranges. The Kachi, thus bounded by barren hills on all sides but the south, is one of the hottest regions in the world. Except where subject to inundations or within reach of irrigation it is completely sterile--a hard clay surface called _Pat_,--and this kind of country extends around to the east of the spur of the Suliman into the Derajat country. Subject to terrific heats and to a fiercely hot pestilential wind, the Kachi is at times fatal even to the natives."

[Ill.u.s.tration: Entrance to the Bolan Pa.s.s, from Dadur.]

The range of mountains bounding the Kachi to the westward is a continuous wall with imperceptible breaks only, and it bears the local names of Gindari, Takari, and Kirthar. Through this uniform rampart there are two notable rents or defiles, viz.: the _Mulla_ opening opposite Gundana, leading to Kelat; and the _Bolan_ entering near Dadur, leading to Quetta, Kandahar, and Herat. The Bolan is an abrupt defile--a rent in the range,--the bottom filled with the pebbly bed of a mountain torrent. This steep ramp forms for sixty miles the road from Dadur, elevation 750 feet, to the Dasht-i-Bedowlat, elevation 6,225 feet. This inhospitable plateau and the upper portion of the Bolan are subject to the most piercingly cold winds and temperature; and the sudden change from the heat of the Kachi to the cold above is most trying to the strongest const.i.tutions. Notwithstanding the difficulties of the road, the absence of supplies and fuel, and the hostile character of the predatory tribes around, this route has been always most in favor as the great commercial and military communication from Persia, Central Asia, and Khora.s.san to India.

The causes which led to the establishment of a British garrison at Quetta are not unlike those which are urged as good Russian reasons for the occupation of territory in certain parts of Central Asia.

Briefly stated, it seems that after the conquest of the Punjab, the proximity of certain disturbed portions of Biluchistan, and the annoyance suffered by various British military expeditions, in 1839-1874, from certain tribes of Biluchis--notably the Maris and Bugtis,--made it desirable that more decisive measures should be adopted. In 1876 a force of British troops was marched to Kelat, and by mutual agreement with the Khan a political agency was established at Quetta, ostensibly to protect an important commercial highway, but at the same time securing a military footing of great value. But the character of the lords of the soil--the Maris, for instance--has not changed for the better, and the temporary general European occupation of the country would afford an opportunity to gratify their predatory instincts, which these bandits would not hesitate to utilize. The Maris can put 2,000 men into the field and march 100 miles to make an attack. When they wish to start upon a raid they collect their wise men together and tell the warriors where the cattle and the corn are. If the reports of spies, sent forward, confirm this statement, the march is undertaken. They ride upon mares which make no noise; they travel only at night. They are the most excellent outpost troops in the world. When they arrive at the scene of action a perfect watch is kept and information by single messengers is secretly sent back. Every thing being ready a rush of hors.e.m.e.n takes place, the villages are surrounded, the cattle swept away, the women and children hardly used--fortunate if they escape with their lives. The villagers have their fortlets to retreat to, and, if they reach them, can pull the ladders over after them and fire away from their towers.

Dadur is an insignificant town at the foot of the Bolan. From here the Kandahar road leads for sixty miles through the Pa.s.s--a gradual ascent; in winter there is not a mouthful of food in the entire length of the defile.

Quetta, compared with the region to the south, appears a very Garden of Eden. It is a small oasis, green and well watered.

From Quetta to Pis.h.i.+n the road skirts the southern border of a vast plain, interspersed with valleys, which extend across the eastern portion of Afghanistan toward the Russian dominion. A study of the Pis.h.i.+n country shows that it is, on its northwestern side supported on a limb of the Western Sulimani. This spur, which defines the west of the Barshor valley, is spread out into the broad plateau of Toba, and is then produced as a continuous ridge, dividing Pis.h.i.+n from the plains of Kadani, under the name of Khoja Amran. The Barshor is a deep bay of the plain, and there is an open valley within the outer screen of hills. A road strikes off here to the Ghilzai country and to Ghazni. Though intersected by some very low and unimportant hills and ridges, the Pis.h.i.+n plains and those of Shallkot may be looked upon as one feature. We may imagine the Shall Valley the vestibule, the Kujlak-Kakur Vale the pa.s.sage, the Gayud Yara Plain an antechamber, and Pis.h.i.+n proper the great _salle_. Surrounded by mountains which give forth an abundant supply of water, the lands bordering on the hills are studded with villages, and there is much cultivation; there is a total absence of timber, and the cultivation of fruit-trees has been neglected. The Lora rivers cutting into the plain interferes somewhat with the construction of roads.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Entrance to the Khojak Pa.s.s, from Pis.h.i.+n, on the Road to Kandahar.]

The Plain of Pis.h.i.+n possesses exceptional advantages for the concentration and rendezvous of large bodies of troops, and has already been utilized for that purpose by the British.

From the Khoja Amran, looking toward Kandahar, the plains, several thousand feet below, are laid out like a sea, and the mountains run out into isolated promontories; to the left the desert is seen like a turbulent tide about to overflow the plains.

The rivers on the Quetta-Kandahar route do not present much impediment to the pa.s.sage of troops in dry weather, but in flood they become serious obstacles and cannot be pa.s.sed until the waters retire.

The ascent from the east through the Khojak Pa.s.s is easy, the descent on the west very precipitous. A thirteen-foot cart road was made, over the entire length of twenty miles, by General Biddulph in 1878-9, by which the first wheeled vehicles, which ever reached Khora.s.san from India, pa.s.sed.

From Kandahar (elsewhere described)--which is considered by General Hamley and other authorities, one of the most important strategic points in any scheme of permanent defence for India--diverge two main roads: one a continuation of the Quetta-Herat route bearing N.W., and one running N.E. to Kabul.

Gen. Biddulph says: "The position of Kandahar near to the slopes of the range to the westward of the city renders it impossible to construct works close at hand to cover the road from Herat. The high ridge and outlying hills dividing Kandahar and its suburbs from the Argandab valley completely command all the level ground between the city and the pa.s.s. Beyond the gap a group of detached mountains extends, overlooking the approaches, and follows the left bank of the Argandab as far down as Panjwai, fifteen miles distant.

Positions for defensive works must be sought, therefore, in front of that place on the right bank of the river. To the N.E. of Kandahar the open plain affords situations for forts, well removed from the hills, at a short distance, and at Akhund Ziarut, thirty miles on the road to Ghazni, there is a gorge which would, if held, add to security on that quarter."

The country between Kandahar and the Helmund has the same general characteristics--plains and mountain spurs alternately,--and while generally fit for grazing is, except in a few spots, unfit for cultivation.

According to the eminent authority just quoted, the great natural strategic feature of this route is the elevated position of Atta Karez, thirty-one miles from Kandahar. He says: "On the whole road this is the narrowest gateway, and this remarkable feature and the concentration of roads [Footnote: The roads which meet at Atta Karez are: the great Herat highway pa.s.sing through Kokeran and crossing the Argandab opposite Sinjari, whence it lies along the open plain all the way to Atta Karez; the road which crosses the Argandab at Panjwai; and the road from Taktipul towards Herat.] here, give to Atta Karez a strategic importance unequalled by any other spot between India and Central Asia."

General Biddulph examined this position carefully in 1879, and discovered a site for a work which would command the valley of the Argandab and sweep the elevated open plain toward the west and northwest.

Abbaza is a village at the crossing of the Herat road over the Helmund, forty-six miles west of Atta Karez. On the west bank lies the ancient castle of Girishk. The country between the Argandab and the Helmund is rolling and inclining gradually from the hills toward the junction of these rivers. The plateau opposite Girishk is 175 feet above the river, which it commands.

The Helmund has already been described. There are numerous fords, but, at certain times, bridges would be required for military purposes. The land in the vicinity of the Helmund is very fertile and seamed with irrigating ca.n.a.ls.

From Girishk a road _via_ Was.h.i.+r runs through the hills to Herat; this is said to be cool, well supplied with water and grazing, and is a favorite military route. A road, parallel, to the south, goes through Farrah, beyond which both roads blend into one main road to the "Key." Still another road, by Bost, Rudbar, and Lash, along the course of the river, exists. Although not so direct, it is an important route to Herat; upon this road stand the ruins of the ancient city of Bost in a wonderful state of preservation; here, as elsewhere in this region, the remains of fortifications testify to the former military importance of the spot. The citadel of Bost is built on the debris of extensive works and rises 150 feet above the river.

_British Generals_.--Perhaps the most prominent of modern British commanders, next to Lord Wolseley--is the young and successful soldier, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, G.C.B., C.I.E., commanding the Anglo-Indian Army of the Madras Presidency. He has already seen service in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and has been appointed to the command of one of the princ.i.p.al divisions of the British forces intended to oppose the threatened advance of the Russians on Herat. It was said of him by one of the most brilliant military leaders of the age,--Skobeleff: "For General Roberts I have a great admiration. He seems to me to possess all the qualities of a great general. That was a splendid march of his from Kabul to Kandahar. I think more highly of him than I do of Sir Garnet Wolseley, but there is this to be said of _all_ your generals, they have only fought against Asiatic and savage foes. They have not commanded an army against a European enemy, and we cannot tell, therefore, what they are really made of."

The Commander-in-chief of the Army of India, General Sir Donald M.

Stewart, G.C.B., C.I.E., to whom has been intrusted the conduct of the British forces in Afghanistan, is also a very distinguished and experienced officer--probably more familiar with the nature of the probable field of operations than any other in Her Majesty's Service.

Like the United States, the great latent power of England is indisputable, and so long as superiority at sea is maintained, time is given to render that latent power active. For the first year of the coming struggle England must lean heavily upon her navy. Nearly all the regiments of infantry are below the average peace limit, and if filled up simultaneously to a maximum war strength will include more than fifty per cent, of imperfectly trained men, and as the practice has been to fill up those corps ordered abroad with men transferred from other small regiments, it may come to pa.s.s that so-called "regular" regiments will consist largely of raw material.

Colonel Trench of the British Army says "the organization of the regular cavalry is very defective," and especially complains of the maladministration we have just noted. Demands for cavalry for the Soudan were met by a heavy drain on the already depleted strength of regiments in England. The Fifth Dragoon Guards, which stood next on the roster for foreign service, gave away nearly two hundred horses and one hundred men. Colonel Trench says that the reserve cavalry have no training, and that there is no reserve of horses. It is doubtful if more than seventy per cent. of the enlisted strength and fifty per cent. of the horses, on paper, could be put in the field now.

Allusion has already been made to the notorious weakness of the British transport system. [Footnote: Captain Gaisford, who commanded the Khaiber Levies in the Afghan campaign, recommended reforms in the system of transport and supply. He advocated certain American methods, as wind and water-mills to crush and cleanse the petrified and gravelled barley, often issued, and to cut up the inferior hay; the selection of transport employes who understand animals; and more care in transporting horses by sea.] If this has been the case in the numerous small wars in which her forces have been engaged for the last twenty-five years, what may be expected from the strain of a great international campaign.

On the other hand, Great Britain can boast of an inexhaustible capital, not alone of the revenues which have been acc.u.mulating during the last quarter of a century, but of patriotism, physical strength, courage, and endurance, peculiar to a race of conquerors.

IV.

THE RUSSIAN FORCES AND APPROACHES.

A mere glance at the ponderous military machine with which Russia enforces law and order within her vast domain, and by which she preserves and extends her power, is all that we can give here.

No army in the world has probably undergone, within the last thirty years, such a succession of extensive alterations in organization, in administrative arrangements, and in tactical regulations, as that of Russia. The Crimean War surprised it during a period of transition. Further changes of importance were carried out after that war. Once more, in 1874, the whole military system was remodelled, while ever since the Peace of San Stefano, radical reforms have been in progress, and have been prosecuted with such feverish haste, that it is difficult for the observer to keep pace with them. [Footnote: Sir L. Graham (_Journal Royal U. S.

Inst.i.tution_).]

The military system of Russia is based upon the principles of universal liability to serve and of territorial distribution. This applies to the entire male population, with certain exemptions or modifications on the ground, respectively, of age or education.

Annually there is a "lot-drawing," in which all over twenty, who have not already drawn lots, must take part. Those who draw blanks are excused from service with the colors, but go into the last reserve, or "Opoltschenie."

The ordinary term of service is fifteen years,--six with the colors and nine with the reserves; a reduction is made for men serving at remote Asiatic posts; the War Office may send soldiers into the reserve before the end of their terms. Reduction is also made, from eleven to thirteen years and a half, for various degrees of educational acquirement. Exemptions are also made for family reasons and on account of peculiar occupation or profession. Individuals who personally manage their estates or direct their own commercial affairs (with the exception of venders of strong liquors) may have their entry into service postponed two years. Men are permitted to volunteer at seventeen (with consent of parents or guardians); all volunteers serve nine years in the reserve; those joining the Guards or cavalry must maintain themselves at their own expense. The total contingent demanded for army and navy in 1880 was 235,000, and 231,961 were enrolled; of this deficit of 3,039, the greater number, 3,000, were Jews.

_Organization_.--The Emperor is the Commander-in-Chief, who issues orders through the War Ministry, whose head is responsible for the general efficiency of the Army. There is also the "Imperial Head-quarters," under a general officer who, in the absence of the War Minister, takes the Emperor's orders and sees to their execution. The War Council, presided over by the War Minister, supervises all financial matters in connection with the army. There are also a High Court of Appeals, and the Head-quarters Staff, who supervise the execution of all military duties. Commissariat, artillery, engineer, medical, military education, Cossack, and judge-advocate departments complete the list of bureaus.

The military forces are arranged into nineteen army corps: five comprise three divisions of infantry; one, two divisions of cavalry; the remainder, two divisions of cavalry and one of infantry; with a due proportion of light artillery and engineers the war strength of an army corps is 42,303 combatants, 10,755 horses, and 108 guns.

When war is declared an army is formed of two or more corps. The general commanding exercises supreme control, civil and military, if the force enters the enemy's country. His staff are detailed much as usual at an American army head-quarters in the field.

There are in the active army--_Infantry_: 768 battalions (192 regiments, 48 divisions), 54 batt. riflemen. _Cavalry_: 56 regular regiments (4 cuira.s.siers, 2 uhlans, 2 hussars, 48 dragoons); 29 regt. Cossacks, divided into 20 divisions, kept in time of peace at 768 men (864 with sub-officers) per regiment. _Artillery_: 51 brigades, or 303 batteries of 8 guns each; 30 horse-batteries of 6 guns each; besides 14 batteries with Cossack divisions. Fifty "parks" and 20 sections of "parks" supply each infantry brigade and cavalry division with cartridges.

THE LAND FORCES OF RUSSIA.

[Footnote: Approximately from latest (1884-85) returns. (Combatants only.)]

EUROPE.

Field Troops PEACE.

Engineers. 21,335 Cavalry. 52,902 Infantry. 49,581 Artillery. 323,701 Total. 447,519 Horses. 71,565 Guns. 1,188 WAR.

Total. 821,243 Horses. 155,149 Guns. 2,172

Reserve, Fortress, and Depot Troops PEACE.

Engineers. - Cavalry. 10,504 Infantry. 23,704 Artillery. 54,995 Total. 89,203 Horses. 8,703 Guns. 144 WAR.

Total. 891,404 Horses. 109,822 Guns. 1,236