Memoirs, Correspondence and Manuscripts of General Lafayette Part 30

TO GENERAL WAs.h.i.+NGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

On board the _Dolphin_, March 9th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Here I am at the mouth of Elk River, and the fleet under my command will proceed to Annapolis, where I am a.s.sured they can go without danger. They are protected by the _Nesbitt_, of twelve guns, some field-pieces on board the vessel that carries Colonel Stevens, and we are going to meet an eight-gun and a six-gun-vessel from Baltimore.

With this escort, we may go as far as Annapolis. No vessel of the enemy ever ventured so far up, and if by chance they should, our force is superior to any cruizer they have in the bay. At Annapolis we shall meet Commodore Nicholson, whom I have requested, by a letter, to take the general command of our fleet, and if there was the least danger, to proceed farther down. They are to remain at Annapolis until I send them new orders.

As to myself, my dear general, I have taken a small boat armed with swivels, and on board of which I have put thirty soldiers. I will precede the fleet to Annapolis, where I am to be met by intelligence, and conformable to the state of things below, will determine my personal movements and those of the fleet.

With a full conviction that (unless you arrived in time at Rhode Island) no frigate will be sent to us I think it my duty to the troops I command, and the country I serve, to overlook some little personal danger, that I may ask for a frigate myself; and in order to add weight to my application, I have clapped on board my boat the only son of the minister of the French Navy, whom I shall take out to speak if circ.u.mstances require it.

Our men were much crowded at first, but I unload the vessels as we go along, and take possession of every boat that comes in my way.

These are, my dear general, the measures I thought proper to take. The detachment is, I hope, free from danger, and my caution on this point has been so far as to be called timidity by every seaman I have consulted. Captain Martin, of the _Nesbitt_, who has been recommended by General Gist, makes himself answerable for the safe arrival of the fleet at Annapolis before to-morrow evening.

I have the honour to be, &c.

TO GENERAL WAs.h.i.+NGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Williamsburg, March the 23rd 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--By former letters your excellency has been acquainted with my motions, from my arrival at the head of Elk to the time of my landing at this place. The march of the detachment to Elk had been very rapid and performed in the best order. Owing to the activity of Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens, a train of artillery had been provided at Philadelphia, and notwithstanding some disappointments, namely, that relating to the want of vessels, no delay should have been imputed to us in this co-operation. Having received your excellency's letter, by which the sailing of the French fleet became a matter of certainty, I determined to transport the detachment to Annapolis, and did it for many essential reasons. The navigation of the bay is such that the going in and the going out of Elk River requires a different wind from those which are fair to go up and down the bay. Our stopping at Annapolis, and making some preparations on the road to Carolina, might be of use to deceive the enemy. But above all, I thought, with your excellency, that it was important, both to the success of the operation and the honour of our arms, that the detachment should be brought to cooperate, and from the time when the French were to sail and the winds that blew for some days, I had no doubt but that our allies were in the Chesapeak, before we could arrive at Annapolis.

Owing to the good disposition of Commodore Nicholson, whom I requested to take charge of our small fleet, the detachment was safely lodged in the harbour of Annapolis; and in the conviction that my presence here was necessary, not so much for preparations which Baron de Steuben provided, as for settling our plans with the French, and obtaining an immediate convoy for the detachment, I thought it better to run some risk than to neglect anything that could forward the success of the operation, and the glory of the troops under my command.

On my arrival at this place, I was surprised to hear that no French fleet had appeared, but attributed it to delays and chances so frequent in naval matters. My first object was to request that nothing be taken for this expedition which could have been intended for, or useful to, the southern army, whose welfare appeared to me more interesting than our success. My second object has been to examine what had been prepared, to gather and forward every requisite for a vigorous co-operation, besides a number of militia amounting to five thousand; I can a.s.sure your excellency that nothing has been wanting to ensure a complete success.

As the position of the enemy had not yet been reconnoitred, I went to General Muhlenberg's camp, near Suffolk, and after he had taken a position nearer to Portsmouth, we marched down with some troops to view the enemy's works. This brought on a trifling skirmish; during which we were able to see something; but the insufficiency of ammunition, which had been for many days expected, prevented my engaging far enough to push the enemy's outposts, and our reconnoitring was postponed to the 21st,--when, on the 20th, Major MacPherson, an officer for whom I have the highest confidence and esteem, sent me word from Hampton, where he was stationed, that a fleet had come to anchor within the Capes. So far it was probable that this fleet was that of M. Destouches, that Arnold himself appeared to be in great confusion, and his vessels, notwithstanding many signals, durst not, for a long time, venture down.

An officer of the French navy bore down upon them from York, and nothing could equal my surprise in hearing from Major MacPherson, that the fleet announced by a former letter certainly belonged to the enemy.

Upon this intelligence, the militia were removed to their former position, and I requested Baron de Steuben (from whom, out of delicacy, I would not take the command until the co-operation was begun, or the continental troops arrived) to take such measures as would put out of the enemy's reach the several articles that had been prepared. On my return to this place, I could not hear more particular accounts of the fleet. Some people think they are coming from Europe; but I believe them to be the fleet from Gardiner's Bay. They are said to be twelve sail in all, frigates included. I have sent spies on board and shall forward their report to head-quarters.

Having certain accounts that the French had sailed on the 8th, with a favourable wind, I must think that they are coming to this place, or were beaten in an engagement, or are gone somewhere else. In these three cases, I think it my duty to stay here until I hear something more, which must be in a little time. But as your excellency will certainly recal a detachment composed of the flower of each regiment, whose loss would be immense to the army under your immediate command, and as my instructions are to march them back as soon as we lose the naval superiority in this quarter, I have sent them orders to move at the first notice which I will send to-morrow or the day after, or upon a letter from your excellency, which my aide-de-camp is empowered to open.

Had I not been here upon the spot, I am sure that I should have waited an immense time before I knew what to think of this fleet, and my presence at this place was the speediest means of forwarding the detachment either to Hampton or your excellency's immediate army.

By private letters, we hear that General Greene had, on the 19th, an engagement with Lord Cornwallis. The honour of keeping the field was not on our side. The enemy lost more men than we did. General Greene displayed his usual prudence and abilities, both in making his dispositions and posting his troops at ten miles from the first field of battle, where they bid defiance to the enemy, and are in a situation to check his progress.

FROM GENERAL WAs.h.i.+NGTON TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

New Windsor, 6th April, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,--Since my letter to you of yesterday,~[1] I have attentively considered of what vast importance it will be to reinforce General Greene as speedily as possible; more especially as there can be little doubt that the detachment under General Phillips, if not part of that now under the command of General Arnold, will ultimately join, or in some degree co-operate with Lord Cornwallis. I have communicated to the general officers at present with the army my sentiments on the subject; and they are unanimously of opinion that the detachment under your command should proceed and join the southern army. Your being already three hundred miles advanced, which is nearly half way, is the reason that operates against any which can be offered in favour of marching that detachment back. You will therefore, immediately at the receipt of this, turn the detachment to the southward. Inform General Greene that you are upon your march to join him, and take his directions as to your route, when you begin to approach him. Previously to that, you will be guided by your own judgment, and by the roads on which you will be most likely to find subsistence for the troops and horses. It will be well to advise Governor Jefferson of your intended march through the state of Virginia, or, perhaps, it will answer a good purpose were you to go forward to Richmond yourself, after putting the troops in motion, and having made some necessary arrangement for their progress.

You will take with you the light artillery and smallest mortars, with their stores and the musket cartridges. But let these follow, under a proper escort, rather than impede the march of the detachment, which ought to move as expeditiously as possible without injury to them. The heavy artillery and stores you will leave at some proper and safe place, if it cannot be conveniently transported to Christiana River, from whence it will be easily got to Philadelphia. You may leave to the option of Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens to proceed or not, as he may think proper; his family is in peculiar circ.u.mstances, and he left it with the expectation of being absent for a short time. Should there be other officers under similar circ.u.mstances, you may make them the same offers, and they shall be relieved.

I am, my dear marquis, yours, &c.

Footnote:

1. This related merely to the expedition which had lately failed.

Was.h.i.+ngton deplored its result, which had been occasioned by maritime events, but he approved and eulogised the conduct of M. de Lafayette.

TO GENERAL WAs.h.i.+NGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Elk, April 8th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Your excellency's letters of the 5th and 6th instant are just come to hand, and before I answer their contents, I beg leave to give you a summary account of the measures I have lately taken. As to the part of my conduct you have been acquainted with, I am happy, my dear general, to find it has met with your approbation.

When the return of the British fleet put it out of doubt that nothing could be undertaken for the present against Portsmouth, I sent pressing orders to Annapolis, in order to have everything in readiness, and even to move the troops by land to the Head-of-Elk. I myself hastened back to Maryland, but confess I could not resist the ardent desire I had of seeing your relations, and, above all, your mother, at Fredericksburg.

For that purpose I went some miles out of my way, and, in order to conciliate my private happiness to duties of a public nature, I recovered by riding in the night those few hours which I had consecrated to my satisfaction. I had also the pleasure of seeing Mount Vernon, and was very unhappy that my duty and my anxiety for the execution of your orders prevented my paying a visit to Mr. Curtis.~[1]

On my arrival at Annapolis, I found that our preparations were far from promising a speedy departure. The difficulty of getting wagons and horses is immense. No boats sufficient to cross over the ferries. The state is very desirous of keeping us as long as possible, as they were scared by the apparition of the _Hope_, twenty guns, and the _Monk_, eighteen guns, who blockaded the harbour, and who (as appeared by intercepted letters) were determined to oppose our movements.

In these circ.u.mstances, I thought it better to continue my preparations for a journey by land, which, I am told, would have lasted ten days, on account of ferries, and, in the meanwhile, had two eighteen-pounders put on board a small sloop, which appeared ridiculous to some, but proved to be of great service. In the morning of the 6th, Commodore Nicholson went out with the sloop and another vessel, full of men. Whether the sound of eighteen pounders, or the fear of being boarded, operated upon the enemy, I am not able to say; but, after some manoeuvres, they retreated so far as to render it prudent for us to sail to this place. Every vessel with troops and stores was sent in the night by the commodore, to whom I am vastly obliged; and having brought the rear with the sloop and other vessels, I arrived this morning at Elk. It is reported that the s.h.i.+ps have returned to their stations; if so, they must have been reinforced; their commander had already applied for an augmentation of force.

Before I left Annapolis, hearing that General Greene was in want of ammunition, I took the liberty of leaving for the southern army four six-pounders, with three hundred rounds each, nearly a hundred thousand cartridges, and some small matters, which I left to the care of the governor and General Smallwood, requesting them to have wagons and horses impressed, to send them to a place of safety, where they must be by this time. I also wrote to the governor of Virginia, to General Greene, and the baron. These stores will set off in a few days, under the care of a detachment, for the Maryland line, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart.

In consequence of previous orders, everything was in readiness for our movement. The troops were ordered to march the next morning, and I expect a sufficiency of vessels is now at Wilmington or Christiana Creek; so that I am in hopes to join your excellency in a very few days.

Your letter of the 6th, ordering me to the southward, is just come to hand. Had I been still at Annapolis, or upon the road by land, and of course with the same means to return that I had to advance, your commands should have been immediately obeyed; but necessity keeps us here for some days, and as your letters arrived in two days, your answer to this must be here before we are in a situation to move.

When your excellency wrote to me, I was supposed to be at Annapolis, or very near that place, with the means of returning, which makes a great difference. Another circ.u.mstance, still more material, is, that, instead of joining either Arnold or Phillips (if Phillips be there), Lord Cornwallis is so disabled as to be forced to a retreat, as appears from General Greene's letter.

To these considerations I have added this one, which is decisive: that being fitted only to march twelve miles, part of it in the State of Delaware, and a part of our provisions being asked for from Philadelphia, it is impossible to have the necessary apparatus to march and subsist, or to cross ferries on our way to the southern army, so as to leave this place under four or five days. As to a transportation through the bay, we cannot expect the same good luck of frightening an enemy, who must know how despicable our preparations are; and we must, at least, wait for the return of look-out boats which, if sent immediately, will not possibly return under five or six days.

In these circ.u.mstances, my dear general, I am going to make every preparation to march to Virginia, so as to be ready as soon as possible.

I shall keep here the vessels, and will also keep those which have been ordered to Christiana Creek. This state of suspense will distract the enemy's conjectures, and put me in a situation to execute your excellency's orders, which will be here before I can be able to move with any degree of advantage towards the southward.

Had it been possible to obey to-morrow morning, I would have done it immediately; but since I am obliged to make preparations, I beg leave to make these observations, which I should have been allowed to present, had I been at the meeting of general officers.

The troops I have with me being taken from every northern regiment, have often (though without mentioning it) been very uneasy at the idea of joining the southern army. They want clothes; shoes particularly; they expect to receive clothes and money from their states. This would be a great disappointment for both officers and men. Both thought at first they were sent out for a few days, and provided themselves accordingly; both came cheerfully to this expedition, but both have had already their fears at the idea of going to the southward. They will certainly obey, but they will be unhappy, and some will desert.

Had this corps considered themselves as light infantry, destined for the campaign, to be separated from their regiments, it would be attended with less inconveniences; and such a corps, in the course of the campaign, might be brought there without difficulty, particularly by water, as they would be prepared accordingly.

Supposing the Jersey line were to join the detachment of their troops at this place, it would hardly make any difference, as we have been but five days coming from Morristown to the Head-of-Elk.