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Therefore it is superfluous to say that G.o.d is present in things by His essence, presence and power.
Obj. 3: Further, as G.o.d by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power.
Obj. 4: Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if G.o.d is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special mode of G.o.d's existence in things.
_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that, "G.o.d by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace." [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].
_I answer that,_ G.o.d is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way G.o.d is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later (Q. 12). He is said to be thus in the saints by grace.
But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house.
Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these it is necessary to say that G.o.d is in all things by His power.
But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider ... and He walketh,' etc.]"
(Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that G.o.d is in all things by His presence.
Further, others said that, although all things are subject to G.o.d's providence, still all things are not immediately created by G.o.d; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things by His essence.
Therefore, G.o.d is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being.
Reply Obj. 2: A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.
Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in G.o.d than G.o.d in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to another.
Reply Obj. 4: No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders G.o.d present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore only grace const.i.tutes a special mode of G.o.d's existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of G.o.d's existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (Part III).
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 4]
Whether to Be Everywhere Belongs to G.o.d Alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to G.o.d alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is G.o.d, as appears from what is said above (Q. 3). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to G.o.d alone.
Obj. 2: Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is const.i.tuted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom (Wis. 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere.
Obj. 3: Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body"
(Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to G.o.d alone.
Obj. 4: Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere does not appear to belong to G.o.d alone.
Obj. 5: Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts."
Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to G.o.d alone.
Obj. 6: Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire s.p.a.ce of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and always is, which a.s.suredly belongs to the divinity alone?"
_I answer that,_ To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to G.o.d. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to G.o.d alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that G.o.d should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to G.o.d and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, G.o.d must be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to His very self.
Reply Obj. 1: The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.
Reply Obj. 2: Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.
Reply Obj. 3: The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would not be in them.
Reply Obj. 4: If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts.
Reply Obj. 5: Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.
Reply Obj. 6: When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere"
determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to exist do not import an act pa.s.sing to an exterior object. In another sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere.
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QUESTION 9
THE IMMUTABILITY OF G.o.d (In Two Articles)
We next consider G.o.d's immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of G.o.d there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether G.o.d is altogether immutable?
(2) Whether to be immutable belongs to G.o.d alone?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 9, Art. 1]
Whether G.o.d is altogether immutable?
Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit, viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore G.o.d is in some way mutable.
Obj. 2: Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active [Vulg. 'mobilior']" (Wis. 7:24). But G.o.d is wisdom itself; therefore G.o.d is movable.
Obj. 3: Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of G.o.d in Scripture, "Draw nigh to G.o.d and He will draw nigh to you" (James 4:8). Therefore G.o.d is mutable.
_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not"
(Malachi 3:6).
_I answer that,_ From what precedes, it is shown that G.o.d is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call G.o.d; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for G.o.d to be in any way changeable.
Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and pa.s.ses away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown above (Q. 3, A. 7) that in G.o.d there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that G.o.d cannot be moved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously.
But since G.o.d is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle was immovable.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because G.o.d understands and loves Himself, in that respect they said that G.o.d moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.
Reply Obj. 2: Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist.
And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which partic.i.p.ate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which partic.i.p.ate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth.
In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light.
Reply Obj. 3: These things are said of G.o.d in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according as its rays reach the house, so G.o.d is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, or decline from Him.