Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 4

In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appet.i.te, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a partic.i.p.ated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end.

But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which const.i.tutes happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which const.i.tutes happiness is something outside the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what const.i.tutes happiness is a good of the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases.

As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friends.h.i.+p there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.

Reply Obj. 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which const.i.tutes happiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 8]

Whether Any Created Good Const.i.tutes Man's Happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that some created good const.i.tutes man's happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom "unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things,"

from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness.

Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, A. 1), it seems that man's happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.

Obj. 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.

Obj. 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good surpa.s.sing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which surpa.s.ses the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good const.i.tutes man's happiness.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is the life of the body, so G.o.d is man's life of happiness: of Whom it is written: 'Happy is that people whose G.o.d is the Lord' (Ps.

143:15)."

_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any created good to const.i.tute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appet.i.te altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man's appet.i.te, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in G.o.d alone; because every creature has goodness by partic.i.p.ation. Wherefore G.o.d alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore G.o.d alone const.i.tutes man's happiness.

Reply Obj. 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good.

Reply Obj. 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to G.o.d, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but G.o.d himself.

Reply Obj. 3: Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the partic.i.p.ated good which is in an angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.

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QUESTION 3

WHAT IS HAPPINESS (In Eight Articles)

We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it.

Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?

(2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?

(3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part?

(4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will?

(5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect?

(6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?

(7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels?

(8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of G.o.d seen in His Essence?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 1]

Whether Happiness Is Something Uncreated?

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that G.o.d is happiness itself."

Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to G.o.d to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an end, but to G.o.d, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr.

Christ. i, 5, 22). Therefore happiness is the same as G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3): "Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore happiness is not something uncreated.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable.

In the first sense, then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, G.o.d, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will. But in the second way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something created.

Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or partic.i.p.ation of something else, but by His Essence.

On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by partic.i.p.ation; just as they are called "G.o.ds," by partic.i.p.ation.

And this partic.i.p.ation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created.

Reply Obj. 2: Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.

Reply Obj. 3: Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 2]

Whether Happiness Is an Operation?

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle says (Rom. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very being of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an operation.

Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But state does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Obj. 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Obj. 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does not remain, but pa.s.ses. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Obj. 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.