Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 46

Reply Obj. 1: This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply.

Reply Obj. 3: He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will the good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not follow that he loves another more than himself.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 4]

Whether Zeal Is an Effect of Love?

Objection 1: It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (1 Cor.

3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention," etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be jealous of (_zelare_) their wives, because they will not share them with others.

Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.

Obj. 3: Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there without love: for it is written (Ps. 72:3): "I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked." Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of hatred.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "G.o.d is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love for all things."

_I answer that,_ Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object loved," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove everything that opposes it.

But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence, and love of friends.h.i.+p. For in love of concupiscence he who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest a.s.sociation with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive individual rights.

In like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, as though these were a hindrance to their excelling.

And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written (Ps. 36:1): "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy (_zelaveris_) them that work iniquity."

On the other hand, love of friends.h.i.+p seeks the friend's good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on G.o.d's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the honor or will of G.o.d; according to 3 Kings 19:14: "With zeal I have been zealous for the Lord of hosts." Again on the words of John 2:17: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a man is eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it."

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking in this pa.s.sage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it.

Reply Obj. 2: Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this communication, becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good.

But through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot, in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does not arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in their entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; except perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it.

Reply Obj. 3: The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down as an effect of love rather than of hatred.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 5]

Whether Love Is a Pa.s.sion That Wounds the Lover?

Objection 1: It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor denotes a hurt in the one that languishes. But love causes languor: for it is written (Cant 2:5): "Stay me up with flowers, compa.s.s me about with apples; because I languish with love." Therefore love is a wounding pa.s.sion.

Obj. 2: Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. But love melts that in which it is: for it is written (Cant 5:6): "My soul melted when my beloved spoke." Therefore love is a dissolvent: therefore it is a corruptive and a wounding pa.s.sion.

Obj. 3: Further, fervor denotes a certain excess of heat; which excess has a corruptive effect. But love causes fervor: for Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) in reckoning the properties belonging to the Seraphim's love, includes "hot" and "piercing" and "most fervent."

Moreover it is said of love (Cant 8:6) that "its lamps are fire and flames." Therefore love is a wounding and corruptive pa.s.sion.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "everything loves itself with a love that holds it together," i.e. that preserves it. Therefore love is not a wounding pa.s.sion, but rather one that preserves and perfects.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 26, AA. 1, 2; Q. 27, A. 1), love denotes a certain adapting of the appet.i.tive power to some good. Now nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which is suitable to it; rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to that which is not suitable to it, it is hurt and made worse thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover; but love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover, wounds and worsens him. Wherefore man is perfected and bettered chiefly by the love of G.o.d: but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin, according to Osee 9:10: "They became abominable, as those things which they loved."

And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appet.i.te. But in respect of the material element in the pa.s.sion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through the change of some bodily organ.

In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment, languor, and fervor. Of these the first is "melting," which is opposed to freezing. For things that are frozen, are closely bound together, so as to be hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appet.i.te is fitted to receive the good which is loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover, as stated above (A. 2). Consequently the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with love: while melting denotes a softening of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved. If, then, the beloved is present and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if the beloved be absent, two pa.s.sions arise; viz.

sadness at its absence, which is denoted by "languor" (hence Cicero in _De Tusc. Quaest._ iii, 11 applies the term "ailment" chiefly to sadness); and an intense desire to possess the beloved, which is signified by "fervor." And these are the effects of love considered formally, according to the relation of the appet.i.tive power to its object. But in the pa.s.sion of love, other effects ensue, proportionate to the above, in respect of a change in the organ.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 6]

Whether Love Is Cause of All That the Lover Does?

Objection 1: It would seem that the lover does not do everything from love. For love is a pa.s.sion, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 2). But man does not do everything from pa.s.sion: but some things he does from choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 8.

Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love.

Obj. 2: Further, the appet.i.te is a principle of movement and action in all animals, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 10. If, therefore, whatever a man does is done from love, the other pa.s.sions of the appet.i.tive faculty are superfluous.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore all things are not done from love.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good."

_I answer that,_ Every agent acts for an end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one.

Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection takes love as a pa.s.sion existing in the sensitive appet.i.te. But here we are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love in chapter iv of _De Divinis Nominibus._

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 5; Q. 27, A. 4) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other pa.s.sions of the soul, result from love. Wherefore every act that proceeds from any pa.s.sion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other pa.s.sions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.

Reply Obj. 3: Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state further on (Q. 29, A. 2).

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QUESTION 29

OF HATRED (In Six Articles)

We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred?

(2) Whether love is the cause of hatred?

(3) Whether hatred is stronger than love?

(4) Whether a man can hate himself?

(5) Whether a man can hate the truth?

(6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred?

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