Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 48

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 5]

Whether a Man Can Hate the Truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For good, true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good.

Neither, therefore, can he hate the truth.

Obj. 2: Further, "All men have a natural desire for knowledge," as stated in the beginning of the _Metaphysics_ (i, 1). But knowledge is only of truth. Therefore truth is naturally desired and loved. But that which is in a thing naturally, is always in it. Therefore no man can hate the truth.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love those who are straightforward." But there can be no other motive for this save truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he cannot hate it.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 4:16): "Am I become your enemy because I tell you the truth?" [*St. Thomas quotes the pa.s.sage, probably from memory, as though it were an a.s.sertion: "I am become,"

etc.]

_I answer that,_ Good, true and being are the same in reality, but differ as considered by reason. For good is considered in the light of something desirable, while being and true are not so considered: because good is "what all things seek." Wherefore good, as such, cannot be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular.

Being and truth in general cannot be the object of hatred: because disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of love; while being and truth are common to all things. But nothing hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an object of hatred, in so far as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant; since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible with the notion of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good.

Now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is repugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First, according as truth is in things as in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates a particular truth, when he wishes that what is true were not true.

Secondly, according as truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him from gaining the object loved: such is the case of those who wish not to know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely; in whose person it is said (Job 21:14): "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways."

Thirdly, a particular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as it is in the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone should know the truth about his sin. In this respect, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that men "love truth when it enlightens, they hate it when it reproves." This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself: hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally, the knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as it hinders one from accomplis.h.i.+ng one's desire.

Reply Obj. 3: The reason why we love those who are straightforward is that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of the truth, considered in itself, is a desirable thing.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 6]

Whether Anything Can Be an Object of Universal Hatred?

Objection 1: It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred. Because hatred is a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te, which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred.

Obj. 2: Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be the object of universal hatred.

Obj. 3: Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is in things, and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a universal object.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a thing in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter."

_I answer that,_ There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as man.

If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of apprehension or of appet.i.te, can attain the universal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter, on which every sensitive power is based.

Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appet.i.te, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight is cognizant of universal color, but because the fact that color is cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this particular color, but simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this thing, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal--for instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet.

ii, 4) that "anger is always directed to something singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in general."

But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it can regard the universal in both ways.

Reply Obj. 1: The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but they apprehend something to which the character of universality is given by abstraction.

Reply Obj. 2: That which is common to all cannot be a reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at variance with others, so as to be hateful to them.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the universal under the aspect of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive apprehension or appet.i.te.

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QUESTION 30

OF CONCUPISCENCE (In Four Articles)

We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appet.i.te only?

(2) Whether concupiscence is a specific pa.s.sion?

(3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?

(4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 1]

Whether Concupiscence Is in the Sensitive Appet.i.te Only?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appet.i.te. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according to Wis. 6:21: "The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom." But the sensitive appet.i.te can have no tendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appet.i.te.

Obj. 2: Further, the desire for the commandments of G.o.d is not in the sensitive appet.i.te: in fact the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): "There dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good."

But desire for G.o.d's commandments is an act of concupiscence, according to Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted (_concupivit_) to long for thy justifications." Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appet.i.te.

Obj. 3: Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul, and not only in the sensitive appet.i.te.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided into the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational part of the soul, pa.s.sive and appet.i.tive." Therefore concupiscence is in the sensitive appet.i.te.

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure is twofold, as we shall state later on (Q. 31, AA. 3, 4): one is in the intelligible good, which is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible to the senses. The former pleasure seems to belong to soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body: because the sense is a power seated in a bodily organ: wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word "concupiscentia." Therefore, properly speaking, concupiscence is in the sensitive appet.i.te, and in the concupiscible faculty, which takes its name from it.

Reply Obj. 1: The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain likeness; or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appet.i.te, so that the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following the lead of the higher appet.i.te, the result being that the body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according to Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living G.o.d."

Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the lower, but also in the higher appet.i.te. For it does not imply fellows.h.i.+p in craving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement towards the thing desired.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appet.i.te, which does not arise from apprehension.

But the craving for good, by the animal appet.i.te, which arises from apprehension, belongs to the appet.i.tive power alone. And to crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible power.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 2]

Whether Concupiscence Is a Specific Pa.s.sion?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific pa.s.sion of the concupiscible power. For pa.s.sions are distinguished by their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something delightful to the senses; and this is also the object of concupiscence, as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore concupiscence is not a specific pa.s.sion of the concupiscible faculty.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "covetousness is the love of transitory things": so that it is not distinct from love. But all specific pa.s.sions are distinct from one another.