Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 126

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 79, Art. 4]

Whether Blindness and Hardness of Heart Are Directed to the Salvation of Those Who Are Blinded and Hardened?

Objection 1: It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as G.o.d is supremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could draw some good from every evil." Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the evil of which He Himself is the cause. Now G.o.d is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 1:13) that "G.o.d hath no pleasure in the destruction of the unG.o.dly [*Vulg.: 'G.o.d made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living.']." Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn their blindness to their profit: just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal the invalid when he prescribes a bitter medicine for him. Therefore G.o.d turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded.

Obj. 3: Further, "G.o.d is not a respecter of persons" (Acts 10:34).

Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not to believe in Christ, and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized with compunction, and converted, as related by Augustine (De Quaest. Evang. iii). Therefore G.o.d turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded.

Obj. 4: On the other hand, according to Rom. 3:8, evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore G.o.d does not blind some for the sake of their welfare.

_I answer that,_ Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a twofold relation--to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's d.a.m.nation--to another, by reason of G.o.d's mercy or providence, viz.

that the sinner may be healed, in so far as G.o.d permits some to fall into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the d.a.m.nation of those who are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through G.o.d's mercy, temporary blindness is directed medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom "all things work together unto good" (Rom. 8:28). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their d.a.m.nation; as Augustine says (De Quaest. Evang. iii).

Reply Obj. 1: Every evil that G.o.d does, or permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom the evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice.

Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that ensues from the loss.

Reply Obj. 3: That G.o.d directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of others is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make G.o.d a respecter of persons, as explained in the First Part (Q. 23, A. 5, ad 3).

Reply Obj. 4: Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue; but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good.

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QUESTION 80

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?

(2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?

(3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity?

(4) Whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 80, Art. 1]

Whether the Devil Is Directly the Cause of Man's Sinning?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appet.i.te.

Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his friends with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on Acts 5:3, says that the devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil "fills men's hearts with secret l.u.s.ts." Therefore the devil is directly the cause of sin.

Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that "as G.o.d is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil." But G.o.d is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the _Eudeme[a]n Ethics_ (vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic principle of human counsel." Now human counsel is not only about good things but also about evil things. Therefore, as G.o.d moves man to take good counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly the cause of sin.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that "nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire." Now man does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man's own will alone.

_I answer that,_ Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action is the will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act.

Now the will, as stated above (Q. 9, AA. 3, 4, 6), can be moved by two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appet.i.te: secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or G.o.d, as was shown above (Q. 9, AA. 3, 4, 6). Now G.o.d cannot be the cause of sin, as stated above (Q. 79, A. 1). Therefore it follows that in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin.

As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed to the will: thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fas.h.i.+on, offers the will its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible things, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin, either by offering an object of appet.i.te to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, as stated above (Q. 10, AA.

1, 2). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appet.i.te.

Reply Obj. 1: All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of appet.i.te.

Reply Obj. 2: This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as G.o.d is in a certain way the cause of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of causation: for G.o.d causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly, whereas the devil cannot move us in this way.

Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d is the universal principle of all inward movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appet.i.te.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 80, Art. 2]

Whether the Devil Can Induce Man to Sin, by Internal Instigations?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul are vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal soul, which are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his internal movements.

Obj. 2: Further, all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to G.o.d alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the First Part (Q. 110, A. 4). Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are perceived by the external senses.

Obj. 3: Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with either of these, because, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, AA. 2, 3, ad 2), the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possible for him to produce imaginary species, since imaginary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless, the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we have said in the First Part (Q.

110, A. 2; Q. 111, AA. 2, 3, ad 2). Therefore the devil cannot through man's internal movements induce him to sin.

_On the contrary,_ In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false.

_I answer that,_ The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will. As regards the will, we have already stated (A. 1; I, Q. 111, A. 1) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appet.i.te.

Consequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appet.i.te, by moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the sensitive appet.i.te to some pa.s.sion or other.

The reason of this is, that as stated in the First Part (Q. 110, A.

3), the corporeal nature has a natural apt.i.tude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil.) [*De Insomn. iii, iv.] that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were being affected by them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play.

In like manner, the sensitive appet.i.te is incited to certain pa.s.sions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain pa.s.sions being aroused in the sensitive appet.i.te, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing of a pa.s.sion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a pa.s.sion, whatever the pa.s.sion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be more easily digested.

Reply Obj. 2: This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according to local movement, as explained above.

Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.

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