Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 132

Objection 1: It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to be to an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in _De Anima_ ii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore covetousness is called the "root of all evils," it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice.

Obj. 2: Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from the head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head: so that no sins should be called capital.

Obj. 3: Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 17) enumerates certain special vices under the name of capital.

_I answer that,_ The word capital is derived from _caput_ (a head).

Now the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which is the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even men who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so called, in the first place, from "head" taken in the proper sense, and thus the name "capital" is given to a sin for which capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in another sense, in which the term "capital" is derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of others. In this way a capital vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 6). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their director and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander in matters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 17) compares these capital vices to the "leaders of an army."

Reply Obj. 1: The term "capital" is taken from _caput_ and applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which have the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the "root," and pride which is called the beginning, but also those which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins.

Reply Obj. 2: Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from G.o.d, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine (De Natura Boni iv), is "the privation of mode, species and order."

But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it regards some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin.

Reply Obj. 3: This objection considers capital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 84, Art. 4]

Whether the Seven Capital Vices Are Suitably Reckoned?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, l.u.s.t. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four princ.i.p.al virtues, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 2). Therefore there are only four princ.i.p.al or capital vices.

Obj. 2: Further, the pa.s.sions of the soul are causes of sin, as stated above (Q. 77). But there are four princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions of the soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins, whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and l.u.s.t, and sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the princ.i.p.al sins are unfittingly enumerated.

Obj. 3: Further, anger is not a princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion. Therefore it should not be placed among the princ.i.p.al vices.

Obj. 4: Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above (A. 2). But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices.

Obj. 5: Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g.

steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enumerated.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. x.x.xi, 17).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this kind of origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come under the consideration of art, because man's particular dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relations.h.i.+p of the ends to one another: and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration of art.

Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appet.i.te; and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing moves the appet.i.te in two ways. First, directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appet.i.te to seek it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appet.i.te to avoid it.

Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil.

Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility, merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is sought inordinately by _vainglory._ Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation of the individual, e.g. meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by _gluttony,_ or the preservation of the species, e.g. s.e.xual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by _l.u.s.t._ Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which _covetousness_ is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils.

Or again, good moves the appet.i.te chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by _pride_ or _vainglory._ Secondly, it implies satiety, which _covetousness_ seeks in riches that give promise thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 7; x, 6, 7, 8 and this _gluttony_ and _l.u.s.t_ pursue.

On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one's own good, and thus we have _sloth,_ which is sadness about one's spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily labor: or else it happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to _envy,_ which is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination with a view to vengeance, it is _anger._ Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appet.i.te to reason, or to the immutable good, which is G.o.d, whereas vice arises from the appet.i.te for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the princ.i.p.al vices to be contrary to the princ.i.p.al virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: Fear and hope are irascible pa.s.sions. Now all the pa.s.sions of the irascible part arise from pa.s.sions of the concupiscible part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital sins, as being the most important of the pa.s.sions, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 3: Although anger is not a princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special kind of movement in the appet.i.te, in so far as recrimination against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. of the right to vengeance.

Reply Obj. 4: Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above (A. 2): and it is in the same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being princ.i.p.al. Wherefore pride, like a universal vice, is not counted along with the others, but is reckoned as the "queen of them all," as Gregory states (Moral.

x.x.xi, 27). But covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).

Reply Obj. 5: These vices are called capital because others, most frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor; for the ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2). That a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should not be done that good may come of it.

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QUESTION 85

OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE (In Six Articles)

We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the debt of punishment.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?

(2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?

(3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is stricken in consequence of sin.

(4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?

(5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?

(6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 1]

Whether Sin Diminishes the Good of Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div.

Nom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human nature.

Obj. 2: Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when its accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action.

Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished.

Obj. 3: Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a pa.s.sion. Now no agent is pa.s.sive by the very reason of its acting, although it is possible for it to act on one thing, and to be pa.s.sive as regards another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, diminish the good of his nature.

Obj. 4: Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected to an accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act.

_On the contrary,_ "A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho (Luke 10:30), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts, and wounded in his nature," as Bede [*The quotation is from the _Glossa Ordinaria_ of Strabo] expounds the pa.s.sage. Therefore sin diminishes the good of nature.

_I answer that,_ The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is const.i.tuted, and the properties that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth.

Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as stated above (Q. 60, A. 1; Q. 63, A. 1), this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature.

Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz. the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin.