Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 186

Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious a.s.sistance of G.o.d's grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he felt as though he were walking on roses.

Yet the virtue of fort.i.tude prevents the reason from being entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that "it is not necessary for a brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not to be sad."

Reply Obj. 1: The vehemence of the action or pa.s.sion of one power hinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his senses hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper operation.

Reply Obj. 2: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is princ.i.p.ally the case with fort.i.tude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end."

Reply Obj. 3: In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the presence of great bodily pain.

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NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 9]

Whether Fort.i.tude Deals Chiefly with Sudden Occurrences?

Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude does not deal chiefly with sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when they are unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "fort.i.tude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil."

Therefore fort.i.tude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "The brave man is not unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures beforehand, and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so as to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say afterwards: This befell me because I did not think it could possibly happen." But it is not possible to be prepared for the future in the case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fort.i.tude is not concerned with sudden happenings.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that the "brave man is of good hope." But hope looks forward to the future, which is inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fort.i.tude is not concerned with sudden happenings.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "fort.i.tude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death."

_I answer that,_ Two things must be considered in the operation of fort.i.tude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fort.i.tude is not about sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to Gregory (Hom. xxv in Evang.), "the blow that is foreseen strikes with less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are forearmed with the s.h.i.+eld of foreknowledge." The other thing to be considered in the operation of fort.i.tude regards the display of the virtuous habit: and in this way fort.i.tude is chiefly about sudden occurrences, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) the habit of fort.i.tude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a habit works by way of nature. Wherefore if a person without forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account of some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that habitual fort.i.tude is firmly seated in his mind.

Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of fort.i.tude, to prepare his mind against danger by long forethought: in the same way as a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

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TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 10]

Whether the Brave Man Makes Use of Anger in His Action?

Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his action. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), when a bodily pa.s.sion is in movement, it does not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man should not employ anger for his action.

Obj. 2: Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he should not seek the a.s.sistance of something weaker and more imperfect. Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of fort.i.tude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira i): "Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than for reason to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid, the trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?"

Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger.

Obj. 3: Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of fort.i.tude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow or desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild beasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain, and adulterous persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now fort.i.tude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore in like manner it should not employ anger.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "anger helps the brave."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), concerning anger and the other pa.s.sions there was a difference of opinion between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded anger and all other pa.s.sions of the soul from the mind of a wise or good man: whereas the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed to virtuous men both anger and the other pa.s.sions of the soul albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed not in reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), gave the name of pa.s.sions to all the movements of the sensitive appet.i.te, however they may comport themselves. And since the sensitive appet.i.te is moved by the command of reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt, they held that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the other pa.s.sions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of pa.s.sions to certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appet.i.te, wherefore they called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them altogether from virtue.

Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but not immoderate anger.

Reply Obj. 1: Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is subject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will, which would not be the case were it immoderate.

Reply Obj. 2: Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its a.s.sistance, but because it uses the sensitive appet.i.te as an instrument, just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it unbecoming for the instrument to be more imperfect than the princ.i.p.al agent, even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover, Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed by him directly at Aristotle.

Reply Obj. 3: Whereas fort.i.tude, as stated above (A. 6), has two acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not for the act of endurance, because the reason by itself performs this act, but for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the other pa.s.sions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with fort.i.tude in attacking.

On the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to the thing that hurts; though accidentally it helps in aggression, either as being the cause of anger, as stated above (I-II, Q. 47, A. 3), or as making a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature, tends to a pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to attack, in so far as one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "Of all the cases in which fort.i.tude arises from a pa.s.sion, the most natural is when a man is brave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose,"

i.e. for a due end; "this is true fort.i.tude."

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ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 11]

Whether Fort.i.tude Is a Cardinal Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude is not a cardinal virtue. For, as stated above (A. 10), anger is closely allied with fort.i.tude. Now anger is not accounted a princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion; nor is daring which belongs to fort.i.tude. Therefore neither should fort.i.tude be reckoned a cardinal virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of virtue is good. But the direct object of fort.i.tude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil and toil, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii). Therefore fort.i.tude is not a cardinal virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the cardinal virtues are about those things upon which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon a hinge (_cardine_). But fort.i.tude is about dangers of death which are of rare occurrence in human life. Therefore fort.i.tude should not be reckoned a cardinal or princ.i.p.al virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, and Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), number fort.i.tude among the four cardinal or princ.i.p.al virtues.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), those virtues are said to be cardinal or princ.i.p.al which have a foremost claim to that which belongs to the virtues in common. And among other conditions of virtue in general one is that it is stated to "act steadfastly," according to _Ethic._ ii, 4. Now fort.i.tude above all lays claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands firm is so much the more praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall or recede. Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in accordance with reason, both by the pleasing good and the displeasing evil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly than pleasure. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is none that does not shun pain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that even the most untamed beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain." And among the pains of the mind and dangers those are mostly feared which lead to death, and it is against them that the brave man stands firm. Therefore fort.i.tude is a cardinal virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Daring and anger do not cooperate with fort.i.tude in its act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly commended: for it is by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which is a princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 2: Virtue is directed to the good of reason which it behooves to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fort.i.tude is directed to evils of the body, as contraries which it withstands, and to the good of reason, as the end, which it intends to safeguard.

Reply Obj. 3: Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence, yet the occasions of those dangers occur frequently, since on account of justice which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds, man encounters mortal adversaries.

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TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 12]

Whether Fort.i.tude Excels Among All Other Virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude excels among all other virtues.

For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fort.i.tude is higher, so to speak, than the rest."

Obj. 2: Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good.

But fort.i.tude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his possessions. But fort.i.tude is about a man's person, for it is this that a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue: whereas justice and the other moral virtues are about other and external things. Therefore fort.i.tude is the chief of the moral virtues.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i): "Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man."

Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19): "Those virtues must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others." Now liberality seems to be more useful than fort.i.tude. Therefore it is a greater virtue.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), "In things that are great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good": wherefore the better a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is man's good, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while justice effects this good, since it belongs to justice to establish the order of reason in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this good, inasmuch as they moderate the pa.s.sions, lest they lead man away from reason's good. As to the order of the latter, fort.i.tude holds the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason: and after fort.i.tude comes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in hindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing essentially ranks before effecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by removing obstacles thereto. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues, prudence ranks first, justice second, fort.i.tude third, temperance fourth, and after these the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: Ambrose places fort.i.tude before the other virtues, in respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both in warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he begins by saying (De Offic. i): "Now we come to treat of fort.i.tude, which being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters."

Reply Obj. 2: Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to its goodness rather than its difficulty.

Reply Obj. 3: A man does not expose his person to dangers of death except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise awarded to fort.i.tude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic.

i) that "fort.i.tude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker."