Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 233

Whether One Ought, by Humility, to Subject Oneself to All Men?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3), humility consists chiefly in man's subjection to G.o.d. Now one ought not to offer to a man that which is due to G.o.d, as is the case with all acts of religious wors.h.i.+p. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject oneself to man.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia x.x.xiv): "Humility should take the part of truth, not of falsehood." Now some men are of the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men.

Obj. 3: Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the detriment of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man subject himself to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to whom he subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise the other. Hence Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest through excessive humility the superior lose his authority." Therefore a man ought not, by humility, to subject himself to all.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:3): "In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves."

_I answer that,_ We may consider two things in man, namely that which is G.o.d's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is man's: but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is G.o.d's, according to the saying of Osee 13:9, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me." Now humility, as stated above (A.

1, ad 5; A. 2, ad 3), properly regards the reverence whereby man is subject to G.o.d. Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that which the latter has of G.o.d's: but humility does not require a man to subject what he has of G.o.d's to that which may seem to be G.o.d's in another. For those who have a share of G.o.d's gifts know that they have them, according to 1 Cor. 2:12: "That we may know the things that are given us from G.o.d." Wherefore without prejudice to humility they may set the gifts they have received from G.o.d above those that others appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (Eph.

3:5): "(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it is now revealed to His holy apostles." In like manner, humility does not require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that which his neighbor has of man's: otherwise each one would have to esteem himself a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle says without prejudice to humility (Gal. 2:15): "We by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners." Nevertheless a man may esteem his neighbor to have some good which he lacks himself, or himself to have some evil which another has not: by reason of which, he may subject himself to him with humility.

Reply Obj. 1: We must not only revere G.o.d in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of reverence as we revere G.o.d. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with humility to all our neighbors for G.o.d's sake, according to 1 Pet. 2:13, "Be ye subject ... to every human creature for G.o.d's sake"; but to G.o.d alone do we owe the wors.h.i.+p of latria.

Reply Obj. 2: If we set what our neighbor has of G.o.d's above that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. lx.x.xiii, qu. 71] on Phil. 2:3, "Esteem others better than themselves," says: "We must not esteem by pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for another person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we are, although our own good whereby we are apparently better than he, be not hidden."

Reply Obj. 3: Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may subject himself to another, without giving the other man an occasion of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "With fear, the superior should prostrate himself at your feet in the sight of G.o.d." On the other hand, due moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as of other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If, however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with humility; since he does not give scandal, although others take it.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 4]

Whether Humility Is a Part of Modesty or Temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is subject to G.o.d, as stated above (A. 3). Now it belongs to a theological virtue to have G.o.d for its object. Therefore humility should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of temperance or modesty.

Obj. 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.

Obj. 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not of temperance but of fort.i.tude, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 5).

Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.

_On the contrary,_ Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): "If thou wilt hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the philosophers, know that humility which G.o.d regards is the same as what they called _metriotes_, i.e. measure or moderation." Now this evidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of modesty or temperance.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3, ad 2), in a.s.signing parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the impetuosity of a pa.s.sion. Hence whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man we may call humble.

Moreover, for the reason given above (Q. 160, A. 2), among the various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 3:4): "In the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit."

Reply Obj. 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our last end, which is the first principle in matters of appet.i.te, are the causes of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by reverence for G.o.d does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or temperance.

Reply Obj. 2: Parts are a.s.signed to a princ.i.p.al virtue by reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3, ad 2). Consequently, although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is a.s.signed as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.

Reply Obj. 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a part of fort.i.tude, and humility a part of temperance.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 5]

Whether Humility Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the publican (Luke 18), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi.] that "if humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the angels by the judgment seat of G.o.d." Hence it is clear that humility is set above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all the virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. [*S. 10, C.

1]): "Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality?

Attend first of all to the foundation of humility." Now this would seem to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue.

Therefore apparently it is greater than the other virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward. Now the greatest reward is due to humility, since "he that humbleth himself shall be exalted" (Luke 14:11). Therefore humility is the greatest of virtues.

Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16), "Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through the human nature which He a.s.sumed." Now He especially proposed His humility for our example, saying (Matt. 11:29): "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart." Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 1) that the "lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility of G.o.d." Therefore humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues.

_On the contrary,_ Charity is set above all the virtues, according to Col. 3:14, "Above all ... things have charity." Therefore humility is not the greatest of virtues.

_I answer that,_ The good of human virtue pertains to the order of reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end: wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance, as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but by partic.i.p.ation it is in the appet.i.te ordered by the reason; and this ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice.

Now humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and in all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some special matter. Therefore after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially legal justice, humility stands before all others.

Reply Obj. 1: Humility is not set before justice, but before that justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue; even so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is said of the publican (Luke 18:14) that through the merit of his humility "he went down into his house justified." Hence Chrysostom says [*De incompr. Nat. Dei, Hom. v]: "Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in the one harness pride with justice, in the other sin with humility: and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its own strength, but by that of humility: while you will see the other pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, but by the weight and size of pride."

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the orderly a.s.sembly of virtues is, by reason of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that which is the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now the virtues are in truth infused by G.o.d. Wherefore the first step in the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place, inasmuch as it expels pride, which "G.o.d resisteth," and makes man submissive and ever open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence it is written (James 4:6): "G.o.d resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble." In this sense humility is said to be the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues directly, because it is the first step towards G.o.d. Now the first step towards G.o.d is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh to G.o.d must believe." In this sense faith is the foundation in a more excellent way than humility.

Reply Obj. 3: To him that despises earthly things, heavenly things are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who despise earthly riches, according to Matt. 6:19, 20, "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth ... but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven." Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to those who despise worldly joys, according to Matt. 4:5, "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." In the same way spiritual uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone merits it, but because it is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]): "Think not that he who humbles himself remains for ever abased, for it is written: 'He shall be exalted.' And do not imagine that his exaltation in men's eyes is effected by bodily uplifting."

Reply Obj. 4: The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility to us, was because it especially removes the obstacle to man's spiritual welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual things, in which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were, a disposition to man's untrammeled access to spiritual and divine goods. Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition, so charity, and other virtues whereby man approaches G.o.d directly, are greater than humility.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 6]

Whether Twelve Degrees of Humility Are Fittingly Distinguished in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict?

Objection 1: It would seem that the twelve degrees of humility that are set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict [*St. Thomas gives these degrees in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict]

are unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be "humble not only in heart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the ground"; the second is "to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice"; the third is "not to be easily moved, and disposed to laughter"; the fourth is "to maintain silence until one is asked"; the fifth is "to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery"; the sixth is "to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all"; the seventh is "to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes"; the eighth is "to confess one's sin"; the ninth is "to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circ.u.mstances"; the tenth is "to subject oneself to a superior"; the eleventh is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires"; the twelfth is "to fear G.o.d and to be always mindful of everything that G.o.d has commanded." For among these there are some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience and patience. Again there are some that seem to involve a false opinion--and this is inconsistent with any virtue--namely to declare oneself more despicable than all men, and to confess and believe oneself to be in all ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these are unfittingly placed among the degrees of humility.

Obj. 2: Further, humility proceeds from within to externals, as do other virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which concern outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which pertain to inward actions.

Obj. 3: Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.) gives seven degrees of humility, the first of which is "to acknowledge oneself contemptible"; the second, "to grieve for this"; the third, "to confess it"; the fourth, "to convince others of this, that is to wish them to believe it"; the fifth, "to bear patiently that this be said of us"; the sixth, "to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt"; the seventh, "to love being thus treated." Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous.

Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Matt. 3:15 says: "Perfect humility has three degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are above us, and not to set ourselves above our equals: this is sufficient. The second is to submit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our inferiors; this is called abundant humility. The third degree is to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righteousness." Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous.

Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. x.x.xi): "The measure of humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It is imperiled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to be entrapped." Now the measure of a man's greatness cannot be fixed according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem that it is not possible to a.s.sign the aforesaid degrees to humility.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2) humility has essentially to do with the appet.i.te, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of his soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is in the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be above what we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these things is the reverence we bear to G.o.d. Now the inward disposition of humility leads to certain outward signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that which is hidden within, as happens also with the other virtues. For "a man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, by his countenance" (Ecclus. 19:26).

Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility include something regarding the root of humility, namely the twelfth degree, "that a man fear G.o.d and bear all His commandments in mind."

Again, they include certain things with regard to the appet.i.te, lest one aim inordinately at one's own excellence. This is done in three ways. First, by not following one's own will, and this pertains to the eleventh degree; secondly, by regulating it according to one's superior judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, by not being deterred from this on account of the difficulties and hards.h.i.+ps that come in our way, and this belongs to the ninth degree.

Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man forms in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three ways.

First by acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs to the eighth degree: secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great things, and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, that in this respect one should put others before oneself, and this belongs to the sixth degree.

Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of these regards deeds, namely that in one's work one should not depart from the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others have reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to speak, which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not immoderate in speech, which refers to the second. The others have to do with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks, which regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other signs of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.

Reply Obj. 1: It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow oneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults which we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of G.o.d which others have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): "Bethink you that some persons are in some hidden way better than you, although outwardly you are better than they." Again, without falsehood one may avow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of one's own capability, so as to refer all one's sufficiency to G.o.d, according to 2 Cor. 3:5, "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from G.o.d." And there is nothing unbecoming in ascribing to humility those things that pertain to other virtues, since, just as one vice arises from another, so, by a natural sequence, the act of one virtue proceeds from the act of another.