Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 65

Reply Obj. 4: When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of G.o.d, but of created wisdom given by G.o.d to creatures: for it is said, "He created her [namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all His works" (Ecclus. 1:9, 10). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for wisdom created is a kind of partic.i.p.ation of the uncreated Wisdom.

The saying may also be referred to the created nature a.s.sumed by the Son, so that the sense be, "From the beginning and before the world was I made"--that is, I was foreseen as united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as both created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine generation; for in generation what is generated receives the nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection; whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but the creature does not receive the Creator's nature. Thus the Son is called both created and begotten, in order that from the idea of creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The other pa.s.sages quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the created spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other invisible substance.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 4]

Whether in G.o.d There Is a Power in Respect of the Notional Acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that in G.o.d there is no power in respect of the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or pa.s.sive; neither of which can be here applied, there being in G.o.d nothing which we call pa.s.sive power, as above explained (Q. 25, A.

1); nor can active power belong to one person as regards another, since the divine persons were not made, as stated above (A. 3).

Therefore in G.o.d there is no power in respect of the notional acts.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the divine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary.

Therefore, as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there cannot be power in G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which belongs to the will. But in G.o.d power exists as regards effects, and not as regards intellect and will, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1). Therefore, in G.o.d power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If G.o.d the Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of G.o.d the Father?" Power therefore exists in G.o.d regarding the notional acts.

_I answer that,_ As the notional acts exist in G.o.d, so must there be also a power in G.o.d regarding these acts; since power only means the principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle of spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father, and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power of generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every generator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating.

Reply Obj. 1: As a person, according to notional acts, does not proceed as if made; so the power in G.o.d as regards the notional acts has no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the person as proceeding.

Reply Obj. 2: Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a consequence of a pa.s.sive power, which does not exist in G.o.d. Hence, in G.o.d there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; and in this latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for G.o.d to be, so also is it possible that the Son should be generated.

Reply Obj. 3: Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must observe a double distinction in things said of G.o.d: one is a real distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real distinction, G.o.d by His essence is distinct from those things of which He is the principle by creation: just as one person is distinct from the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in G.o.d the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in G.o.d. And therefore with regard to those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are distinct from G.o.d, either personally or essentially, we may ascribe power to G.o.d in its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to G.o.d the power of creating, so we may ascribe the power of begetting and of spirating. But "to understand" and "to will" are not such actions as to designate the procession of something distinct from G.o.d, either essentially or personally. Wherefore, with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe power to G.o.d in its proper sense, but only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we designate by different terms the intellect and the act of understanding in G.o.d, whereas in G.o.d the act of understanding is His very essence which has no principle.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 5]

Whether the Power of Begetting Signifies a Relation, and Not the Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the power of begetting, or of spirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power signifies a principle, as appears from its definition: for active power is the principle of action, as we find in _Metaph._ v, text 17.

But in G.o.d principle in regard to Person is said notionally.

Therefore, in G.o.d, power does not signify essence but relation.

Obj. 2: Further, in G.o.d, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are not distinct. But in G.o.d, begetting signifies relation. Therefore, the same applies to the power of begetting.

Obj. 3: Further, terms signifying the essence in G.o.d, are common to the three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to the three persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify the essence.

_On the contrary,_ As G.o.d has the power to beget the Son, so also He wills to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence.

Therefore, also, the power to beget.

_I answer that,_ Some have said that the power to beget signifies relation in G.o.d. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is properly called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that produces something by its action, produces something like itself, as to the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power of begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter.

Now the Son of G.o.d is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power of begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): "The birth of G.o.d cannot but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot subsist other than G.o.d, Who subsists from no other source than G.o.d."

We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies princ.i.p.ally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent. i, D, vii), and not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as identified with the relation, so as to signify both equally. For although paternity is signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect to the person of the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature.

Now the individual form in things created const.i.tutes the person begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither can paternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, but as const.i.tuting the person of the Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like to Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that generation is the "work of nature," not of nature generating, but of nature, as being that by which the generator generates. And therefore the power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation indirectly.

Reply Obj. 1: Power does not signify the relation itself of a principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it signifies that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in which we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that by which the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the generator from that which it generates: but that by which the generator generates is common to generated and generator, and so much more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since, therefore, the divine generation is most perfect, that by which the Begetter begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of ident.i.ty, and not only of species, as in things created. Therefore, from the fact that we say that the divine essence "is the principle by which the Begetter begets," it does not follow that the divine essence is distinct (from the Begotten): which would follow if we were to say that the divine essence begets.

Reply Obj. 2: As in G.o.d, the power of begetting is the same as the act of begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as the act of begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of reason.

Reply Obj. 3: When I speak of the "power of begetting," power is signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say, the "essence of the Father." Wherefore in respect of the essence, which is signified, the power of begetting is common to the three persons: but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the person of the Father.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 6]

Whether Several Persons Can Be the Term of One Notional Act?

Objection 1: It would seem that a notional act can be directed to several Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or spirated in G.o.d. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He cannot beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son. Therefore there can be several Sons in G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): "The Son did not beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved Him not."

Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d the Father has greater power to beget than has a created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore G.o.d can also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished after begetting the Son.

_On the contrary,_ In G.o.d "that which is possible," and "that which is"

do not differ. If, therefore, in G.o.d it were possible for there to be several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be more than three Persons in G.o.d; which is heretical.

_I answer that,_ As Athanasius says, in G.o.d there is only "one Father, one Son, one Holy Ghost." For this four reasons may be given.

The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or several Sons in G.o.d, unless there were more than one paternity, or more than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in G.o.d.

Wherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in G.o.d: just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness.

The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For G.o.d understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which person is the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of love, which person is the Holy Ghost.

The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said (A. 2), and nature is determined to one.

The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons.

For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation is contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is similar in regard to the other persons.

Reply Obj. 1: We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the power "generandi" [of begetting] thus taking "generandi" as the gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has the "power to beget." Just as, although Father and Son have the same being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by reason of the notional term added. But if the word "generandi" [of being begotten] is taken as the gerundive of the pa.s.sive verb, the power "generandi" is in the Son--that is, the power of being begotten. The same is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the sense be "the power of generation"--that is, a power by which it is generated by some person.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the Son could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not because He could not, as we shall see later on (Q. 42, A. 6, ad 3).

Reply Obj. 3: Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in G.o.d require that there cannot be several Sons in G.o.d, as we have explained. Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to any lack of begetting power in the Father. _______________________

QUESTION 42

OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS (In Six Articles)

We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another: firstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, with regard to mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry.

(1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons?

(2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He proceeds in eternity?

(3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons?