History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 46

Half battalion 2nd Royal Berks.h.i.+re regiment.

2nd Wilts.h.i.+re regiment.]

CHAPTER XXV.

LORD ROBERTS AT CAPE TOWN; REORGANISES.[284]

[Footnote 284: See maps Nos. 9 and 17.]

[Sidenote: 10th Jan. 1900. Lord Roberts lands. Situation at that date.]

Field-Marshal Lord Roberts landed at Cape Town on the 10th January, 1900, and a.s.sumed the supreme command.

The situation with which he was confronted will be more easily realised if a brief summary be here given of the facts as they now presented themselves at each of the several widely separated points of contact between the opposed forces.

[Sidenote: French before Colesberg.]

[Sidenote: Gatacre at Sterkstroom.]

[Sidenote: Boers in front of him.]

[Sidenote: Mafeking and Kimberley.]

[Sidenote: Natal.]

[Sidenote: Ladysmith.]

As described in detail in the last chapter, the Boer commandos in front of General French having fallen back on Colesberg at the end of December, he had, on the 1st January, seized a group of hills on the south-western edge of the plain in which the town lies, and was continuing his tactics of active defence with constant success, save that a night attack made by the Suffolk regiment on 6th January had been repulsed with somewhat heavy loss. The Cavalry Lieut.-General's never-ceasing energy had not only foiled the enemy in his attempt to advance into the central districts of Cape Colony, but had appreciably diminished the pressure in other portions of the theatre of war.

Gatacre was firmly established at Sterkstroom, with an advanced post at Cypher Gat, the main body of those fronting him remaining pa.s.sively at Stormberg. A Boer commando had made a demonstration towards Molteno on 3rd January, and another party, about the same date, had driven out of Dordrecht a patrol of British mounted troops, which had occupied that place on the 23rd December. At Mafeking and Kimberley the garrisons were still gallantly holding their own against the enemy, although in the latter town the hards.h.i.+ps of the siege were telling much on the spirits of the civilian portion of the population. In Natal the 5th division had landed; and an attack, made by the Boers on Ladysmith on 6th January, had been repulsed after a severe struggle in which the fighting efficiency of the British troops was shown to be unimpaired. Yet disease, coupled with losses in action, was beginning seriously to reduce their effective strength and their capacity for active co-operation in the field with the relief force.

[Sidenote: Boers.]

[Sidenote: In Natal.]

[Sidenote: Cape Colony. 1. With Grobelaar at and near Stormberg. 2.

With Schoeman at Colesberg. 3. Reinforcements on road. 4. With Cronje.

5. With Ferreira before Kimberley. 6. With Snyman before Mafeking, and in the west. 7. Under Botha fronting Plumer.]

The Boer scheme for the whole war still centred on the capture of Ladysmith. For the siege of that town, and for the repulse of the British relieving force, at least 21,000 burghers appear to have been still employed under the supreme command of Joubert. In the western theatre Grobelaar had probably 4,000 men under his control at Stormberg and in the adjacent areas: facing French at Colesberg were some 5,000 men, with Schoeman as leader; Boer reinforcements, gathered from various sources, amounting in all to some 2,000, were on their way, or would shortly be on their way, to that threatened point. The strength of Cronje's commando at Scholtz Nek may be estimated at 8,000, while 3,000 men, under Wessels and Ferreira, were investing Kimberley. Snyman had under his orders some 2,500, most of whom were encircling Mafeking, although a few detachments patrolled and dominated those western districts of Cape Colony which lie to the north of the Orange river. North of the frontier of the colony about 1,000 men, under Commandant Botha, opposed Plumer's efforts to relieve Baden-Powell's garrison from southern Rhodesia. Thus the total effective strength of the Boer forces actually in the field at this time may be approximately set down as nearly 46,500 men. Of these probably 1,000 were Natal rebels, and 5,000 British subjects belonging to Cape Colony, the latter being mainly distributed between the Stormberg, Colesberg, Kimberley, and Mafeking commandos. Of the Boer leaders, some, notably De Wet, had realised the folly of remaining on the defensive, but Joubert, whose appreciation of the conditions of the contest can be judged from his circular letter printed at the close of this chapter, was opposed to any forward movement, and Joubert's views prevailed. Sir Redvers Buller personally, although the Field Intelligence staff in South Africa did not agree with his estimate, a.s.sessed the strength of the enemy in the field at far higher figures than those above given;[285] and on 9th January he telegraphed to the Secretary of State that there was reason to believe that it was not less than 120,000 men, of whom 46,000 were in Natal.

[Footnote 285: The views of the Field Intelligence department as to the actual strength of the enemy may be gathered from Lord Roberts' report to the War Office on 12th January, that in his opinion the total strength against us had never been more than 80,000 men (telegram to Secretary of State for War).]

[Sidenote: Buller's memorandum for Lord Roberts of Dec. 28th/99.]

Lord Roberts received on landing a memorandum, written by Sir R.

Buller at Frere camp on 28th December, the following extracts from which will serve to explain the views of Sir Redvers:

"The whole Tugela river is a strong position; there is no question of turning it; the only open question is whether one part of it is easier to get through than another. I tried Colenso, because, though unaided I could not have forced the defile north of Colenso, it was the only place in the whole line in which Sir George White's force could aid me in my advance from the Tugela. I am now waiting for reinforcements, and am going to try and force a pa.s.sage at Potgieters Drift. If I can find water to use in the subsequent advance, I think I ought to just pull through: but the difficulties are very great. If I succeed, it should be about the 12th January, and if then I join hands with Sir G. White, I think together we shall be able to force the enemy to retire and so free Sir G. White's force."

After stating that, in the event of success in the relief of Ladysmith, he hoped to be able to spare a division from the Natal army, and after referring Lord Roberts to instructions issued from time to time to Sir F. Forestier-Walker as regards the general plan of his operations in the western theatre, Sir R. Buller continued:

"You will see that my original idea was to bring Methuen back, but as his task has grown harder I have proposed a railway to Jacobsdal and thence to Bloemfontein. I think that for many reasons you would find such a line of advance easier and quicker than one up the main railway. Up that line the enemy will have a rail behind them, and will tear it up as you advance, and occupy positions that you must attack and from which they can escape. If I could have had my own way on arrival I should have pushed through Bethulie to Bloemfontein, but the fat was in the fire before I got out. Kimberley I believe will be saved. Ladysmith is a terrible nut to crack, but I hope it will (? be relieved). Then I would propose to attack Bloemfontein from Kimberley, and I think an army holding Bloemfontein based on Kimberley will be better off than one which holds Bloemfontein but has allowed Kimberley to be again invested. Time, after all, is in our favour. The Boers cannot reproduce their horses which are being used up, and if they lose their mobility, they lose their power.

I believe that French and Gatacre are strong enough to prevent the spread of disaffection, and that when the 7th division arrives they will join hands, and the disaffected Dutch will go back to their homes."

[Sidenote: Sir Redvers telegraphs, Jan. 10th, 1900, that he is about to try to reach Ladysmith by Potgieters or Trickhardts.]

This written memorandum was supplemented by a telegram, in which General Buller reported that he was leaving Chieveley the next day (11th January), and would operate towards Ladysmith from Potgieters Drift or Trickhardts Drift. From the larger point of view Lord Roberts would have preferred that the forward movement in Natal should have been delayed a little longer; but he felt that he was not in a position to judge how far Sir R. Buller was committed to an immediate stroke, or whether the situation before him or Ladysmith itself demanded prompt action. He decided, therefore, to give General Buller an absolutely free hand to carry out the operations he had planned.[286]

[Footnote 286: See p. 461, Vol. I., Minutes of Evidence before War Commission.]

[Sidenote: Lord Roberts prepares to carry out his plan of campaign.]

Before he left England Lord Roberts had determined on the line for the advance of the army which he had to command in person. Though in detail his scheme was somewhat modified afterwards, he began to prepare for the execution of it as soon as he had landed. For reasons which will be more fully recorded in his own words, he had decided to choose the route along the western line of railway, on which side alone a bridge over the Orange river was in his possession. In order to possess the freedom of movement essential to the execution of any sound schemes of war, he determined to make such arrangements as would enable him to cast himself loose from the railway and to march across the Free State eastward. His first idea was to strike the central railway as close as possible to Springfontein junction. He believed that the Boers would thus be compelled to evacuate their positions at Stormberg and Colesberg, and to abandon to him the Norval's Pont and Bethulie bridges over the river. The Commander-in-Chief was convinced, moreover, that this course, by menacing Bloemfontein, would oblige the enemy to relax his hold on the Modder river and Natal.[287] But, on the 27th January, increasing anxiety as to Kimberley led him to decide that the prompt relief of that town had become necessary. This involved, not a change of plan, but merely a modification of details.

The initial march eastward was still to be carried out, but as soon as Cronje's flank had thus been effectively pa.s.sed, a wheel northward would bring the British troops athwart the Boer line of communication, and, when the pa.s.sage of the Modder was made, the way to Kimberley would be opened.[288] After relieving Kimberley the Field-Marshal's movements would depend on the situation, as it might then present itself, but should such a march appear possible, he determined to make straight for Bloemfontein.[289] The occupation of that capital would, he thought, make it easy to re-establish direct railway communication with Cape Colony through Norval's Pont and Bethulie. The considerations which guided Lord Roberts to the adoption of this plan, as finally formulated, were explained by him in detail nearly three years later to the War Commission in the following terms:[290]

[Footnote 287: Telegram, Lord Roberts to Secretary of State, 26th January, 1900.]

[Footnote 288: Telegram, Lord Roberts to Secretary of State, 27th January, 1900.]

[Footnote 289: Telegram to Secretary of State, dated 30th January, 1900.]

[Footnote 290: Minutes of Evidence of War Commission, Vol.

I., pp. 460-1.]

"Before leaving England I had practically determined that the advance must be through the Orange Free State, but by one, not by three lines through Cape Colony, as was originally intended;[291]

and the western line commended itself to me for the following reasons:

[Footnote 291: This would seem to be a misapprehension. Sir R. Buller's intention had been to advance by Bethulie (see page 411).]

"1. It was on that line only that we had possession of a railway bridge over the Orange river:

"2. It was by that line only that Kimberley could be relieved in time, and had Kimberley fallen, Mafeking must have fallen also:

"3. It was by that line only I could deal with the Boer forces in detail, and defeat Cronje before he could be reinforced.

[Sidenote: Lord Roberts' explanation why he chose the route he took.]

"Both the Norval's Pont and Bethulie bridges were in the hands of the enemy, and by the time I had forced them back into the Orange Free State, and had been able to repair either of these bridges (which I was certain would be destroyed, and which actually happened), and I had occupied Bloemfontein, I should have between me and Kimberley, not only Cronje, but the whole of the Boer force which was not engaged in Natal. I should have then been obliged either to march across the veld against this increased force, or to have transported the greater portion of my troops by rail to the Modder River camp (if the railway could have been kept intact, which was hardly likely, seeing how weakly it was necessarily guarded and the number of Boers who would have been available to destroy it), and then to turn the Magersfontein position. To carry out either of these operations, and for the onward advance on an extended front to Pretoria, at least the same amount of transport would have been required as was needed for the march from Modder River camp to Bloemfontein. But this would not have been forthcoming had I adopted the railway line to Bloemfontein and not organised the system of transport directly I arrived at the Cape.

"I felt convinced that an advance on Bloemfontein must draw the Free Staters back from Kimberley and Natal, and that the occupation of their capital would render the Boer positions to the south of the Orange river untenable. To carry out this scheme, as large a force as could be collected was necessary, as the enemy had through railway communication (about two days'

journey) between Natal and Bloemfontein, and could transfer a considerable portion of their forces from one of the theatres of the war to the other in infinitely less time than we could.

Moreover, rapidity was essential in concentrating this force and making an advance towards Bloemfontein, as Ladysmith and Kimberley were, so far as I know, only provisioned for a very limited time."

[Sidenote: His reason for deciding against the railway through Jacobsdal.]