A Treatise on the Tactical Use of the Three Arms Part 2

So, at the battle of Mill Springs, in January, 1862, after the combatants had been exchanging musketry fires for several hours without any decisive result, the rebels' left was vigorously charged by the Ninth Ohio with the bayonet. This charge broke the enemy's flank. His whole line gave way in confusion, and the battle was won.

So, at Malvern Hill, in 1862, in several instances, columns of rebels whom a storm of canister and sh.e.l.l had failed to repulse, were driven back and routed by a dash with the bayonet, after a volley poured in at a few yards from the muzzles of the guns.

So, at the battle of Seven Pines, according to General Heintzelman's report, whenever our troops used the bayonet, their loss was comparatively light, and the enemy was driven back, suffering heavily.

3. The bayonet charge, when made from any considerable distance, should be in column; the only formation in which order can be combined with sufficient speed. But, at a short distance, a bayonet charge by a line, instantly after firing a volley to repel an attack, will be very effective, and usually successful.

4. In ordinary cases, the charge should be prepared by first shattering the hostile ma.s.ses, or, at least, wearying and demoralizing them by artillery, or by skirmishers' fire.

5. The more vigorous and resolute the charge, the greater the chance of success. The enemy never retires before a moderate advance.

6. Where the enemy is forced into a defile, a charge with the bayonet, preceded by a few rounds of grape, will complete his destruction.

7. When the enemy is behind cover, the best way to drive him from it is with the bayonet. This will cause less loss of life than to attempt to return his fire. But, in such case, the charge should be prepared, when possible, by a few sh.e.l.ls, or rounds of canister.

8. Shots up or down a declivity usually miss. A height should, therefore, be carried with the bayonet, without firing.

The moral effect, moreover, of a steady charge of infantry up a hill, without stopping to fire, is very great; and such a charge is usually successful. Prince Czartoryski, Alexander's most experienced general at Austerlitz, admitted that he lost all confidence in the result on seeing the French infantry ascending the plateau of Pratzen, the key to the Allies' position, with a firm and decided step, without once stopping to fire.

So, at Chattanooga, in November, 1863, Thomas's troops carried the height of Missionary Ridge by a similar steady and determined ascent, in spite of the volleys of grape and canister from nearly thirty pieces of artillery, and of musketry from the rebels' rifle-pits at the summit. General Grant attributed the small number of casualties our troops sustained in the attack to the rebels' surprise at its audacity, causing "confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces."

V.-Defence against Infantry.

1. The defence of infantry is by its fire, and therefore its proper defensive formation is in deployed lines.

2. Avoid a premature commencement of the fire. Long firing exhausts the men's energy, expends the ammunition, fouls the pieces, destroys the soldier's confidence in his weapon, and emboldens the enemy.

3. So, a fire upon an enemy while under cover, as in a wood, would be virtually thrown away. If his fire from such a position causes us any loss, he had better be sh.e.l.led, or driven away by skirmishers, according to circ.u.mstances.

4. The practice of hostile regiments exchanging for a considerable time a musketry fire at a distance, is highly objectionable, as it causes a great sacrifice of life without corresponding results. Instead of standing in line for ten minutes, receiving and returning fire at a distance of three hundred yards, it would be much better to clear this s.p.a.ce at double quick in two or three minutes, and close with the enemy; for, in returning his fire, we can do him no more harm than we receive, while nothing decisive is accomplished. The case is, of course, different where our own troops are behind cover, while the enemy's are exposed.

5. But in special cases, as where we have to cover a flank movement of our second line, or of the reserve, or to await a force coming to our support, it may be necessary to keep up an incessant fusillade, without regard to losses received.

6. Fire in action is of two kinds: the fire at will, and the fire by volleys; the former kind being the rule, the latter the exception. Although the fire at will is the one princ.i.p.ally used, there are very strong objections to it.

(1.) The men load and fire as individuals, and generally with great rapidity, and under more or less excitement, rarely stopping to take a deliberate aim. The consequence is, that very few shots take effect, and the fire is, for the greater part, wasted, as is shown by the well-established fact that, in every engagement, for every man killed or disabled, there have been from three to ten thousand musket or rifle bullets fired.

(2.) Except on windy days, a cloud of smoke soon collects in front of a line firing at will, hiding, more or less completely, the enemy from view. The fire being then at random, it is, of course, unreliable.

(3.) The fire at will leads to a rapid and enormous consumption of ammunition. To show how serious is this objection also, it is only necessary to consider in how many instances victory has been turned into defeat by the premature exhaustion, by one or more regiments, of their ammunition.

(4.) As a necessary consequence of this rapid consumption of ammunition, the pieces soon become fouled, and thus, to a great extent, useless.

(5.) Troops under a musketry fire at will, soon become accustomed to it, and its incessant din produces on them a stunning effect, which deadens, in no small degree, their sensibility to danger.

7. On the other hand, volley firing has often been attended with decisive results, especially when it has been reserved to the proper moment, and delivered at short range. Instances of this have occurred in almost every great battle we read of in history, as also in the late War of the Rebellion. For example: at the battle of South Mountain, Doubleday's brigade was engaged with a heavy force of rebels at some thirty or forty paces in its front. Our men were behind a fence, firing at will; but their fire made little or no impression on the enemy, who attempted to charge at the least cessation of the fire. Our troops were then made to cease firing, to lie down behind the fence, and, on the enemy's approach to within fifteen paces, to spring up and pour in a volley. This was so deadly, that the rebels fled in disorder, leaving their dead and wounded, and could not be rallied again.

At Chickamauga, in 1863, the regiments of Hazen's brigade fired only by volleys; every one of which, it is officially reported, was powerfully effective in checking the enemy's attacks.

8. Nevertheless, it has been a common military saying, and supported even by high authority, that the fire at will is the only one possible in action. This a.s.sertion implies that the rank and file are not sufficiently cool to reserve their fire, and that they must be kept constantly occupied by the excitement, noise, and smoke of their own fire, in order to make them remain steady in their ranks under that of the enemy.

As applied to raw, undisciplined, or demoralized troops, the proposition may be, to a great extent, true. But in reference to disciplined or veteran troops, whose morale has not been impaired, it will be found disproved on almost every page of military history; from which a few examples will be cited hereafter. For the present, one instance will suffice; that of Colonel Willich's regiment of Thirty-second Indiana Volunteers, at the battle of s.h.i.+loh, in April, 1862. While under fire, their commander, perceiving their own fire to have become "a little wild," caused them to cease firing, and then drilled them in the manual of arms, which they went through as if on parade; after which, they again opened on the enemy a fire, which is reported to have been "deliberate, steady, and effective."

It may be here observed that, whenever troops lose their presence of mind, there is no surer way of restoring it than by the repet.i.tion, by their officers, in their usual tone, of any words of command they have learned instinctively to obey on the drill-ground.

9. Infantry, when charged in position, should reserve its fire till it can be made with deadly effect, as at the distance of fifty paces; and the volleys should be instantly followed up by a countercharge with the bayonet on the charging enemy. For, if our fire has staggered him, a vigorous charge will complete his repulse; and if it has not, our only chance of success is in suddenly taking the offensive ourselves.

Whilst awaiting his charge, we shall incur but little, if any, loss from the enemy's fire; for the fire of troops advancing to attack is usually of very little account.

The only disadvantage attending a volley just before we charge is, that, as the smoke veils us from the enemy's view, it will rob us, to some extent, of the moral effect of our swift advance.

But, in many cases, if the enemy see us awaiting his bayonet attack, and reserving our fire to the very last, he loses resolution, relaxes his speed, and then stops short, or retires.

At Cowpens, Colonel Howard broke and routed the British line which was advancing to attack him, by reserving his fire to within thirty yards, and then charging with the bayonet.

At the battle of Friedland, the Russian Imperial Guard charged on Dupont's division with the bayonet. The French did not wait for them to close, but rushed on with the bayonet themselves, and completely routed them.

10. A volley concentrated upon the enemy's regimental colors will usually disable the color-guard and the men near it; and, if promptly followed up by a charge, may enable us to capture the colors. This is always an important advantage; for, by the loss of its colors, a regiment is not only dispirited, but in danger of disorganization; these being its proper rallying-point.

11. When infantry is acting as a support to artillery which is attacked, it should throw out sharpshooters to reply to the enemy's skirmishers that are firing at the gunners and horses, whilst it engages the compact ma.s.s by which it is itself attacked.

If the enemy should commit the blunder of attacking the battery with his entire force, without detaching to engage the support, we should profit by it by instantly charging him in flank; but taking care not to be led away to any distance from the battery we are protecting.

12. Infantry, surrounded by the enemy, will often be able to cut its way through and escape. For this purpose, as the highest degree of concentration is required, its formation should be in close column.

VI.-Defence against Artillery.

1. The best defence of infantry against artillery is by the fire of sharpshooters deployed as skirmishers, to pick off the gunners and the horses; the main body, meanwhile, occupying the most sheltered locality it can find.

2. Where no shelter is afforded by any natural obstacles, or by irregularities of ground, it may be sometimes necessary to make the men lie down.

But this expedient should be used as rarely as possible, on account of its demoralizing tendency. Troops that have become accustomed to it cannot be expected to bravely face the enemy; and the habit is very rapidly formed. At Bull Run, in July, 1861, a whole company was seen to grovel in the dust at the mere snapping of a percussion-cap of one of their own muskets.

This demoralizing tendency does not exist, however, where troops lie down only to enable their own artillery to fire over them. This was shown at the battle of Pea Ridge, where several of our regiments lay on the ground for two hours or more, while thirty of our guns were firing over them. When, at last, this fire had silenced the enemy's guns, our infantry then rose, charged him in a compact line, and drove him from the field.

3. A line of infantry may avoid cannon-shot by advancing or retiring fifty paces. A column or a square would have to move this distance, or more, according to its depth.

Ricochet shots may be avoided by moving fifty paces to the right or left.

This s.h.i.+fting of position is but a temporary expedient, it is true, for the enemy's guns will soon obtain the exact range again. But for this, several trial-shots will be requisite, thus making the enemy lose time; and, in battle, a few minutes lost or gained have often decided between victory and defeat.

4. When the enemy opens an artillery fire on a square, preparatory to a cavalry charge, his fire must cease when his cavalry approaches the square; say, on its arriving within one hundred and fifty yards. To avoid the artillery fire, the square may safely remain lying down until the hostile cavalry has reached this point. For, as they will require about half a minute to clear the intervening ground, the square will still have time enough left to rise, align its ranks, and deliver a volley before the cavalry reaches it.

VII.-Defence against Cavalry.

1. The discipline of infantry is never put to a severer test than when it is required to resist a charge of cavalry, properly made. The moral effect of a charge of a body of horse at full speed, on the troops waiting to receive it, is like that caused by the swift approach of a locomotive under full steam, seeming quite as irresistible. It would be so in reality, but for the counter effect produced both on the horses and their riders by the sight of the infantry standing firm and reserving its fire. I have been told by an old cuira.s.sier officer, who served through the campaigns of Napoleon with distinguished bravery, that there was no operation that his regiment so much dreaded as a charge upon well-disciplined infantry.

2. This counter moral effect on the charging cavalry is the greater, the longer the infantry reserve their fire; since, the less the distance at which it is delivered, the more fatal will be its effects. A volley at long range is not destructive enough to check the cavalry's advance; while this effect has often been produced by the infantry merely withholding its fire till the cavalry has approached very near; and a volley delivered at the very last moment has, in by far the greater number of instances, effectually repulsed the charge.