Famous Sea Fights Part 23

Rojdestvensky might attempt a raid on the coasts of j.a.pan, or make a dash for Niu-chw.a.n.g to seize that port, now the nearest base of supply of the j.a.panese field army. Far-seeing precautions were taken against this eventuality by acc.u.mulating enormous stores of supplies in the immediate rear of the army. But it was far more likely that the Russian admiral would try to reach Vladivostock, either with or without a battle. To do so he would have ultimately to pa.s.s through one of three channels into the Sea of j.a.pan. He must choose between the Korean or Tsu-s.h.i.+ma straits between j.a.pan and Korea, or the Tsugaru channel between Nippon and Yozo, or the La Perouse Straits (known to the j.a.panese as the Soya channel) still further north. Whatever course he chose, the best position for the j.a.panese fleet was near the Tsu-s.h.i.+ma straits, with the a.r.s.enal and dockyard of s.h.i.+monoseki close by on the j.a.panese sh.o.r.e. This the Russians themselves foresaw would be the most likely position for Togo to select.

He made Masampho Bay on the Korean side of the straits, and inside them (the "Douglas Bay" of our Admiralty Charts), the station for his fleet.

Freed from all hara.s.sing blockading and cruising work, he devoted the period between the retirement and destruction of the Port Arthur fleet in the late summer of 1904, and the approach of the Russians in May, 1905, to repairing his s.h.i.+ps very thoroughly, subst.i.tuting new guns for those they had mounted at the beginning of the war, which had had their rifling worn down. Continual target practice and manoeuvre exercises kept every s.h.i.+p and every man up to the mark. Charts of the sea around j.a.pan were ruled off into small numbered squares, so as to facilitate the reporting of the enemy's position and movements from the moment he would be first sighted.

An elaborate system of scouting by light cruisers was organized; signal stations were established on islands and headlands, and wireless installations erected at central and outlying points. If Rojdestvensky made for the Tsu-s.h.i.+ma channels, Togo was there to meet him. If he went for either of the more northern straits, the j.a.panese admiral counted on having news of his movements in sufficient time to enable him to steam at full speed by a shorter route, and still interpose between the Baltic armada and Vladivostock.

After pa.s.sing Singapore, on 25 March, there was another delay before the final advance of the Russian fleet. Rojdestvensky was anxious to give time to Nebogatoff to join him. This last reinforcement was coming by the Mediterranean route. The Russian commander-in-chief again strained French neutrality to the utmost. In April and May he pa.s.sed week after week in the ports of French Cochin China, first at Kamranh and then at Van Fong or Honkohe. Here, early in May, he was at last joined by Nebogatoff's squadron.

Again j.a.pan protested against the use of French harbours by her enemy. The diplomatic tension became acute, and at one moment it seemed as if the Russian admiral were anxious to produce complications that would force France into the war. But at last, to the general relief, on 14 May he sailed from Honkohe Bay. He pa.s.sed through the Bas.h.i.+ Strait between Formosa and the Philippines, and then steered for Shanghai. Here, on 25 May, the fighting portion of the fleet lay out at sea, while a crowd of auxiliary steamers, colliers, store-s.h.i.+ps, and armed merchantmen were sent into the Wusung River, the mouth of the Yang-tse, and anch.o.r.ed there.

Their appearance without the fleet to which they belonged led to many conjectures. The j.a.panese at once grasped its real meaning. To quote the message cabled by the Tokio correspondent of "The Times":--

"They read it as a plain intimation that Rojdestvensky intended to put his fate to the test at Tsu-s.h.i.+ma, since, had it been his purpose to make for Tsugaru or Soya, he must have retained the services of these auxiliary s.h.i.+ps during several days longer. It is apparent, indeed, that the Russian admiral here made his first cardinal mistake; he should have kept his non-combatant vessels out of sight as long as possible. Their absence from the arena would have been a mysterious element, whereas their apparition, especially as a segregated squadron in the Yang-tse River, furnished an unerring clue to expert observers."

With the fleet the admiral retained only the hospital and repairing s.h.i.+ps and those laden with naval stores for the Vladivostock dockyard. On the evening of the 25th the fleet stood out to sea heading for Tsu-s.h.i.+ma. The weather was bad, with a probability that it would be worse. There was a rising wind and sea with cold rain that made a blinding haze, but the Russian staff officers were rather pleased than depressed at such unpleasant conditions. Thick weather would baffle the j.a.panese scouts and lookout stations, and rough seas would keep their torpedo flotillas at anchor.

Out ahead were the fast cruisers of the scouting division, the "Svietlana,"

"Almaz," and "Ural." After these came the main body of the fleet in line ahead in two columns, the heavy armour-clads on the starboard (right side), the rest of the armoured s.h.i.+ps and four cruisers in the port line. Abreast of the leading s.h.i.+ps each flank was guarded by a cruiser and two torpedo destroyers. After the fighting lines and between their foaming wakes steamed four store-s.h.i.+ps and two repairing s.h.i.+ps. Last of all were the two steamers fitted as hospital s.h.i.+ps. The arrangement is best shown by a rough diagram:--

_Svietlana_.

(Cruisers.) _Almaz_. _Ural_.

PORT LINE. STARBOARD LINE.

(Cruiser.) (Cruiser.) _Jemschug_. _Imperator Nikolai_. _Knias Suvaroff_. _Izumrud_.

2 torpedo _Admiral Senyavin_. _Imperator Alexander_. 2 torpedo destroyers. _Admiral Apraxin_. _Borodino_. destroyers.

_Admiral Ushakoff_. _Orel_.

{_Oleg_. _Ossliabya_.

Cruisers. {_Aurora_. _Sissoi Veliki_.

{_Dimitri Donskoi_. _Navarin_.

{_Alexander Monomach_. _Admiral Nakhimoff_.

5 torpedo destroyers.

_Anadir_. } _Irtish_. } Store-s.h.i.+ps.

_Korea_. } _Kamschatka_. } _Svir_. } Repairing s.h.i.+ps and tugs.

_Russ_. }

_Orel_. _Kostroma_.

|_______________________| Hospital s.h.i.+ps.

In this order the great fleet steamed slowly through the rain and darkness.

On board the great battles.h.i.+ps there was much grumbling at "Nebogatoff's old tubs," though they themselves could not do much better, for poor coal, inefficient stoking, and weed-grown bottom-plates handicapped even the newest of them. The next day, 26 May, was the eve of the greatest naval battle in all history. "The clouds began to break and the sun shone fitfully," says Captain s.e.m.e.noff,[23] "but although a fairly fresh south-westerly wind had sprung up, a thick mist still lay upon the water."

Rojdestvensky meant to pa.s.s the perilous straits in daylight, and he calculated that by noon next day the fleet would be in the narrows of Tsu-s.h.i.+ma.

[23] s.e.m.e.noff had served with the Port Arthur fleet on board one of the cruisers which were disarmed in a neutral port after the battle of August 10th, 1904. He then returned to Europe, was attached to the staff of the Baltic fleet, and went out to the East on board the flags.h.i.+p. His remarkable narrative, "The Battle of Tsu-s.h.i.+ma," is a vivid detailed account of the "Suvaroff's" fortunes during the fight. He died in 1910.

Behind that portal of the Sea of j.a.pan Togo was waiting confidently for his enemy, who, he knew, must now be near at hand. Never before had two such powerful fleets met in battle, and the fate of the East hung upon the result of their encounter.

That result must depend mainly upon the heavy armoured s.h.i.+ps. In these and in the number of guns of the largest calibre, the Russians had an advantage so far as mere figures went, as the following tables show:--

ARMOURED s.h.i.+PS Cla.s.s. j.a.pan. Russia.

Battles.h.i.+ps 4 8 Coast-defence armour-clad -- 3 Armoured cruisers 8 3 -- -- Total 12 14

HEAVY GUNS Quick-firers.

Guns. 12-inch. 10-inch. 9-inch. 8-inch. |---------------| 6-inch. 4.7-inch.

j.a.pan 16 1 -- 30 160 -- Russia 26 15 4 8 102 30[24]

[24] These tables are from Sir George Sydenham Clarke's preface to Captain Lindsay's translation of s.e.m.e.noff's "Tsu-s.h.i.+ma,"

p. 11.

The annexed tables (pp. 315, 316) give some details of Russian and j.a.panese armoured s.h.i.+ps.

With regard to the armour it must be kept in mind for purposes of comparison that the armoured belts of the newer s.h.i.+ps, nine inches at the thickest part, were of Harveyized or Krupp steel, and could resist penetration better than the thicker belts of the older s.h.i.+ps. It will be noticed that the j.a.panese carried fewer of the heavier types of guns, but had more 6-inch quick-firers than the Russians. This is a point to bear in mind in following the story of the battle. It was the steady rain of 100-pounder sh.e.l.ls from the quick-firers that paralysed the fighting power of the Russian s.h.i.+ps.

Far more important than the mere number of guns was the fact that the j.a.panese shot straighter and had a more effective projectile. There was such a marked difference between the effect of the j.a.panese sh.e.l.ls at Tsu-s.h.i.+ma and in the naval battle of 10 August, 1904, that Captain s.e.m.e.noff, who was present at both battles, thought that in the interval the j.a.panese must have adopted a more powerful kind of high explosive for their bursting charges. This was not the case. Throughout the war the j.a.panese used for their bursting charges the famous Chimose powder. But perhaps between 10 August, 1904, and the following May they had improved their fuses, so as to detonate the charge more certainly and thoroughly.

The first five battles.h.i.+ps on the Russian list were up-to-date modern vessels. The "Navarin" was fairly fit to lie in line with them. The rest were, to use a familiar expression, "a scratch lot," coast-defence s.h.i.+ps of small speed and old craft quite out of date. The decks of the larger s.h.i.+ps were enc.u.mbered with an extra supply of coal, and this must have seriously diminished their margin of stability, with, as we shall see, disastrous results.

Admiral Togo could oppose to them only four modern battles.h.i.+ps. But his two heavy cruisers, the "Niss.h.i.+n" and "Kasuga" (the s.h.i.+ps bought from Argentina on the eve of the war), might almost have been cla.s.sed as smaller battles.h.i.+ps, and certainly would have been given that rank a few years earlier. His fine fleet of armoured cruisers were at least a match for the Russian coast-defence s.h.i.+ps and the older battles.h.i.+ps.

RUSSIA ----------+--------------------+-------+----+-------------+----+------------------- Cla.s.s. | | | | | | | s.h.i.+ps. | | | | | | |Displacement. Tons. | | | | |Thickest Armour. Inches.

| | | |Princ.i.p.al Armament. Guns.

| | | | |Men.| | | | | | | Remarks.

----------+--------------------+-------+----+-------------+----+------------------- {|_Knias Suvaroff_ |} | | | |Flags.h.i.+p of Admiral {| |} | | | |Rojdestvensky.

{|_Imperator |} | | | | These four {| Alexander III_ |}13,516| 9 |{ 4 12-inch }| 740| s.h.i.+ps were B {|_Borodino_ |} | |{12 6-inch }| | all completed a {|_Orel_ |} | | | | in 1904.

t {| | | | | | t {|_Ossliabya_ | 12,674| 9 |{ 4 10-inch }| 732|Flags.h.i.+p of Rear- l {| | | |{11 6-inch }| |Admiral Folkersham.

e {| | | | | |Completed 1901.

s {| | | | | | h {|_Sissoi Veliki_ | 8,880|15.7|{ 4 12-inch }| 550|Completed 1894.

i {| | | |{ 6 6-inch }| | p {| | | | | | s {|_Navarin_ | 10,206|16 |{ 4 12-inch }| 550| " 1895.

{| | | |{ 8 6-inch }| | {| | | | | | {|_Imperator | 9,672|14 |{ 4 9-inch }| 604| " 1892.

{| Nikolai I_ | | |{ 8 6-inch }| |Flags.h.i.+p of Rear- {| | | | | |Admiral Nebogatoff.

| | | | | | C d A c | | | | | | o e r l {|_General Admiral | 4,162|10 |{ 3 10-inch }| 400|Completed 1898.

a f m a {| Apraxin_ | | |{ 4 6-inch }| | s e o d {| | | | | | t n u s {|_Admiral Senyavin_ |} 4,684|10 |{ 4 9-inch }| 400| " 1895.

- c r {|_Admiral Ushakoff_ |} | |{ 4 6-inch }| | e - | | | | | | | | | | | | A C {|_Admiral Nakhimoff_ | 8,524|10 |{ 8 8-inch }| 567|Completed 1888.

r r {| | | |{10 6-inch }| |Reconstructed 1895.

m u {| | | | | | o i {|_Dimitri Donskoi_ | 6,200| 7 |{ 6 6-inch }| 510|Completed 1885.

u s {| | | |{10 4.7-inch}| |Reconstructed 1896.

r e {| | | | | | e r {|_Vladimir Monomach_ | 5,593|10 |{ 5 8-inch }| 550|Completed 1885.

d s {| | | |{12 6-inch }| |Rearmed 1898.

j.a.pAN ------+-------------+-------+----+-------------+----+------------------------- Cla.s.s.| | | | | | | s.h.i.+ps.[25] | | | | | | |Displacement. Tons. | | | | |Thickest Armour. Inches.

| | | |Princ.i.p.al Armaments. Guns.

| | | | |Men.| | | | | | | Remarks.

------+-------------+-------+----+-------------+----+------------------------- B s {|_Mikasa_ | 15,200| 9 |{ 4 12-inch } |795|Completed 1902. Flags.h.i.+p a h {| | | |{14 6-inch }| |of Admiral Togo.

t i {| | | | | | t p {|_Skikis.h.i.+ma_ |}14,850| 9 |{ 4 12-inch }| 810|Completed 1899.

l s {|_Asahi_ |} | |{14 6-inch }| | e {| | | | | | - {|_Fuji_ |12,320 | 14 |{ 4 12-inch }| 600| " 1897.

{| | | |{10 6-inch }| | | | | | | | | | | | | | {|_Niss.h.i.+n_ |} 7,294| 6 |{ 4 8-inch }| 500| " 1904. _Niss.h.i.+n_ {|_Kasuga_ |} | |{14 6-inch }| |was flags.h.i.+p {| | | | | |of Vice-Admiral Misu.

{| | | | | | A C {|_Idzumo_ |} 9,750| 7 |{ 4 8-inch }| 500|Completed 1901.

r r {|_Iwate_ |} | |{14 6-inch }| |_Idzumo_--flags.h.i.+p of m u {| | | | | |Vice-Admiral Kamimura.