Belgium Part 16

From 1839 till 1914, Belgium lived under the regime of independent neutrality.

Her territory had been gradually reduced during modern times. She stood stripped of all her marches. In the course of the seventeenth century she had lost Walloon Flanders and Artois to France and Northern Brabant to Holland, while the conquest by the latter Power of Zeeland Flanders and some districts in Eastern Limburg had been confirmed and enlarged by the 1839 settlements. In 1816 Prussia had seized the districts of Eupen, Malmedy, St. Vith and Bitsburg, and the XXIV Articles had given half of Luxemburg to the German Confederation.

The same treaty granted Belgium independence. Within these narrow limits, she remained at least mistress of her destinies. She had her own king, her own Government, her own Const.i.tution. As far as internal affairs were concerned, she enjoyed full sovereignty. She was diminished, but not deeply altered. She maintained, in the nineteenth century, all the main characteristics which had distinguished her history and civilization during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

Two races, two languages, were still a.s.sociated on her soil. Walloons and Flemings took an equal share in the framing of her future. The sea remained free for commercial purposes, and the great European roads, which had so largely contributed in the past to placing her in the forefront of European nations, still found in the country their natural and necessary meeting-place. This main fact must be made evident if one attempts to explain the causes of the Belgian renaissance during the nineteenth century. It is not enough to say that the Belgium of Leopold I and Leopold II followed the tradition of the Belgium of Charles V and Philip the Good. It must be added that modern Belgium, in spite of gradual encroachments, had remained whole. Such encroachments having taken place on all sides, the nucleus was untouched. Belgium preserved her great towns and her main streams. No essential organ of the national body had been impaired.

As far as internal affairs were concerned, Belgium then emerged free and sound from the turmoil of three centuries of European warfare. For external affairs, she was still subjected to the restriction of guaranteed neutrality. It is scarcely necessary to dwell on the distinction between self-imposed neutrality, such as that existing in Switzerland, and the regime of guaranteed neutrality imposed by the Powers on Belgium. The first is no restriction of the sovereign rights of the State upon its foreign policy, the second takes away from it practically all initiative in foreign matters. If the Powers bound themselves, in the 1839 treaty, not to violate the integrity of Belgian territory and to defend the country in case of attack, Belgium, on her side, undertook to observe strictly the rules of neutrality and to take necessary measures towards the defence of her frontiers. It might be argued, and it has been argued frequently in Belgium, that such neutrality could not prevent a nation from possessing colonies and concluding a defensive alliance for the sole purpose of safeguarding herself. But, as a matter of fact, rival Powers could not give such a liberal interpretation to the text of the treaties. First from the French side, later from the German side, Belgium was constantly held under suspicion. Any manifestation of public opinion concerning foreign affairs was deeply resented, her military policy was narrowly watched, she could not take a step towards self-defence or economic expansion without provoking some discontent among the Powers. Thanks to the firmness of her statesmen and, more than once, to the friendly support of Great Britain, she was able to resist urgent demands. But it goes without saying that the Belgian Government, anxious to preserve their dignity, avoided all possible cause of friction, so that Belgium scarcely ever made use of her legitimate right to determine, within some limits, her foreign policy. Neutrality, to all intents and purposes, meant paralysis. For many, it meant worse than that--carelessness and apathy.

[_FALSE SECURITY_]

After the eight years of uncertainty which followed the first signature of the XXIV Articles--eight years during which all parties joined under the permanent Dutch menace--two currents of thought divided Belgian opinion. The first attempted to minimize the military responsibility of the country, and, trusting blindly to the promise of the Powers, to reduce to a strict minimum Belgium's military charges in men and money.

The second saw clearly that, without an adequate army and the necessary defences, Belgium would be unable to fulfil her obligations in case her integrity should be violated, and would suffer in consequence; it realized that any weakness in the country's defences increased the temptation of some Powers to break their pledge. It is easy to understand that the first school was generally more popular than the other, and rallied not only the sincere idealists who thought such a contingency as the tearing up of solemn treaties absolutely impossible, but many unscrupulous politicians only too anxious to use the popular catchword "Not a penny, not a soldier," or "Niemand gedwongen soldaat," for electoral purposes. The Belgians had always been stubbornly opposed to conscription; it will be remembered that they resisted all attempts at enforcing it in the past and that it was the main cause of the War of Peasants (1798) against the "Sans Culottes." To a people which, by tradition, was strongly adverse to militarism and centralization, it was only too easy to misrepresent measures of self-defence, urgently required by the European situation, as the first step towards autocracy and oppression. The partisans of military safeguards found themselves, therefore, in a minority, and their only support was the personal influence of the Belgian kings, who, from the first days of the new regime till the eve of the war, never ceased to emphasize the evident danger of disregarding the country's international responsibilities. It is true that, with the lapse of time, the danger became more and more threatening, but, on the other hand, the "anti-militarists" found a fresh argument in the fact that, during so many years, the country had been able to weather the storm.

[_MILITARY PROBLEMS_]

The first trouble arose in connection with the Socialist revolution which broke out in France in 1848. In the previous year, Marx and Engels had established their headquarters in Brussels, where they drafted the "Manifesto of the Communist Party." The Belgians, however, were not prepared to adopt it, and the revolutionaries decided to invade the country from the South. Bands organized in France and secretly encouraged by some French leaders attempted to cross the frontier near Mouscron, at Risquons Tout, but their advance was easily checked by the Belgian forces.

The only consequence of these disturbances was the vote by the Chamber of a new grant towards the reinforcement of the army: "No doubt," said the Minister Rogier on that occasion, "it will cost something to equip a greater number of men. But has one ever estimated the cost of an invasion, even if it only lasted a week?" In 1850, Leopold II wrote to one of his ministers: "Without means of defence you will be the plaything of everyone."

A greater danger loomed ahead. Louis Napoleon had, by the coup d'etat of December 1, 1851, imposed his dictators.h.i.+p on France. Many prominent exiles and refugees came to Belgium, and the Brussels papers openly expressed their opinion of the new dictator. So that Belgium, which three years before had been branded as ultramontane, was now denounced as a nest of communists and rebels. Pressure was even brought to bear on the Government to introduce Press censors.h.i.+p. It was duly ignored, and the relations between the two countries became strained. One year later, Napoleon became Emperor of the French, and all clear-sighted Belgians realized that he was only awaiting an opportunity to extend his power and authority towards the North. This was shown plainly by the French policy with regard to Luxemburg.

[_FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR_]

The emperor having approached the King of Holland in view of obtaining from him the cession of the Grand Duchy, a conference was called in London (May 1867) at which the independence, neutrality and inviolability of the duchy were placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers. Thwarted in this direction by European diplomacy, Napoleon III attempted to obtain a footing in Luxemburg by controlling the railways. In January 1868 the Compagnie de l'Est, under guarantee of the French Government, took over from the Compagnie Guillaume Luxembourg its railway lines both in Luxemburg and Belgian territory.

Further negotiations began with the Belgian companies Grand Luxemburg and Chemins de fer Liegeois-Limbourgeois, which would have placed all the main railways of Luxemburg and South-eastern Belgium in French hands. Warned in time, the Premier, Frere-Orban, instructed the Belgian representative in Paris to declare that Belgium would never consent to such an arrangement. Napoleon's threats remained without result, the Belgian policy being strongly upheld by Lord Clarendon, and, in July 1869, a protocol was signed annulling the contracts of the Compagnie de l'Est as far as the Belgian railways were concerned. At the same time, Napoleon III, anxious to find at any cost "compensations" for the increased prestige which Prussia obtained from her Danish and Austrian victories, had sounded that Power regarding a project of part.i.tion of the Netherlands. His proposal, first kept secret and subsequently revealed by Bismarck on the morrow of the declaration of war in 1870, was to annex Belgium to France, while Prussia would be left a free hand in Holland. The publication of this revelation by _The Times_ did more than anything else to alienate British public opinion, if not from France at least from the French emperor, during the Franco-Prussian War.

Baron Chazal, who had joined the Belgian ministry in 1857, succeeded in convincing the Cabinet of the necessity of reinforcing Belgian defences. In view of the superiority of the French army--for the threat came evidently from that quarter at the time--it was decided to give up the idea of defending the country by a cordon of inefficient fortresses, and to build round Antwerp a powerful "entrenched camp,"

where the Belgian army could retreat and maintain itself until reinforcements came from abroad. It goes without saying that the only country which would be in a position to send such reinforcements to Antwerp, in case of an invasion, was Great Britain, and Antwerp was purposely chosen as the only position where considerable forces could conveniently be disembarked from the sea. In view of the present interpretation placed on the 1839 treaties by Holland, which gives to the latter country the right to close the Scheldt in time of war, this scheme seems, to say the least, hastily conceived. But the Dutch exclusive sovereignty over the Scheldt did not appear nearly so definite at the time as it appears now. No mention being made of the matter in the 1839 settlement, many Belgian authorities considered that the stream was placed under a regime of co-sovereignty, and it seemed then incredible that the Dutch should stop the pa.s.sage of relief s.h.i.+ps.

In the face of strong popular opposition, the Chamber voted a credit of 50,000,000 francs for the Antwerp fortifications, and General Brialmont, one of the foremost military engineers in Europe, was entrusted with the work. After its completion, Antwerp was considered one of the strongest fortified towns in the world.

As soon as a conflict became imminent between France and Prussia, Great Britain, in accordance with her traditional policy as far as Belgium was concerned, demanded from the two Powers a declaration confirming Belgian neutrality. The situation in 1870 corresponds exactly to that in 1914, and the language used by Mr. Asquith during the first days of August of the latter year seems to echo the words uttered forty years before by his great chief. "It would be impossible for us not to interfere," firmly declared Mr. Gladstone, "should we witness the destruction of Belgium's liberty and independence." In both cases, British policy was inspired by the guarantee mentioned in the treaties, a guarantee which not only implied safety for Belgium, but also absolute opposition to any Power attempting to seize the Belgian coast.

The motives were the same, the steps taken were the same, the outcome only was different. Both the French emperor and Bismarck confirmed, in 1870, the inviolability of Belgian territory, the latter stating that such a declaration was not required, the treaties being sufficiently explicit on the subject.

[_EUROPEAN POLICY IN 1870_]

Why did Germany respect in 1870 a treaty which she ignored in 1914?

Even without taking into account the change in German mentality since her victory, military conditions were totally different. The strong chain of fortifications on the French Eastern frontier had not yet been erected, and the strength of the Belgian army appeared by no means negligible. Before the enormous increase of modern armies which took place during the twenty years of "armed peace," 80,000 men might have made all the difference one way or the other. It was approximately the strength of the French army which surrendered at Sedan. After this great defeat, German Headquarters declared their intention to pursue the fugitives into Belgian territory if the French forces attempted to escape being encircled by crossing the frontier. Such steps, however, were not rendered necessary. While showing their intense sympathy for the vanquished, the Belgians fulfilled most scrupulously all their obligations, and the European diplomats who had conceived the idea of neutralizing "the c.o.c.kpit of Europe" could congratulate themselves.

Their arrangements had worked perfectly, and for once Belgium had not been drawn into the conflict.

In the light of recent events, it is almost to be regretted that the test had been so successful. More than anything else, the 1870 experience allayed suspicion in and out of Belgium. The Powers refrained from pressing on the country the necessity for further armaments, and the hands of the anti-militarists in Belgium, instead of being weakened (as they ought to have been if events had been placed in their proper light), were considerably strengthened.

Ill.u.s.tration: LEOPOLD II. (REIGNED 1865-1909).

_Ph. B._

[_ANTWERP, LIeGE, NAMUR_]

During the long period of armed peace which followed, while the Powers formed, on one side the "Triplice" (1883), on the other the "Duplice"

(1891) and the Entente Cordiale (1904), while armies and fleets were increased tenfold and German aggressive policy a.s.serted itself more and more acutely, Belgium's defences were only slowly reinforced, in spite of the desperate efforts of disinterested patriots and of the stern warnings of the kings. The name of Leopold II must be a.s.sociated here with that of Albert I. Both were prompted in their action by the same motives that inspired Leopold I's policy. They placed security on a level with, and even above, prosperity. Standing aloof from party intrigues, they were in a position to appeal to all patriots without distinction, and to make use of the services of a little band of clear-sighted citizens who saw the centre of danger transferred from France to Germany, and watched the young Empire's military and economic development with growing anxiety. Foremost among them stood Emile Banning, author of a prophetic report on the Meuse defences (1881-86).

Nothing ill.u.s.trated more clearly the crippling influence of neutrality on Belgian international thought than the way this man of genius was ignored by his fellow-citizens. In any other country, he would have exercised a considerable influence on public opinion. In Belgium, he was only heard by a few statesmen and, happily, by Leopold II, who no doubt had his report in mind when, in 1887, he warned one of his ministers of the necessity of Belgium not only safeguarding her independence, but "preventing the pa.s.sage" of foreign troops through her territory. Germany had now become the main source of danger, but in order to avoid all criticism it was decided to build two bridgeheads, one at Namur and the other at Liege. The first commanded the upper valley of the Meuse, the second the middle course of the stream; one was facing France, the other Germany. The plan of defence was consequently developed, the forts enabling the army to make a short stand before retiring into the entrenched camp of Antwerp. It is largely to Banning's clearsightedness and to Leopold II's firm att.i.tude that Western Europe owes the respite given by the resistance of Liege in August 1914. Had not General Brialmont's original plans of the forts been unduly curtailed, this resistance would have proved still more effective.

[_MILITARY REFORM_]

Credits for the defences of Liege and Namur, like those of Antwerp a few years before, were voted grudgingly by a Chamber lulled into a false state of security by the experience of 1870. But, if public opinion was little inclined to devote money to improve the country's defences, it became obdurate when experts advised a reform of the Belgian military system. Not only were the effectives ridiculously small, compared with the size of the German and French armies, but recruiting was managed through a system of drawing lots, to which was added the evil of "subst.i.tution"--that is to say, the sons of the bourgeois cla.s.s who drew a "bad number" were ent.i.tled to buy a subst.i.tute, who took their place in the ranks. A campaign for personal and general service was launched, but in spite of the king's support it met with little success. A certain number of volunteers were added to the normal effectives in 1902, and in 1908, after the sensational journey of William II to Tangiers, new credits were voted for the development of the Antwerp defences. To those who objected that fortifications would be useless if Belgium did not possess a sufficient army to man them, the king answered: "Let us have the stones first. The men will come later." When the seventy-fifth anniversary of Belgian Independence gave him at last the opportunity of breaking the silence imposed upon him by the Congo campaign, he uttered a supreme warning to the nation: "Let us not be overconfident in our present prosperity; let us stand closer and closer together around our flag. Nations, like human beings, have to pa.s.s through a critical age which brings about old age or premature death. Its date, for young nations, falls _during the last quarter of the first century of their existence_." Once more, on February 18, 1909, he imparted to a friend--for his lack of popularity had made public declarations useless at that time--his anxieties regarding the future: "It is indispensable that we should possess a good army, that we should be able to defend ourselves, and thus, in conformity with our international obligations, prevent the crossing of our territory by a foreign army, and _make such crossing as costly as possible, in order to remove the temptation from those who would be inclined to attempt it.... On my return from my recent journey to Germany, I warned all concerned that Germany is building more s.h.i.+ps and increasing her military expenses. We must efficiently complete our fortifications and our equipment. You know that neither one nor the other can be improvised...._"

Leopold II attached such importance to the adoption of personal service, proposed in 1909, that he deliberately postponed an operation which might have saved his life, in order to be able to sign the decree which placed the Bill on the Statute Book. He died three days later.[1]

Footnote 1: See E. Vandersmissen, _Leopold II and Beernaert_, and G.

Harry, _Leopold II_ (1920).

This supreme satisfaction was not unmixed. Important concessions had had to be made. The voluntary system was maintained to a certain extent, only one son per family being called up for a short time (fifteen months). The pa.s.sing of the Bill was a victory in principle, but it only increased very slightly the strength of the Belgian army.

The Pan-German campaign was in full swing by then. Maps were published, beyond the Rhine, showing large portions of Belgium painted in imperial red, like the rest of the Reich. Pamphlets and books appeared claiming Antwerp as a German port and connecting East Africa with the German Cameroons through the Belgian Congo. Still the majority of the Belgians would not believe that such views were shared by the German Emperor and his Government. It was only after the Agadir coup (1911) and Algeciras (1912) that M. de Broqueville, Minister of War, strongly supported by King Albert, was able to carry through a Bill introducing general and compulsory service, which would have placed the army on a proper footing if its provisions had been rendered immediately effective.

Unhappily, the Bill only provided for a gradual increase, the army reaching its full strength of 340,000 men in 1917. This last reservation proved nearly fatal to the country, for, when mobilization was ordered, in July 1914, the total forces available only amounted to 117,000 men, of which the combatant portion was reduced to 93,000 bayonets--an increase of only 10,000 over the effectives of 1870.

There are few subjects so depressing as the slow development of Belgian defences under the threat of invasion. Each time the situation became serious, as in 1848, 1852, 1908 and 1911, public opinion allowed some progress to be made. But it came always too late. The people were ready to face their responsibilities, but they could not be made to realize them. Blindly relying on the 1839 treaties, absorbed in their economic and intellectual development, they showed little interest in international affairs. Those who did, found themselves in the dilemma either of taking refuge in a fools' paradise or of powerlessly facing an ever-growing menace. Neutrality may have saved Belgium in 1870, full independence might have saved her in 1914.

CHAPTER XXVII

ECONOMIC RENAISSANCE

One month after the first outbreak of the Belgian Revolution, elections were already taking place. An almost equal number of Liberals (the successors of the Vonckists) and of Catholics (Statists) were returned to the Congress whose duty was to frame the new Const.i.tution. It is typical of the spirit of patriotic union between both parties and of the adaptability of the Belgians to their new independent life that these deputies, most of whom had no experience of political life, succeeded, within two months, in drafting a Const.i.tution which has since served as a model for several European nations. It was the result of various influences: the groundwork--based on individual liberty, equality before the law, freedom of the press, of wors.h.i.+p, of public meeting, of a.s.sociation and of teaching--was no doubt inspired by the French. On the other hand, the preponderance of legislative power, represented by the Chamber and the Senate, over the executive, the principle of ministerial responsibility, placing the king outside and above parties, was the result of English influence: but perhaps the most interesting characteristic of the new Const.i.tution was the way in which provincial and communal rights were safeguarded, the communes, in particular, preserving practical autonomy for local affairs, with the only restriction that the burgomaster was to be nominated by the king.

The Belgian Const.i.tution struck the balance between centralization, inherited from the period of French rule, and particularism, which had, from the Burgundian period, been the most striking feature in Belgian politics. If we a.s.sociate, in our minds, particularism with the traditional conservatism of the Catholic peasantry and centralization with modern industrial developments and the intellectual culture of the large towns, we shall obtain a fairly good idea of the two general tendencies which divided public opinion in Belgium during the nineteenth century and whose main features may be recognized not only in politics, but also in the economic, intellectual and artistic development of the country.

[_LIBERALS AND CATHOLICS_]

The status of neutrality not only affected foreign politics, it reacted very strongly on Belgium's internal life. If it crippled her activity with regard to home defence, it developed to an abnormal degree party warfare. It shut the door on international problems and all questions which may be considered as national issues and before which party strife ought to cease in consideration for the common weal. Social, philosophic or religious differences were not balanced, in modern Belgium, as in other countries, by international consciousness. In the close atmosphere of the tutelage of the Powers, party politics absorbed the whole public life of the nation and external problems were practically ignored. It thus happened that the people who stood in the forefront of Europe, and who were more directly interested than any other in the fluctuations of European politics, were about the worst informed on foreign affairs.

From 1839 to 1885, the electorate being limited by a property qualification (only 35,000 electors out of 4,000,000 inhabitants taking part in the first election), the struggle was confined to the two middle-cla.s.s parties, Catholics and Liberals. Roughly speaking, the Catholics stood for the defence of religious interests, more especially in the domain of education and relief, the Liberals for the supremacy of a nominally neutral State in all public matters. It is easy to realize how this purely political quarrel could degenerate into a conflict of ideals, some ultramontanes distrusting the motives of "atheists" and ignoring the public spirit of men who did not share their creed, while some agnostics, steeped in the narrow doctrines of Voltaire and Diderot, made the Church the scapegoat of all social evils and even denied the wholesome influence of religion on social education.

During the first part of the century the conflict was not so acute, both parties possessing their moderate and extremist leaders and the so-called "Liberal Catholics" acting as a link between the two factions. From 1847 to 1870 the Liberals, representing the bourgeoisie of the large towns, were most of the time in power, while from 1870 to 1878 the Catholics, upheld by the farmers and the middle cla.s.ses of the small towns, took the direction of affairs. The property qualification was progressively reduced, first for the parliamentary, later for the provincial and communal elections, and a larger share was given to the lower middle cla.s.ses in the administration of the country. Meanwhile, party differences had developed through the gradual disappearance of the moderating elements on both sides, and the vexed question of education was coming to the fore. The 1830 Const.i.tution was not very explicit concerning this matter, and both parties interpreted it according to their own interests. Many communes having neglected to keep up the official schools, religious orders had taken a more and more important part in primary education. When the Liberals came into power, in 1878, they pa.s.sed a law compelling every commune to maintain its own schools, where religious instruction should only be given out of school hours. They also founded a great many secondary schools and training colleges, with the object of transferring education from religious to secular teachers. These sweeping reforms entailed heavy expenditure and unpopular taxation, and finally brought about the downfall of the Liberal regime in 1884. The Catholics proceeded to abrogate the 1879 law on primary education by giving State grants to the free Catholic schools, and suppressed a number of the secondary schools and training colleges established by the previous regime.

Feeling ran so high that King Leopold, who realized the harm which this "school war" was doing to the national spirit, warned Monsieur Malou (the Catholic premier) against the att.i.tude he had adopted, as he had previously warned the Liberal premier, Frere-Orban: "The Liberals have acted as if there were no longer any Catholics in Belgium. Are you going also to act as if there were no Liberals left in the country, without any consideration for the disastrous consequences of such an att.i.tude for the nation and for yourself?"

From 1885 to 1913 educational matters, though by no means forgotten, were entirely overshadowed by social problems and by the efforts made by the Opposition to obtain the revision of the Const.i.tution and the adoption of universal suffrage. This change was brought about by the foundation, in 1885, by the Flemish printer, Cesar de Paepe, of the Belgian Labour Party. Its action was from the first political as well as economic. While consumers' co-operatives, such as the "Vooruit" of Ghent, were founded in several large towns, Socialist clubs entertained a continuous agitation for electoral franchise, their aim being to use Parliament to obtain the sweeping social reforms inscribed on their programme. Here, again, we find French insistence on politics checked by the old spirit of a.s.sociation which had been so prominent in the Netherlands during the Middle Ages.

[_LABOUR PARTY_]

After the miners' strike of 1886, both Catholics and Liberals revised their programmes and paid more attention to social reforms. But the workmen, who were now powerfully organized, especially in the industrial centres of the South, wanted to take a direct share in political life. Under pressure of public opinion, the demand for a revision of the Const.i.tution was at last taken into consideration in 1891, and in 1893 a new law granted universal suffrage tempered by plural voting. In 1902 a new campaign was launched by the allied Liberal-Socialist opposition in favour of universal suffrage pure and simple, without obtaining any result, but when, in 1913, a general strike supported the demand, the Catholic Government promised that the question should be examined by a parliamentary commission.

Before the war, Belgium was the most productive agricultural district of Europe. The secret of her prosperity is generally attributed to the small number of large estates and to the great area cultivated by small owners, 48 per cent. of the cultivated area being covered by farms of 2 to 7 acres. It must be added that, during the last twenty years, powerful producers' co-operatives, or "Boerenbonden," have grouped agriculturists and given them important advantages with regard to credit and insurance. The inbred qualities which have rendered this development possible are, however, to be found in the race itself.

Again and again, in the course of centuries, the Belgian peasant has come to the fore under every political regime and every system of landholding. He has had to conquer the country from the sea, protect it against its incursions and to repair periodically the havoc caused by war. The memory of physical and social calamities has been handed down the ages, and the present system of small-owners.h.i.+p and co-operative societies is only the result of centuries of incessant toil.