Ancient States and Empires Part 18

(M598) After the Persian wars the rivals.h.i.+p between Athens and Sparta is the most prominent feature in Grecian history. The confederacy of Delos gave to Athens supremacy over the sea, and the great commercial prosperity of Athens under Pericles, and the empire gained over the Ionian colonies and the islands of the aegaean, made Athens, perhaps, the leading State. It was the richest, the most cultivated, and the most influential of the Grecian States, and threatened to absorb gradually all the other States of Greece in her empire.

(M599) This ascendency and rapid growth in wealth and power were beheld with jealous eyes, not only by Sparta, but other States which she controlled, or with which she was in alliance. The consequence was, the Peloponnesian war, which lasted half a generation, and which, after various vicissitudes and fortunes, terminated auspiciously for Sparta, but disastrously to Greece as a united nation. The Persian wars bound all the States together by a powerful h.e.l.lenic sentiment of patriotism. The Peloponnesian war dissevered this Panh.e.l.lenic tie. The disaster at Syracuse was fatal to Athenian supremacy, and even independence. But for this Athens might have remained the great power of Greece. The democratic organization of the government gave great vigor and enterprise to all the ambitious projects of Athens. If Alcibiades had lent his vast talents to the building up of his native State, even then the fortunes of Athens might have been different. But he was a traitor, and threw all his energies on the side of Sparta, until it was too late for Athens to recover the prestige she had won. He partially redeemed his honor, but had he been animated by the spirit of Pericles or Nicias, to say nothing of the self-devotion of Miltiades, he might have raised the power of Athens to a height which nothing could have resisted.

(M600) Lysander completed the war which Brasidas had so n.o.bly carried on, and took possession of Athens, abolished the democratic const.i.tution, demolished the walls, and set up, as his creatures, a set of tyrants, and also a Spartan governor in Athens. Under Lysander, the Lacedaemonian rule was paramount in Greece. At one time, he had more power than any man in Greece ever enjoyed. He undertook to change the government of the allied cities, and there was scarcely a city in Greece where the Spartans had not the ascendency. In most of the Ionian cities, and in all the cities which had taken the side of Athens, there was a Spartan governor, so that when Xenophon returned with his Ten Thousand to Asia Minor, he found he could do nothing without the consent of the Spartan governors. Moreover, the rule of Sparta was hostile to all democratic governments. She sought to establish oligarchal inst.i.tutions everywhere. Perhaps this difference between Athens and Sparta respecting government was one great cause of tho Peloponnesian war.

(M601) But the same envy which had once existed among the Grecian States of the prosperity of Athens, was now turned upon Sparta. Her rule was arrogant and hard and she in turn had to experience the humiliation of revolt from her domination. "The allies of Sparta," says Grote, "especially Corinth and Thebes, not only relented in their hatred of Athens, now she had lost her power, but even sympathized with her suffering exiles, and became disgusted with the self-willed encroachments of Sparta; while the Spartan king, Pausanias, together with some of the ephors, were also jealous of the arbitrary and oppressive conduct of Lysander. He refused to prevent the revival of the democracy. It was in this manner that Athens, rescued from that sanguinary and rapacious _regime_ of the Thirty Tyrants, was enabled to reappear as a humble and dependent member of the Spartan alliance-with nothing but the recollection of her former power, yet with her democracy again in vigorous action for internal government."

(M602) The victory of aegospotami, which annihilated the Athenian navy, ushered in the supremacy of Sparta, both on the land and sea, and all Greece made submission to the ascendant power. Lysander established in most of the cities an oligarchy of ten citizens, as well as a Spartan harmost, or governor. Everywhere the Lysandrian dekarchy superseded the previous governments, and ruled oppressively, like the Thirty at Athens, with Critias at their head. And no justice could be obtained at Sparta against the bad conduct of the harmosts who now domineered in every city.

Sparta had embroiled Greece in war to put down the ascendency of Athens, but exercised a more tyrannical usurpation than Athens ever meditated. The language of Brasidas, who promised every thing, was in striking contrast to the conduct of Lysander, who put his foot on the neck of Greece.

(M603) The rule of the Thirty at Athens came to an end by the n.o.ble efforts of Thrasybulus and the Athenian democracy, and the old const.i.tution was restored because the Spartan king was disgusted with the usurpations and arrogance of Lysander, and forbore to interfere. Had Sparta been wise, with this vast accession of power gained by the victories of Lysander, she would have ruled moderately, and reorganized the Grecian world on sound principles, and restored a Panh.e.l.lenic stability and harmony. She might not have restored, as Brasidas had promised, a universal autonomy, or the complete independence of all the cities, but would have bound together all the States under her presidency, by a just and moderate rule. But Sparta had not this wisdom. She was narrow, hard, and extortionate. She loved her own, as selfish people generally do, but nothing outside her territory with any true magnanimity.

And she thus provoked her allies into rebellion, so that her chance was lost, and her dominion short-lived. Athens would have been more enlightened, but she never had the power, as Sparta had, of organizing a general Panh.e.l.lenic combination. The nearest approach which Athens ever made was the confederacy of Delos, which did not work well, from the jealousy of the cities. But Sparta soon made herself more unpopular than Athens ever was, and her dream of empire was short.

(M604) The first great movement of Sparta, after the establishment of oligarchy in all the cities which yielded to her, was a renewal of the war with Persia. The Asiatic Greek cities had been surrendered to Persia according to treaty, as the price for the a.s.sistance which Persia rendered to Sparta in the war with Athens. But the Persian rule, under the satraps, especially of Tissaphernes, who had been rewarded by Artaxerxes with more power than before, became oppressive and intolerable. Nothing but aggravated slavery impended over them. They therefore sent to Sparta for aid to throw off the Persian yoke. The ephors, with nothing more to gain from Persia, and inspired with contempt for the Persian armies-contempt created by the expedition of the Ten Thousand-readily listened to the overtures, and sent a considerable force into Asia, under Thimbron. He had poor success, and was recalled, and Dereyllidas was sent in his stead. He made a truce with Tissaphernes, in order to attack Pharnabazus, against whom he had an old grudge, and with whom Tissaphernes himself happened for the time to be on ill terms. Dereyllidas overrun the satrapy of Pharnabazus, took immense spoil, and took up winter-quarters in Bythinia.

Making a truce with Pharnabazus, he crossed over into Europe and fortified the Chersonesus against the Thracians. He then renewed the war both against Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes upon the Maeander, the result of which was an agreement, on the part of the satraps, to exempt the Grecian cities from tribute and political interference, while the Spartan general promised to withdraw from Asia his army, and the Spartan governors from the Grecian cities.

(M605) At this point, B.C. 397, Dercyllidas was recalled to Sparta, and King Agesilaus, who had recently arrived with large re-enforcements, superseded him in command of the Lacedaemonian army. Agesilaus was the son of king Archidamus, and half-brother to King Agis. He was about forty when he became king, through the influence of Lysamler, in preference to his nephew, and having been brought up without prospects of the throne, had pa.s.sed through the unmitigated rigor of the Spartan drill and training. He was distinguished for all the Spartan virtues-obedience to authority, extraordinary courage and energy, simplicity and frugality.

(M606) Agesilaus was a.s.sisted by large contingents from the allied Greek cities for his war in Asia; but Athens, Corinth, and Thebes stood aloof.

Lysander accompanied him as one of the generals, but gave so great offense by his overweening arrogance, that he was sent to command at the h.e.l.lespont. The truce between the Spartans and Persians being broken, Agesilaus prosecuted the war vigorously against both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. He gained a considerable victory over the Persians near Sardis, invaded Phrygia, and laid waste the satrapy of Pharnabazus. He even surprised the camp of the satrap, and gained immense booty. But in the midst of his victories he was recalled by Sparta, which had need of his services at home. A rebellion of the allies had broken out, which seriously threatened the stability of the Spartan empire.

(M607) "The prostration of the power of Athens had removed that common bond of hatred and alarm which attached the allied cities to the heads.h.i.+p of Sparta; while her subsequent conduct had given positive offense, and had excited against herself the same fear of unmeasured imperial ambition which had before run so powerfully against Athens. She had appropriated to herself nearly the whole of the Athenian maritime empire, with a tribute of one thousand talents. But while Sparta had gained so much by the war, not one of her allies had received the smallest remuneration. Even the four hundred and seventy talents which Lysander brought home out of the advances made by Cyrus, together with the booty acquired at Decelea, was all detained by the Lacedaemonians. Hence there arose among the allies not only a fear of the grasping dominion, but a hatred of the monopolizing rapacity of Sparta. This was manifested by the Thebans and Corinthians when they refused to join Pausanias in his march against Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Piraeus. But the Lacedaemonians were strong enough to despise this alienation of the allies, and even to take revenge on such as incurred their displeasure. Among these were the Elians, whose territory they invaded, but which they retreated from, on the appearance of an earthquake."

The following year the Spartans, under King Agis, again invaded the territory of Elis, enriched by the offerings made to the temple of Olympeia. Immense booty in slaves, cattle, and provisions was the result of this invasion, provoked by the refusal of the Elians to furnish aid in the war against Athens. The Elians were obliged to submit to hard terms of peace, and all the enemies of Sparta were rooted out of the Peloponnesus.

(M608) Such was the triumphant position of Sparta at the close of the Peloponnesian war. And a great change had also taken place in her internal affairs. The people had become enriched by successful war, and gold and silver were admitted against the old inst.i.tution of Lycurgus, which recognized only iron money. The public men were enriched by bribes. The strictness of the old rule of Spartan discipline was gradually relaxed.

(M609) It was then, shortly after the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, on the death of Agis, that a dangerous conspiracy broke out in Sparta itself, headed by Cinadon, a man of strength and courage, who saw that men of his cla.s.s were excluded from the honors and distinctions of the State by the oligarchy-the ephors and the senate. But the rebellion, though put down by the energy of Agesilaus, still produced a dangerous discontent which weakened the power of the State.

(M610) The Lacedaemonian naval power, at this crisis, was seriously threatened by the union of the Persian and Athenian fleet under Conon.

That remarkable man had escaped from the disaster of aegospotami with eight triremes, and sought the shelter of Cyprus, governed by his friend Evagoras, where he remained until the war between Sparta and the Persians gave a new direction to his enterprising genius. He joined Pharnabazus, enraged with the Spartans on account of the invasion of his satrapy by Lysander and Agesilaus, and by him was intrusted with the command of the Persian fleet. He succeeded in detaching Rhodes from the Spartan alliance, and gained, some time after, a decisive victory over Pisander-the Spartan admiral, off Cnidus, which weakened the power of Sparta on the sea, B.C.

394. More than half of the Spartan s.h.i.+ps were captured and destroyed.

(M611) This great success emboldened Thebes and other States to throw off the Spartan yoke. Lysander was detached from his command at the h.e.l.lespont to act against Botia, while Pausanias conducted an army from the Peloponnesus. The Thebans, threatened by the whole power of Sparta, applied to Athens, and Athens responded, no longer under the control of the Thirty Tyrants. Lysander was killed before Haliartus, an irreparable blow to Sparta, since he was her ablest general. Pausanias was compelled to evacuate Botia, and the enemies of Sparta took courage. An alliance between Athens, Corinth, Thebes, and Argos was now made to carry on war against Sparta.

(M612) Thebes at this time steps from the rank of a secondary power, and gradually rises to the rank of an ascendant city. Her leading citizen was Ismenias, one of the great organizers of the anti-Spartan movement-the precursor of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. He conducted successful operations in the northern part of Botia, and captured Heracleia.

(M613) Such successes induced the Lacedaemonians to recall Agesilaus from Asia, and to concentrate all their forces against this new alliance, of which Thebes and Corinth were then the most powerful cities. The allied forces were also considerable-some twenty-four thousand hoplites, besides light troops and cavalry, and these were mustered at Corinth, where they took up a defensive position. The Lacedaemonians advanced to attack them, and gained an indecisive victory, B.C. 394, which secured their ascendency within the Peloponnesus, but no further. Agesilaus advanced from Asia through Thrace to co-operate, but learned, on the confines of Botia, the news of the great battle of Cnidus. At Coronaea another battle was fought between the Spartan and anti-Spartan forces, which was also indecisive, but in which the Thebans displayed great heroism. This battle compelled Agesilaus, with the Spartan forces, which he commanded, to retire from Botia.

(M614) This battle was a moral defeat to Sparta. Nearly all her maritime allies deserted her-all but Abydos, which was held by the celebrated Dercyllidas. Pharnabazus and Conon now sailed with their fleet to Corinth, but the Persian satrap soon left and Conon remained sole admiral, a.s.sisted with Persian money. With this aid he rebuilt the long walls of Athens, with the hearty co-operation of those allies which had once been opposed to Athens.

(M615) Conon had large plans for the restoration of the Athenian power. He organized a large mercenary force at Corinth, which had now become the seat of war. But as many evils resulted from the presence of so many soldiers in the city, a conspiracy headed by the oligarchal party took place, with a view of restoring the Lacedaemonian power. Pasimelus, the head of the conspirators, admitted the enemy within the long walls of the city, which, as in Athens, secured a communication between the city and the port. And between these walls a battle took place, in which the Lacedaemonians were victorious with a severe loss. They pulled down a portion of the walls between Corinth and the port of Lechaeum, sallied forth, and captured two Corinthian dependencies, but the city of Corinth remained in the hands of their gallant defenders, under the Athenian Iphicrates. The long walls were soon restored, by aid of the Athenians, but were again retaken by Agesilaus and the Spartans, together with Lechaeum. This success alarmed Thebes, which unsuccessfully sued for peace.

The war continued, with the loss, to the Corinthians, of Piraeum, an important island port, which induced the Thebans again to open negotiations for peace, which were contemptuously rejected.

(M616) In the midst of these successes, tidings came to Agesilaus of a disaster which was attended with important consequences, and which spoiled his triumph. This was the destruction of a detachment of six hundred Lacedaemonian hoplites by the light troops of Iphicrates-an unprecedented victory-for the hoplites, in their heavy defensive armor, held in contempt the peltarts with their darts and arrows, even as the knights of mediaeval Europe despised an encounter with the peasantry. This event revived the courage of the anti-Spartan allies, and intensely humiliated the Lacedaemonians. It was not only the loss of the aristocratic hoplites, but the disgrace of being beaten by peltarts. Iphicrates recovered the places which Agesilaus had taken, and Corinth remained undisturbed.

(M617) Sparta, in view of these great disasters, now sought to detach Persia from Athens. She sent Antalcidas to Ionia, offering to surrender the Asiatic Greeks, and promising a universal autonomy throughout the Grecian world. These overtures were disliked by the allies, who sent Conon to counteract them. But Antalcidas gained the favor of the Persian satrap Tiribasus, who had succeeded Tissaphernes, and he privately espoused the cause of Sparta, and seized Conon and caused his death. Tiribasus, however, was not sustained by the Persian court, which remained hostile to Sparta. Struthas, a Persian general, was sent into Ionia, to act more vigorously against the Lacedaemonians. He gained a victory, B.C. 390, over the Spartan forces, commanded by Thimbron, who was slain.

(M618) The Lacedaemonians succeeded, after the death of Conon, in concentrating a considerable fleet near Rhodes. Against this, Thrasybulus was sent from Athens with a still larger one, and was gaining advantages, when he was slain near Aspendus, in Pamphylia, in a mutiny, and Athens lost the restorer of her renovated democracy, and an able general and honest citizen, without the vindictive animosities which characterized the great men of his day.

(M619) Rhodes still held out against the Lacedaemonians, who were now commanded by Anaxibius, in the place of Dercyllidas. He was surprised by Iphicrates, and was slain, and the Athenians, under this gallant leader, again became masters of the h.e.l.lespont. But this success was balanced by the defection of aegina, which island was constrained by the Lacedaemonians into war with Athens. I need not detail the various enterprises on both sides, until Antalcidas returned from Susa with the treaty confirmed between the Spartans and the court of Persia, which closed the war between the various contending parties, B.C. 387. This treaty was of great importance, but it indicates the loss of all h.e.l.lenic dignity when Sparta, too, descends so far as to comply with the demands of a Persian satrap.

Athens and Sparta, both, at different times, invoked the aid of Persia against each other-the most mournful fact in the whole history of Greece, showing how much more powerful were the rivalries of States than the sentiment of patriotism, which should have united them against their common enemy. The sacrifice of Ionia was the price which was paid by Sparta, in order to retain her supremacy over the rest of Greece, and Persia ruled over all the Greeks on the Asiatic coast. Sparta became mistress of Corinth and of the Corinthian Isthmus. She organized anti-Theban oligarchies in the Botian cities, with a Spartan harmost. She decomposed the Grecian world into small fragments. She crushed Olythus, and formed a confederacy between the Persian king and the Dionysius of Syracuse. In short, she ruled with despotic sway over all the different States.

We have now to show how Sparta lost the ascendency she had gained, and became involved in a war with Thebes, and how Thebes became, under Pelopidas and Epaminondas, for a time the dominant State of Greece.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE REPUBLIC OF THEBES.

(M620) After Sparta and Athens, no State of Greece arrived at pre-eminence, until the Macedonian empire arose, except Thebes, the capital of Botia; and the empire of this city was short, though memorable, from the extraordinary military genius of Epaminondas.

In the year B.C. 370, Sparta was the ascendant power of Greece, and was feared, even as Athens was in the time of Pericles. She had formed an alliance with the Persian king and with Dionysius of Syracuse. All Greece, within and without the Peloponnesus, except Argos and Attica and some Thessalian cities, was enrolled in a confederacy under the lead of Sparta, and Spartan governors and garrisons occupied the princ.i.p.al cities.

(M621) Thebes especially was completely under Spartan influence and control, and was apparently powerless. Her citadel, the Cadmea, was filled with Spartan soldiers, and the independence of Greece was at an end.

Confederated with Macedonians, Persians, and Syracusans, n.o.body dared to call in question the heads.h.i.+p of Sparta, or to provoke her displeasure.

(M622) This destruction of Grecian liberties, with the aid of the old enemies of Greece, kindled great indignation. The orator Lysias, at Athens, gave vent to the general feeling, in which he veils his displeasure under the form of surprise, that Sparta, as the chief of Greece, should permit the Persians, under Artaxerxes, and the Syracusans, under Dionysius, to enslave Greece. The orator Isocrates spoke still more plainly, and denounced the Lacedaemonians as "traitors to the general security and freedom of Greece, and seconding foreign kings to aggrandize themselves at the cost of autonomous Grecian cities-all in the interest of their own selfish ambition." Even Xenophon, with all his partiality for Sparta, was still more emphatic, and accused the Lacedaemonians with the violation of their oaths.

(M623) In Thebes the discontent was most apparent, for their leading citizens were exiled, and the oligarchal party, headed by Leontiades and the Spartan garrison, was oppressive and tyrannical. The Theban exiles found at Athens sympathy and shelter. Among these was Pelopidas, who resolved to free his country from the Spartan yoke. Holding intimate correspondence with his friends in Thebes, he looked forward patiently for the means of effecting deliverance, which could only be effected by the destruction of Leontiades and his colleagues, who ruled the city.

Philidas, secretary of the polemarchs, entered into the conspiracy, and, being sent in an emba.s.sy to Athens, concocted the way for Pelopidas and his friends to return to Thebes and effect a revolution. Charon, an eminent patriot, agreed to shelter the conspirators in his house until they struck the blow. Epaminondas, then living at Thebes, dissuaded the enterprise as too hazardous, although all his sympathies were with the conspirators.

(M624) When all was ready, Philidas gave a banquet at his house to the polemarchs, agreeing to introduce into the company some women of the first families of Thebes, distinguished for their beauty. In concert with the Theban exiles at Athens, Pelopidas, with six companions, crossed Cithaeron and arrived at Thebes, in December, B.C. 379, disguised as hunters, with no other arms than concealed daggers. By a fortunate accident they entered the gates and sought shelter in the house of Charon until the night of the banquet. They were introduced into the banqueting chamber when the polemarchs were full of wine, disguised in female attire, and, with the aid of their Theban conspirators, dispatched three of the polemarchs with their daggers. Leontiades was not present, but the conspirators were conducted secretly to his house, and effected their purpose. Leontiades was slain, in the presence of his wife. The conspirators then proceeded to the prison, slew the jailer, and liberated the prisoners, and then proclaimed, by heralds, in the streets, at midnight, that the despots were slain and Thebes was free. But the Spartans still held possession of the citadel, and, apprised of the _coup d'etat_, sent home for re-enforcements. But before they could arrive Pelopidas and the enfranchised citizens stormed the Cadmea, dispersed the garrison, put to death the oligarchal Thebans, and took full possession of the city.

(M625) This unlooked-for revolution was felt throughout Greece like an electric shook, and had a powerful moral effect. But the Spartans, although it was the depth of winter, sent forth an expedition, under King Cleombrotus-Agesilaus being disabled-to reconquer Thebes. He conducted his army along the Isthmus of Corinth, through Megara, but did nothing, and returned, leaving his lieutenant, Sphodrias, to prosecute hostilities.

Sphodrias, learning that the Piraeus was undefended, undertook to seize it, but failed, which outrage so incensed the Athenians, that they dismissed the Lacedaemonian envoys, and declared war against Sparta. Athens now exerted herself to form a second maritime confederacy, like that of Delos, and Thebes enrolled herself a member. As the Athenian envoys, sent to the islands of the aegean, promised the most liberal principles, a new confederacy was formed. The confederates a.s.sembled at Athens and threatened war on an extensive scale. A resolution was pa.s.sed to equip twenty thousand hoplites, five hundred hors.e.m.e.n, and two hundred triremes.

A new property-tax was imposed at Athens to carry on the war.

(M626) At Thebes there was great enthusiasm, and Pelopidas, with Charon and Melon, were named the first botrarchs. The Theban government became democratic in form and spirit, and the military force was put upon a severe training. A new brigade of three hundred hoplites, called the Sacred Band, was organized for the special defense of the citadel, composed of young men from the best families, distinguished for strength and courage. The Thebans had always been good soldiers, but the popular enthusiasm raised up the best army for its size in Greece.

(M627) Epaminondas now stands forth as a leader of rare excellence, destined to achieve the greatest military reputation of any Greek, before or since his time, with the exception of Alexander the Great-a kind of Gustavus Adolphus, introducing new tactics into Grecian warfare. He was in the prime of life, belonging to a poor but honorable family, younger than Pelopidas, who was rich. He had acquired great reputation for his gymnastic exercises; and was the most cultivated man in Thebes, a good musician, and a still greater orator. He learned to play on both the lyre and flute from the teachings of the best masters, sought the conversation of the learned, but was especially eloquent in speech, and effective, even against the best Athenian opponents. He was modest, unambitious, patriotic, intellectual, contented with poverty, generous, and disinterested. When the Cadmea was taken, he was undistinguished, and his rare merits were only known to Pelopidas and his friends. He was among the first to join the revolutionists, and was placed by Pelopidas among the organizers of the military force.

(M628) The Spartans now made renewed exertions, and King Agesilaus, the greatest military man of whom Sparta can boast, marched with a large army, in the spring of B.C. 378, to attack Thebes. He established his head-quarters in Thespiae, from which he issued to devastate the Theban territory.

The Thebans and Athenians, unequal in force, still kept the field against him, acting on the defensive, declining battle, and occupying strong positions. After a month of desultory warfare, Agesilaus retired, leaving Phbidas in command at Thespiae, who was slain in an incautious pursuit of the enemy.

(M629) In the ensuing summer Agesilaus undertook a second expedition into Botia, but gained no decided advantage, while the Thebans acquired experience, courage, and strength. Agesilaus having strained his lame leg, was incapacitated for active operation, and returned to Sparta, leaving Cleombrotus to command the Spartan forces. He was unable to enter Botia, since the pa.s.ses over Mount Cithaeron were held by the Thebans, and he made an inglorious retreat, without even reaching Botia.

(M630) The Spartans now resolved to fit out a large naval force to operate against Athens, by whose a.s.sistance the Thebans had maintained their ground for two years. The Athenians, on their part, also fitted out a fleet, a.s.sisted by their allies, under the command of Chabrias, which defeated the Lacedaemonian fleet near Naxos, B.C. 376. This was the first great victory which Athens had gained since the Peloponnesian war, and filled her citizens with joy and confidence, and led to a material enlargement of their maritime confederacy. Phocion, who had charge of a squadron detached from the fleet of Chabrias, also sailed victorious round the aegean, took twenty triremes, three thousand prisoners, with one hundred and ten talents in money, and annexed seventeen cities to the confederacy. Timotheus, the son of Conon, was sent with the fleet of Chabrias, to circ.u.mnavigate the Peloponnesus, and alarm the coast of Laconia. The important island of Corcyra entered into the confederation, and another Spartan fleet, under Nicolochus, was defeated, so that the Athenians became once again the masters of the sea. But having regained their ascendency, Athens became jealous of the growing power of Thebes, now mistress of Botia, and this jealousy, inexcusable after such reverses, was increased when Pelopidas gained a great victory over the Lacedaemonians near Tegyra, which led to the expulsion of their enemies from all parts of Botia, except Orchomenus, on the borders of Phocis.

That territory was now attacked by the victorious Thebans, upon which Athens made peace with the Lacedaemonians.

(M631) It would thus seem that the ancient Grecian States were perpetually jealous of any ascendant power, and their policy was not dissimilar from that which was inaugurated in modern Europe since the treaty of Westphalia-called the balance of power. Greece, thus far, was not ambitious to extend her rule over foreign nations, but sought an autonomous independence of the several States of which she was composed.

Had Greece united under the leaders.h.i.+p of Sparta or Athens, her foreign conquests might have been considerable, and her power, centralized and formidable, might have been a match even for the Romans. But in the anxiety of each State to secure its independence, there were perpetual and unworthy jealousies of each rising State, when it had reached a certain point of prosperity and glory. Hence the various States united under Sparta, in the Peloponnesian war, to subvert the ascendency of Athens. And when Sparta became the dominant power of Greece, Athens unites with Thebes to break her domination. And now Athens becomes jealous of Thebes, and makes peace with Sparta, in the same way that England in the eighteenth century united with Holland and other States, to prevent the aggrandizement of France, as different powers of Europe had previously united to prevent the ascendency of Austria.