The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 1

The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary.

by Sankaracarya.

INTRODUCTION.

To the sacred literature of the Brahmans, in the strict sense of the term, i.e. to the Veda, there belongs a certain number of complementary works without whose a.s.sistance the student is, according to Hindu notions, unable to do more than commit the sacred texts to memory. In the first place all Vedic texts must, in order to be understood, be read together with running commentaries such as Saya/n/a's commentaries on the Sa/m/hitas and Brahma/n/as, and the Bhashyas ascribed to [email protected] on the chief Upanishads. But these commentaries do not by themselves conduce to a full comprehension of the contents of the sacred texts, since they confine themselves to explaining the meaning of each detached pa.s.sage without investigating its relation to other pa.s.sages, and the whole of which they form part; considerations of the latter kind are at any rate introduced occasionally only. The task of taking a comprehensive view of the contents of the Vedic writings as a whole, of systematising what they present in an unsystematical form, of showing the mutual co-ordination or subordination of single pa.s.sages and sections, and of reconciling contradictions--which, according to the view of the orthodox commentators, can be apparent only--is allotted to a separate sastra or body of doctrine which is termed Mima/m/sa, i.e.

the investigation or enquiry [Greek: kat ezochaen], viz. the enquiry into the connected meaning of the sacred texts.

Of this Mima/m/sa two branches have to be distinguished, the so-called earlier (purva) Mima/m/sa, and the later (uttara) Mima/m/sa. The former undertakes to systematise the karmaka/nd/a, i.e. that entire portion of the Veda which is concerned with action, pre-eminently sacrificial action, and which comprises the Sa/m/hitas and the Brahma/n/as exclusive of the ara/n/yaka portions; the latter performs the same service with regard to the so-called j/n/anaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Vedic writings which includes the ara/n/yaka portions of the Brahma/n/as, and a number of detached treatises called Upanishads. Its subject is not action but knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Brahman.

At what period these two /s/astras first a.s.sumed a definite form, we are unable to ascertain. Discussions of the nature of those which const.i.tute the subject-matter of the Purva Mima/m/sa must have arisen at a very early period, and the word Mima/m/sa itself together with its derivatives is already employed in the Brahma/n/as to denote the doubts and discussions connected with certain contested points of ritual. The want of a body of definite rules prescribing how to act, i.e. how to perform the various sacrifices in full accordance with the teaching of the Veda, was indeed an urgent one, because it was an altogether practical want, continually pressing itself on the adhvaryus engaged in ritualistic duties. And the task of establis.h.i.+ng such rules was moreover a comparatively limited and feasible one; for the members of a certain Vedic sakha or school had to do no more than to digest thoroughly their own brahma/n/a and sa/m/hita, without being under any obligation of reconciling with the teaching of their own books the occasionally conflicting rules implied in the texts of other sakhas. It was a.s.sumed that action, as being something which depends on the will and choice of man, admits of alternatives, so that a certain sacrifice may be performed in different ways by members of different Vedic schools, or even by the followers of one and the same sakha.

The Uttara Mima/m/sa-/s/astra may be supposed to have originated considerably later than the Purva Mima/m/sa. In the first place, the texts with which it is concerned doubtless const.i.tute the latest branch of Vedic literature. And in the second place, the subject-matter of those texts did not call for a systematical treatment with equal urgency, as it was in no way connected with practice; the mental att.i.tude of the authors of the Upanishads, who in their lucubrations on Brahman and the soul aim at nothing less than at definiteness and coherence, may have perpetuated itself through many generations without any great inconvenience resulting therefrom.

But in the long run two causes must have acted with ever-increasing force, to give an impulse to the systematic working up of the teaching of the Upanishads also. The followers of the different Vedic sakhas no doubt recognised already at an early period the truth that, while conflicting statements regarding the details of a sacrifice can be got over by the a.s.sumption of a vikalpa, i.e. an optional proceeding, it is not so with regard to such topics as the nature of Brahman, the relation to it of the human soul, the origin of the physical universe, and the like. Concerning them, one opinion only can be the true one, and it therefore becomes absolutely inc.u.mbent on those, who look on the whole body of the Upanishads as revealed truth, to demonstrate that their teaching forms a consistent whole free from all contradictions. In addition there supervened the external motive that, while the karmaka/nd/a of the Veda concerned only the higher castes of brahmanically const.i.tuted society, on which it enjoins certain sacrificial performances connected with certain rewards, the j/n/anaka/nd/a, as propounding a certain theory of the world, towards which any reflecting person inside or outside the pale of the orthodox community could not but take up a definite position, must soon have become the object of criticism on the part of those who held different views on religious and philosophic things, and hence stood in need of systematic defence.

At present there exists a vast literature connected with the two branches of the Mima/m/sa. We have, on the one hand, all those works which const.i.tute the Purva Mima/m/sa-/s/astra--or as it is often, shortly but not accurately, termed, the Mima/m/sa-/s/astra--and, on the other hand, all those works which are commonly comprised under the name Vedanta-/s/astra. At the head of this extensive literature there stand two collections of Sutras (i.e. short aphorisms const.i.tuting in their totality a complete body of doctrine upon some subject), whose reputed authors are Jainini and Badaraya/n/a. There can, however, be no doubt that the composition of those two collections of Sutras was preceded by a long series of preparatory literary efforts of which they merely represent the highly condensed outcome. This is rendered probable by the a.n.a.logy of other /s/astras, as well as by the exhaustive thoroughness with which the Sutras perform their task of systematizing the teaching of the Veda, and is further proved by the frequent references which the Sutras make to the views of earlier teachers. If we consider merely the preserved monuments of Indian literature, the Sutras (of the two Mima/m/sas as well as of other /s/astras) mark the beginning; if we, however, take into account what once existed, although it is at present irretrievably lost, we observe that they occupy a strictly central position, summarising, on the one hand, a series of early literary essays extending over many generations, and forming, on the other hand, the head spring of an ever broadening activity of commentators as well as virtually independent writers, which reaches down to our days, and may yet have some future before itself.

The general scope of the two Mima/m/sa-sutras and their relation to the Veda have been indicated in what precedes. A difference of some importance between the two has, however, to be noted in this connexion.

The systematisation of the karmaka/nd/a of the Veda led to the elaboration of two cla.s.ses of works, viz. the Kalpa-sutras on the one hand, and the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras on the other hand. The former give nothing but a description as concise as possible of the sacrifices enjoined in the Brahma/n/as; while the latter discuss and establish the general principles which the author of a Kalpa-sutra has to follow, if he wishes to render his rules strictly conformable to the teaching of the Veda. The j/n/anaka/nd/a of the Veda, on the other hand, is systematised in a single work, viz. the Uttara Mima/m/sa or Vedanta-sutras, which combine the two tasks of concisely stating the teaching of the Veda, and of argumentatively establis.h.i.+ng the special interpretation of the Veda adopted in the Sutras. This difference may be accounted for by two reasons. In the first place, the contents of the karmaka/nd/a, as being of an entirely practical nature, called for summaries such as the Kalpa-sutras, from which all burdensome discussions of method are excluded; while there was no similar reason for the separation of the two topics in the case of the purely theoretical science of Brahman. And, in the second place, the Vedanta-sutras throughout presuppose the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras, and may therefore dispense with the discussion of general principles and methods already established in the latter.

The time at which the two Mima/m/sa-sutras were composed we are at present unable to fix with any certainty; a few remarks on the subject will, however, be made later on. Their outward form is that common to all the so-called Sutras which aims at condensing a given body of doctrine in a number of concise aphoristic sentences, and often even mere detached words in lieu of sentences. Besides the Mima/m/sa-sutras this literary form is common to the fundamental works on the other philosophic systems, on the Vedic sacrifices, on domestic ceremonies, on sacred law, on grammar, and on metres. The two Mima/m/sa-sutras occupy, however, an altogether exceptional position in point of style. All Sutras aim at conciseness; that is clearly the reason to which this whole species of literary composition owes its existence. This their aim they reach by the rigid exclusion of all words which can possibly be spared, by the careful avoidance of all unnecessary repet.i.tions, and, as in the case of the grammatical Sutras, by the employment of an arbitrarily coined terminology which subst.i.tutes single syllables for entire words or combination of words. At the same time the manifest intention of the Sutra writers is to express themselves with as much clearness as the conciseness affected by them admits of. The aphorisms are indeed often concise to excess, but not otherwise intrinsically obscure, the manifest care of the writers being to retain what is essential in a given phrase, and to sacrifice only what can be supplied, although perhaps not without difficulty, and an irksome strain of memory and reflection. Hence the possibility of understanding without a commentary a very considerable portion at any rate of the ordinary Sutras. Altogether different is the case of the two Mima/m/sa-sutras.

There scarcely one single Sutra is intelligible without a commentary.

The most essential words are habitually dispensed with; nothing is, for instance, more common than the simple ommission of the subject or predicate of a sentence. And when here and there a Sutra occurs whose words construe without anything having to be supplied, the phraseology is so eminently vague and obscure that without the help derived from a commentary we should be unable to make out to what subject the Sutra refers. When undertaking to translate either of the Mima/m/sa-sutras we therefore depend altogether on commentaries; and hence the question arises which of the numerous commentaries extant is to be accepted as a guide to their right understanding.

The commentary here selected for translation, together with Badaraya/n/a's Sutras (to which we shall henceforth confine our attention to the exclusion of Jaimini's Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras), is the one composed by the celebrated theologian /S/[email protected] or, as he is commonly called, /S/[email protected]/k/arya. There are obvious reasons for this selection. In the first place, the /S/[email protected] represents the so-called orthodox side of Brahminical theology which strictly upholds the Brahman or highest Self of the Upanishads as something different from, and in fact immensely superior to, the divine beings such as Vish/n/u or Siva, which, for many centuries, have been the chief objects of popular wors.h.i.+p in India. In the second place, the doctrine advocated by /S/[email protected] is, from a purely philosophical point of view and apart from all theological considerations, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil; neither those forms of the Vedanta which diverge from the view represented by /S/[email protected] nor any of the non-Vedantic systems can be compared with the so-called orthodox Vedanta in boldness, depth, and subtlety of speculation. In the third place, /S/[email protected]'s bhaashya is, as far as we know, the oldest of the extant commentaries, and relative antiquity is at any rate one of the circ.u.mstances which have to be taken into account, although, it must be admitted, too much weight may easily be attached to it. The /S/[email protected] further is the authority most generally deferred to in India as to the right understanding of the Vedanta-sutras, and ever since /S/[email protected]'s time the majority of the best thinkers of India have been men belonging to his school. If in addition to all this we take into consideration the intrinsic merits of /S/[email protected]'s work which, as a piece of philosophical argumentation and theological apologetics, undoubtedly occupies a high rank, the preference here given to it will be easily understood.

But to the European--or, generally, modern--translator of the Vedanta-sutras with /S/[email protected]'s commentary another question will of course suggest itself at once, viz. whether or not /S/[email protected]'s explanations faithfully render the intended meaning of the author of the Sutras. To the Indian Pandit of /S/[email protected]'s school this question has become an indifferent one, or, to state the case more accurately, he objects to it being raised, as he looks on /S/[email protected]'s authority as standing above doubt and dispute. When pressed to make good his position he will, moreover, most probably not enter into any detailed comparison of /S/[email protected]'s comments with the text of Badaraya/n/a's Sutras, but will rather endeavour to show on speculative grounds that /S/[email protected]'s philosophical view is the only true one, whence it of course follows that it accurately represents the meaning of Badaraya/n/a, who himself must necessarily be a.s.sured to have taught the true doctrine. But on the modern investigator, who neither can consider himself bound by the authority of a name however great, nor is likely to look to any Indian system of thought for the satisfaction of his speculative wants, it is clearly inc.u.mbent not to acquiesce from the outset in the interpretations given of the Vedanta-sutras--and the Upanishads--by /S/[email protected] and his school, but to submit them, as far as that can be done, to a critical investigation.

This is a task which would have to be undertaken even if /S/[email protected]'s views as to the true meaning of the Sutras and Upanishads had never been called into doubt on Indian soil, although in that case it could perhaps hardly be entered upon with much hope of success; but it becomes much more urgent, and at the same time more feasible, when we meet in India itself with systems claiming to be Vedantic and based on interpretations of the Sutras and Upanishads more or less differing from those of /S/[email protected] The claims of those systems to be in the possession of the right understanding of the fundamental authorities of the Vedanta must at any rate be examined, even if we should finally be compelled to reject them.

It appears that already at a very early period the Vedanta-sutras had come to be looked upon as an authoritative work, not to be neglected by any who wished to affiliate their own doctrines to the Veda. At present, at any rate, there are very few Hindu sects not interested in showing that their distinctive tenets are countenanced by Badaraya/n/a's teaching. Owing to this the commentaries on the Sutras have in the course of time become very numerous, and it is at present impossible to give a full and accurate enumeration even of those actually existing, much less of those referred to and quoted. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall, in his Bibliographical Index, mentions fourteen commentaries, copies of which had been inspected by himself. Some among these (as, for instance, Ramanuja's Vedanta-sara, No. x.x.xV) are indeed not commentaries in the strict sense of the word, but rather systematic expositions of the doctrine supposed to be propounded in the Sutras; but, on the other hand, there are in existence several true commentaries which had not been accessible to Fitz-Edward Hall. It would hardly be practical--and certainly not feasible in this place--to submit all the existing bhashyas to a critical enquiry at once. All we can do here is to single out one or a few of the more important ones, and to compare their interpretations with those given by /S/[email protected], and with the text of the Sutras themselves.

The bhashya, which in this connexion is the first to press itself upon our attention, is the one composed by the famous [email protected] theologian and philosopher Ramanuja, who is supposed to have lived in the twelfth century. The Ramanuja or, as it is often called, the /S/ri-bhashya appears to be the oldest commentary extant next to /S/[email protected]'s. It is further to be noted that the sect of the Ramanujas occupies a pre-eminent position among the Vaishnava, sects which themselves, in their totality, may claim to be considered the most important among all Hindu sects. The intrinsic value of the /S/ri-bhashya moreover is--as every student acquainted with it will be ready to acknowledge--a very high one; it strikes one throughout as a very solid performance due to a writer of extensive learning and great power of argumentation, and in its polemic parts, directed chiefly against the school of /S/[email protected], it not unfrequently deserves to be called brilliant even. And in addition to all this it shows evident traces of being not the mere outcome of Ramanuja's individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty tradition.

This latter point is clearly of the greatest importance. If it could be demonstrated or even rendered probable only that the oldest bhashya which we possess, i.e. the /S/[email protected], represents an uninterrupted and uniform tradition bridging over the interval between Badaraya/n/a, the reputed author of the Sutras, and /S/[email protected]; and if, on the other hand, it could be shown that the more modern bhashyas are not supported by old tradition, but are nothing more than bold attempts of clever sectarians to force an old work of generally recognised authority into the service of their individual tenets; there would certainly be no reason for us to raise the question whether the later bhashyas can help us in making out the true meaning of the Sutras. All we should have to do in that case would be to accept /S/[email protected]'s interpretations as they stand, or at the utmost to attempt to make out, if at all possible, by a careful comparison of /S/[email protected]'s bhashya with the text of the Sutras, whether the former in all cases faithfully represents the purport of the latter.

In the most recent book of note which at all enters into the question as to how far we have to accept /S/[email protected] as a guide to the right understanding of the Sutras (Mr. A. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads) the view is maintained (pp. 239 ff.) that /S/[email protected] is the generally recognised expositor of true Vedanta doctrine, that that doctrine was handed down by an unbroken series of teachers intervening between him and the Sutrakara, and that there existed from the beginning only one Vedanta doctrine, agreeing in all essential points with the doctrine known to us from /S/[email protected]'s writings. Mr. Gough undertakes to prove this view, firstly, by a comparison of /S/[email protected]'s system with the teaching of the Upanishads themselves; and, secondly, by a comparison of the purport of the Sutras--as far as that can be made out independently of the commentaries--with the interpretations given of them by /S/[email protected] To both these points we shall revert later on.

Meanwhile, I only wish to remark concerning the former point that, even if we could show with certainty that all the Upanishads propound one and the same doctrine, there yet remains the undeniable fact of our being confronted by a considerable number of essentially differing theories, all of which claim to be founded on the Upanishads. And with regard to the latter point I have to say for the present that, as long as we have only /S/[email protected]'s bhashya before us, we are naturally inclined to find in the Sutras--which, taken by themselves, are for the greater part unintelligible--the meaning which /S/[email protected]ara ascribes to them; while a reference to other bhashyas may not impossibly change our views at once.--Meanwhile, we will consider the question as to the unbroken uniformity of Vedantic tradition from another point or view, viz. by enquiring whether or not the Sutras themselves, and the /S/[email protected], furnish any indications of there having existed already at an early time essentially different Vedantic systems or lines of Vedantic speculation.

Beginning with the Sutras, we find that they supply ample evidence to the effect that already at a very early time, viz. the period antecedent to the final composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present shape, there had arisen among the chief doctors of the Vedanta differences of opinion, bearing not only upon minor points of doctrine, but affecting the most essential parts of the system. In addition to Badaraya/n/a himself, the reputed author of the Sutras, the latter quote opinions ascribed to the following teachers: atreya, a/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi, Karsh/n/agini, Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna, Jaimini, Badari. Among the pa.s.sages where diverging views of those teachers are recorded and contrasted three are of particular importance. Firstly, a pa.s.sage in the fourth pada of the fourth adhyaya (Sutras 5-7), where the opinions of various teachers concerning the characteristics of the released soul are given, and where the important discrepancy is noted that, according to Au/d/ulomi, its only characteristic is thought (/k/aitanya), while Jaimini maintains that it possesses a number of exalted qualities, and Badaraya/n/a declares himself in favour of a combination of those two views.--The second pa.s.sage occurs in the third pada of the fourth adhyaya (Sutras 7-14), where Jaimini maintains that the soul of him who possesses the lower knowledge of Brahman goes after death to the highest Brahman, while Badari--whose opinion is endorsed by /S/[email protected] that it repairs to the lower Brahman only--Finally, the third and most important pa.s.sage is met with in the fourth pada of the first adhyaya (Sutras 20-22), where the question is discussed why in a certain pa.s.sage of the Brhadara/n/yaka Brahman is referred to in terms which are strictly applicable to the individual soul only. In connexion therewith the Sutras quote the views of three ancient teachers about the relation in which the individual soul stands to Brahman. According to a/s/marathya (if we accept the interpretation of his view given by /S/[email protected] and /S/[email protected]'s commentators) the soul stands to Brahman in the bhedabheda relation, i.e. it is neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire. Audulomi, on the other hand, teaches that the soul is altogether different from Brahman up to the time when obtaining final release it is merged in it, and Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna finally upholds the doctrine that the soul is absolutely non-different from Brahman; which, in, some way or other presents itself as the individual soul.

That the ancient teachers, the ripest outcome of whose speculations and discussions is embodied in the Vedanta-sutras, disagreed among themselves on points of vital importance is sufficiently proved by the three pa.s.sages quoted. The one quoted last is specially significant as showing that recognised authorities--deemed worthy of being quoted in the Sutras--denied that doctrine on which the whole system of /S/[email protected] hinges, viz. the doctrine of the absolute ident.i.ty of the individual soul with Brahman.

Turning next to the /S/[email protected] itself, we there also meet with indications that the Vedantins were divided among themselves on important points of dogma. These indications are indeed not numerous: /S/[email protected], does not on the whole impress one as an author particularly anxious to strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities, a peculiarity of his which later writers of hostile tendencies have not failed to remark and criticise. But yet more than once /S/[email protected] also refers to the opinion of 'another,' viz., commentator of the Sutras, and in several places /S/[email protected]'s commentators explain that the 'other'

meant is the V/ri/ttikara (about whom more will be said shortly). Those references as a rule concern minor points of exegesis, and hence throw little or no light on important differences of dogma; but there are two remarks of /S/[email protected]'s at any rate which are of interest in this connexion. The one is made with reference to Sutras 7-14 of the third pada of the fourth adhyaya; 'some,' he says there, 'declare those Sutras, which I look upon as setting forth the siddhanta view, to state merely the purvapaksha;' a difference of opinion which, as we have seen above, affects the important question as to the ultimate fate of those who have not reached the knowledge of the highest Brahman.--And under I, 3, 19 /S/[email protected], after having explained at length that the individual soul as such cannot claim any reality, but is real only in so far as it is identical with Brahman, adds the following words, 'apare tu vadina/h/ paramarthikam eva jaiva/m/ rupam iti manyante asmadiya/s/ /k/a ke/k/it,'

i.e. other theorisers again, and among them some of ours, are of opinion that the individual soul as such is real.' The term 'ours,' here made use of, can denote only the Aupanishadas or Vedantins, and it thus appears that /S/[email protected] himself was willing to cla.s.s under the same category himself and philosophers who--as in later times the Ramanujas and others--looked upon the individual soul as not due to the fict.i.tious limitations of Maya, but as real in itself; whatever may be the relation in which they considered it to stand to the highest Self.

From what precedes it follows that the Vedantins of the school to which /S/[email protected] himself belonged acknowledged the existence of Vedantic teaching of a type essentially different from their own. We must now proceed to enquire whether the Ramanuja system, which likewise claims to be Vedanta, and to be founded on the Vedanta-sutras, has any t.i.tle to be considered an ancient system and the heir of a respectable tradition.

It appears that Ramanuja claims--and by Hindu writers is generally admitted--to follow in his bhashya the authority of Bodhayana, who had composed a v/ri/tti on the Sutras. Thus we read in the beginning of the /S/ri-bhashya (Pandit, New Series, VII, p. 163), 'Bhagavad-bodhayanak/ri/ta/m/ vistirna/m/ brahmasutra-v/ri/tti/m/ purva/k/arya/h/ sa/m/kiks.h.i.+pus tanmata.n.u.sare/n/a sutrakshara/n/i vyakhyasyante.' Whether the Bodhayana to whom that v/ri/tti is ascribed is to be identified with the author of the Kalpa-sutra, and other works, cannot at present be decided. But that an ancient v/ri/tti on the Sutras connected with Bodhayana's name actually existed, there is not any reason to doubt. Short quotations from it are met with in a few places of the /S/ri-bhashya, and, as we have seen above, /S/[email protected]'s commentators state that their author's polemical remarks are directed against the V/ri/ttikara. In addition to Bodhayana, Ramanuja appeals to quite a series of ancient teachers--purva/k/aryas--who carried on the true tradition as to the teaching of the Vedanta and the meaning of the Sutras. In the [email protected] work composed by Ramanuja himself--we meet in one place with the enumeration of the following authorities: Bodhayana, /T/[email protected], Drami/d/a, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bharu/k/i, and quotations from the writings of some of these are not unfrequent in the [email protected], as well as the /S/ri-bhashya. The author most frequently quoted is Drami/d/a, who composed the Drami/d/a-bhashya; he is sometimes referred to as the bhashyakara.

Another writer repeatedly quoted as the vakyakara is, I am told, to be identified with the /T/[email protected] mentioned above. I refrain from inserting in this place the information concerning the relative age of these writers which may be derived from the oral tradition of the Ramanuja sect. From another source, however, we receive an intimation that Drami/d/a/k/arya or Dravi/d/a/k/arya preceded /S/[email protected] in point of time. In his /t/ika on /S/[email protected]'s bhashya to the Chandogya Upanishad III, 10, 4, anandagiri remarks that the attempt made by his author to reconcile the cosmological views of the Upanishad with the teaching of Sm/ri/ti on the same point is a reproduction of the a.n.a.logous attempt made by the Dravi/d/a/k/arya.

It thus appears that that special interpretation of the Vedanta-sutras with which the /S/ri-bhashya makes us acquainted is not due to innovating views on the part of Ramanuja, but had authoritative representatives already at a period anterior to that of /S/[email protected] This latter point, moreover, receives additional confirmation from the relation in which the so-called Ramanuja sect stands to earlier sects.

What the exact position of Ramanuja was, and of what nature were the reforms that rendered him so prominent as to give his name to a new sect, is not exactly known at present; at the same time it is generally acknowledged that the Ramanujas are closely connected with the so-called Bhagavatas or Pa/nk/aratras, who are known to have existed already at a very early time. This latter point is proved by evidence of various kinds; for our present purpose it suffices to point to the fact that, according to the interpretation of the most authoritative commentators, the last Sutras of the second pada of the second adhyaya (Vedanta-sutras) refer to a distinctive tenet of the Bhagavatas--which tenet forms part of the Ramanuja system also--viz. that the highest being manifests itself in a fourfold form (vyuha) as Vasudeva, [email protected]/n/a, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, those four forms being identical with the highest Self, the individual soul, the internal organ (manas), and the principle of egoity ([email protected]). Whether those Sutras embody an approval of the tenet referred to, as Ramanuja maintains, or are meant to impugn it, as /S/[email protected] thinks; so much is certain that in the opinion of the best commentators the Bhagavatas, the direct forerunners of the Ramanujas, are mentioned in the Sutras themselves, and hence must not only have existed, but even reached a considerable degree of importance at the time when the Sutras were composed. And considering the general agreement of the systems of the earlier Bhagavatas and the later Ramanujas, we have a full right to suppose that the two sects were at one also in their mode of interpreting the Vedanta-sutras.

The preceding considerations suffice, I am inclined to think, to show that it will by no means be wasted labour to enquire how Ramanuja interprets the Sutras, and wherein he differs from /S/[email protected] This in fact seems clearly to be the first step we have to take, if we wish to make an attempt at least of advancing beyond the interpretations of scholiasts to the meaning of the Sutras themselves. A full and exhaustive comparison of the views of the two commentators would indeed far exceed the limits of the s.p.a.ce which can here he devoted to that task, and will, moreover, be made with greater ease and advantage when the complete Sanskrit text of the /S/ri-bhashya has been printed, and thus made available for general reference. But meanwhile it is possible, and--as said before--even urged upon a translator of the Sutras to compare the interpretations, given by the two bhashyakaras, of those Sutras, which, more than others, touch on the essential points of the Vedanta system. This will best be done in connexion with a succinct but full review of the topics discussed in the adhikara/n/as of the Vedanta-sutras, according to /S/[email protected]; a review which--apart from the side-glances at Ramanuja's comments--will be useful as a guide through the Sutras and the /S/[email protected] Before, however, entering on that task, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the philosophical systems of /S/[email protected] as well as of Ramanuja, which may be referred to when, later on discrepancies between the two commentators will be noted.

In these sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and not enter into any details. Of /S/[email protected]'s system we possess as it is more than one trustworthy exposition; it may suffice to refer to Deussen's System of the Vedanta, in which the details of the entire system, as far as they can be learned from the Sutra-bhashya, are represented fully and faithfully, and to Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads which, princ.i.p.ally in its second chapter, gives a lucid sketch of the /S/[email protected] Vedanta, founded on the Sutra-bhashya, the Upanishad bhashyas, and some later writers belonging to /S/[email protected]'s school. With regard to Ramanuja's philosophy our chief source was, hitherto, the Ramanuja chapter in the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha; the short sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the /S/ri-bhashya itself.

What in /S/[email protected]'s opinion the Upanishads teach, is shortly as follows.--Whatever is, is in reality one; there truly exists only one universal being called Brahman or Paramatman, the highest Self. This being is of an absolutely h.o.m.ogeneous nature; it is pure 'Being,' or, which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (/k/aitanya, j/n/ana). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as its attribute, but const.i.tutes its substance, Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself. It is absolutely dest.i.tute of qualities; whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of it.--But, if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the appearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and, in which we ourselves exist as individual beings?--Brahman, the answer runs, is a.s.sociated with a certain power called Maya or avidya to which the appearance of this entire world is due. This power cannot be called 'being' (sat), for 'being' is only Brahman; nor can it be called 'non-being' (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the appearance of this world. It is in fact a principle of illusion; the undefinable cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world comprehending distinct individual existences. Being a.s.sociated with this principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearances of animate and inanimate beings. Maya thus const.i.tutes the upadana, the material cause of the world; or--if we wish to call attention to the circ.u.mstance that Maya belongs to Brahman as a /s/akti--we may say that the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is a.s.sociated with Maya. In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called i/s/vara, the Lord.

Maya, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies itself by a progressive evolution into all the individual existences (bheda), distinguished by special names and forms, of which the world consists; from it there spring in due succession the different material elements and the whole bodily apparatus belonging to sentient Beings. In all those apparently, individual forms of existence the one indivisible Brahman is present, but, owing to the particular adjuncts into which Maya has specialised itself, it appears to be broken up--it is broken up, as it were--into a multiplicity, of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called jivas (individual or personal souls). What is real in each jiva is only the universal Brahman itself; the whole aggregate of individualising bodily organs and mental functions, which in our ordinary experience separate and distinguish one jiva from another, is the offspring of Maya and as such unreal.

The phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience (vyavahara) thus consists of a number of individual souls engaged in specific cognitions, volitions, and so on, and of the external material objects with which those cognitions and volitions are concerned. Neither the specific cognitions nor their objects are real in the true sense of the word, for both are altogether due to Maya. But at the same time we have to reject the idealistic doctrine of certain Bauddha schools according to which nothing whatever truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional acts or ideas to which no external objects correspond; for external things, although not real in the strict sense of the word, enjoy at any rate as much reality as the specific cognitional acts whose objects they are.

The non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and beyond Maya, which, like a veil, hides from it its true nature. Instead of recognising itself to be Brahman, it blindly identifies itself with its adjuncts (upadhi), the fict.i.tious offspring of Maya, and thus looks for its true Self in the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ (manas), i.e. the organ of specific cognition. The soul, which in reality is pure intelligence, non-active, infinite, thus becomes limited in extent, as it were, limited in knowledge and power, an agent and enjoyer. Through its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit, the consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of future embodied existences, the Lord--as a retributor and dispenser--allotting to each soul that form of embodiment to which it is ent.i.tled by its previous actions. At the end of each of the great world periods called kalpas the Lord retracts the whole world, i.e. the whole material world is dissolved and merged into non-distinct Maya, while the individual souls, free for the time from actual connexion with upadhis, lie in deep slumber as it were. But as the consequences of their former deeds are not yet exhausted, they have again to enter on embodied existence as soon as the Lord sends forth a new material world, and the old round of birth, action, death begins anew to last to all eternity as it has lasted from all eternity.

The means of escaping from this endless sa/ms/ara, the way out of which can never be found by the non-enlightened soul, are furnished by the Veda. The karmaka/nd/a indeed, whose purport it is to enjoin certain actions, cannot lead to final release; for even the most meritorious works necessarily lead to new forms of embodied existence. And in the j/n/anaka/nd/a of the Veda also two different parts have to be distinguished, viz., firstly, those chapters and pa.s.sages which treat of Brahman in so far as related to the world, and hence characterised by various attributes, i.e. of i/s/vara or the lower Brahman; and, secondly, those texts which set forth the nature of the highest Brahman transcending all qualities, and the fundamental ident.i.ty of the individual soul with that highest Brahman. Devout meditation on Brahman as suggested by pa.s.sages of the former kind does not directly lead to final emanc.i.p.ation; the pious wors.h.i.+pper pa.s.ses on his death into the world of the lower Brahman only, where he continues to exist as a distinct individual soul--although in the enjoyment of great power and knowledge--until at last he reaches the highest knowledge, and, through it, final release.--That student of the Veda, on the other hand, whose soul has been enlightened by the texts embodying the higher knowledge of Brahman, whom pa.s.sages such as the great saying, 'That art thou,' have taught that there is no difference between his true Self and the highest Self, obtains at the moment of death immediate final release, i.e. he withdraws altogether from the influence of Maya, and a.s.serts himself in his true nature, which is nothing else but the absolute highest Brahman.

Thus /S/[email protected] to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the teaching of the Upanishads has to be summarised as follows.--There exists only one all-embracing being called Brahman or the highest Self of the Lord.

This being is not dest.i.tute of attributes, but rather endowed with all imaginable auspicious qualities. It is not 'intelligence,'--as /S/[email protected] maintains,--but intelligence is its chief attribute. The Lord is all-pervading, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-merciful; his nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil. He contains within himself whatever exists. While, according to /S/[email protected], the only reality is to be found in the non-qualified h.o.m.ogeneous highest Brahman which can only be defined as pure 'Being' or pure thought, all plurality being a mere illusion; Brahman--according to Ramanuja's view--comprises within itself distinct elements of plurality which all of them lay claim to absolute reality of one and the same kind. Whatever is presented to us by ordinary experience, viz. matter in all its various modifications and the individual souls of different cla.s.ses and degrees, are essential real const.i.tuents of Brahman's nature. Matter and souls (a/k/it and /k/it) const.i.tute, according to Ramanuja's terminology, the body of the Lord; they stand to him in the same relation of entire dependence and subserviency in which the matter forming an animal or vegetable body stands to its soul or animating principle. The Lord pervades and rules all things which exist--material or immaterial--as their antaryamin; the fundamental text for this special Ramanuja tenet--which in the writings of the sect is quoted again and again--is the so-called antaryamin brahma/n/a. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7) which says, that within all elements, all sense organs, and, lastly, within all individual souls, there abides an inward ruler whose body those elements, sense-organs, and individual souls const.i.tute.--Matter and souls as forming the body of the Lord are also called modes of him (prakara). They are to be looked upon as his effects, but they have enjoyed the kind of individual existence which is theirs from all eternity, and will never be entirely resolved into Brahman. They, however, exist in two different, periodically alternating, conditions. At some times they exist in a subtle state in which they do not possess those qualities by which they are ordinarily known, and there is then no distinction of individual name and form.

Matter in that state is unevolved (avyakta); the individual souls are not joined to material bodies, and their intelligence is in a state of contraction, non-manifestation ([email protected]/k/a). This is the pralaya state which recurs at the end of each kalpa, and Brahman is then said to be in its causal condition (kara/n/avastha). To that state all those scriptural pa.s.sages refer which speak of Brahman or the Self as being in the beginning one only, without a second. Brahman then is indeed not absolutely one, for it contains within itself matter and souls in a germinal condition; but as in that condition they are so subtle as not to allow of individual distinctions being made, they are not counted as something second in addition to Brahman.--When the pralaya state comes to an end, creation takes place owing to an act of volition on the Lord's part. Primary unevolved matter then pa.s.ses over into its other condition; it becomes gross and thus acquires all those sensible attributes, visibility, tangibility, and so on, which are known from ordinary experience. At the same time the souls enter into connexion with material bodies corresponding to the degree of merit or demerit acquired by them in previous forms of existence; their intelligence at the same time undergoes a certain expansion (vika/s/a). The Lord, together with matter in its gross state and the 'expanded' souls, is Brahman in the condition of an effect (karyavastha). Cause and effect are thus at the bottom the same; for the effect is nothing but the cause which has undergone a certain change (pari/n/ama). Hence the cause being known, the effect is known likewise.

Owing to the effects of their former actions the individual souls are implicated in the sa/m/sara, the endless cycle of birth, action, and death, final escape from which is to be obtained only through the study of the j/n/anaka/nd/a of the Veda. Compliance with the injunctions of the karmaka/nd/a does not lead outside the sa/m/sara; but he who, a.s.sisted by the grace of the Lord, cognizes--and meditates on--him in the way prescribed by the Upanishads reaches at his death final emanc.i.p.ation, i.e. he pa.s.ses through the different stages of the path of the G.o.ds up to the world of Brahman and there enjoys an everlasting blissful existence from which there is no return into the sphere of transmigration. The characteristics of the released soul are similar to those of Brahman; it partic.i.p.ates in all the latter's glorious qualities and powers, excepting only Brahman's power to emit, rule, and retract the entire world.

The chief points in which the two systems sketched above agree on the one hand and diverge on the other may be shortly stated as follows.--Both systems teach advaita, i.e. non-duality or monism. There exist not several fundamentally distinct principles, such as the prak/r/iti and the purushas of the [email protected], but there exists only one all-embracing being. While, however, the advaita taught by /S/[email protected] is a rigorous, absolute one, Ramanuja's doctrine has to be characterised as visish/t/a advaita, i.e. qualified non-duality, non-duality with a difference. According to Sankara, whatever is, is Brahman, and Brahman itself is absolutely h.o.m.ogeneous, so that all difference and plurality must be illusory. According to Ramanuja also, whatever is, is Brahman; but Brahman is not of a h.o.m.ogeneous nature, but contains within itself elements of plurality owing to which it truly manifests itself in a diversified world. The world with its variety of material forms of existence and individual souls is not unreal Maya, but a real part of Brahman's nature, the body investing the universal Self. The Brahman of /S/[email protected] is in itself impersonal, a h.o.m.ogeneous ma.s.s of objectless thought, transcending all attributes; a personal G.o.d it becomes only through its a.s.sociation with the unreal principle of Maya, so that--strictly speaking--/S/[email protected]'s personal G.o.d, his i/s/vara, is himself something unreal. Ramanuja's Brahman, on the other hand, is essentially a personal G.o.d, the all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a real world permeated and animated by his spirit. There is thus no room for the distinction between a param nirgu/n/am and an apara/m/ sagu/n/am brahma, between Brahman and i/s/vara.--/S/[email protected]'s individual soul is Brahman in so far as limited by the unreal upadhis due to Maya. The individual soul of Ramanuja, on the other hand, is really individual; it has indeed sprung from Brahman and is never outside Brahman, but nevertheless it enjoys a separate personal existence and will remain a personality for ever--The release from sa/m/sara means, according to /S/[email protected], the absolute merging of the individual soul in Brahman, due to the dismissal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct from Brahman; according to Ramanuja it only means the soul's pa.s.sing from the troubles of earthly life into a kind of heaven or paradise where it will remain for ever in undisturbed personal bliss.--As Ramanuja does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman, the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge is likewise not valid for him; the teaching of the Upanishads is not twofold but essentially one, and leads the enlightened devotee to one result only [1].

I now proceed to give a conspectus of the contents of the Vedanta-sutras according to /S/[email protected] in which at the same time all the more important points concerning which Ramanuja disagrees will be noted. We shall here have to enter into details which to many may appear tedious. But it is only on a broad substratum of accurately stated details that we can hope to establish any definite conclusions regarding the comparative value of the different modes of interpretation which have been applied to the Sutras. The line of investigation is an entirely new one, and for the present nothing can be taken for granted or known.--In stating the different heads of discussion (the so-called adhikara/n/as), each of which comprises one or more Sutras, I shall follow the subdivision into adhikara/n/as adopted in the Vyasadhika-ra/n/amala, the text of which is printed in the second volume of the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the Sutras.

FIRST ADHYaYA.

PaDA I.

The first five adhikara/n/as lay down the fundamental positions with regard to Brahman. Adhik. I (1) [2] treats of what the study of the Vedanta presupposes. Adhik. II (2) defines Brahman as that whence the world originates, and so on. Adhik. III (3) declares that Brahman is the source of the Veda. Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be the uniform topic of all Vedanta-texts. Adhik. V (5-11) is engaged in proving by various arguments that the Brahman, which the Vedanta-texts represent as the cause of the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be identified with the non-intelligent pradhana from which the world springs according to the [email protected]

With the next adhikara/n/a there begins a series of discussions of essentially similar character, extending up to the end of the first adhyaya. The question is throughout whether certain terms met with in the Upanishads denote Brahman or some other being, in most cases the jiva, the individual soul. /S/[email protected] remarks at the outset that, as the preceding ten Sutras had settled the all-important point that all the Vedanta-texts refer to Brahman, the question now arises why the enquiry should be continued any further, and thereupon proceeds to explain that the acknowledged distinction of a higher Brahman devoid of all qualities and a lower Brahman characterised by qualities necessitates an investigation whether certain Vedic texts of prima facie doubtful import set forth the lower Brahman as the object of devout meditation, or the higher Brahman as the object of true knowledge. But that such an investigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion of the first adhyaya, appears neither from the wording of the Sutras nor even from /S/[email protected]'s own treatment of the Vedic texts referred to in the Sutras. In I, 1, 20, for instance, the question is raised whether the golden man within the sphere of the sun, with golden hair and beard and lotus-coloured eyes--of whom the Chandogya Upanishad speaks in 1, 6, 6--is an individual soul abiding within the sun or the highest Lord.

/S/[email protected]'s answer is that the pa.s.sage refers to the Lord, who, for the gratification of his wors.h.i.+ppers, manifests himself in a bodily shape made of Maya. So that according to /S/[email protected] himself the alternative lies between the sagu/n/a Brahman and some particular individual soul, not between the sagu/n/a Brahman and the nirgu/n/a Brahman.

Adhik. VI (12-19) raises the question whether the anandamaya, mentioned in Taittiriya Upanishad II, 5, is merely a transmigrating individual soul or the highest Self. /S/[email protected] begins by explaining the Sutras on the latter supposition--and the text of the Sutras is certainly in favour of that interpretation--gives, however, finally the preference to a different and exceedingly forced explanation according to which the Sutras teach that the anandamaya is not Brahman, since the Upanishad expressly says that Brahman is the tail or support of the anandamaya[3].--Ramanuja's interpretation of Adhikara/n/a VI, although not agreeing in all particulars with the former explanation of /S/[email protected], yet is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the anandamaya is Brahman. It further deserves notice that, while /S/[email protected] looks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of interpretatory discussions, all of which treat the question whether certain Vedic pa.s.sages refer to Brahman or not, Ramanuja separates the adhikara/n/a from the subsequent part of the pada and connects it with what had preceded. In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be identified with the pradhana; Adhik. VI shows that it is different from the individual soul, and the proof of the fundamental position of the system is thereby completed[4].--Adhik. VII (20, 21) demonstrates that the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye, mentioned in Ch. Up. I, 6, are not some individual soul of high eminence, but the supreme Brahman.--Adhik. VIII (22) teaches that by the ether from which, according to Ch. Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not the elemental ether has to be understood but the highest Brahman.--Adhik. IX (23). The pra/n/a also mentioned in Ch. Up. I, ii, 5 denotes the highest Brahman[5]--Adhik. X (24-27) teaches that the light spoken of in Ch. Up. III, 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but the highest Brahman[6].--Adhik. XI (28-31) decides that the pra/n/a mentioned in Kau. Up. III, 2 is Brahman.

PaDA II.

Adhik. I (1-8) shows that the being which consists of mind, whose body is breath, &c., mentioned in Ch. Up. III, 14, is not the individual soul, but Brahman. The Sutras of this adhikara/n/a emphatically dwell on the difference of the individual soul and the highest Self, whence /S/[email protected] is obliged to add an explanation--in his comment on Sutra 6--to the effect that that difference is to be understood as not real, but as due to the false limiting adjuncts of the highest Self.--The comment of Ramanuja throughout closely follows the words of the Sutras; on Sutra 6 it simply remarks that the difference of the highest Self from the individual soul rests thereon that the former as free from all evil is not subject to the effects of works in the same way as the soul is [7].--Adhik. II (9, 10) decides that he to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food (Ka/th/a. Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest Self.--Adhik. III (11, 12) shows that the two entered into the cave (Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 1) are Brahman and the individual soul[8].--Adhik. IV (13-17) shows that the person within the eye mentioned in Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1 is Brahman.--Adhik. V (18-20) shows that the ruler within (antaraymin) described in B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3 is Brahman. Sutra 20 clearly enounces the difference of the individual soul and the Lord; hence /S/ is obliged to remark that that difference is not real.--Adhik. VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c, mentioned in Mu/nd/aka Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman.--Adhik. VII (24-32) shows that the atman vai/s/vanara of Ch. Up. V, 11, 6 is Brahman.