The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 19

31. On account of the impossibility of (the G.o.ds being qualified) for the madhu-vidya, &c., Jaimini (maintains) the non-qualification (of the G.o.ds for the Brahma-vidya).

A new objection is raised against the averment that the G.o.ds, &c. also are ent.i.tled to the knowledge of Brahman. The teacher, Jaimini, considers the G.o.ds and similar beings not to have any claim.--Why?--On account of the impossibility, in the case of the so-called Madhu-vidya, &c. If their claim to the knowledge of Brahman were admitted, we should have to admit their claim to the madhu-vidya ('the knowledge of the honey') also, because that also is a kind of knowledge not different (from the knowledge of Brahman). But to admit this latter claim is not possible; for, according to the pa.s.sage, 'The Sun is indeed the honey of the devas' (Ch. Up. III, 1, 1), men are to meditate on the sun (the G.o.d aditya) under the form of honey, and how, if the G.o.ds themselves are admitted as meditating wors.h.i.+ppers, can aditya meditate upon another aditya?--Again, the text, after having enumerated five kinds of nectar, the red one, &c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the five cla.s.ses of G.o.ds, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, adityas, Maruts, and Sadhyas, live on one of these nectars each, declares that 'he who thus knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with Agni at their head, he sees the nectar and rejoices, &c., and indicates thereby that those who know the nectars enjoyed by the Vasus, &c., attain the greatness of the Vasus, &c.' But how should the Vasus themselves know other Vasus enjoying the nectar, and what other Vasu-greatness should they desire to attain?--We have also to compare the pa.s.sages 'Agni is one foot, aditya is one foot, the quarters are one foot' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 2); 'Air is indeed the absorber' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1); 'aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine.' All these pa.s.sages treat of the meditation on the Self of certain divinities, for which meditation these divinities themselves are not qualified.--So it is likewise impossible that the /ri/s.h.i.+s themselves should be qualified for meditations connected with /ri/s.h.i.+s, such as expressed in pa.s.sages like B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 4, 'These two are the /ri/s.h.i.+s Gautama and Bharadvaja; the right Gautama, the left Bharadvaja.'--Another reason for the non-qualification of the G.o.ds is stated in the following Sutra.

32. And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on account of (the words denoting the devas, &c.) being (used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.

To that sphere of light, the purvapaks.h.i.+n resumes, which is stationed in the sky, and during its diurnal revolutions illumines the world, terms such as aditya, i.e. the names of devas, are applied, as we know from the use of ordinary language, and from Vedic complementary pa.s.sages[207]. But of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it should be endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart and the like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming wishes[208]. For mere light we know to be, like earth, entirely devoid of intelligence.

The same observation applies to Agni (fire), and so on. It will perhaps be said that our objection is not valid, because the personality of the devas is known from the mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, pura/n/as, and from the conceptions of ordinary life[209]; but we contest the relevancy of this remark. For the conceptions of ordinary life do not const.i.tute an independent means of knowledge; we rather say that a thing is known from ordinary life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means of knowledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means of knowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the matter under discussion. Itihasas and pura/n/as again being of human origin, stand themselves in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. The arthavada pa.s.sages also, which, as forming syntactical wholes with the injunctory pa.s.sages, have merely the purpose of glorifying (what is enjoined in the latter), cannot be considered to const.i.tute by themselves reasons for the existence of the personality, &c. of the devas. The mantras again, which, on the ground of direct enunciation, &c., are to be employed (at the different stages of the sacrificial action), have merely the purpose of denoting things connected with the sacrificial performance, and do not const.i.tute an independent means of authoritative knowledge for anything[210].--For these reasons the devas, and similar beings, are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

33. Badaraya/n/a, on the other hand, (maintains) the existence (of qualification for Brahma-vidya on the part of the G.o.ds); for there are (pa.s.sages indicatory of that).

The expression 'on the other hand' is meant to rebut the purvapaksha.

The teacher, Badaraya/n/a, maintains the existence of the qualification on the part of the G.o.ds, &c. For, although the qualification of the G.o.ds cannot be admitted with reference to the madhu-vidya, and similar topics of knowledge, in which the G.o.ds themselves are implicated, still they may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brahman, qualification in general depending on the presence of desire, capability, &c.[211] Nor does the impossibility of qualification in certain cases interfere with the presence of qualification in those other cases where it is not impossible. To the case of the G.o.ds the same reasoning applies as to the case of men; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything, Brahma/n/as, for instance, not for the rajasuya-sacrifice[212].

And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scripture, moreover, contains express hints notifying that the devas are qualified; compare, for instance, /Br/i. Up. I, 4, 10, 'Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that; and the same with /ri/s.h.i.+s;' Ch.

Up. VIII, 7, 2, 'They said: Well, let us search for that Self by which, if one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained.

Thus saying, Indra went forth from the Devas, Viro/k/ana from the Asuras.' Similar statements are met with in Sm/ri/ti, so, for instance, in the colloquy of the Gandharva and Yaj/n/avalkya[213].--Against the objection raised in the preceding Sutra (32) we argue as follows. Words like aditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having reference to light and the like, yet convey the idea of certain divine Selfs (persons) endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent power; for they are used in that sense in mantras and arthavada pa.s.sages. For the devas possess, in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of residing within the light, and so on, and to a.s.sume any form they like.

Thus we read in Scripture, in the arthavada pa.s.sage explaining the words 'ram of Medhat.i.thi,' which form part of the Subrahma/n/ya-formula, that 'Indra, having a.s.sumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhat.i.thi, the descendant of Ka/n/va' (Sha/d/v. Br. I, 1). And thus Sm/ri/ti says that 'aditya, having a.s.sumed the shape of a man, came to Kunti.' Moreover, even in such substances as earth, intelligent ruling beings must be admitted to reside, for that appears from such scriptural pa.s.sages as 'the earth spoke,' 'the waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light and the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted in the case of the sun (aditya), &c. also; but--as already remarked--from the use of the words in mantras and arthavadas it appears that there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those material elements).

We now turn to the objection (raised above by the purvapaks.h.i.+n) that mantras and arthavadas, as merely subserving other purposes, have no power of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not the circ.u.mstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes a reason for (our a.s.suming) the existence of something. This is exemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other purpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves, gra.s.s, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.--But, the purvapaks.h.i.+n may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly a.n.a.logous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the gra.s.s and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception of their existence. In the case of an arthavada, on the other hand, which, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory pa.s.sage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is impossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own.

For in general any minor syntactical unity, which is included in a more comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. Thus, for instance, we derive, from the combination of the three words const.i.tuting the negative sentence, '(Do) not drink wine,' one meaning only, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of the last two words, 'drink wine.'--To this objection we reply, that the instance last quoted is not a.n.a.logous (to the matter under discussion).

The words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one whole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor syntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavada, on the other hand, the words const.i.tuting the arthavada form a separate group of their own which refers to some accomplished thing[214], and only subsequently to that, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they enter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, as an ill.u.s.trative example, the injunctive pa.s.sage, 'He who is desirous of prosperity is to offer to Vayu a white animal.' All the words contained in this pa.s.sage are directly connected with the injunction. This is, however, not the case with the words const.i.tuting the corresponding arthavada pa.s.sage, 'For Vayu is the swiftest deity; Vayu he approaches with his own share; he leads him to prosperity.' The single words of this arthavada are not grammatically connected with the single words of the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which contains the praise of Vayu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far as they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected with a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the subordinate (arthavada) pa.s.sage can be known by some other means of knowledge, the arthavada acts as a mere anuvada, i.e. a statement referring to something (already known)[215]. When its contents are contradicted by other means of knowledge it acts as a so-called gu/n/avada, i.e. a statement of a quality[216]. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavada is to be taken as a gu/n/avada on account of the absence of other means of knowledge, or as an arthavada referring to something known (i.e. an anuvada) on account of the absence of contradiction by other means of proof. The latter alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting people.--The same reasoning applies to mantras also.

There is a further reason for a.s.suming the personality of the G.o.ds. The Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the other G.o.ds, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual divinities, because without such the sacrificer could not represent Indra and the other G.o.ds to his mind. And if the divinity were not represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to it. So Scripture also says, 'Of that divinity for which the offering is taken he is to think when about to say vausha/t/' (Ai. Br. III, 8, 1).

Nor is it possible to consider the essential form (or character) of a thing to consist in the word only[217]; for word (denoting) and thing (denoted) are different. He therefore who admits the authoritativeness of the scriptural word has no right to deny that the shape of Indra, and the other G.o.ds, is such as we understand it to be from the mantras and arthavadas.--Moreover, itihasas and pura/n/as also--because based on mantra and arthavada which possess authoritative power in the manner described--are capable of setting forth the personality, &c. of the devas. Itihasa and pura/n/a can, besides, be considered as based on perception also. For what is not accessible to our perception may have been within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times.

Sm/ri/ti also declares that Vyasa and others conversed with the G.o.ds face to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were no more able to converse with the G.o.ds than people are at present, would thereby deny the (incontestable) variety of the world. He might as well maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the whole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a position by which the scriptural injunction of the rajasuya-sacrifice[218] would be stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of duty of the different castes and a/s/ramas were as generally unsettled as they are now, and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture which define those different duties to be purposeless. It is therefore altogether un.o.bjectionable to a.s.sume that the men of ancient times, in consequence of their eminent religious merit, conversed with the G.o.ds face to face. Sm/ri/ti also declares that 'from the reading of the Veda there results intercourse with the favourite divinity' (Yoga Sutra II, 44). And that Yoga does, as Sm/ri/ti declares, lead to the acquirement of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a fact which cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also proclaims the greatness of Yoga, 'When, as earth, water, light, heat, and ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body produced by the fire of Yoga' (/S/vet. Up. II, 12). Nor have we the right to measure by our capabilities the capability of the /ri/s.h.i.+s who see the mantras and brahma/n/a pa.s.sages (i.e. the Veda).--From all this it appears that the itihasas and pura/n/as have an adequate basis.--And the conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.

The general result is that we have the right to conceive the G.o.ds as possessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, pura/n/as, and ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the G.o.ds may thus be in the condition of having desires and so on, they must be considered as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual emanc.i.p.ation[219]

agree with this latter supposition only.

34. Grief of him (i.e. of Jana/s/ruti) (arose) on account of his hearing a disrespectful speech about himself; on account of the rus.h.i.+ng on of that (grief) (Raikva called him /S/udra); for it (the grief) is pointed at (by Raikva).

(In the preceding adhikara/n/a) the exclusiveness of the claim of men to knowledge has been refuted, and it has been declared that the G.o.ds, &c.

also possess such a claim. The present adhikara/n/a is entered on for the purpose of removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the /S/udras also possess such a claim.

The purvapaks.h.i.+n maintains that the /S/udras also have such a claim, because they may be in the position of desiring that knowledge, and because they are capable of it; and because there is no scriptural prohibition (excluding them from knowledge) a.n.a.logous to the text, 'Therefore[220] the /S/udra is unfit for sacrificing' (Taitt. Sa/m/h.

VII, 1, 1, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the /S/udras for sacrificial works, viz. their being without the sacred fires, does not invalidate their qualification for knowledge, as knowledge can be apprehended by those also who are without the fires. There is besides an inferential mark supporting the claim of the /S/udras; for in the so-called sa/m/varga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Jana/s/ruti Pautraya/n/a, who wishes to learn from him, by the name of /S/udra 'Fie, necklace and carnage be thine, O /S/udra, together with the cows' (Ch.

Up. IV, 2, 3). Sm/ri/ti moreover speaks of Vidura and others who were born from /S/udra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge.--Hence the /S/udra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.

To this we reply that the /S/udras have no such claim, on account of their not studying the Veda. A person who has studied the Veda and understood its sense is indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a /S/udra does not study the Veda, for such study demands as its antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the three (higher) castes only. The mere circ.u.mstance of being in a condition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if capability is absent. Mere temporal capability again does not const.i.tute a reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the /S/udras) excluded by their being excluded from the study of the Veda.--The Vedic statement, moreover, that the /S/udra is unfit for sacrifices intimates, because founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for knowledge also; for the argumentation is the same in both cases[221].--With reference to the purvapaks.h.i.+n's opinion that the fact of the word '/S/udra' being enounced in the sa/m/varga-knowledge const.i.tutes an inferential mark (of the /S/udra's qualification for knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark has no force, on account of the absence of arguments. For the statement of an inferential mark possesses the power of intimation only in consequence of arguments being adduced; but no such arguments are brought forward in the pa.s.sage quoted.[222] Besides, the word '/S/udra' which occurs in the sa/m/varga-vidya would establish a claim on the part of the /S/udras to that one vidya only, not to all vidyas. In reality, however, it is powerless, because occurring in an arthavada, to establish the /S/udras'

claim to anything.--The word '/S/udra' can moreover be made to agree with the context in which it occurs in the following manner. When Jana/s/ruti Pautraya/n/a heard himself spoken of with disrespect by the flamingo ('How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were like Raikva with the car?' IV, 1, 3), grief (su/k/) arose in his mind, and to that grief the /ri/s.h.i.+ Raikva alludes with the word /S/udra, in order to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This explanation must be accepted because a (real) born /S/udra is not qualified (for the sa/m/varga-vidya). If it be asked how the grief (su/k/) which had arisen in Janasruti's mind can be referred to by means of the word /S/udra, we reply: On account of the rus.h.i.+ng on (adrava/n/a) of the grief. For we may etymologise the word /S/udra by dividing it into its parts, either as 'he rushed into grief (/S/u/k/am abhidudrava) or as 'grief rushed on him,' or as 'he in his grief rushed to Raikva;' while on the other hand it is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional sense.

The circ.u.mstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover expressly touched upon in the legend[223].

35. And because the kshattriyahood (of Jana/s/ruti) is understood from the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with /K/aitraratha (who was a kshattriya himself).

Jana/s/ruti cannot have been a /S/udra by birth for that reason also that his being a kshattriya is understood from an inferential sign, viz.

his being mentioned together (in one chapter) with the kshattriya /K/aitraratha Abhipratarin. For, later on, i.e. in the pa.s.sage complementary to the sa/m/varga-vidya, a kshattriya /K/aitrarathi Abhipratarin is glorified, 'Once while /S/aunaka Kapeya and Abhipratarin Kakshaseni were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged of them' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratarin was a /K/aitrarathi (i.e. a descendant of /K/itraratha) we have to infer from his connexion with a Kapeya. For we know (from /S/ruti) about the connexion of /K/itraratha himself with the Kapeyas ('the Kapeyas made /K/itraratha perform that sacrifice;' Ta/nd/ya. Br. XX, 12, 5), and as a rule sacrificers of one and the same family employ officiating priests of one and the same family. Moreover, as we understand from Scripture ('from him a /K/aitrarathi descended who was a prince[224]') that he (/K/aitraratha) was a prince, we must understand him to have been a kshattriya. The fact now of Jana/s/ruti being praised in the same vidya with the kshattriya Abhipratarin intimates that the former also was a kshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together with equals.

That Jana/s/ruti was a kshattriya we moreover conclude from his sending his door-keeper and from other similar signs of power (mentioned in the text).--Hence the /S/udras are not qualified (for the knowledge of Brahman).

36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications (in the case of the higher castes) and on account of their absence being declared (in the case of the /S/udras).

That the /S/udras are not qualified, follows from that circ.u.mstance also that in different places of the vidyas such ceremonies as the upanayana and the like are referred to. Compare, for instance, /S/at. Br. XI, 5, 3, 13, 'He initiated him as a pupil;' Ch. Up. VII, 1, 1, 'Teach me, Sir!

thus he approached him;' Pra. Up. I, 1, 'Devoted to Brahman, firm in Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their hands, approached the venerable Pippalada, thinking that he would teach them all that.'--Thus the following pa.s.sage also, 'He without having made them undergo the upanayana (said) to them' (Ch. Up. V, 11, 7), shows that the upanayana is a well-established ceremony[225].--With reference to the /S/udras, on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies is frequently mentioned; so, for instance, Manu X, 4, where they are spoken of as 'once born' only ('the /S/udra is the fourth caste, once-born'), and Manu X, 126, 'In the /S/udra there is not any sin, and he is not fit for any ceremony.'

37. And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to initiate Jabala) on the ascertainment of (his) not being that (i.e. a /S/udra).

The /S/udras are not qualified for that reason also that Gautama, having ascertained Jabala not to be a /S/udra from his speaking the truth, proceeded to initiate and instruct him. 'None who is not a Brahma/n/a would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you.

You have not swerved from the truth' (Ch. Up. IV, 4, 5); which scriptural pa.s.sage furnishes an inferential sign (of the /S/udras not being capable of initiation).

38. And on account of the prohibition, in Sm/ri/ti, of (the /S/udras') hearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing and performing) (Vedic) matters.

The /S/udras are not qualified for that reason also that Sm/ri/ti prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the Veda, and their understanding and performing Vedic matters. The prohibition of hearing the Veda is conveyed by the following pa.s.sages: 'The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac,' and 'For a /S/udra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be read in the vicinity of a /S/udra.' From this latter pa.s.sage the prohibition of studying the Veda results at once; for how should he study Scripture in whose vicinity it is not even to be read? There is, moreover, an express prohibition (of the /S/udras studying the Veda). 'His tongue is to be slit if he p.r.o.nounces it; his body is to be cut through if he preserves it.' The prohibitions of hearing and studying the Veda already imply the prohibition of the knowledge and performance of Vedic matters; there are, however, express prohibitions also, such as 'he is not to impart knowledge to the /S/udra,' and 'to the twice-born belong study, sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts.'--From those /S/udras, however, who, like Vidura and 'the religious hunter,' acquire knowledge in consequence of the after effects of former deeds, the fruit of their knowledge cannot be withheld, since knowledge in all cases brings about its fruit. Sm/ri/ti, moreover, declares that all the four castes are qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the itihasas and pura/n/as; compare the pa.s.sage, 'He is to teach the four castes' (Mahabh.).--It remains, however, a settled point that they do not possess any such qualification with regard to the Veda.

39. (The pra/n/a is Brahman), on account of the trembling (predicated of the whole world).

The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge--on which we entered as an opportunity offered--being finished we return to our chief topic, i.e. the enquiry into the purport of the Vedanta-texts.--We read (Ka. Up. II, 6, 2), 'Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth trembles in the pra/n/a. It (the pra/n/a) is a great terror, a raised thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal[226].'--This pa.s.sage declares that this whole world trembles, abiding in pra/n/a, and that there is raised something very terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that through its knowledge immortality is obtained. But as it is not immediately clear what the pra/n/a is, and what that terrible thunderbolt, a discussion arises.

The purvapaks.h.i.+n maintains that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term, pra/n/a denotes the air with its five modifications, that the word 'thunderbolt' also is to be taken in its ordinary sense, and that thus the whole pa.s.sage contains a glorification of air. For, he says, this whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five forms--which is here called pra/n/a--and the terrible thunderbolts also spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the air, people say, when it manifests itself in the form of Parjanya, lightning, thunder, rain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves.--Through the knowledge of that air immortality also can be obtained; for another scriptural pa.s.sage says, 'Air is everything by itself, and air is all things together. He who knows this conquers death.'--We therefore conclude that the same air is to be understood in the pa.s.sage under discussion.

To this we make the following reply.--Brahman only can be meant, on account of what precedes as well as what follows. In the preceding as well as the subsequent part of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of; how then can it be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once the air should be referred to? The immediately preceding pa.s.sage runs as follows, 'That only is called the Bright, that is called Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond it.' That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our pa.s.sage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity; and, secondly, from the circ.u.mstance that in the clause, 'The whole world trembles in pra/n/a' we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its const.i.tuting the abode of the whole world. That the word pra/n/a can denote the highest Self also, appears from such pa.s.sages as 'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a'

(B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18). Being the cause of trembling, moreover, is a quality which properly appertains to the highest Self only, not to mere air. Thus Scripture says, 'No mortal lives by the pra/n/a and the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up.

II, 5 5). And also in the pa.s.sage subsequent to the one under discussion, ('From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun burns, from terror Indra and Vayu, and Death as the fifth run away,') Brahman, and not the air, must be supposed to be spoken of, since the subject of that pa.s.sage is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the whole world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude that the pa.s.sage under discussion also refers to Brahman, firstly, on the ground of proximity; and, secondly, because we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its being the cause of fear, in the words, 'A great terror, a raised thunderbolt.' The word 'thunderbolt' is here used to denote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man strictly carries out a king's command because he fearfully considers in his mind, 'A thunderbolt (i.e. the king's wrath, or threatened punishment) is hanging over my head; it might fall if I did not carry out his command.' In the same manner this whole world inclusive of fire, air, sun, and so on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from fear of Brahman; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to a thunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural pa.s.sage, whose topic is Brahman, declares, 'From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.'--That Brahman is what is referred to in our pa.s.sage, further follows from the declaration that the fruit of its cognition is immortality. For that immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman is known, for instance, from the mantra, 'A man who knows him only pa.s.ses over death, there is no other path to go' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 15).--That immortality which the purvapaks.h.i.+n a.s.serts to be sometimes represented as the fruit of the knowledge of the air is a merely relative one; for there (i.e. in the chapter from which the pa.s.sage is quoted) at first the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic being started (B/ri/. Up. III, 4), and thereupon the inferior nature of the air and so on is referred to. ('Everything else is evil.')--That in the pa.s.sage under discussion the highest Self is meant appears finally from the general subject-matter; for the question (asked by Na/k/iketas in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that') refers to the highest Self.

40. The light (is Brahman), on account of that (Brahman) being seen (in the scriptural pa.s.sage).

We read in Scripture, 'Thus does that serene being, arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3). Here the doubt arises whether the word 'light' denotes the (physical) light, which is the object of sight and dispels darkness, or the highest Brahman.

The purvapaks.h.i.+n maintains that the word 'light' denotes the well-known (physical) light, because that is the conventional sense of the word.

For while it is to be admitted that in another pa.s.sage, discussed under I, 1, 24, the word 'light' does, owing to the general topic of the chapter, divest itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there is in our pa.s.sage no similar reason for setting the ordinary meaning aside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter treating of the na/d/is of the body, that a man going to final release reaches the sun ('When he departs from this body then he departs upwards by those very rays;' Ch.

Up. VIII, 6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word 'light' denotes, in our pa.s.sage, the ordinary light.

To this we make the following reply.--The word 'light' can denote the highest Brahman only, on account of that being seen. We see that in the whole chapter Brahman is carried on as the topic of discussion. For the Self, which is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general subject-matter in VIII, 7, 1 ('the Self which is free from sin'); it is thereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and to be understood (VIII, 7, 1); it is carried on by means of the clauses, 'I shall explain that further to you' (VIII, 9, 3 ff.); after that freedom from body is said to belong to it, because it is one with light ('when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,'

VIII, 12, 1)--and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman--and it is finally qualified as 'the highest light, the highest person'

(VIII, 12, 3).--Against the statement, made by the purvapaks.h.i.+n, that Scripture speaks of a man going to release as reaching the sun, we remark, that the release there referred to is not the ultimate one, since it is said to be connected with going and departing upwards. That the ultimate release has nothing to do with going and departing upwards we shall show later on.

41. The ether is (Brahman), as it is designated as something different, &c. (from name and form).

Scripture says, 'He who is called ether, (aka/s/a) is the revealer of all forms and names. That within which these forms and names are contained is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1).

There arising a doubt whether that which here is called ether is the highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether, the purvapaks.h.i.+n declares that the latter alternative is to be embraced, firstly, because it is founded on the conventional meaning of the word 'ether;' and, secondly, because the circ.u.mstance of revealing names and forms can very well be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords room (for all things). Moreover, the pa.s.sage contains no clear indicatory mark of Brahman, such as creative power, and the like.

To this we reply, that the word 'ether' can here denote the highest Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing, &c. For the clause, 'That within which these two are contained is Brahman,'

designates the ether as something different from names and forms. But, excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and form, since the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names and forms. Moreover, the complete revealing of names and forms cannot be accomplished by anything else but Brahman, according to the text which declares Brahman's creative agency, 'Let me enter (into those beings) with this living Self (jiva atman), and evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up.

VI, 3, 2). But--it may be said--from this very pa.s.sage it is apparent that the living Self also (i.e. the individual soul) possesses revealing power with regard to names and forms.--True, we reply, but what the pa.s.sage really wishes to intimate, is the non-difference (of the individual soul from the highest Self). And the very statement concerning the revealing of names and forms implies the statement of signs indicatory of Brahman, viz. creative power and the like.--Moreover, the terms 'the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self' (VIII, 14) indicate that Brahman is spoken of.

42. And (on account of the designation) (of the highest Self) as different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and departing.

In the sixth prapa/th/aka of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka there is given, in reply to the question, 'Who is that Self?' a lengthy exposition of the nature of the Self, 'He who is within the heart, among the pra/n/as, the person of light, consisting of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the doubt arises, whether the pa.s.sage merely aims at making an additional statement about the nature of the transmigrating soul (known already from other sources), or at establis.h.i.+ng the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.