Germany, The Next Republic? Part 3

CHAPTER III

THE GULF BETWEEN KIEL AND BERLIN

At the beginning of the war, even the Socialist Party in the Reichstag voted the Government credits. The press and the people unanimously supported the Government because there was a very terrorising fear that Russia was about to invade Germany and that England and France were leagued together to crush the Fatherland. Until the question of the submarine warfare came up, the division of opinion which had already developed between the Army and Navy clique and the Foreign Office was not general among the people. Although the army had not taken Paris, a great part of Belgium and eight provinces of Northern France were occupied and the Russians had been driven from East Prussia. The German people believed they were successful. The army was satisfied with what it had done and had great plans for the future. Food and economic conditions had changed very little as compared to the changes which were to take place before 1917. Supplies were flowing into Germany from all neutral European countries. Even England and Russia were selling goods to Germany indirectly through neutral countries.

Considerable English merchandise, as well as American products, came in by way of Holland because English business men were making money by the transaction and because the English Government had not yet discovered leaks in the blockade. Two-thirds of the b.u.t.ter supply in Berlin was coming from Russia. Denmark was sending copper. Norway was sending fish and valuable oils. Sweden was sending horses and cattle. Italy was sending fruit. Spanish sardines and olives were reaching German merchants. There was no reason to be dissatisfied with the way the war was going. And, besides, the German people hated their enemies so that the leaders could count upon continued support for almost an indefinite period. The cry of "Hun and Barbarian" was answered with the battle cry "Gott strafe England."

The latter part of April on my first trip to the front I dined at Great Headquarters (Grosse Haupt Quartier) in Charleville, France, with Major Nicolai, Chief of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff.

The next day, in company with other correspondents, we were guests of General von Moehl and his staff at Peronne. From Peronne we went to the Somme front to St. Quentin, to Namur and Brussels. The soldiers were enthusiastic and happy. There was plenty of food and considerable optimism. But the confidence in victory was never so great as it was immediately after the sinking of the _Lusitania_. That marked the crisis in the future trend of the war.

Up to this time the people had heard very little about the fight between the Navy and the Foreign Office. But gradually rumours spread.

While there was previously no outlet for public opinion, the _Lusitania_ issue was debated more extensively and with more vigour than the White Books which were published to explain the causes of the war.

With the universal feeling of self confidence, it was but natural that the people should side with the Navy in demanding an unrestricted submarine warfare. When Admiral von Bachmann gave the order to First Naval Lieutenant Otto Steinbrink to sink the Lusitania, he knew the Navy was ready to defy the United States or any other country which might object. He knew, too, that von Tirpitz was very close to the Kaiser and could count upon the Kaiser's support in whatever he did.

The Navy believed the torpedoing of the Lusitania would so frighten and terrorise the world that neutral s.h.i.+pping would become timid and enemy peoples would be impressed by Germany's might on the seas. Amba.s.sador von Bernstorff had been ordered by the Foreign Office to put notices in the American papers warning Americans off these s.h.i.+ps. The Chancellor and Secretary von Jagow knew there was no way to stop the Admiralty, and they wanted to avoid, if possible, the loss of American lives.

The storm of indignation which encircled the globe when reports were printed that over a thousand people lost their lives on the Lusitania, found a sympathetic echo in the Berlin Foreign Office. "Another navy blunder," the officials said--confidentially. Foreign Office officials tried to conceal their distress because the officials knew the only thing they could do now was to make preparation for an apology and try to excuse in the best possible way what the navy had done. On the 17th of May like a thunderbolt from a clear sky came President Wilson's first Lusitania note.

"Recalling the humane and enlightened att.i.tude hitherto a.s.sumed by the Imperial German Government in matters of international life, particularly with regard to the freedom of the seas; having learned to recognise German views and German influence in the field of international obligations as always engaged upon the side of justice and humanity;" the note read, "and having understood the instructions of the Imperial German Government to its naval commanders to be upon the same plane of human action as those prescribed by the naval codes of other nations, the government of the United States is loath to believe--it cannot now bring itself to believe--that these acts so absolutely contrary to the rules and practices and spirit of modern warfare could have the countenance or sanction of that great government. . . . Manifestly submarines cannot be used against merchantmen as the last few weeks have shown without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity. American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their s.h.i.+ps and in travelling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be a well justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations and certainly in the confidence that their own government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights."

And then the note which Mr. Gerard handed von Jagow concluded with these words:

"It (The United States) confidently expects therefore that the Imperial German Government will disavow the acts of which the United States complains, that they will make reparation as far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare, for which the Imperial German Government in the past so wisely and so firmly contended. The Government and people of the United States look to the Imperial German Government for just, prompt and enlightened action in this vital matter. . . . Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in the case of neutral s.h.i.+ps sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy international obligations if no loss of life results, cannot justify or excuse a practice, the natural necessary effect of which is to subject neutral nations or neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks. The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word, or any act, necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens, and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

Never in history had a neutral nation indicted another as the United States did Germany in its first _Lusitania_ note without immediately going to war. Because the Foreign Office feared the reaction it might have upon the people, the newspapers were not permitted to publish the text until the press bureaus of the Navy and the Foreign Office had mobilised the editorial writers and planned a publicity campaign to follow the note's publication. But the Navy and Foreign Office could not agree on what should be done. The Navy wanted to ignore Wilson.

Naval officers laughed at President Wilson's impertinence and, when the Foreign Office sent to the Admiralty for all data in possession of the Navy Department regarding the sinking of the _Lusitania_ the Navy refused to acknowledge the request.

During this time I was in constant touch with the Foreign Office and the American Emba.s.sy. Frequently I went to the Navy Department but was always told they had nothing to say. When it appeared, however, that there might he a break in diplomatic relations over the Lusitania the Kaiser called the Chancellor to Great Headquarters for a conference.

Meanwhile Germany delayed her reply to the American note because the Navy and Foreign Office were still at loggerheads. On the 31st of May von Jagow permitted me to quote him in an interview saying:

"America can hardly expect us to give up any means at our disposal to fight our enemy. It is a principle with us to defend ourselves in every possible way. I am sure that Americans will be reasonable enough to believe that our two countries cannot discuss the _Lusitania_ matter _until both have the same basis of facts_."

The American people were demanding an answer from Germany and because the two branches of the Government could not agree on what should be said von Jagow had to do something to gain time. Germany, therefore, submitted in her reply of the 28th of May certain facts about the _Lusitania_ for the consideration of the American Government saying that Germany reserved final statements of its position with regard "to the demands made in connection with the sinking of the _Lusitania_ until a reply was received from the American Government." After the note was despatched the chasm between the Navy and Foreign Office was wider than ever. Amba.s.sador Gerard, who went to the Foreign Office daily, to try to convince the officials that they were antagonising the whole world by their att.i.tude on the _Lusitania_ question, returned to the Emba.s.sy one day after a conference with Zimmermann and began to prepare a sc.r.a.p book of cartoons and clippings from American newspapers. Two secretaries were put to work pasting the comments, interviews, editorials and cartoons reflecting American opinion in the sc.r.a.p book. Although the German Foreign Office had a big press department its efforts were devoted more to furnis.h.i.+ng the outside world with German views than with collecting outside opinions for the information of the German Government. Believing that this information would be of immeasurable benefit to the German diplomats in sounding the depths of public sentiment in America, Gerard delivered the book to von Jagow personally.

In the meantime numerous conferences were held at Great Headquarters.

Financiers, business men and diplomats who wanted to keep peace with America sided with the Foreign Office. Every anti-American influence in the Central Powers joined forces with the Navy. The _Lusitania_ note was printed and the public discussion which resulted was greater than that which followed the first declarations of war in August, 1914.

The people, who before had accepted everything their Government said, began to think for themselves. One heard almost as much criticism as praise of the _Lusitania_ incident. For the first time the quarrel, which had been nourished between the Foreign Office and the Admiralty, became nation-wide and forces throughout Germany lined up with one side or the other. But the Navy Department was the cleverer of the two.

The press bureau sent out inspired stories that the submarines were causing England a loss of a million dollars a week. They said that every week the Admiralty was launching two U-boats. It was stated that reliable reports to Admiral von Tirpitz proved the high toll taken by the submarines in two weeks had struck terror to the hearts of English s.h.i.+p-owners. The newspapers printed under great headlines: "Toll of Our Tireless U-Boats," the names and tonnage of s.h.i.+ps lost. The press bureau pointed to the rise in food prices in Great Britain and France.

The public was made to feel a personal pride in submarine exploits.

And at the same time the Navy editorial writers brought up the old issue of American arms and ammunition to further embitter the people.

Thus the first note which President Wilson wrote in the _Lusitania_ case not only brought the quarrel between the Navy and Foreign Office to a climax but it gave the German people the first opportunity they had had seriously to discuss questions of policy and right.

In the Rhine Valley, where the ammunition interests dominated every phase of life, the Navy found its staunchest supporters. In educational circles, in s.h.i.+pping centres, such as Hamburg and Bremen, in the financial districts of Frankfort and Berlin, the Foreign Office received its support. Press and Reichstag were divided. Supporting the Foreign Office were the _Lokal Anzeiger_, the _Berliner Tageblatt_, the _Cologne Gazette_, the _Frankforter Zeitung_, the _Hamburger Fremdemblatt_, and the _Vorwarts_.

The Navy had the support of Count Reventlow, Naval Critic of the _Deutsche Tageszeitung_, the _Taglische Rundscha_, the _Vossische Zeitung_, the _Morgen Post_, the _B. Z. Am Mittag_, the _Munchener Neueste Nachrichten_, the _Rheinische Westfalische Zeitung_, and the leading Catholic organ, the _Koelnische Volks-Zeitung_.

Government officials were also divided. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg led the party which demanded an agreement with the United States. He was supported by von Jagow, Zimmermann, Dr. Karl Helfferich, Secretary of the Treasury; Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister; Dr. Siegfried Heckscher, Vice Chairman of the Reichstag Committee on Foreign Relations; and Philip Scheidemann, leader of the majority of the Socialists in the Reichstag.

The opposition was led by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. He was supported by General von Falkenhayn, Field Marshal von Mackensen and all army generals; Admirals von Pohl and von Bachmann; Major Ba.s.sermann, leader of the National Liberal Party in the Reichstag; Dr. Gustav Stressemann, member of the Reichstag and Director of the North German Lloyd Steams.h.i.+p Company; and von Heydebrand, the so-called "Uncrowned King of Prussia," because of his control of the Prussian Diet.

With these forces against each other the internal fight continued more bitter than ever. President Wilson kept insisting upon definite promises from Germany but the Admiralty still had the upper hand.

There was nothing for the Foreign Office to do except to make the best possible excuses and depend upon Wilson's patience to give them time to get into the saddle. The Navy Department, however, was so confident that it had the Kaiser's support in everything it did, that one of the submarines was instructed to sink the _Arabic_.

President Wilson's note in the _Arabic_ case again brought the submarine dispute within Germany to a head. Conferences were again held at Great Headquarters. The Chancellor, von Jagow, Helfferich, von Tirpitz and other leaders were summoned by the Kaiser. On the 28th of August I succeeded in sending by courier to The Hague the following despatch:

"With the support of the Kaiser, the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, is expected to win the fight he is now making for a modification of Germany's submarine warfare that will forever settle the difficulties with America over the sinking of the _Lusitania_ and the _Arabic_. Both the Chancellor and von Jagow are most anxious to end at once and for all time the controversies with Was.h.i.+ngton desiring America's friends.h.i.+p." (Published in the Chicago _Tribune_, August 29th, 1915.)

"The Marine Department, headed by von Tirpitz, creator of the submarine policy, will oppose any disavowal of the action of German's submarines.

But the Kaiser is expected to approve the steps the Chancellor and Foreign Secretary contemplate taking, swinging the balance in favour of von Bethmann-Hollweg's contention that s.h.i.+ps in the future must be warned before they are torpedoed."

One day I went to the Foreign Office and told one of the officials I believed that if the American people knew what a difficult time the Foreign Office was having in trying to win out over the Admiralty that public opinion in the United States might be mobilised to help the Foreign Office against the Admiralty. I took with me a brief despatch which I asked him to pa.s.s. He censored it with the understanding that I would never disclose his name in case the despatch was read in Germany.

A few days later the Manchester, England, _Guardian_ arrived containing my article, headed as follows:

HOLLWEG'S CHANGE OF TUNE

Respect for Sc.r.a.ps of Paper

LAW AT SEA

Insists on Warning by Submarines

TIRPITZ PARTY BEATEN

Kaiser Expected to Approve New Policy

"New York, Sunday.

"Cables from Mr. Carl W. Ackerman, Berlin correspondent of the United Press published here, indicate that the real crisis following the _Arabic_ is in Germany, not America. He writes:

"The Berlin Foreign Office is unalterably opposed to submarine activity, such as evidenced by the _Arabic_ affair, and it was on the initiative of this Government department that immediate steps were taken with Mr. Gerard the American Amba.s.sador. The nature of these negotiations is still unknown to the German public.

"It is stated on the highest authority that Herr von Jagow, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg are unanimous in their anxiety to settle American difficulties once and for all, retaining the friends.h.i.+p of the United States in any event.

"The Kaiser is expected to approve the course suggested by the Imperial Chancellor, despite open opposition to any disavowal of submarine activities which constantly emanates from the German Admiralty.