Anarchy, State and Utopia Part 9

3 Williams, "The Idea of Equality," pp. 121-122. Williams, "The Idea of Equality," pp. 121-122.

4 Perhaps we should understand Rawls' focus on social cooperation as based upon this triadic notion of one person, by dealing with a second, blocking a third person from dealing with the second. Perhaps we should understand Rawls' focus on social cooperation as based upon this triadic notion of one person, by dealing with a second, blocking a third person from dealing with the second.

5 See Kurt Vonnegut's story "Harrison Bergeron" in his collection See Kurt Vonnegut's story "Harrison Bergeron" in his collection Welcome to the Monkey House Welcome to the Monkey House (New York: Dell, 1970). (New York: Dell, 1970).

6 See on this point, Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," See on this point, Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," Philosophy & Public Affairs, Philosophy & Public Affairs, I, no. I (Fall 1971), 55-56. I, no. I (Fall 1971), 55-56.

7 "Men are, in great measure, what they feel themselves to be, and they think of themselves as they are thought of by their fellows. The advance in individual self-respect and in social amenity caused by the softening of the more barbarous inequalities of the past is a contribution to civilization as genuine as the improvement in material conditions." R. H. Tawney, "Men are, in great measure, what they feel themselves to be, and they think of themselves as they are thought of by their fellows. The advance in individual self-respect and in social amenity caused by the softening of the more barbarous inequalities of the past is a contribution to civilization as genuine as the improvement in material conditions." R. H. Tawney, Equality Equality (New York: Barnes & n.o.ble, 1964), p. 171. The slightly different connection I shall trace between equality and self-esteem does not go in the first instance through other persons' views. (New York: Barnes & n.o.ble, 1964), p. 171. The slightly different connection I shall trace between equality and self-esteem does not go in the first instance through other persons' views.

8 Compare L. P. Hartley's novel, Compare L. P. Hartley's novel, Facial Justice; Facial Justice; and Blum and Kalven, and Blum and Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, p. 74: "Every experience seems to confirm the dismal hypothesis that envy will find other, and possibly less attractive, places in which to take root." See also Helmut Schoeck, p. 74: "Every experience seems to confirm the dismal hypothesis that envy will find other, and possibly less attractive, places in which to take root." See also Helmut Schoeck, Envy, Envy, trans. M. Glenny and B. Ross (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1972). trans. M. Glenny and B. Ross (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1972).

9 Might some thrive on no work at all, others on repet.i.tive work that does not demand constant attention and leaves many opportunities for daydreaming? Might some thrive on no work at all, others on repet.i.tive work that does not demand constant attention and leaves many opportunities for daydreaming?

10 The Theory of Capitalist Development The Theory of Capitalist Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956). See also R. L. Meek, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956). See also R. L. Meek, Studies in the Labour Theory of Value Studies in the Labour Theory of Value (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1958), pp. 168-173. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1958), pp. 168-173.

11 See Eugene Von Bohm-Bawerk, See Eugene Von Bohm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest, Capital and Interest, vol. I (South Holland, III.: Libertarian Press, 1959), chap. 12; and his vol. I (South Holland, III.: Libertarian Press, 1959), chap. 12; and his Karl Marx and the Close of His System Karl Marx and the Close of His System (Clifton, N.J.: Augustus M. Kelley, 1949). (Clifton, N.J.: Augustus M. Kelley, 1949).

12 . Capital, . Capital, Part I, Chapter I, Section I, page 48. Part I, Chapter I, Section I, page 48.

13 Marx, Marx, Capital, Capital, Vol. I, Chapter 2, pp. 97-98. Vol. I, Chapter 2, pp. 97-98.

14 Marx, Marx, Capital, Capital, p. 120. Why "stomach"? p. 120. Why "stomach"?

15 Compare Ernest Mandel, Compare Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, Marxist Economic Theory, vol. I (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 161. "It is precisely through compet.i.tion that it is discovered whether the amount of labor embodied in a commodity const.i.tutes a vol. I (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 161. "It is precisely through compet.i.tion that it is discovered whether the amount of labor embodied in a commodity const.i.tutes a socially necessary socially necessary amount amount or not.... or not.... When the supply of a certain commodity exceeds the demand for it, that means that more human labor has been spent altogether on producing this commodity than was socially necessary at the given period... When, however, supply is less than demand, that means that less human labor has been expended on producing the commodity in question than was socially necessary." When the supply of a certain commodity exceeds the demand for it, that means that more human labor has been spent altogether on producing this commodity than was socially necessary at the given period... When, however, supply is less than demand, that means that less human labor has been expended on producing the commodity in question than was socially necessary."

16 Compare the discussion of this issue in Meek, Compare the discussion of this issue in Meek, Studies in the Labour Theory of Value, Studies in the Labour Theory of Value, pp. 178-179. pp. 178-179.

17 See the detailed discussion of his theory in Marc Blaug, See the detailed discussion of his theory in Marc Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect Economic Theory in Retrospect (Homewood, III.: Irwin, 1962), pp. 207-271. (Homewood, III.: Irwin, 1962), pp. 207-271.

18 See Israel Kirzner, See Israel Kirzner, Compet.i.tion and Entrepreneurs.h.i.+p Compet.i.tion and Entrepreneurs.h.i.+p (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973). (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).

19 Or he sends Or he sends n n different money orders to different money orders to n n different recipients; or different recipients; or n n rich people each send an amount to one specific recipient. Since it makes no difference to our argument, we shall make the simplifying a.s.sumption of an equal number of rich and poor individuals. rich people each send an amount to one specific recipient. Since it makes no difference to our argument, we shall make the simplifying a.s.sumption of an equal number of rich and poor individuals.

20 With With n n individuals in poverty, the utility for this person of no one's being in poverty is greater than individuals in poverty, the utility for this person of no one's being in poverty is greater than n n n n[image] i i=1 u u (individual (individual l l is not in poverty given that the rest remain in poverty). This statement uses a notion of conditional utility, on which see my unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Normative Theory of Individual Choice" (Princeton University, 1963, chap. 4, sect. 4); and R. Duncan Luce and David Krantz, "Conditional Expected Utility," is not in poverty given that the rest remain in poverty). This statement uses a notion of conditional utility, on which see my unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Normative Theory of Individual Choice" (Princeton University, 1963, chap. 4, sect. 4); and R. Duncan Luce and David Krantz, "Conditional Expected Utility," Econometrica, Econometrica, March 1971, pp. 253-271. March 1971, pp. 253-271.

21 As one might have thought the earlier cases to be. See H. M. Hockman and James D. Rodgers, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," As one might have thought the earlier cases to be. See H. M. Hockman and James D. Rodgers, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Review, September 1969, pp. 542-556. See also Robert Goldfarb, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution: Comment," September 1969, pp. 542-556. See also Robert Goldfarb, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution: Comment," American Economic Review. American Economic Review. December 1970, pp. 994-996, whose argument that compulsory redistribution is in some circ.u.mstances more efficient is complicated by our imagined scheme of direct interpersonal transfers. December 1970, pp. 994-996, whose argument that compulsory redistribution is in some circ.u.mstances more efficient is complicated by our imagined scheme of direct interpersonal transfers.

22 Why not those that unimportantly affect their lives as well, with some scheme of Why not those that unimportantly affect their lives as well, with some scheme of weighted weighted voting used (with the number of votes not necessarily being proportional to the degree of effect)? See my note "Weighted-Voting and 'One Man One-Vote' " in voting used (with the number of votes not necessarily being proportional to the degree of effect)? See my note "Weighted-Voting and 'One Man One-Vote' " in Representation, Representation, ed. J. R. Pennock and John Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 1969). ed. J. R. Pennock and John Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 1969).

23 Dr. Seuss, Dr. Seuss, Thidwick, the Big-Hearted Moose Thidwick, the Big-Hearted Moose (New York: Random House, 1948). (New York: Random House, 1948).

CHAPTER 9 / Demoktesis.

1 "With the purpose of the State thus confined to the provision of external and internal security, or to the realization of a scheme of legal order, the sovereign commonwealth was reduced, in the last a.n.a.lysis, to the level of an insurance society for securing the liberty and the property of individuals." Otto Gierke, "With the purpose of the State thus confined to the provision of external and internal security, or to the realization of a scheme of legal order, the sovereign commonwealth was reduced, in the last a.n.a.lysis, to the level of an insurance society for securing the liberty and the property of individuals." Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500-1800, vol. I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 113. All the more would Gierke make this complaint (which others might view as praise) about the dominant protective a.s.sociation of a territory. 1500-1800, vol. I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 113. All the more would Gierke make this complaint (which others might view as praise) about the dominant protective a.s.sociation of a territory.

2 For an alternative For an alternative illegitimate illegitimate route to a state more extensive than the minimal state, see Franz Oppenheimer, route to a state more extensive than the minimal state, see Franz Oppenheimer, The State The State (New York: Vanguard, 1926). Though it would be appropriate within this essay to dissect critically Locke's route to a more powerful state, it would be tedious, and similar things have been done by others. (New York: Vanguard, 1926). Though it would be appropriate within this essay to dissect critically Locke's route to a more powerful state, it would be tedious, and similar things have been done by others.

3 On these last points see my "Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice," in On these last points see my "Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice," in Essays in Honor of C. Essays in Honor of C. G. G. Hempel, Hempel, ed. Nicholas Rescher et al. (Holland : Reidel, 1969), especially pp. 135-140. ed. Nicholas Rescher et al. (Holland : Reidel, 1969), especially pp. 135-140.

4 See C. G. Hempel, See C. G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 266-270. I use "fundamental" here in Hempel's sense, rather than as in Chapter I above. The requirement excluding indexical expressions ("I," "my") from moral principles lacks adequate justification. (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 266-270. I use "fundamental" here in Hempel's sense, rather than as in Chapter I above. The requirement excluding indexical expressions ("I," "my") from moral principles lacks adequate justification.

5 See Harold Demsetz, "Toward A Theory of Property Rights," See Harold Demsetz, "Toward A Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review. American Economic Review. 1967, pp. 347-359. 1967, pp. 347-359.

6 "Each gives himself to everybody, so that ... he gives himself to n.o.body ; and since every a.s.sociate acquires over every a.s.sociate the same power he grants to every a.s.sociate over himself, each gains an equivalent for all that he loses..." Jean Jacques Rousseau, "Each gives himself to everybody, so that ... he gives himself to n.o.body ; and since every a.s.sociate acquires over every a.s.sociate the same power he grants to every a.s.sociate over himself, each gains an equivalent for all that he loses..." Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, The Social Contract, bk. I, chap. 6. bk. I, chap. 6.

7 See Locke, See Locke, First Treatise on Government, First Treatise on Government, chap. 6, for Locke's criticism of the view that parents own their children, and chap. 9, for his objections to considering owners.h.i.+p in such cases (supposing it to exist) as transitive. chap. 6, for Locke's criticism of the view that parents own their children, and chap. 9, for his objections to considering owners.h.i.+p in such cases (supposing it to exist) as transitive.

8 In his introduction to his standard edition of Locke In his introduction to his standard edition of Locke (Two Treatises of Government, (Two Treatises of Government, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967) Peter Laslett offers no 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967) Peter Laslett offers no internal internal explanation of why Locke goes on to write the explanation of why Locke goes on to write the First Treatise, First Treatise, and he treats this somewhat as an oddity (pp. 48, 59, 61, 71). That Locke's own developing views on property led him to think it necessary to consider, and distinguish himself from, Filmer in such detail, may seem to be contradicted by Laslett's a.s.sertion on page 68 about Locke's view of property, but one sees that this a.s.sertion does not have this consequence if one closely examines Laslett's statements on page 34 and page 59. and he treats this somewhat as an oddity (pp. 48, 59, 61, 71). That Locke's own developing views on property led him to think it necessary to consider, and distinguish himself from, Filmer in such detail, may seem to be contradicted by Laslett's a.s.sertion on page 68 about Locke's view of property, but one sees that this a.s.sertion does not have this consequence if one closely examines Laslett's statements on page 34 and page 59.

9 Compare Locke's presentation of a similar argument in sections 116 and 117, and see section 120 where Locke s.h.i.+fts illegitimately from someone's wanting society to secure and protect his property to his allowing it complete jurisdiction over his property. Compare Locke's presentation of a similar argument in sections 116 and 117, and see section 120 where Locke s.h.i.+fts illegitimately from someone's wanting society to secure and protect his property to his allowing it complete jurisdiction over his property.

10 See Herbert Spencer, See Herbert Spencer, Social Statics Social Statics (London: Chapman, 1851), chap. 19, "The Right to Ignore the State," a chapter that Spencer omitted from the revised edition. (London: Chapman, 1851), chap. 19, "The Right to Ignore the State," a chapter that Spencer omitted from the revised edition.

11 See Herbert Spencer, See Herbert Spencer, The Man Versus the State The Man Versus the State (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1960), pp. 41-43. (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1960), pp. 41-43.

CHAPTER 10 / A Framework for Utopia.

1 "A state which was really morally neutral, which was indifferent to all values, other than that of maintaining law and order, would not command enough allegiance to survive at all. A soldier may sacrifice his life for Queen and Country, but hardly for the Minimum State. A policeman, believing in Natural Law and immutable right and wrong, may tackle an armed desperado but not if he regards himself as an employee of a Mutual Protection and a.s.surance Society, constructed from the cautious contracts of prudent individuals. Some ideals are necessary to inspire those without whose free co-operation that State would not survive." J. R. Lucas, "A state which was really morally neutral, which was indifferent to all values, other than that of maintaining law and order, would not command enough allegiance to survive at all. A soldier may sacrifice his life for Queen and Country, but hardly for the Minimum State. A policeman, believing in Natural Law and immutable right and wrong, may tackle an armed desperado but not if he regards himself as an employee of a Mutual Protection and a.s.surance Society, constructed from the cautious contracts of prudent individuals. Some ideals are necessary to inspire those without whose free co-operation that State would not survive." J. R. Lucas, The Principles of Politics The Principles of Politics (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 292. Why does Lucas a.s.sume that the employees of the minimal state cannot be devoted to the rights it protects? (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 292. Why does Lucas a.s.sume that the employees of the minimal state cannot be devoted to the rights it protects?

2 The a.s.sumption that supply is always limited "is trivially valid in a pure exchange economy, since each individual has a finite stock of goods to trade. In an economy where production takes place, the matter is less clear. At an arbitrarily given set of prices, a producer may find it profitable to offer an infinite supply; the realization of his plans will, of course, require him to demand at the same time an infinite amount of some factor of production. Such situations are of course incompatible with equilibrium, but since the existence of equilibrium is itself in question here, the a.n.a.lysis is necessarily delicate." Kenneth Arrow, "Economic Equilibrium," The a.s.sumption that supply is always limited "is trivially valid in a pure exchange economy, since each individual has a finite stock of goods to trade. In an economy where production takes place, the matter is less clear. At an arbitrarily given set of prices, a producer may find it profitable to offer an infinite supply; the realization of his plans will, of course, require him to demand at the same time an infinite amount of some factor of production. Such situations are of course incompatible with equilibrium, but since the existence of equilibrium is itself in question here, the a.n.a.lysis is necessarily delicate." Kenneth Arrow, "Economic Equilibrium," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 4, p. 381. vol. 4, p. 381.

3 See John Rawls, A See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Ma.s.s.: Harvard University Press, 1971), chap. 9, sect. 79, "The Idea of a Social Union," and Ayn Rand, (Cambridge, Ma.s.s.: Harvard University Press, 1971), chap. 9, sect. 79, "The Idea of a Social Union," and Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged Atlas Shrugged (New York: Random House, 1957), pt. III, chaps. 1, 2. (New York: Random House, 1957), pt. III, chaps. 1, 2.

4 See Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, "The General Theory of Second Best," See Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, "The General Theory of Second Best," Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies, 24 (December 1956), which has stimulated an extensive literature. 24 (December 1956), which has stimulated an extensive literature.

5 Compare John Rawls, Compare John Rawls, Theory of Justice, Theory of Justice, sect. 63, n. II. It is not clear how extensively Rawls' later text would have to be revised to take this point explicitly into account. sect. 63, n. II. It is not clear how extensively Rawls' later text would have to be revised to take this point explicitly into account.

6 Some theories underlying such imposition are discussed by J. L. Talmon in Some theories underlying such imposition are discussed by J. L. Talmon in The Origins The Origins of of Totalitarian Democracy Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Norton, 1970) and (New York: Norton, 1970) and Political Messianism Political Messianism (New York: Praeger, 1961). (New York: Praeger, 1961).

7 An illuminating discussion of the operation and virtues of a similar filter system is found in F. A. Hayek, An illuminating discussion of the operation and virtues of a similar filter system is found in F. A. Hayek, The Const.i.tution of Liberty The Const.i.tution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), chaps. 2, 3 Some utopian endeavors have fit this, to some extent "[The nondoctrinaire character of the origins of the Jewish communal settlements in Palestinel also determined their development in all essentials. New forms and new intermediate forms were constantly branching off-in complete freedom. Each one grew out of the particular social and spiritual needs as these came to light-in complete freedom, and each one acquired, even in the initial stages, its own ideology-in complete freedom, each struggling to propagate itself and spread and establish its proper sphere-all in complete freedom. The champions of the various forms each had his say, the pros and cons of each individual form were frankly and fiercely debated... The various forms and intermediate forms that arose in this way at different times and in different situations represented different kinds of social structure ... different forms corresponded to different human types and ... just as new forms branched off from the original Kvuza, so new types branched off from the original Chaluz type, each with its special mode of being and each demanding its particular sort of realization..." Martin Buber, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), chaps. 2, 3 Some utopian endeavors have fit this, to some extent "[The nondoctrinaire character of the origins of the Jewish communal settlements in Palestinel also determined their development in all essentials. New forms and new intermediate forms were constantly branching off-in complete freedom. Each one grew out of the particular social and spiritual needs as these came to light-in complete freedom, and each one acquired, even in the initial stages, its own ideology-in complete freedom, each struggling to propagate itself and spread and establish its proper sphere-all in complete freedom. The champions of the various forms each had his say, the pros and cons of each individual form were frankly and fiercely debated... The various forms and intermediate forms that arose in this way at different times and in different situations represented different kinds of social structure ... different forms corresponded to different human types and ... just as new forms branched off from the original Kvuza, so new types branched off from the original Chaluz type, each with its special mode of being and each demanding its particular sort of realization..." Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia Paths in Utopia (New York: Macmillan, 1950), pp. 145-146. (New York: Macmillan, 1950), pp. 145-146.

The people involved need not be trying to discover the best possible community ; they may merely be attempting to improve their own situation. Some persons, however, may consciously set out to use and streamline the filtering process of people's choices to arrive at what they (tentatively) judge to be the best community. Compare Karl Popper's account of the filtering process of scientific method, self-consciously used and partic.i.p.ated in to get closer to the truth [Objective Knowledge [Objective Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972)]. Since some persons who partic.i.p.ate in filtering processes (or equilibrium processes) will have as an objective reaching the final end, while others won't, we might refine the notion of an invisible-hand process to admit of degrees. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972)]. Since some persons who partic.i.p.ate in filtering processes (or equilibrium processes) will have as an objective reaching the final end, while others won't, we might refine the notion of an invisible-hand process to admit of degrees.

8 See Benjamin Zablocki, See Benjamin Zablocki, The Joyful Community The Joyful Community (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971). (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971).

9 For a recent account see Haim Barkai, "The Kibbutz: an Experiment in Micro-socialism," in For a recent account see Haim Barkai, "The Kibbutz: an Experiment in Micro-socialism," in Israel, the Arabs, and the Middle East, Israel, the Arabs, and the Middle East, ed. Irving Howe and Carl Gershman (New York: Bantam Books, 1972). ed. Irving Howe and Carl Gershman (New York: Bantam Books, 1972).

10 That is, we think that if we are presented with individual members of the set of exceptions to a particular principle, we will often (though not necessarily always) be able to tell it is an exception, even though it does not fit any explicit description of the exceptions we had been able to offer heretofore. Being confronted with the particular case and realizing it is an exception to the principle often will lead us to offer a new explicit marking off of exceptions to the principle; one that once again (we realize) does not mark off That is, we think that if we are presented with individual members of the set of exceptions to a particular principle, we will often (though not necessarily always) be able to tell it is an exception, even though it does not fit any explicit description of the exceptions we had been able to offer heretofore. Being confronted with the particular case and realizing it is an exception to the principle often will lead us to offer a new explicit marking off of exceptions to the principle; one that once again (we realize) does not mark off all all the exceptions. One possible structure of the moral views of a person who makes particular moral judgments, yet is unable to state moral principles that he is confident have no exceptions, is discussed in my "Moral Complications and Moral Structures," the exceptions. One possible structure of the moral views of a person who makes particular moral judgments, yet is unable to state moral principles that he is confident have no exceptions, is discussed in my "Moral Complications and Moral Structures," Natural Law Forum, Natural Law Forum, 13, 1968, pp. 1-50. 13, 1968, pp. 1-50.

11 We are here speaking of questions of emigration out of a community. We should note that someone may be refused entry into a community he wishes to join, on individual grounds or because he falls under a general restriction designed to preserve the particular character of a community. We are here speaking of questions of emigration out of a community. We should note that someone may be refused entry into a community he wishes to join, on individual grounds or because he falls under a general restriction designed to preserve the particular character of a community.

12 See Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in A See Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in A Critique of Pure Tolerance, Critique of Pure Tolerance, ed. Robert P. Wolff et al. (Boston: Beacon, 1969). ed. Robert P. Wolff et al. (Boston: Beacon, 1969).

13 "There is no really satisfactory theoretical solution of the problem. If a federal government possesses a const.i.tutional authority to intervene by force in the government of a state for the purpose of insuring the state's performance of its duties as a member of the federation, there is no adequate const.i.tutional barrier against the conversion of the federation into a centralized state by vigorous and resolute central government. If it does not possess such authority, there is no adequate a.s.surance that the federal government can maintain the character of the system when vigorous and resolute state governments take full advantage of their const.i.tutional freedom to go their own ways." Arthur W. MacMahon, ed., "There is no really satisfactory theoretical solution of the problem. If a federal government possesses a const.i.tutional authority to intervene by force in the government of a state for the purpose of insuring the state's performance of its duties as a member of the federation, there is no adequate const.i.tutional barrier against the conversion of the federation into a centralized state by vigorous and resolute central government. If it does not possess such authority, there is no adequate a.s.surance that the federal government can maintain the character of the system when vigorous and resolute state governments take full advantage of their const.i.tutional freedom to go their own ways." Arthur W. MacMahon, ed., Federalism: Mature and Emergent Federalism: Mature and Emergent (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. 139. See also of course the (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. 139. See also of course the Federalist Papers. Federalist Papers. Martin Diamond interestingly discusses "The Federalist's View of Federalism," in Martin Diamond interestingly discusses "The Federalist's View of Federalism," in Essays in Federalism Essays in Federalism (Inst.i.tute for Studies in Federalism, 1961). (Inst.i.tute for Studies in Federalism, 1961).

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