Elements of Morals Part 26

_Economy_, a mean between prodigality and avarice.

Economy and saving are not only duties of _self-preservation_, but of _dignity_.

Maxims of Franklin.--The prodigal and the miser, according to Aristotle.

=Acquisition of external things.=--Universal law of work.--_Servile_ and _free_ work.--n.o.bility of work.

Work is a _pleasure_, a _necessity_, a _duty_.

=142. Necessity of external goods.=--External goods are as necessary to man as is his body: for it is in the first place a fundamental law of beings physically organized, that they only subsist by means of a continual exchange of their component parts, with foreign substances. Life is a circulation, a vortex: we lose and acquire; we return to nature what it gave us, and we take from it back again in exchange what we need to repair our losses. There follows from this that certain external things, especially food, are indispensable to our existence, and that it is absolutely necessary that we be in sure possession of them in order to be ourselves sure of life.

Food is not the only need of man. Shelter and clothing, without being as rigorously indispensable (especially in warm countries), are nevertheless of great utility to maintain a certain equilibrium between the temperature of our bodies and the external temperature; for it is well known that the derangement of this equilibrium is one of the most ordinary causes of illness. Nature not having clothed man as she has the other animals, he is obliged to provide himself with clothes by his industry. As for habitations, several animals know as well as man how to construct them: for example, beavers and rabbits; and despite the indisputable superiority of his art, this is yet, as we see for man, but the development of an instinct which he shares with other creatures.

These various wants, then, which to be satisfied demand a certain number of material objects, such as food, houses, clothing, etc., carry with them others in their train: for example, the need of locomotion to procure what is wanted: hence, carriages, boats, etc.;--the need of protecting one's self against those who would take from us what we possess: hence, arms of every kind;--the need of repose and order in the house: hence, furniture of every sort;--in a higher degree again the need of pleasing the imagination: hence, works of art, pictures, statuary;--the need of information: hence, books, etc.

Finally, and independently of all these different things, there are yet two which deserve to be specially noticed, because of their particular and distinctive character. These are, first, land, which is the common and inexhaustible source of all riches, the only thing that does not perish, and which is always found again in the same quant.i.ty after as well as before the enjoyment of it; land, which is as the substance, the very basis of riches;[98] and the second, money (gold or silver, with their representative, paper), which is of a nature to be exchanged against all kind of merchandise, even land, and which, consequently, represents them all. These two kinds of things, land and money, the one an essential, the other a condensed image, of all wealth, are the two most natural objects of man's desires, because, with the one or the other, he can procure all the rest.

We have not to examine here how man succeeds in securing to himself the exclusive enjoyment of these several goods: we shall treat the subject of property further on, and shall explain in what, and why, it is inviolable.

Let it suffice to say here that these goods being bound up with the very preservation of our existence, the desire and instinct which lead us to appropriate them, have nothing blameworthy in themselves.

External goods being necessary to life, we have to consider how we should use them when we possess them, and how acquire them when we do not possess them.

=143. Duties relating to the use of external goods.--Cupidity.--Avarice.=--From the very fact that man is a part of nature, it manifestly follows that he is allowed to make his profit of the goods of nature and to turn them to his use. The only question is then to know to what degree and in what spirit, he should love material goods, and what use he is to make of them, not in regard to others, but in regard to himself.

A first consideration is that material things or riches have no value in themselves; they are only worth anything as they suit our wants. Gold and silver, in particular, are only a value because they can be exchanged against useful things, and these things, again, are only good because they are useful. They are, to employ Kant's favorite formula, _means_, not _ends_. Now we precisely overthrow this order when we take material things as ends and not as means--that is to say, when we attribute to them an _absolute_ instead of a _relative_ value. This happens when, for example, we seek gain for gain's sake; when we acc.u.mulate riches for the sole pleasure of acc.u.mulating them--a vice we call _cupidity_.

It is, again, what happens when we enjoy wealth for itself, without wis.h.i.+ng to turn it to use, and depriving ourselves of everything to enjoy the thing itself, which has no other value except that of buying other things; a vice we call _avarice_.

The character of these two vices (a character which is not only contrary to prudence, but also to virtue) is to transform material things into absolute ends. "Avarice," says Kant, very justly, "is not only economy misunderstood, but a servile subjection to the goods of fortune; an incapacity of exercising mastery over them.... It is not only opposed to generosity, but to liberality of sentiments in general--that is to say, to the principle of independence which recognizes nothing but the law, and becomes thus a fraud which man commits against himself." Cupidity does not, at first glance, appear to be of so shameful, and especially so ridiculous a character as avarice; for avarice is a contradiction to one's self (to die rather than lose that which can only serve to prevent us from dying), and viewed in that light it becomes a comical oddity. But the love of gain for gain's sake is, no less than avarice, a servile subjection to the goods of fortune. To earn money is a necessity to which we must submit (and of which we need not be ashamed, since it is nature herself that requires it), but it is not, and should not be, an end to the soul. The end of wealth (without failing in the duties we owe to ourselves) should be to make sure of the means of self-preservation, self-cultivation, education--yea, even recreation; for recreation is a thing much more refined and n.o.ble than acc.u.mulation of wealth. In one word, according to an old saying, one must possess riches and not be possessed by them.

Such is the _spirit_ in which man should seek or possess riches; and it is for him a strict duty; but as to the degree and limits of possession, as to the extent or quant.i.ty of riches, morality gives us neither rules nor principles. There is no particular limit known beyond which a man in making money would become immoral. There is no restriction to his becoming a millionaire if he can. A morality that should teach to look upon the rich as culpable, would be a very false one. The contempt for riches, such as the ancient philosophers professed, is a very beautiful thing in itself; but to make good use of wealth is also very praiseworthy. Wealth, which in itself has no value, may have a very great one from the use made of it. There is, therefore, no other rule to be observed here than the one we have already pointed out, namely, that we should not love money for itself, but acquire it or receive it as a means to be useful to ourselves and to others. Let us add, however, that even with this motive, we should not entertain too great a desire for gain;[99] for to take too much pleasure in acc.u.mulating a fortune, even to make a good use of it, is again another way to become its slave.

=144. Poverty.=--The duty of not allowing one's self to become morally a slave to external goods, carries with it, as its corollary, the duty of bearing poverty patiently if circ.u.mstances impose it on us. I do not mean here the strength of soul with which we should bear adversity of any kind (we shall speak of that further on), but the resignation with which we should look upon the deprivation of certain things, which have no value in themselves. The poor man should, of course, endeavor to improve his condition by his work, and we are far from recommending to him a stupid insensibility which would dry up the sources of all industry; but what we should especially guard against is this uneasy discontent and powerless desire which are also a kind of slavery. We should try to be satisfied with our lot, as ancient wisdom has it, and if it requires a certain amount of heroism to bear extreme misery, a limited share of wisdom will be sufficient to enable one to accept patiently poverty and mediocrity.

=145. Prodigality.=--Maintaining, as we have done, that riches have no value in themselves, except as means to satisfy our wants, do we mean thereby that they are to be spent injudiciously?--and would not that appear to be condemning saving and economy, virtues which not only morality, but wisdom also, recommends? Shall we, in order to avoid cupidity and avarice, run into dissipation and prodigality?

Let us first observe that prodigality, which is the opposite of avarice, is not always the opposite of cupidity. The need of spending engenders necessarily the need of obtaining and gaining as much money as possible; and the prodigal, if he is not so in the beginning, very soon becomes covetous, through the exhaustion of his resources. "Most prodigals," says Aristotle, "become greedy and grasping, because they always wish to spend at their will. Their own resources being soon exhausted, they must needs procure others; and as they scarcely take thought about dignity and honor, they appropriate without scruple, and as they can." We should, therefore, not view prodigality as a n.o.ble independence in respect to riches. It is so in the beginning, in fact, with young rich people; but they soon find out the limits of their great fortunes, and then begins their slavery in respect to those very goods they made at first so light of.

Prudence and our own interest teach us, of course, sufficiently that prodigality is a stupid vice, and that it is absurd to sacrifice the wants of to-morrow to the pleasures of to-day. Simple common-sense advises economy and saving. But for this very reason may we ask, with Kant: "whether they deserve the name of virtues; and whether prodigality even, inasmuch as it tends to an unexpected indigence, should not be called an imprudence rather than a vice?" We shall say in reply that self-interest well understood becomes itself a duty when in opposition to pa.s.sion. For instance, if, on the one side, pa.s.sion lures me on to procure to myself a certain pleasure, and that, on the other, self-interest shows that this pleasure imperils my health, it is certain that _duty_ in this circ.u.mstance commands me to prefer my health to a momentary pleasure.[100]

Prudence, then, is but the exercise of a more general duty, which, if not the basis, is at least the condition of all the others: the duty of self-preservation.

Economy and saving are not only a duty of self-preservation, but also a duty of dignity: for experience teaches us that poverty and misery bring us into the dependency of others and that want leads to beggary. He who knows how to husband his means of existence, secures for himself in the future not only his livelihood, but also independence; in depriving himself of fleeting and commonplace pleasures, he buys what is far better, namely, dignity.

"Be economical," says Franklin, "and independence shall be thy s.h.i.+eld and buckler, thy helmet and crown; then shall thy soul walk upright, nor stoop to the silken wretch because he hath riches; nor pocket an abuse because the hand which offers it wears a ring set with diamonds."

It is from this point of view that the charming and witty, though sometimes vulgar, precepts of poor Richard may be regarded as moral maxims, and should have access to all minds:

"If you would be wealthy, think of saving as well as of getting."

"A fat kitchen makes a lean will."

"What maintains one vice would bring up two children."

"Many littles make a mickle."

"Fools make feasts and wise men eat them."

"It is foolish to lay out money in a purchase of repentance."

"Silks and satins, scarlet and velvets put out the kitchen fire."

"When the well is dry, they know the worth of water."

"Pride breakfasted with Plenty, dined with Poverty, and supped with Infamy."[101]

What Franklin has depicted with greatest force and eloquence, is the humiliation attached to debts, a sad consequence of the want of economy.

There is a kind of pride which is not that of Rome and Sparta, nor of the courts and the great, but which has not the less its price.

"He that goes a borrowing, goes a sorrowing. Alas! think well what you do when you run in debt; you give to another power over your liberty.

If you cannot pay at the time, you will be ashamed to see your creditor; you will be in fear when you speak to him; you will make poor, pitiful, sneaking excuses, and by degrees come to lose your veracity, and sink into base, downright lying. _For lying rides upon Debt's back._ A free-born man ought not to be afraid to see or speak to any man living. But poverty often deprives a man of all spirit and virtue. _It is hard for an empty bag to stand upright._"

We should then avoid so to subject ourselves to material things as not to dare make use of them, which is avarice; or to spend them foolishly and thus render ourselves dependent upon men, which is prodigality. Economy lies between the two, and it is one of the virtues upon which Aristotle has most successfully established his theory of the golden mean. Kant, however, does not agree with him on this point. "For," says he, "if economy is a just medium between two extremes, then should we, in going from one vice to the opposite vice, have to pa.s.s through virtue: the latter then would be nothing more than a lesser vice." According to Kant, it is not the _measure_ but the _principle_ which may serve to distinguish a vice from a virtue: the one is distinguished from the other not quant.i.tatively, but specifically. The two vices, extremes themselves, prodigality and avarice, namely, are opposed to each other, not only in degree, but in kind. What is prodigality? "It is," says Kant, "to procure means of livelihood with a view to the enjoyment only." What is avarice?

"To acquire and preserve these means in view of possession only, interdicting one's self the enjoyment thereof." These two qualities, it is seen, do not only differ from each other in the more or the less, but in their very nature. There would remain next to ask, what is the quality of economy, and that is just what Kant does not tell us. In default of it, it might be formulated thus: "to acquire and preserve the means of livelihood, not for the sake of possession or enjoyment, but for present or future need." Only there remains still the difficulty of distinguis.h.i.+ng need from enjoyment. Where does legitimate need end? Where does barren enjoyment begin? It is here that Aristotle's formula a.s.serts itself, and that we must finally come to recognize that the virtue of economy consists in a certain medium between prodigality and avarice.

Yet whatever it be, we cannot better close this subject than by citing Aristotle's admirable description of the prodigal and the miser: La Bruyere shows no greater acuteness and force.

"The prodigal is he who ruins himself on his own accord. The senseless squandering of his property is a sort of self-destruction, since one can only live on what one has. Prodigality is the excess of giving, and the want of receiving; but these two conditions cannot very long keep together; for it is not easy to give to every one, when one receives from no one. This vice, however, should not appear as blameworthy as that of avarice. Age, distress even, may easily enough correct the prodigal and bring him back to a just medium. Thus is the nature of the prodigal on the whole not a bad one; there is nothing vicious or low in this excessive tendency to give much and take nothing in return; it is only folly. It is true that prodigals become greedy and grasping. This is also why their gifts are not truly liberal ... why they enrich some people who should be left in poverty, and refuse doing anything for others far more deserving. They give with open hands to flatterers or people who procure them pleasures as unworthy as those of flattery.

"Avarice is incurable.... Avarice is more natural to man than prodigality; for most of us prefer keeping what we have than giving it away.... It consists of two princ.i.p.al elements: defect of giving, excess of receiving.... Some show more excess of receiving, some more defect of giving. Thus do all those branded by the name shabby, stingy, mean, sin through a defect of giving; yet do they not covet, nor would they take what belongs to others.... Other misers, on the contrary, may be known by their grasping propensities, taking all they can get: for example, all those who engage in ign.o.ble speculations ...

usurers and all those who lend small sums at large interest. All these people take where they should not take, and more than they ought to take. l.u.s.t for the most shameful lucre seems to be the common vice of all degraded hearts: there is no infamy they are not willing to endure, if they can make it a profit."[102]

=146. Duties relating to the acquisition of external things.--Work.=--The necessity of procuring the things needful to life imposes on us a fundamental obligation, which continues even when the want is met: it is the obligation of _work_.

Work springs from want; this is its first origin; but it survives want; and its beauty and dignity consist in that, being at first born of a natural necessity, it becomes the honor of man and the salvation of society.

In its most general sense, work means activity, and in that sense it may be said that everything works in nature; everything is in motion; everywhere we see effort, energy, unfolding of forces. Take but the animals: the bird works to build its nest; the spider to weave its web; the bee to make her honey; the beaver to construct its lodges; the dog to catch the game; the cat to catch mice. We find among animals workmen of all sorts: masons, architects, tailors, hunters, travelers; even politicians and artists, as if they had been destined to set us examples in all kinds of work and activity.

"In the morning," says Marcus Aurelius, "when thou hast trouble in getting up, say to thyself: I awake to do the work of a man: why, then, should I grieve for having to do things for which I am born, for which I was sent into the world? Was I born to remain warmly in bed under my cover?--But it is so pleasant.--Wert thou born for pleasure, then? Was it not for action, for work? Seest thou not the plants, the sparrows, the ants, the spiders, the bees, filling each their functions, and contributing according to their capacity to the harmony of the world? And shouldst thou refuse to attend thy functions as man?

Shouldst thou not follow the biddings of nature?"[103]

The ancients distinguished two kinds of work: n.o.ble and independent work, namely, the arts, the sciences, war and politics; and servile or mercenary work imposed by necessity. The latter they deemed below the dignity of man; manual labor, properly so called, useful work, distinct from gymnastics and military exercises, they considered as belonging exclusively to slaves. It is to this Aristotle referred when he said:

"There are men who have but just the necessary amount of reason to understand the reason of others: it is they whose only work is useful manual labor. It is obvious that such men cannot belong to themselves; they belong necessarily to others; they are slaves by nature."

Aristotle believed, moreover, that nature herself had made the distinction between the freeman and the slave:

"Nature," he said, "made the bodies of the freemen different from those of the slaves; she gave to the latter the necessary vigor for the heavy work of society, and made the former unable to bend their erect natures to such rude labors."[104]