Fire and Sword in the Sudan Part 29

He converses princ.i.p.ally with his Kadis, who are, for the most part, willing tools in his hands, and serve to give a veneer of justice to his despotic actions. These myrmidons, submissively seated in a semi-circle on the bare floor, their heads bowed down, listen to his orders, which are generally given in an undertone; and rarely any one of them dares to open his mouth or make a suggestion, no matter how necessary he may think it. In addition to the Kadis, he occasionally interviews Emirs and other influential persons, from whom he ascertains the condition of the country and tribes; but he invariably stirs up intrigue, and tries to pit one against the other. He generally consults, immediately after night prayers, with Yakub and some of his near relatives; and these meetings often last till long past midnight. They are usually convened for discussing the ways and means of ridding themselves of persons who are objectionable, or who are in the smallest degree a menace to their authority.

Occasionally, he makes short riding excursions to various parts of the town, or visits his houses in the north or south of Omdurman. The melancholy notes of the ombeija and the beating of war-drums announce to the inhabitants that their master is about to appear in public. Horses are at once saddled in the large thatched enclosure immediately behind the mosque. The doors are thrown open, and the mulazemin stream out from all directions, and, last of all, follows the Khalifa, mounted, as a rule, on horseback. A square is immediately formed around him; and the men advance in front of him in detachments, ten or twelve abreast.

Behind them follow the horse and foot men of the town population, while on the Khalifa's left walks an immensely powerful and well-built Arab named Ahmed Abu Dukheka, who has the honour of lifting his master in and out of the saddle. On his right is a strongly-made young Black, who is chief of the slaves in the royal stables. The Khalifa is immediately preceded by six men, who alternately blow the ombeija by his orders.

Behind him follow the buglers, who sound the advance or halt, or summon, at his wish, the chiefs of the mulazemin. Just behind these follow his small personal attendants, who carry the Rekwa (a leather vessel used for religious ablutions), the sheepskin prayer-carpet, and several spears. Sometimes, either in front or rear, as the case may be, follows the musical band, composed of about fifty Black slaves, whose instruments comprise antelope-horns, and drums made of the hollow trunks of trees covered with skin. The strange African tunes they play are remarkable rather for the hideously discordant noise they make than for their melody. These rides are generally undertaken after midday prayer; and the Khalifa returns at sunset. Whilst he is advancing in this solemn state, the mulazemin generally indulge in displays of horsemans.h.i.+p.

Galloping four abreast, with their spears poised high in the air, they dash up towards him at full speed, drawing up their horses almost on to their haunches. They then slowly retire to repeat the operation.

[Ill.u.s.tration: The Khalifa and Cadis in Council.]

During the early years of his rule, the Khalifa was present every Friday on the large parade ground where the ceremony of trooping the colours is performed; but now he attends only four times a year, viz., on the birthday of the Prophet, on the Feast of Miraj, the Feast of Bairam, and the Feast of Kurbam Bairam; on this last date all the troops in the neighbourhood, as well as the Darfur and Gedaref armies, are a.s.sembled during peaceful times. On the first day of the Feast of Bairam, the Khalifa holds prayers on the parade ground, and retires himself within a zariba in which a small mud-brick house has been built. A few special favourites, and a number of mulazemin, remain with him; but the rest of the troops and populace range themselves in long lines; and when the prayer is over he mounts a wooden pulpit, and delivers a sermon, which is generally specially prepared for him by his secretaries. This over, a salute of seven guns is fired, and all those who can afford it kill the sacrificial lambs prescribed by the religion; but, owing to the prevailing distress and poverty of the inhabitants, very few of them are in a position to bear this expense, and are obliged to content themselves with a sort of porridge which takes the place of a sacrificial dish. During the three following days, a review is held.

Long before sunrise, the Emirs, with their flags and followers, collect and march to their allotted positions on the parade ground, which is an almost perfectly flat sandy plain, with a few stones here and there. The troops are marshalled in long lines in rear of each other, facing east.

Yakub has the princ.i.p.al flag,--an immense piece of black cloth, which is hoisted exactly opposite the Khalifa's zariba, and about four hundred yards from it. To the right and left are ranged those of the different Emirs, while on the north side flies the green flag of the Khalifa Ali Wad Helu, on either side of which are the flags of his Emirs. On the left flank, the horse and camel-men are drawn up, while on the right flank are ranged the riflemen, consisting partly of Jehadia, and partly of men belonging to the various Emirs, who are only specially provided with arms for the time being. Immediately after sunrise, the Khalifa comes out of the zariba, and, mounted on his horse, stands surrounded by his mulazemin and body-guard, whilst the entire army pa.s.ses in review before him, the troops being generally provided with new jibbas and turbans in honour of the feast. Sometimes the Khalifa mounts on a camel; and, on one occasion, he drove in the carriage of one of the former Governors-General which had been captured in Khartum, and which was kept stored away in the Beit el Mal. Two horses were specially trained to draw this vehicle, which the Khalifa ordered to be driven at a foot pace, as he feared being upset; but, latterly, he has given up this plan, and generally rides on horseback direct from the mosque along the road leading due west towards the black flag, and, on reaching it, he solemnly contemplates it for a few moments, and then rides to the zariba, at the south front of which a small shelter, consisting of trunks of trees lashed together and covered with palm-mats, has been erected. Here he dismounts and reclines on an angareb, surrounded by his Kadis, whilst the troops file past. Occasionally, he starts from his own house, and, taking a southern road, marches out of the town, then turns west and rides along the front alignment of his troops, after which the usual march past takes place. At these reviews the hors.e.m.e.n are generally clad in coats of mail, of European or Asiatic origin, whilst on their heads they wear heavy iron helmets and curious cotton caps of various colours and the most grotesque shapes, round which a small turban is wound. The horses are clothed in large padded patchwork quilts, somewhat resembling those worn by the knights of old at tournaments; and one might almost imagine one was gazing at one of those old mediaeval displays. These reviews terminate at the end of the third day; and the troops brought from beyond Omdurman are permitted to return to their respective garrisons.

I propose now to briefly consider the Khalifa's political intentions and ideas.

As I have already stated, when the Mahdi first declared himself, he nominated three Khalifas, viz., Abdullahi, Ali Wad Helu, and Mohammed Sherif, who were to succeed him in this order, if they survived. On his death, Abdullahi succeeded as arranged; but, from the moment he took over the reins of government, he did everything in his power to increase his personal ascendancy, and make it hereditary in the family. The mutinous Ashraf, who prided themselves on their relations.h.i.+p to the Mahdi, afforded him a welcome pretext for compa.s.sing their downfall; and he did not hesitate to possess himself of the Black troops belonging to both his rival Khalifas. An obscure member of a western tribe, he was a complete stranger in the country; and he knew that he could not reckon on the Jaalin, Danagla, inhabitants of the Gezira, and other Nile valley tribes to support his authority. He therefore sent secret emissaries to the western Arabs to induce them to make a pilgrimage to the Mahdi's tomb, and emigrate to the Nile valley. His agents drew a tempting picture of the magnificent country to which they had been invited, telling them that they were the Lord's chosen people, and that they should go out to possess the land, the inhabitants of which were rich in cattle and slaves, which should be theirs. Tempted by these glowing accounts, many of these tribes emigrated of their own free-will to Omdurman; but as this contingent was not sufficient, the Khalifa instructed his Emirs in Darfur and Kordofan to enforce his orders; and, in consequence of this, an immense emigration took place, and continues, on a reduced scale, down to the present day. By this means the Khalifa has surrounded himself with hordes of strangers who have ousted the rightful owners of the soil, and have made themselves absolute masters of the situation. All offices and important situations are filled by them, and by his own relatives, the majority belonging to the Taaisha section. Almost the only one of the old Emirs left is Osman Digna; and the reason for this is that the eastern Arab tribes he governs speak a language which is unknown to the western Arabs. Besides many of these tribes are gradually coming under Egyptian and Italian influence, and the few that are left are merely attached to Osman Digna because he is one of them. Thus the Taaisha tribe has acquired all the power and authority in the land; and they fill their pockets with the waning revenues of the impoverished Sudan.

Years ago, the Emirs of Dongola and Berber had been instructed by the Khalifa to weaken the local population as much as possible; and, in consequence, fire-arms and weapons of all descriptions were taken from them, and they were reduced to a condition of complete harmlessness.

Moreover, in the actions of Toski and Tokar numbers of Jaalin and Danagla were killed, whilst large contingents of them had been sent to Darfur and Gallabat in the hope that they may be eventually exterminated. In this manner the Khalifa has secured their countries, and rendered any attempt to oppose his authority almost impossible. The same may be said of the inhabitants of the Gezira, who have also been drafted off into various remote parts of the country, or have been forced to come to Omdurman with their families, where they have endured the greatest hards.h.i.+ps and privations. Moreover, they were called upon to give up more than half their cultivated lands, which were distributed amongst the western Arabs; and all their best fields are now possessed by the Khalifa's own relatives and favourites. The former owners are often obliged to till the soil for their new masters, who have annexed their servants, slaves, and cattle. Thus the cultivable area of the Gezira, which, in former times, was the most populous and prosperous part of the Sudan, has been reduced by at least a half; and such commotion prevailed in the districts that the Khalifa was himself obliged to intervene on behalf of the inhabitants, who were ill-treated, tyrannised over, and oppressed to an incredible extent.

As I have before stated, his own tribes are preferred on all occasions.

Not only do they hold all the best positions and posts, but the greater part of the money and spoil which pa.s.ses into the Beit el Mal from the provincial treasuries at Darfur, Gallabat, and Reggaf finds its way into their hands. For their special benefit he has imposed a horse tax, which must be paid in kind; and in this manner he has provided the majority of the Taaisha with chargers. His own section, the Jubarat, of course gets the lion's share of everything.

He never hesitates to make use of every description of intrigue in order to strengthen his own side and weaken the other. For example, on the defeat and death of Nejumi, whose flags belonged to those of Khalifa Sherif, and from whom Abdullahi had withdrawn all power of command over other Emirs, the remnant of the defeated force was placed under the direction of the Emir Yunes, and, in order to replace those who had been killed, he appointed fresh Jaalin and Emirs as well as men from Omdurman. These he first placed under the command of their compatriot Bedawi Wad el Ereik; but, instead of sending them to Dongola, they were despatched to Gedaref, and as an unavoidable delay occurred in their departure, he made out that this was a proof of disobedience, and condemned Bedawi, with six of his Emirs, to be banished to Reggaf; and in their place he nominated other Emirs, whom he placed under the direct command of his cousin Hamed Wad Ali.

It is human nature to seek the protection of the most powerful; and now, instead of being desirous to serve under their own Emirs, the greater number of the so-called opposition party vie with one another in their efforts to be placed under the direct command of the Khalifa or of Yakub; even the adherents of Ali Wad Helu come under this category. As an instance of this, I will quote the case of Hamed Wad Gar en Nebbi, who was the princ.i.p.al cause of the destruction of the Batahin. He belonged to the Ha.s.sanab tribe, which was commanded by Ali Wad Helu.

Recognising how matters stood, he wished to place himself and his tribe under Yakub's command; but he was short-sighted enough to tell Khalifa Ali's relatives of his plans. He even went so far as to state in public that on the death of Abdullahi he would be succeeded by his brother Yakub or his son Osman, and that, as they had all the power in their hands, Khalifa Ali could expect nothing, and was, moreover, a weak man without energy. Several of the bystanders retorted that the Mahdi had nominated Khalifa Ali to be Abdullahi's successor, to which he replied that times had changed, that Abdullahi was all-powerful, and that the Mahdi's commands were never attended to or taken into consideration.

When this interview came to the ears of Khalifa Ali, he charged Gar en Nebbi before the Kadi; and it was proved beyond a doubt that the latter had actually made these statements. He was consequently convicted of being "irreligious," having doubted the maintenance of the Mahdi's doctrines and instructions. Abdullahi could not therefore publicly interfere. Had he done so, he would have revealed his own intentions, which were in reality well known, and would have corroborated Gar en Nebbi's a.s.sertions. The judges sentenced him to death; and although Abdullahi did all in his power to induce Ali Wad Helu to grant a reprieve, the latter insisted that the sentence should be carried out; and Gar en Nebbi was publicly executed in the market-place as an unbeliever and a disturber of public tranquillity. All the tribes under the command of Yakub, as well as the Khalifa's immediate followers, received instructions to show general dissatisfaction with the execution by openly absenting themselves from it.

Whenever it is a question between himself and his opponents, the Khalifa invariably relies upon his arms, which are far more than sufficient to overcome with ease any attempt to dispute his authority, whether it be in Omdurman itself or in any other part of the country. Within the Sudan, therefore, he is all-powerful; but he is not in a position to offer determined resistance to outside enemies. His leaders are neither capable nor sufficiently instructed to ensure victory. His men are not now loyal enough to fight with that determination which early fanaticism had inspired. They have little or no faith in the cause for which they are supposed to be fighting; and there is little doubt that the Khalifa's forces could not resist the advance of a foreign power bent on re-occupying the Sudan.

The table on the next page shows approximately the forces at present at the Khalifa's disposal. Of the forty thousand rifles shown in the table, there are not more than twenty-two thousand Remingtons in good condition. The remainder consist of single and double barrel smoothbores, and other guns of a variety of pattern. Several of the Remington barrels, however, have been cut short with the object of lessening the weight, and with entire disregard to the altered trajectory thus occasioned. Of the sixty-four thousand swords and spear men, at least twenty-five per cent are either too old or too young to be considered effective for a campaign. The seventy-five guns comprise six Krupps of large calibre, and for which there is only a very small amount of ammunition, eight machine guns of various patterns, and sixty-one bra.s.s muzzle-loading guns of various shapes and sizes, the ammunition for which is manufactured princ.i.p.ally in Omdurman, and is of a very inferior quality, the range being little over six or seven hundred yards.

-----------------+-------------+---------------------------+----+-------- Armed Strength. Rifles Position and Emirs. +--------+--------+---------+Guns and Garrisons. Swords. Smooth Jehadia. Cavalry. Spearmen. Bores.

-----------------+-------------+--------+--------+---------+----+-------- Omdurman Osman Sheikh (mulazemin) ed Din 11,000 11,000 " Yakub 4,000 3,500 45,000 46 4,000 " (in store) 6,000 Reggaf Arabi Wad 1,800 4,500 3 1,800 Dafalla Western Sudan: El Fasher } El Obeid } Mahmud, etc. 6,000 350 2,500 4 6,000 Shakka, etc. } Berber Zeki Osman 1,600 500 1,300 6 1,600 Abu Hamed Nur en Nau 400 100 700 4 400 Eastern Sudan: Adarama Osman Digna 450 350 1,000 450 Gedaref Ahmed Fedil 4,500 600 1,000 4 4,500 El Fasher 1,000 200 500 1,000 Asubri Hamed Wad Ali 900 400 1,400 900 Gallabat En Nur 50 200 50 Dongola Yunes ed Degheim 2.400 500 5.000 8 2,400 Suarda Hammuda 250 100 1,000 250 -----------------+-------------+--------+--------+---------+----+-------- Total 34,350 6,600 64,000 75 40,350 -----------------+-------------+--------+--------+---------+----+--------

Let us now consider for a few moments the present limits of the Khalifa's influence.

Until a few years ago, Dervish authority extended from near Wadi Halfa in a southeasterly direction towards Abu Hamed, thence eastwards to the Suakin neighbourhood, including Tokar and the Khor Baraka, thence in a southerly direction, including Ka.s.sala, Gallabat, and the southeastern slopes of the Beni Shangul and Gulli mountains, and from here it trended in a southwesterly direction towards the White Nile, and included Fashoda, Bohr, and Reggaf. On the west, it extended in a southwesterly direction through the southern Libyan desert, including Selima, the Dongola, Kordofan, and Darfur Provinces, up to the Wadai frontier, and thence southward across the Bahr el Arab through Dar Runga, and included Dar Fert.i.t, the Bahr el Ghazal, and a portion of Equatoria.

The defeat of Nejumi obliged the Mahdists to evacuate the northern portion of the Dongola Province; and their most northerly outpost is now Suarda, some three days' march from Dongola. The Egyptian victories at Tokar and Handub gave back to the local tribes the districts in the immediate neighbourhood of Suakin and Tokar, whilst the capture of Ka.s.sala threw into the hands of the Italians all districts lying east of that town, in consequence of which the river Atbara may now be considered the Khalifa's eastern frontier. The main force originally stationed at Gallabat under Ahmed Fedil has been moved to Gedaref, and only an insignificant force is maintained at the former station. The chief of the Beni Shangul districts--Tur el Guri--and many of the neighbouring Sheikhs have declared themselves independent.

In the extreme west, the Ma.s.salit, Tama, Beni Hussein, and Gimr tribes, who formerly paid tribute, have now revolted against the Mahdi's government, and until lately were independent. They entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with Sultan Yusef of Wadai; and the Khalifa was about to despatch an expedition with the object of bringing them into subjection, when the alarming news, to which I have already referred, regarding the appearance of Europeans in the Bahr el Ghazal induced him to alter the destination of Khatem Musa's force to that neighbourhood. After the retirement of the Dervishes, orders were sent to Khatem Musa not to proceed further south until he had received reinforcements from Omdurman.

The s.h.i.+lluks and d.i.n.kas were, as I have already stated, reduced to subjection by Zeki Tummal, and the route opened to Reggaf, which continues to be the most southerly of the Dervish garrisons; in consequence of the disquieting news of European movements in these districts, the strength of the force there is by no means inconsiderable. The Khalifa's object in retaining these districts is to replenish his supplies of slaves and ivory; and, under the energetic command of Arabi Wad Dafalla, frequent expeditions are despatched south and west, some of which have collided with the forces of the Congo Free State; but, as I quitted the Sudan before the result of these expeditions was known, I am not in a position to state which side was victorious.

The Khalifa's revenue and expenditure is worked entirely on the Beit el Mal system.

The following are the princ.i.p.al:--

Beit el Mal el Umumi (General Treasury).

Beit el Mal el Mulazemin (the Mulazemin Treasury).

Beit el Mal Khums el Khalifa (or the Treasury of the Khalifa's fifth t.i.thes).

Beit el Mal Warshat el Harbia (Treasury of the War Department).

Beit el Mal Zabtia es Suk (Treasury of the Bazaar Police).

The following are the sources of revenue of the General Treasury, viz.:--

1. The "Zeka" and "fitra" as laid down in the Moslem Law.

2. Confiscated property.

3. The ushr (or tenth) tax paid by merchants and traders on goods.

4. The gum-tax.

5. The boat-tax.

6. Loans from merchants (which are never repaid).

7. The ferry or "meshra" tax (_i. e._ the farming out of ferries).

8. The produce of all lands on the east of the Blue Nile and the west of the White Nile, as far south as Karkoj and Fashoda, and as far north as Haggar el Asal.

9. A percentage of the revenues of the princ.i.p.al Beit el Mals.

The following are the main expenses borne by the Treasury:--

1. Transport of troops and supplies to the different provinces.

2. Pay of the troops (Jehadia).

3. Pay of the various officials.

4. Alms.

The revenues of the Mulazemin Treasury come from the Gezira lands; and the main item of expenditure is the pay of the mulazemin.

The revenues of the Treasury of the Khalifa's fifth t.i.thes are:--

1. The greater part of the balance revenues of the Provincial Treasuries.

2. The revenues of all islands, including Tuti Island, and all "Ghenima" lands, including the Halfaya and Kemlin districts, which formerly belonged to His Highness, the Khedive.

3. The ushr on all goods coming from Berber to Omdurman.

4. All slaves sent from the provinces.

5. Revenues of the majority of steamers and boats.

The expenditure of this Treasury is devoted to the Khalifa's household.

The War Department Revenues are:--

1. The produce of the Khartum gardens.

2. The revenue of some "sakias" (water-wheels) in the vicinity of Khartum.

3. Ivory from Equatoria.

Expenditure:--

1. Dockyard expenses.

2. Beit el Amana (a.r.s.enal) expenses.

3. Saltpetre refining.