The Life of Gordon Volume II Part 8

Gordon's mission to the leading Basuto chief, and the policy of conciliation which he consistently and ably advocated from the beginning to the end of his stay at the Cape, were thus failures, but they failed, as an impartial writer like Mr Gresswell says, solely because "of Mr Sauer's intrigues behind his back." It is only necessary to add what Gordon himself wrote on this subject on his return, and to record that practically the very policy he advocated was carried into force, not by the Cape Government, but over its head by the British Government, two years later, in the separation of Basutoland from the Cape Colony, and by placing it in its old direct dependence under the British Crown.

"I have looked over the Cape papers; the only thing that is misrepresented, so far as I could see in a ten minutes' glance at them, is that Sauer says I knew of his intentions of sending an expedition against Masupha. He puts it thus: 'Gordon knew that an expedition was being organised against Masupha.' He gives apparently three witnesses that I knew well. It is quite true; but read the words. _I knew Sauer was going_ to try the useless expedient of an expedition against Masupha, and _before he did so_ we _agreed I should go and try and make peace_. While carrying on this peace mission, Sauer sends the expedition. So you see he is verbally correct; yet the deduction is false; in fact, who would ever go up with peace overtures to a man who was to be attacked during those overtures, as Masupha was? Garcia knew well enough what a surprise it was to him and me when we heard Sauer was sending the expedition. Garcia was with me at the time."

And again, when at Jaffa, General Gordon adds further, on the 27th of July 1883:--

"I saw Masupha one day at 10 A.M., and spoke to him; Sauer was twenty miles away. At 1 P.M. I came back, and wrote to Sauer an account of what had pa.s.sed; before I sent it off I received a letter from Sauer. I believe it is wished to be made out that Sauer wrote this letter after he had heard what had pa.s.sed between Masupha and me. This is not the case, for Sauer, having let me go to Masupha, changed his mind and wrote the letter, but this letter had nothing to do with my interview with Masupha."

With this further quotation of Gordon's own words I may conclude the description of the Basuto mission, which, although deemed a failure at the time, was eventually the direct cause of the present administrative arrangement in that important district of South Africa.

"In order you should understand the position of affairs, I recall to your memory the fact that Scanlan, Merriman, and yourself all implied to me doubts of Orpen's policy and your desire to remove him; that I deprecated any such change in my favour; that I accepted the post of Commandant-General on Merriman's statement that the Government desired me to eradicate the red-tape system of the colonial forces; that I made certain reports to the Government upon the settlement of the Basuto question in May and July, showing my views; that the Government were aware of the great difference between my views and those of Orpen, both by letter and verbally to Merriman; also to my objections to go up.

Sauer was told by me the same thing. I conversed with him _en route_, and I told him if I visited Masupha I could not afterwards fight him, for I would not go and spy upon his defences. Sauer asked me to go to Masupha; he knew my views; yet when I was there negotiating, he, or rather Orpen, moved Lerothodi to attack Masupha, who would, I believe, have come to terms respecting the acceptance of magistrates, a modified hut-tax, and border police. The reported movement of Lerothodi prevented my coming to any arrangement. I told Masupha, when he sent and told me of Lerothodi's advance, not to answer the Government until the hostile movements had ceased. The Government sent me up, knowing my views, and against my wish, and knowing I was not likely to mince matters. There are not more than two Europeans in Basutoland who believe in Orpen or his policy, while the natives have lost all confidence in him. Sauer shut his eyes to all this, and has thrown in his lot with Orpen. Masupha is a sincere man, and he does not care to have placed with him magistrates, against whom are complaints, which Sauer ignores. To show you I was in earnest, I offered to remain as magistrate with Masupha for two years, so much did I desire a settlement of the Basuto question. I did not want nor would I have taken the post of Governor's Agent. The chiefs and people desire peace, but not at any price. They have intelligence enough to see through wretched magistrates like some of those sent up into the native territories. They will accept a convention like the one I sent down to the Colonial Secretary on the 19th of July, and no other.

I do not write this to escape being a scapegoat--in fact, I like the altar--only that you may know my views. As long as the present magistrates stay there, no chance exists for any arrangement. As to the Premier's remark that I would not fight against Masupha, is it likely I could fight against a man with whom I am life and soul? Would I fight against him because he would not be controlled by some men like ---- and ----? Even suppose I could sink my conscience to do so, what issue would result from the action of undisciplined and insubordinate troops, who are difficult to keep in order during peace-time, and about whom, when I would have made an example of one officer, a Minister telegraphs to me to let him down easy. I beg to recall to you that Her Majesty's Government disapproved of the former Basuto war; therefore, why should I, who am an outsider to the colony, even pretend I could make war against a n.o.ble people, who resist magistrates of no capacity? The Government were well warned by me, and they cannot, therefore, plead being led astray."

Intimately connected with the Basuto question was the larger one of the right treatment to be generally extended to the natives, and on that subject General Gordon drew up, on 19th October 1882, the following masterly note, which elicited the admiration of one of the Cape Premiers, Mr Merriman, who said--"As a Colony we must try to follow out the ideas sketched by General Gordon."

The following is the full text of this interesting and valuable state paper:--

THE NATIVE QUESTION.

"1. The native question of South Africa is not a difficult one to an outsider. The difficulty lies in procuring a body of men who will have strength of purpose to carry out a definite policy with respect to the natives.

"2. The strained relations which exist between the colonist and the native are the outcome of employing, as a rule, magistrates lacking in tact, sympathy, and capacity to deal with the natives, in the Government not supervising the action of these magistrates, and in condoning their conduct, while acknowledging those faults which come to their cognisance.

"3. The Colonial Government act in the nomination of native magistrates as if their duties were such as any one could fulfil, instead of being, as they are, duties requiring the greatest tact and judgment. There can be no doubt but that in a great measure, indeed one may say entirely, disturbances among the natives are caused by the lack of judgment, or of honesty, or of tact, on the part of the magistrates in the native territories. There may be here and there good magistrates, but the defects of the bad ones re-act on the good ones. Revolt is contagious and spreads rapidly among the natives.

"4. One may say no supervision, in the full sense of the term, exists over the actions of magistrates in native territories.

They report to headquarters what suits them, but unless some very flagrant injustice is brought to light, which is often condoned, the Government know nothing. The consequence is that a continual series of petty injustices rankle in the minds of the natives, eventually breaking out into a revolt, in the midst of which Government does not trouble to investigate the causes of such revolt, but is occupied in its suppression. The history of the South African wars is essentially, as Sir G. Cathcart puts it, "Wars undertaken in support of unjustifiable acts." Sir Harry Smith was recalled for supporting an inefficient official of the now Free State Territory. Any one who chooses can investigate the causes of the late wars, and will find out that they arose in a great measure from the ignorance of the Government, their support of incapable officials, and their weakness in not investigating causes before they proceeded to coercion.

"5. Government by coercion is essentially rotten. The Duke of Wellington said that any fool could govern by that means. And it is still more rotten when Government governs by the rule of coercion without the power of coercion except at great expense.

"6. A properly const.i.tuted Commission of independent men proceeding to the native territories, not accepting the hospitality of those whose conduct they _go_ to investigate, not driving through the territories in hot haste, as is the manner of some Ministers, but a Commission who would patiently and fearlessly inquire into every detail of administration, into every grievance, is the _sine qua non_ of any quiet in the native territories. This Commission should detail on bra.s.s plates the _modus vivendi_, the limits of territory of each district chief, and a body of trustees should be appointed to watch over any infraction of such charter.

"7. It must be borne in mind that these native territories cost the Colony for administration some 9000 per annum for administration of magistracies; the receipts are some 3000, leaving a deficit of some 6000 per annum. To this deficit has to be added some 150,000 for regular troops. The last rebellion of Transkei ended in capture of some 60,000 worth of cattle, and that from natives of Colony driven into rebellion, and cost Government of Colony with Basuto war nearly 4,000,000. It is surely worth while, from a financial point of view, to investigate the administration of the Transkei.

"8. The present state of the Transkei is one of seething discontent and distrust which the rivalry of the tribes alone prevents breaking out into action, to be quelled again at great expense and by the ruin of the people, and upset of all enterprise to open up the country. Throughout the Transkei is one general clamour against the Government for broken promises, for promises made and never kept. Magistrates complain no answers are given to their questions; things are allowed to drift along as best they can. A fair open policy towards the Pondos would obtain from them all the Colony could require, but as things are now, the Pondos are full of distrust, and only want the chance to turn against the Colony. There are in Transkei 399,000 natives, and 2800 Europeans. Therefore, for the benefit of these 2800 Europeans, 399,000 natives are made miserable, and an expenditure of 210,000 is incurred by the Colony with the probability of periodical troubles.

"9. However disagreeable it might be, the Commission of Investigation should inquire into the antecedents of each magistrate, and also his capabilities.

"10. With respect to Basutoland, it is understood that no revenue from that country is to go to the Colony, therefore it can be no object to Colony to insist on the installation of magistrates in that country. If the magistrates of Transkei are the cause of discontent among the natives, then what object is there in insisting on their installation in Basutoland? The Pondos, a far inferior people, are happy under their own chiefs--far happier than the natives of Transkei. Why should the Colony insist on sending men who are more likely to goad the Basutos into rebellion than anything else? The administration of Basutoland is on a scale costing 30,000 per annum.

"11. It is argued that should the Colony go to war with Masupha the other chiefs would hold aloof. This is quite erroneous. A war with Masupha means a war with the Basuto nation, with a rising in the Transkei, and perhaps in Pondoland, and would affect Natal and Her Majesty's Government.

"12. The only remedy is the sending up of his Excellency the Governor, or of some high neutral officer, to Basutoland, and the calling together of the people to decide on their future government and connection with Colony. Or, should the British Government refuse this small concession, which could not involve it, then the Colony should send up an independent Commission to meet the Basuto people, and arrange a _modus vivendi_. Whichever course is followed it is a _sine qua non_ that the present officials in Basutoland should be relieved at once, as they have lost the confidence both of Europeans and natives. The Basutos desire peace, and it is an error to describe their demeanour as aggressive. It is not unnatural that after what they have suffered from the hands of Colonial Government they should desire at least as nearly as much self-government as the Pondos enjoy.

Certainly the present magisterial administration of the Transkei is very far from being a blessing, or conducive to peace.

"13. Nothing can possibly be worse than the present state of affairs in native administration, and the interests of the Colony demand a vertebrate government of some sort, whoever it may be composed of, instead of the invertebrate formation that is now called a government, and which drifts into and creates its own difficulties.

C. G. GORDON.

"October 19, 1882.

"_P.S._--Should Her Majesty's Government manage to arrange with Basutos in a satisfactory manner, 10,000 splendid cavalry could be counted on as allies in any contingencies in Natal, etc."

The vital part of Gordon's Cape experiences was the Basuto mission, and as it is desirable that it should not be obscured by other matters, I will only touch briefly on his work as Commandant-General, apart from that he performed as Adviser to the Cape Government in the Basuto difficulty. The post of Commandant-General was forced upon him in the first weeks of his arrival from the Mauritius by the combined urgency of Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor, and Mr Merriman, then Premier. Much against his inclination, Gordon agreed to fill the post thus thrust upon him, but only for a time. It entailed an infinity of work and worry. His instructions were to break up a red-tape system, and such a task converted every place-holder into his enemy. Still that opposition rather made his task attractive than otherwise, but in a little time he found that this opposition would not stop short of insubordination, and that to achieve success it would be necessary to cas.h.i.+er a good many officers as a wholesome example. It was while matters were in this preliminary stage that Mr Merriman's ministry went out of office, and was succeeded by another under Mr Scanlan. The measures which were favoured by the one were opposed by the other, and Gordon soon saw that the desire for a thorough reorganisation of the Cape forces, which, if properly supported, he could have carried out, was no longer prevalent among the responsible Ministers. Still he drew up an elaborate programme for the improvement of the Colonial Regular forces, by which they might be increased in numbers and improved in efficiency, at the same time that the annual expenditure was reduced.

This doc.u.ment shows that mastery of detail which was one of his most striking characteristics, and if his advice had been taken, the Cape would have acquired nearly 4000 troops at no greater cost than it already expended on 1600. In a second memorandum, he not only showed the necessity existing for that larger force, but also how, by administrative alterations in the Transkeian provinces, its cost might be diminished and most conveniently discharged. Although I do not quote these two doc.u.ments, I cannot help saying that Gordon, in the whole course of his life, never wrote anything more convincing than the advice he gave the Cape Government, which, owing to local jealousies and the invincible bulwark of vested interests, was never carried into effect, although the Basuto question was subsequently composed on Gordon's lines by the Imperial Government, and there has been peace there during all the other South African troubles.

The closing pa.s.sages between Gordon and the Cape Ministers need only be briefly referred to. Gordon resigned because he saw he could do no good in Basutoland; the Cape Premier accepted his resignation because Gordon "would not fight the Basutos." The intercommunications were much more numerous, but that is their pith. Gordon came down to Cape Town and sailed for England on 14th October, after having been five and a half months in South Africa. He had been treated by the Cape authorities without any regard for justice, and little for courtesy.

The leading paper even admitted this much when it observed that "at least General Gordon was ent.i.tled to the treatment of a gentleman."

But the plain truth was that Gordon was summoned to South Africa and employed by the Government, not as was ostentatiously proclaimed, and as he himself believed, for the attainment of a just solution of the Basuto difficulty, and for the execution of much-needed military reforms, but in order that his military experience and genius might be invoked for the purpose of overthrowing Masupha and of annexing Basutoland, which two years of war and five millions of money had failed to conquer. Hence their disappointment and resentment when Gordon proclaimed that justice was on the side of Masupha; that under no circ.u.mstances would he wage war with him; and that the whole origin of the trouble lay in the bad policy, the incompetent magistrates, and the insubordinate military officers of the Cape Government. The indictment was a terrible one; it was also true in every line and every particular.

Having thus vindicated his own character, as well as the highest principles of Government, Gordon left the Cape a poorer and a wiser man than he was on his arrival. I have explained the personal loss he incurred through the inadequacy of his pay and the cutting-off of his army allowance. It has been stated that when he had taken his pa.s.sage for England he was without any money in his pocket, and that he quaintly said to a friend: "Do you think it is right for a Major-General of the British Army to set out on a journey like this without sixpence in his pocket?" There is nothing improbable in such an occurrence, and it was matched only sixteen months later, when he was on the point of starting for Khartoum in the same impecunious condition.

Gordon arrived in England on 8th November, and after some correspondence with the King of the Belgians, which will be referred to later in connection with the Congo mission, he again left England on 26th December. On this occasion he was going to carry out a long-cherished desire to visit and reside in the Holy Land, so that he might study on the spot the scenes with which his perfect knowledge of the Bible--his inseparable companion--had made him in an extraordinary degree familiar. In the best sense of the word, he was going to take a holiday. There was to be absolute quiet and rest, and at the same time a congenial occupation. He sailed for Jaffa as a guest on one of Sir William Mackinnon's steamers, but he at once proceeded to Jerusalem, where he lived alone, refusing to see any one, with his books as companions, and "mystifying people as to what he was doing." During his stay at Jerusalem he entered with much zest and at great length into the questions of the various sites in the old Jewish capital. I do not propose to follow the course of his labours in that pursuit, as several works contain between them, I should say, every line he wrote on the subject, and the general reader cannot be expected to take any interest in abstruse and much-debated theological and topographical questions. But even in the midst of these pursuits he did not lose his quickness of military perception. After a brief inspection he at once declared that the Russian Convent commanded the whole city, and was in itself a strong fortress, capable of holding a formidable garrison, which Russia could despatch in the guise of priests without any one being the wiser. From Jerusalem, when the heat became great, he returned to Jaffa, and his interest aroused in worldly matters by the progress of events in Egypt, and the development of the Soudan danger, which he had all along seen coming, was evoked by a project that was brought under his notice for the construction across Palestine of a ca.n.a.l to the head of the Gulf of Akabah. In a letter to myself he thus dilates upon the scheme:--

"Here is the subject which I am interested in if it could be done. The reasons are:--

"1. We are in Egypt supporting an unpopular sovereign, whose tenure ends with departure of our troops. We offer no hope to the people of any solace by this support, and by the supporting of the Turco-Circa.s.sian Pashas, who I know by experience are _hopeless_. We neither govern nor take responsibility; yet we support these vampires.

"2. We are getting mixed up with the question of whether the interest of 90,000,000 will be paid or not.

"3. We are mixed up with the Soudan, where we provoked the rebellion, and of the responsibility of which government we cannot rid ourselves.

"4. We are in constant and increasing hot water with the French, and we gain no benefit from it, for the Ca.n.a.l will remain theirs.

"On the other hand, if we get a Firman from Sultan for the Palestine Ca.n.a.l--

"1. We lose the sacred sites of Jordan River, Capernaum, Bethsaida, and Tiberias, Jericho, not Engedi.

"2. We swamp a notoriously unhealthy valley, where there are no missions.

"3. We cut off the pest of the country of Palestine, the Bedouins.

"4. We are free of all four objections _in re_ occupation of Egypt.

"5. We gain the fertile lands of Moab and Ammon.

"6. Cyprus is 150 miles from the Mediterranean _debouche_.

"7. We get a waterway for large s.h.i.+ps to within fifty miles of Damascus.

"8. We can never be bothered by any internal commotion, except for the twenty-five miles from Haifa to Tiberias, for the waterway of the Ca.n.a.l would be ten miles wide, except in Arabah Valley, where there are on both sides wastes and deserts.

"9. We get rid of unhealthiness of a narrow cut with no current, which is the case with Suez Ca.n.a.l now, where the mud is pestilential from s.h.i.+ps' refuse and no current.

"10. It would isolate Palestine, render it quiet from Bedouins; it would pave the way to its being like Belgium, under no Great Power, for religious views would be against Palestine ever being owned by a Great Power.

"11. Up the ladder of Tyre to Gaza would be 10,000 square miles; population 130,000, quite a small country.