A Leap in the Dark Part 7

WHY THE NEW CONSt.i.tUTION WILL NOT BE A SETTLEMENT OF THE IRISH QUESTION

'_We believe that this measure [the Home Rule Bill] when improved in Committee will be, at all events in our time, a final settlement of the Irish question_.'[95]

'Five speeches were made from the Irish benches ... there was not one of those speeches which fell short of what we have declared to be in our opinion necessary for the acceptance of this Bill. That is where we look for a durable and solid statement as to finality. We find the word _finality_ not even eschewed by the generous unreserve of the honourable member for North Longford[96] who attached the character of finality to the Bill.... What said the honourable member for Kerry[97] last night?

He said, "_This is a Bill that will end the feud of ages_" This is exactly what we want to do. That is what I call acceptance by the Irish members of this Bill.... _What we mean by this Bill is to close and bury a controversy of seven hundred years.'_[98]

This hope of ending the feud of ages has been for years dangled by Gladstonians before the English electorate. It has gained thousands of votes for Home Rule. But it is doomed to disappointment. The new const.i.tution will never be a settlement of the Irish question: and this for three reasons, which can be definitely stated and easily understood.

_First._ The new const.i.tution satisfies neither Ireland nor England.

It does not satisfy Ireland.

Ulster, Protestant Ireland, and indeed, speaking generally, all men of property in Ireland, whether Protestant or Catholic, detest Home Rule.

They hate the new const.i.tution, they protest against the new const.i.tution, they a.s.sert that they will to the utmost of their ability resist the introduction and impede the working of the new const.i.tution.

Their abhorrence of Home Rule may be groundless, their threats may be baseless; their power to give effect to their menaces may have no existence. All that I now contend is that the strongest, and the most energetic, part of Irish society is in fact and in truth bitterly opposed, not only to the details, but to the fundamental principle, of the new polity. It avails nothing to urge that the Protestants and the educated Catholics are in a minority. This plea shows that in Parliament they can be outvoted; it does not show that they will, or can, be pacified by a policy which runs counter to their traditions, their interests, and their sentiment. You cannot vote men into content, you cannot coerce them into satisfaction. Let us look facts in the face. The measure which is supposed to gratify Ireland satisfies at most a majority of Irishmen. This may be enough for a Parliamentary tactician, it is not enough for a far-seeing statesman or a man of plain common sense. When we are told a minority are filled with discontent, we must ask who const.i.tute the minority. When we find that the minority consists of men of all descriptions and of all creeds, that they represent the education, the respectability, the worth, and the wealth of Ireland, we must be filled with alarm. Wealth, no doubt, is no certain sign of virtue, any more than poverty can be identified with vice; a rich man may be a scoundrel, and a poor man may be an honour to the human race, but the world would be much worse const.i.tuted than it is, if the possession of a competence were not connected with honesty, energy, adherence to duty, and every other civic virtue. When it is said or admitted by Gladstonians that the propertied cla.s.ses of Ireland are against Home Rule we know what this means; it means that the energy of Ireland is against Home Rule, that the honesty of Ireland is against Home Rule, that the learning of Ireland is against Home Rule, that all that makes a nation great is against Home Rule, and that the Irishmen most ent.i.tled to our respect and honour implore us not to force upon them the curse of Home Rule. This is no trifle. Let us at any rate have done with phrases; let us admit that the satisfaction of Ireland means merely the satisfaction of a cla.s.s, though it may be the most numerous cla.s.s of Irishmen, and that it also means the bitter discontent of the one cla.s.s of Irishmen who are specially loyal to Great Britain. If we are closing one feud we are a.s.suredly opening another feud which it may at least be as hard to heal.

But is it true that even the Home Rulers of Ireland are satisfied? Their representatives indeed accept the new const.i.tution. Their acceptance may well, as far as intention goes, be honest. Mr. Davitt, I dare say, when he sentimentalises in the House of Commons about his affection for the English democracy, is nearly, though not quite, as sincere as when he used to express pa.s.sionate hatred of England.[99] But acquiescence is one thing, satisfaction is another. There is every reason why the Irish members should acquiesce in the new const.i.tution. They obtain much, and they gain the means of getting more. Quite possibly they feel grateful.

But their grat.i.tude is not the grat.i.tude of Ireland, and grat.i.tude is hardly a sentiment possible, or indeed becoming, to a nation.

England saved Portugal and Spain from the domination of France. Do we find that Portuguese and Spaniards gladly subordinate their interests to the welfare of England? France delivered Italy from thraldom to Austria; French blood paid the price of Italian freedom. Yet France is detested from one end of Italy to the other, whilst Italians rejoice in the alliance with Austria. In all this there is nothing unreasonable and nothing to blame. Policy is not sentimentality, and the relations of peoples cannot be regulated in the same manner as the relations of individuals. Thirty, twenty, ten, five years hence all the sentiment of the year 1893 will have vanished. Irish content and satisfaction must, if it is to exist at all, rest on a far more solid basis than the hopes, the words, the pledges, or the intentions of Mr. M'Carthy, Mr. s.e.xton, or Mr. Davitt. Note that their satisfaction is even now of a limited kind. It absolutely depends on the new const.i.tution being worked exactly in the way which they desire. The use of the veto, legislation for Ireland by the Imperial Parliament, any conflict between the wish of England and the wish, I do not say of Ireland, but of the Irish Nationalists, must from the nature of things put an end to all grat.i.tude or content. But we may go further than this: the new const.i.tution contains elements of discord. It denies to Ireland the rights of a nation; it does not concede to her the full privileges of colonial independence. No genuine Nationalist can really acquiesce in the prohibition of Ireland's arming even in self-defence. Where, again, is the Nationalist who is prepared to say that he will not if the Bill is pa.s.sed demand that every conspirator and every dynamiter, who is suffering for the cause of Ireland, shall be released from prison? Is it credible that the Land Leaguers have forgotten what is due to the wounded soldiers of their cause? Are they prepared to forget the imperative claims of evicted tenants or imprisoned zealots?[100] I cannot believe it.

But if they are so base as to forget what is due to their friends and victims, what trust could England place in the permanence of any sentiment expressed by such men with however much temporary fervour and however much apparent honesty? If, as I am convinced, the Irish leaders are not prepared to betray the fanatics or ruffians who have trusted and served them, then with what content does England look on the prospect of a general amnesty for criminals or of lavish rewards for breach of contract and the defiance of law?

But in truth the new const.i.tution provides for the general discontent, not of one cla.s.s of Irishmen, but of the whole Irish people.

Home Rule is at bottom federalism, and the successful working of a federal government depends on the observation by its founders of two principles. The first is that no one State should be so much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with the whole, or even with many of them combined.[101] The second is that the federal power should never if possible come into direct conflict with the authority of any State. Each of these well-known principles has, partly from necessity and partly from want of skill, been violated by the constructors of the spurious federation which is to be miscalled the United Kingdom. The confederacy will consist of two States; the one, England, to use popular but highly significant language, in wealth, in population, and in prestige immensely outweighs the other, Ireland. And by an error less excusable because it might have been avoided, the power of the central government will be brought into direct conflict with the authority of the Irish State. Read the Bill as it should be read by any one who wishes to understand the working of the new const.i.tution, and throughout subst.i.tute 'England' for the term 'United Kingdom.' Note then what must be the operation of the const.i.tution in the eyes of an Irishman. The federal power is the power of England. An English Viceroy instructed by an English Ministry will veto Bills pa.s.sed by an Irish Parliament and approved by the Irish people. An English court will annul Irish Acts; English revenue officers will collect Irish customs, and every penny of the Irish customs will pa.s.s into the English Exchequer.

An English army commanded by English officers, acting under the orders of English ministers, will be quartered up and down Ireland, and, in the last resort, English soldiers will be employed to wring money from the Irish Exchequer for the rigorous payment of debts due from Ireland to England. Will any Irishman of spirit bear this? Will not Irishmen of all creeds and parties come to hate the const.i.tution which subjects Ireland to English rule when England shall have in truth been turned into an alien power?

The new const.i.tution does not in any case satisfy England.

That England is opposed to Home Rule is admitted on all hands; that England has good reason to oppose the new form of Home Rule with very special bitterness is apparent to every Unionist, and must soon become apparent to any candid man, whether Gladstonian or Unionist, who carefully studies the provisions of the new const.i.tution, and meditates on the effect of retaining Irish representatives in the Parliament at Westminster. For my present purpose there is no need to establish that English discontent is reasonable; enough to note its existence.

A consideration must be here noticed which as the controversy over Home Rule goes on will come into more and more prominence. We are engaged in rearranging new terms of union between England and Ireland; this is the real effect of the Home Rule Bill; but for such a rearrangement Great Britain and Ireland must in fairness, no less than in logic, be treated as independent parties. Whether you make a Union or remodel a Union between two countries the satisfaction of both parties to the treaty is essential. Till England is satisfied the new const.i.tution lacks moral sanction. That the Act of Union could not have been carried without, at any rate, the technical a.s.sent both of Great Britain and Ireland is admitted, and yet the moral validity of the Treaty of Union is, whether rightly or not, after the lapse of ninety-three years a.s.sailed, on the ground that the a.s.sent of Ireland was obtained by fraud and undue influence. But if the separate a.s.sent of both parties was required for the making of the treaty, so the free a.s.sent of both must be required for its revision, and the politicians who force on Great Britain the terms of a political partners.h.i.+p which Great Britain rejects, repeat in 1893 and in an aggravated form the error or crime of 1800.[102]

_Secondly_. The new const.i.tution rests on an unsound foundation.

It is a topsy-turvy const.i.tution, it aims at giving weakness supremacy over strength.

The main, though not the sole, object of a well-const.i.tuted polity is to place political power (whilst guarding against its abuse) in the hands of the men, or body of men, who from the nature of things, _i.e._ by wealth, education, position, numbers, or otherwise, form the most powerful portion of a given state. The varying forms of the English Const.i.tution have, on the whole, possessed the immense merit of giving at each period of our history political authority into the hands of the cla.s.s, or cla.s.ses, who made up the true strength of the nation. Right has in a rough way been combined with might. Wherever this is not the case, and genuine power is not endowed with political authority, there exists a sure cause of revolution; for sooner or later the natural forces of any society must a.s.sert their predominance. No inst.i.tution will stand which does not correspond with the nature of things. Vain were all the efforts of party interest or of philanthropic enthusiasm to give to the Blacks political predominance in the Southern States. Votes, ballot boxes, laws, federal arms, all were in vain. By methods which no man will justify, but which no power could resist, the Whites have re-acquired political authority. The nature of things could not be made obedient to the dogmas of democratic equality. Now the gravest flaw of the new const.i.tution, the disease from which it is certain to perish, is that, in opposition to the forces which ultimately must determine the destiny of the United Kingdom, it renders the strong elements of the community subordinate to the weak.

In Ireland Dublin is made supreme over Belfast, the South is made not the equal, but in effect the master of the North; ignorance is given dominion over education, poverty is allowed to dispose of wealth. If Ireland were an independent state, or even a self-governed British colony, things would right themselves. But the politicians who are to rule in Dublin will not depend upon their own resources or be checked by a sense of their own feebleness. They will be const.i.tutionally and legally ent.i.tled to the support of the British army; they will const.i.tute the worst form of government of which the world has had experience, a government which relying for its existence on the aid of an external power finds in its very feebleness support for tyranny.

Murmurs are already heard of armed resistance. These mutterings, we are told, are nothing but bl.u.s.ter. It is at any rate that sort of "bl.u.s.ter"

at which the justice and humanity of a loyal Englishman must take alarm.

I have not yet learnt to look without horror on the possibility of civil war, nor to picture to myself without emotion the situation of brave men compelled by the British army to obey rulers whose moral claim to allegiance they justly deny and whose power unaided by British arms they contemn. Civil warfare created by English policy and despotism maintained by English arms must surely be to any Englishman objects of equal abhorrence.

But in England no less than in Ireland our new const.i.tution gives artificial power to weakness. At Westminster the Irish members, be they 80 or 103, will have no legitimate place. Mr. Gladstone on this point is, for aught I know, at one with the Unionists. In 1886 he without scruple, and therefore no doubt without any sense of injustice, expelled the representatives of Ireland from the British Parliament. In 1893 he brings them back to Westminster. But his words betray his hesitation. He expects, may we not say he hopes, that they will remain in Ireland and on their occasional visits to London have the good sense and good taste not to interfere in British affairs. Few are the persons who share these antic.i.p.ations. If they are to be realised they must be embodied in the const.i.tution; the Premier might at this moment without shame, and without regret, revert to the better policy of 1886. On his present policy we all know that his expectations will not be fulfilled. The voluntary absence of the Irish members from Westminster is as vain a dream as the fancy that Ireland under Home Rule may suffer from a plethora of money. To Westminster the Irish members will come. If they do not come of their own accord they will be fetched by allies who need their help. At Westminster they will hold the balance of parties, and will while the const.i.tution lasts rule the destiny of England with a sole regard at best to the immediate interest of Ireland, at worst to the interests of an Irish faction. To Ireland will be given power without responsibility, to England will belong responsibility without power. Nor will the unnatural subjection of a great, a flouris.h.i.+ng, a wealthy, and a proud country to a weaker and poorer neighbour be rendered the more bearable by the knowledge that the ill-starred supremacy of Ireland means, in England, the equally unnatural and equally ominous predominance of an English faction, which, since it needs Irish aid, does not command England's confidence. Radicals or revolutionists will in the long run have bitter cause to regret an arrangement which identifies their political triumph with England's humiliation.

_Thirdly_. The new const.i.tution is based on a play of words which conceals two contradictory interpretations of its character.[103]

The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament means to Irish Home Rulers and to most Gladstonians that Ireland shall possess colonial independence.[104] It means to Unionists and to many electors who can hardly be called either Unionists or Gladstonians, that the British Parliament, or, in other words, England, shall retain the real, effective, and even habitual control of Irish affairs. In the one sense it means only that Ireland shall remain part of the British Empire, in the other that Ireland shall still be part of the United Kingdom. And, what is of great importance, the ma.s.s of Englishmen waver between these two interpretations of Imperial supremacy. When they think of Home Rule as satisfying Ireland, they hold that it gives Irishmen everything which they can possibly ask. When they think of Home Rule as not dismembering the United Kingdom, they fancy that it leaves to the British Parliament all the real authority which Parliament can possibly require.

This difference of interpretation lays the foundation of misunderstanding, but it does far more harm than this. It must keep Irish Nationalists alarmed, and not without reason, for the permanence of the independence which they may have obtained. A change of feeling or a change of party may cause the Imperial Parliament to a.s.sert its reserved authority. England keeps her pledges.[105] Yes, but here it is not a mere question of good faith. When two contractors each from the beginning put _bona fide_ a different interpretation upon their contract, neither of them is chargeable with dishonesty for acting in accordance with his own view of the agreement. The spirit of Unionism and the spirit of Separation will survive the creation of the new const.i.tution. Under one form or another Unionists will be opposed to Federalists and it is more than possible, should the Bill pa.s.s, that the division of English parties may turn upon their reading of the Irish Government Act, 1893.

The possibility, again, that the Parliament at Westminster may a.s.sert its reserved authority, if it raises the fears of Irishman, may excite the hopes of English politicians. If at any time the supremacy of Ireland becomes unbearable to British national sentiment, or if the condition of Ireland menaces or is thought to menace English interests, the new const.i.tution places in the hands of a British majority a ready-made weapon for the restoration of British power. The result might be attained without the necessity for pa.s.sing any Act of Parliament, or of repealing a single section of the Irish Government Act, 1893. A strong Viceroy might be sent to Ireland; he might be instructed not to convoke the Irish Parliament at all; or, having convoked, at once to prorogue it. He might thereupon form any Ministry he chose out of the members of the Irish Privy Council. The Imperial Parliament would at once resume its present position and could pa.s.s laws for Ireland. This might be called revolution or reaction. For my argument it matters not two straws by what name this policy be designated. The scheme sketched out is not a policy which I recommend. My contention is not that it will be expedient--this is a matter depending upon circ.u.mstances which no man can foresee--but that it will be strictly and absolutely legal.

The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, combined with the presence of the Irish members at Westminster, will thus by a curious fatality turn out a source at once of permanent disquietude to Ireland and of immediate, if not of permanent, weakness to England.

Our New Const.i.tution is not made to last Home Rule does not close a controversy; it opens a revolution.

No one in truth expects that the new const.i.tution will stand. Its very builders hesitate when they speak of its permanence,[106] and are grateful for the generous credulity of a friend who believes in its finality. Nor is it hard to conjecture (and in such a matter nothing but conjecture is possible) what are the forces or tendencies which threaten its destruction.

If Ireland is discontented Irishmen will demand either the extension of federalism or separation. In every federal government the tendency of the States is to diminish as far as possible the authority of the federal power. But this tendency will be specially strong in the grotesque Anglo-Irish federation, since the federal power will be nothing but the predominance of England. The mode of weakening the federal authority is only too obvious. 'The more there is of the more,'

says a profound Spanish proverb, 'the less there is of the less.' The more the number of separate States in the confederacy, the less will be the weight of England, and the greater the relative authority of Ireland. Let England, Scotland, and Wales become separate States, let the Channel Islands and Man, and, if possible, some colonies, be added to the federation, and as the greatness of England dwindles so the independence of Ireland will grow.

Some seven years ago Sir Gavan Duffy predicted that before ten years had elapsed there would be a federation of the Empire.[107] Like other prophets he may have antedated the fulfilment of his prediction, but his dictum is the forecast of an experienced politician--it points to a pressing danger. Home Rule for Ireland menaces the dissolution of the United Kingdom, and the unity of the United Kingdom is the necessary condition for maintaining the existence of the British Empire. Home Rule is the first stage to federalism.

But Irish discontent, should it not find satisfaction in a movement for federalism, will naturally take the form of the demand for colonial or for national independence. You cannot play with the spirit of political nationality. The semi-independence of Ireland from England, combined with the undue influence of Ireland in English politics, is certain to produce both unreasonable and reasonable grounds for still further loosening the tie which binds together the two islands. The cry 'Ireland a nation' is one of which no Irishman need be ashamed, and to which North and South alike, irritated by the vexations of a makes.h.i.+ft const.i.tution, are, as I have already insisted, likely enough to rally.

Nor is it certain that Irish Federalists or Irish Nationalists will not obtain allies in England. The politicians who are content with a light heart to destroy the work of Pitt may, for aught I know, with equal levity, annul the Union with Scotland and undo the work of Somers, or by severing Wales from the rest of England render futile the achievement of the greatest of the Plantagenets. Enthusiasts for 'Home Rule all round'

would appear to regard their capacity for destroying the United Kingdom as a proof of their ability to build up a new fabric of Imperial power, and to fulfil their vain dreams of a federated Empire. Sensible men may doubt whether a turn for revolutionary destruction is any evidence that politicians possess the rare gift of constructive statesmans.h.i.+p. And should the working of the new const.i.tution confirm these doubts, persons of prudence will begin to perceive that Irish independence is for both England and Ireland a less evil than the extension of federalism.

The natural expression however of English discontent or disappointment is reactionary opposition. Reaction, or the attempt of one party in a state to reverse a fundamental policy deliberately adopted by the nation, is one of the worst among the offspring of revolution, and is almost, though not entirely, unknown to the history of England. Yet there is more than one reason why if the Home Rule Bill be carried, reaction should make its ill-omened appearance in the field of English public life. The policy of Home Rule, even should it be for the moment successful, lacks the moral sanctions which have compelled English statesmen to accept accomplished facts. The methods of agitation in its favour have outraged the moral sense of the community. Mr. Gladstone's victory is the victory of Mr. Parnell, and the triumph of Parnellism is the triumph of conspiracy, and of conspiracy rendered the more base because it was masked under the appearance of a const.i.tutional movement.

Neither the numbers nor the composition of the ministerial majority are impressive. The tactics of silence, evasion, and ambiguity may aid in gaining a parliamentary victory, but deprive the victory of that respect for the victors on the part of the vanquished which, in civil contests at any rate, alone secures permanent peace. But the pleas and justifications for reaction are rarely its causes. If Englishmen attempt to bring about the legal destruction of the new const.i.tution, their action will be produced by a sense of the false position a.s.signed to England. No device of statesmans.h.i.+p can stand which is condemned by the nature of things. The predominance of England in the affairs of the United Kingdom is secured by sanctions which in the long run can neither be defied nor set aside; the const.i.tution which does not recognise this predominance is doomed to ruin. That its overthrow would be just no one dare predict; the future is as uncertain as it is dark. A main reason why a wise man must deprecate the weak surrender by Englishmen of rightful power is the dread that, if in a moment of irritation they rea.s.sert their strength, they may exhibit neither their good faith nor their justice.

FOOTNOTES:

[95] J. M'Carthy, April 10, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates_, p. 354.

No part of these quotations is italicised in the report.

[96] J. M'Carthy.

[97] Mr. s.e.xton.

[98] Mr. Gladstone, April 21, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates_, p.

565.

[99] At Bod.y.k.e, June 2, 1887, Mr. M. Davitt said:--'Our people, however, who so leave Ireland are not lost in the Irish cause, for they will join the ranks of the Ireland of retribution beyond the Atlantic; and when the day shall again come that we have a right to manage our own affairs, the sun may some day s.h.i.+ne down upon England when we here in Ireland will have the opportunity of having vengeance upon the enemy for its crimes in Ireland.'--_Freeman's Journal_, June 3, 1887. See 'Notes on the Bill,' published by the Irish Unionist Alliance, p. 368. These expressions were used after the union of hearts.

[100] 'But all these matters are, as it were, minor details. They all sink into comparative insignificance before the one great demand--and I almost apologise for mentioning them--because I want you to concentrate your attention on the one great demand which we make, and the one unalterable statement we intend to adhere to, that whether guilty or innocent, these men, according to their lights and their consciences, were trying to serve Ireland; that any of them who were guilty were driven into this course by the misgovernment of Ireland, and the oppression of Ireland by an outside power, and that if we are asked to settle this Irish question, if we are asked to let peace reign where discord and hatred reign at present, there must be no victims--that if there is to be peace there must also be amnesty. I don't discuss the question of guilt or innocence. For the sake of argument I will say that there are some men in jail who are guilty. They must come out as well as the innocent, because their guilt is due to misgovernment in the past.'--Mr. Pierce Mahony, _Irish Independent_, April 5. See 'Notes on the Bill,' p. 423.

'There is no use in deceiving ourselves upon this matter; we would be fools if we thought that in the next few weeks, or within the next few months, we would succeed in getting our brethren out of prison. I don't believe we will; ... but I am convinced of this, that there is not a man amongst them who will ever be called upon to serve anything like the remainder of his sentence. I am convinced that in a short time--and the extent of its duration depends upon other circ.u.mstances--every one of these men will be restored to liberty if only we conduct this agitation with determination, with resolution, and I would say above all with moderation and with wisdom.'--Mr. John Redmond, M.P., _Dublin Irish Independent_, April 5. See 'Notes on the Bill,' p. 424.

[101] See Mill, _Representative Government_, 1st ed. p. 300.

[102] Of course I do not for a moment dispute the legal right of Parliament to repeal all or any of the articles of the Treaty of Union with Ireland. I am writing now not upon the law, but upon the ethics of the const.i.tution. My contention is, that, as things stand, the undoubted a.s.sent of Great Britain (or even perhaps of England, in the narrower sense) is morally requisite for the repeal or at any rate for the remodelling of the Treaty of Union. Note that Ireland would stand morally and logically in a stronger position if demanding Separation than when demanding a revision of the Act of Union. An example shows my meaning. _A, B_, and _C_ form a partners.h.i.+p. _A_ is by far the richest, and _C_ by far the poorest of the firm. _C_ finds the terms of partners.h.i.+p onerous. He may have a moral right to retire, but certainly he cannot have a moral, and would hardly under any system of law have a legal, right to say, 'I do not want to leave the firm, but I insist that the terms of partners.h.i.+p be remodelled wholly in my favour.' Nor again is it conceivable that _B_ and _C_ by uniting together could in fairness claim to impose upon _A_ disadvantages the burden of which he had never intended to accept.

[103] See pp. 22-31, _ante_.