A Military Genius Part 13

REVERDY JOHNSON.

_Discussions in Congress Showing the Critical Nature of the Situation._

IN THE HOUSE, _January 7, 1862_.

Mr. KELLEY: I think the condition of this Capital to-day invites war.

It is environed within a narrow circle of two hundred thousand men in arms, and yet, sir, that short river which leads to the Capital of a great and proud country, thus defended and encircled by patriot troops, is so thoroughly blockaded by rebels that the Government, though its army has not an adequate supply of forage, cannot bring upon it a peck of oats to feed a hungry horse. * * * Call it what you may, it is a sight at which men may well wonder. We have six hundred thousand men in the field. We have spent I know not how many millions of dollars, and what have we done? What one evidence of determined war or military skill have we exhibited to foreign nations, or to our own people? * * * We have been engaged in war for seven months. * * *

England does respect power. * * * Let her hear the shouts of a victorious army, and England and the powers of the continent will pause with bated breath. Sir, it was said yesterday the last days had come. My heart has felt the last day of our dear country was rapidly approaching. Before we have reached victory we have reached bankruptcy. We are to-day flooding the country with an irredeemable currency. In ninety days, with the patriotism of the people paralyzed by the inaction of our great army, the funded debt of the country will depreciate with a rapidity that will startle us. In ninety days more the nations of the world will, I fear, be justified in saying to us, "You have no more right to shut up the cotton fields of the world by a vain and fruitless effort to reconquer the territory now in rebellion than China or j.a.pan has to wall themselves in", and in the eyes of international law, in the eyes of the world, and, I fear, in the eyes of impartial history, they will be justified in breaking our blockade and giving to the rebels means and munitions of war. * * * But, sir, in less than ninety days, to come back to the point of time, we shall be advancing in the month of April, when Northern men will begin to feel the effects of heat in the neighborhood of s.h.i.+p Island and the mouth of the Mississippi. Looking at the period of ninety days, I say it is not a double but a triple edged sword approaching, perhaps, the single thread of destiny upon which the welfare of our country hangs.

Bankruptcy and miasmatic pestilence are sure to come within the lapse of that period, and foreign war may add its horror to theirs.

Mr. WRIGHT: We are gasping for life. This great Government is upon the brink of a volcano, which is heaving to and fro, and we are not certain whether we exist or no.

Mr. F. A. CONKLING: In this crisis of our history, when the very existence of the Republic is threatened, when in all human probability the next thirty days will decide forever whether the Union is to maintain its place among the powers of the earth or whether it is to go down and const.i.tutional liberty is to perish. * * *

IN THE HOUSE, _January 20, 1862_.

Mr. WRIGHT: There is one great abiding and powerful issue to-day, and that is the issue whether the country and the Const.i.tution shall be saved or whether it shall be utterly and entirely annihilated. With Pennsylvania it is a question of national existence, of life or death.

* * * The great heart of Pennsylvania is beating to-day for the cause of the Union. * * * It is to decide the great question whether the liberty which has been handed down to us by our fathers shall be permitted to remain in the land, or whether chaos or desolation shall blot out the country and Government forever.

IN THE SENATE, _January 22, 1862_.

Mr. WADE: But, sir, though the war lies dormant, still there is war, and it is not intended that it shall stay in this quiescent state much longer. The committee to which I belong are determined * * * that it shall move with energy. If the Congress will not give us, or give themselves, power to act with efficiency in war, we must confide everything to the Executive Government and let them usurp everything.

If you would not fix your machinery so that you might advise with me and act with me, * * * I would act independent of you, and you might call it what you please. This is for the suppression of the rebellion, and the measures that we are to sit in secrecy upon look to that end and none other. No measure rises in importance above that connected with the suppression of the rebellion. * * * We stand here for the people and we act for them. * * * There is no danger to be apprehended from any secrecy which, in the consideration of war measures, we may deem it proper to adopt. It is proper for us, as it is for the general in the field, as it is for your Cabinet ministers, to discuss matters in secret when they pertain to war.

IN THE HOUSE, _January 22, 1862_.

Mr. THADDEUS STEVENS: * * * Remember that every day's delay costs the nation $1,500,000 and hundreds of lives. * * * What an awful responsibility rests upon those in authority; their mistakes may bring mourning to the land and sorrow to many a fireside. * * * If we cannot save our honor, save at least the lives and the treasure of the nation.

About this time Miss Carroll was spoken of by those conversant with her plans as "the great unrecognized member of Lincoln's Cabinet."

But, glorious as was the success, Miss Carroll's plans were not fully carried out, to the great after regret of the War Department, who recognized that the war, which might then have been brought to a speedy termination, had been greatly prolonged through the omission.

Miss Carroll continued her communications to the War Department, endeavoring to rectify mistakes.

Extract from Miss Carroll's letter to the Department on the reduction of Island No. 10, and pointing out the advantages of the immediate seizure of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, March 26, 1862.

"The failure to take Island No. 10, which thus far occasions much disappointment to the country, excites no surprise in me. When I looked at the gunboats at St. Louis and was informed as to their power, and considered that the current of the Mississippi at full tide runs at the rate of five miles per hour, which is very near the speed of our gunboats, I could not resist the conclusion that they were not well fitted to the taking of batteries on the Mississippi river if a.s.sisted by gunboats perhaps equal to our own. Hence it was that I wrote Colonel Scott from there that the Tennessee was our strategic point, and the successes at Fort Henry and Donelson established the justice of these observations. Had our victorious army, after the fall of Fort Henry, immediately pushed up the Tennessee river and taken a position on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, between Corinth, Mississippi, and Decatur, Alabama, which might easily have been done at that time with a small force, every rebel soldier in Western Kentucky and Tennessee would have fled from every position to the south of that railroad; and had Buell pursued the enemy in his retreat from Nashville, without delay, into a commanding position in North Alabama, on the railroad between Chattanooga and Decatur, the rebel government at Richmond would have necessarily been obliged to retreat to the cotton States. I am fully satisfied that the true policy of General H----is to strengthen Grant's column by such force as will enable him at once to seize the Memphis and Charleston railroad, as it is the readiest means of reducing Island 10 and all the strongholds of the enemy to Memphis."

Letter written from St. Louis, military headquarters for the Southwest:

[27]ST. LOUIS, _May 2, 1862_.

"I think the war on the approaches to the Tennessee river has ended. I think the enemy will retreat to the Grand Junction, some sixty miles nearer Memphis; and when our forces approach him there, he will go down the Central Mississippi railroad to Jackson, and if there is another great battle in the West it will be there. I think they will try to postpone anything serious until after the pending battles in Virginia. If they make the attempt now every leader would be taken in the event of defeat, without fail, whilst if it is postponed until after the fate of Virginia is decided the leaders can bring what troops they have left and, joining them to what they have here, make one last struggle for life, and if defeated they can escape across the Mississippi into Arkansas, and through that into Texas and Mexico. You may rest a.s.sured the _leaders_ will not be caught if they can get away with life; and as to _property_, they have _that_ secured already. The only way this plan can be frustrated is to occupy Memphis and Vicksburg strongly, _particularly_ the _latter_, and send one or more of our gunboats up the _Yazoo_ river _to watch every creek and inlet_, so that they may be unable to get across the _swamps_ by _canoes_ and _skiffs_.

"I have heard that all the skiffs and canoes have been taken from Memphis and Vicksburg to some point up the _Yazoo river_ and fitted up, for what purpose I do not know, but I can think there is no other than what I name, for _one night's ride_ from Jackson will carry a man to the edge of the _Yazoo_ river _swamps_, where it would be impossible to follow unless equally well acquainted and with boats like theirs. From there their escape would be easy, as _they would have 400 miles_ of the river to strike, at any part of which they would find friends to a.s.sist them over to the Arkansas side of the river, and from _there_ pursuit would be useless."

[Footnote 27: Copied by me on March 23, 1891, from the file at the office of the Attorney General.

S. E. BLACKWELL.]

[28]Letter from Miss Carroll to Secretary Stanton:

[Footnote 28: Written to recommend Pilot Scott for information given.]

_May 14, 1862._

Hon. E. M. STANTON, _Secretary of War_:

It will be the obvious policy of the rebels, in the event of Beauregard's defeat, to send a large column into Texas for the purpose of holding that country for subsistence, where beef and wheat abound. Now, all this can be defeated by strongly occupying Vicksburg and plying a gunboat or two on the Yazoo river. I would also suggest a gunboat to be placed at the mouth of the Red and Arkansas rivers. Whether the impending battle in North Mississippi should occur at Corinth or within the area of a hundred miles, a large part of the enemy's forces will retreat by the Yazoo river and by the railroad to Vicksburg, on the Mississippi, and will then take the railroad through Louisiana into Texas. I handed Honorable Mr. Watson on Monday a letter giving information that the canoes, skiffs, and other transports had been sent up the Yazoo river from Memphis and Vicksburg for the purpose, undoubtedly, of securing the rebels' retreat from our pursuing army.

This information I obtained from Mr. Scott, a pilot on the _Memphis_, which conducted the retreat of the soldiers at the battle of Belmont, and had been with the fleet in the same capacity up the Tennessee river. Until June last he resided in New Orleans, and for twenty years or more has been in his present employment. His wife stated this to me, and with a view of obtaining facts about that section of country I requested her to introduce him to me. I was surprised at his general intelligence in regard to the war, and from the facts I derived from him and other practical men I satisfied myself that the Tennessee river was the true strategic point, and submitted a doc.u.ment to this effect to Hon. Thomas A. Scott, dated the 30th of November, 1861, which changed the whole programme of the war in the Southwest, and inured to the glory of our arms in that section and throughout the land. The Government is not aware of the incalculable service rendered by the facts I learned from this pilot, and I therefore take the present occasion to ask his promotion to the surveyors.h.i.+p of New Orleans, for which I should think him well suited in this crisis.

I enclose you a letter describing the battle of Pittsburg Landing, which will interest you.

Very sincerely,

ANNA ELLA CARROLL.

Extract from the letter to the Secretary of War on the 15th of May, 1862, advising the occupation of Vicksburg:

* * * "It will be the obvious policy of the rebels, in the event of Beauregard's defeat, to send a large column into Texas for the purpose of holding that country for subsistence, where beef and wheat abound. This can be defeated by strongly occupying Vicksburg and plying a gunboat, to be placed at the mouth of the Red and Arkansas rivers." * * * "Whether the impending battle in North Mississippi should occur at Corinth or within the area of a hundred miles, a large part of the enemy's forces will retreat by the Yazoo river, and by the railroad to Vicksburg, on the Mississippi, and will take the railroad through Louisiana into Texas." * * *

On the following Monday Miss Carroll handed Mr. Watson a letter giving information that the canoes, skiffs, and other transports had been sent up the Yazoo from Memphis and Vicksburg for the purpose, undoubtedly, of securing the rebels' retreat from our pursuing army.

Letter from the file of the Attorney General, Court of Claims:[29]

[Footnote 29: Copied by me from the file at the office of the Attorney General, March 23, 1891. S.

E. BLACKWELL.]

Hon. E. M. STANTON, _Secretary of War_: