A Historical Geography of the British Colonies Part 20

[Sidenote: _Iberville takes Port Nelson and the forts in James Bay._]

[Sidenote: _They are recovered by the English._]

The northernmost post of the Hudson Bay Company, the post on the Nelson river, or rather on the Hayes river, which flows into the same estuary, had not been taken by the French in their buccaneering expedition of 1686. It was known indifferently as Port Nelson or Fort York. It was at some distance from the forts in James Bay, and promised to be an outlet for trade from the regions west of the great lakes. It had been threatened by the French in 1690, and in October, 1694, the bold and restless Iberville, who had returned to Canada in 1687, appeared before it with two s.h.i.+ps. After a short siege it capitulated, and was renamed Fort Bourbon; and Iberville followed up his success by recapturing the forts in James Bay. Thus, by the middle of 1695, the French held every post in Hudson Bay. In the next year came English s.h.i.+ps, and all the positions were regained for England.

[Sidenote: _Fresh raid by Iberville._]

[Sidenote: _The Peace of Ryswick._]

[Sidenote: _The Peace of Utrecht._]

[Sidenote: _Hudson Bay secured to England._]

Once more, in 1697, Iberville appeared on the scene. He had in the meantime taken Fort Pemaquid on the Acadian frontier, and overrun Newfoundland; and starting from Placentia, with four s.h.i.+ps of war sent out from France, he made sail for Hudson Bay. The destination was Port Nelson; but the vessels became separated, and with a single s.h.i.+p, Iberville, when nearing the fort, came into collision with three armed English merchantmen. The bold Frenchman closed with them, one to three, sank one of the vessels, took a second, {190} while the third made its escape. A heavy gale came on, his own s.h.i.+p was driven ash.o.r.e and broken up; but landing with his men, he was rejoined shortly afterwards by the rest of the French squadron, and laying siege to the fort compelled it to capitulate. This feat of arms took place early in September, 1697; on the twentieth of the same month the Peace of Ryswick was signed, and under its terms the French were placed in possession of all the Hudson Bay forts, with the exception of Fort Albany.[15] They held them down to the year 1713, when the Peace of Utrecht in no uncertain words gave back to Great Britain 'to be possessed in full right for ever, the Bay and Straits of Hudson, together with all lands, seas, seacoasts, rivers and places situate in the same Bay and Straits and which belong thereunto, no tracts of land or of sea being excepted, which are at present possessed by the subjects of France.' Boundaries, which by the treaty were to be defined, were never fixed; but no French s.h.i.+p appeared again with hostile intent in Hudson Bay until the year 1782.

[Footnote 15: The manner in which the Treaty of Ryswick worked out in favour of the French in Hudson Bay is explained, as far as it can be explained, in Kingsford's _History of Canada_, vol. iii, pp. 39-41.]

NOTE.--For the first part of the above chapter, see

KINGSFORD'S _History of Canada_, vol. ii.

Sir J. BOURINOT'S _Cape Breton_ (referred to above, p. 34, note).

The same author's _Canada_, in the 'Story of the Nations' Series, chap. vii, and Dr. PATTERSON'S Paper on _Sir William Alexander and the Scottish Attempt to Colonize Acadia_, published in the _Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada_, vol. x, 1892.

For the second part, see KINGSFORD'S _History of Canada_, vol. iii.

Two books have recently been published on the Hudson Bay Company, viz: _The Remarkable History of the Hudson's Bay Company_, by GEORGE BRYCE, M.A., LL.D., and _The Great Company (1667-1871)_, by BECKLES WILSON.

{191}

CHAPTER VII

LOUISBOURG

[Sidenote: _Cape Breton Island under the provisions of the Peace of Utrecht._]

[Sidenote: _Importance of the island to France._]

The Treaty of Utrecht provided that 'the island called Cape Breton, as also all others both in the mouth of the river of St. Lawrence and in the gulf of the same name, shall hereafter belong of right to the French, and the Most Christian King shall have all manner of liberty to fortify any place or places there.' It was an important provision.

Driven from Acadia and Newfoundland, with the reservation of certain fis.h.i.+ng rights along a specified part of the Newfoundland coast, the French would have lost the seaboard altogether but for the possession of these islands at the entrance of the river of Canada.

A French eye-witness of the siege of Louisbourg in 1745 described, in a contemporary pamphlet, the value of Cape Breton Island to France.

It was used, he says, to provide a place for the French settlers who were leaving Newfoundland after the cession of that island to Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht, but 'this was not all. It was necessary that we should retain a position that would make us at all times masters of the entrance to the River which leads to New France.'[1] Similar testimony to its value is given by an English writer. 'Cape Breton Island is a subject no good Englishman can write or read with pleasure. The giving of it to the French by the Treaty of Utrecht may prove as great a loss to the Kingdom, as the Sinking Fund amounts {192} to or even the charge of the last war.'[2] Cape Breton, in short, kept open for France the mouth of the St. Lawrence, and the story of New France became more than ever the story of that river, and of the waterways which connected it with the far West, and with the newborn French colony in Louisiana.

[Footnote 1: _Louisbourg in 1745_, the anonymous _Lettre d'un habitant de Louisbourg_, translated and edited by Professor Wrong (Toronto, 1897), p. 26.]

[Footnote 2: Oldmixon's _British Empire in America_ (1741 ed.), vol.

i, p. 37.]

From 1713, for thirty years, there was nominally peace between Great Britain and France. In 1743, English troops a.s.sisted the Austrians and defeated the French at the battle of Dettingen; but war was not formally proclaimed between the two powers until the following year, 1744, when it lasted for four years, being terminated by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. During the years of so-called peace, French Governors, French priests, French explorers and border leaders lost no opportunity of strengthening the French position in North America.

[Sidenote: _Controversy as to the boundaries of Acadia._]

Intrigue and covert force were notably at work in Acadia. By the Treaty of Utrecht, King Louis ceded to Great Britain 'all Nova Scotia or Accadie with its ancient boundaries.' What were the ancient boundaries? They were left to be demarcated by commissioners of the two nations; but no demarcation ever took place, and meanwhile French on the one hand, and English on the other, construed the term 'Acadia' according to their respective interests. While Acadia was French, the French widened, the English narrowed, the area to which the name might apply. When Acadia became English, the contention was reversed; and the French, who had included in Acadia a large extent of mainland, claimed that the peninsula of Nova Scotia alone was covered by the terms of the treaty.

[Sidenote: _The Acadians and French intrigues._]

Within that peninsula there were, at the time when the treaty was signed, some two thousand French settlers--a simple peasantry, uneducated, priest-ridden, of the same type as the _habitans_ of the St. Lawrence; but more primitive, {193} more old-fas.h.i.+oned, clinging to their homes, to their national traditions, to their faith. Under the fourteenth article of the treaty, French subjects were given liberty to remove themselves within one year; if they preferred to remain and become subjects of the British Crown, they were to enjoy the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion 'as far as the laws of Great Britain do allow the same.' The Acadians themselves did not wish to leave their farms and homesteads, nor did the English, when they took over Acadia, wish to lose the white settlers of the peninsula, who might reasonably be expected to become loyal and valuable citizens. The French authorities, on the other hand, desired to remove them in order to populate their own territories and deplete the ceded lands. Thus from the outset the intention of the treaty was frustrated, and the unfortunate Acadians suffered between two masters. As years went on, English and French views alike changed.

The French, having by priestly influence rendered the Acadians thoroughly disaffected to English rule, and having year by year stronger hope of recovering Acadia, wished the Acadians to remain where they were, a growing hostile population around a weak English garrison. The English, on the other hand, seeing the impossibility of securing the loyalty of the peasantry, wished to be rid of them, and in the end deported large numbers of them to other lands.

[Sidenote: _Annapolis neglected by the home Government._]

The main agents of mischief were on the one side French priests, political and religious fanatics, who threatened and cajoled their flocks; on the other the British Government, which left Acadia to take care of itself. It is deplorable to read the accounts given of Annapolis, as Port Royal was now called, and of the state of its garrison. What should have been the strong and thriving capital of a British province, remained for years nothing more than practically a very weak outpost in the enemy's country.

[Sidenote: _The Acadians and the oath of allegiance._]

A long time pa.s.sed in vainly attempting to make the {194} Acadians swear allegiance to the King of England. At length, in 1730, Governor Philipps reported that he had succeeded in persuading each adult member of the population to 'promise and solemnly swear on the faith of a Christian that I will be thoroughly faithful and will truly obey his Majesty George II'; but the adoption of this form of words had little effect on the minds or the conduct of the French settlers.

Strength to insist on loyalty and to punish traitorous dealing was not supplied from home; the Governors were unable to enforce their proclamations, and the governed were irritated by orders which were not carried into effect. Meanwhile, from 1720 onwards, Louisbourg grew up in artificial strength, the Dunkirk of America, the most powerful fortress on the Atlantic coast. Money and soldiers came out from France, while the British possession almost under the guns of the fortress was starved and neglected. To reconquer Acadia for the French, writes the eye-witness of the siege of Louisbourg in 1745, 'it was only necessary to appear before this English colony ... and to land a few men'; and yet in 1745 Acadia had been in British keeping for thirty-five years.

[Sidenote: _The Abenaki Indians._]

On the mainland, French policy was the same as in the Acadian peninsula, nominally to keep the peace, secretly to incite the natives to war. For generations the Abenaki Indians had raided at frequent intervals the New England frontier; yet fear and the necessities of trade might at length have kept them quiet, had it not been for the instigation of the Canadian Government and its priestly agents. In 1713, and again in 1717, Abenaki chiefs had come to terms with Ma.s.sachusetts; but there could be no peace as long as the savages were carefully instructed that the English were the enemies of their religion and the robbers of their lands. The savages were in truth in a hard case. Peace meant the aggressive growth of the white men's settlements, inevitable encroachment on the red men's heritage.

War {195} meant cutting off the New England trade, and inadequate support from France. They sent to Quebec to ask what aid they might expect from Canada. 'I will send you in secret,' said the Governor Vaudreuil, 'tomahawks, powder, and shot.' It was such a reply as the English Governors of New York had been wont to give to the Iroquois; and the Abenakis, like the Iroquois, were little satisfied with it.

To fight the battles of France while the French looked on, was not what the Indians wished or understood. Yet their priests taught them to do it, and the Canadian Government stiffened their resolution by sending in mission Indians from Canada.

[Sidenote: _Sebastian Rasle._]

[Sidenote: _His mission destroyed and himself killed._]

[Sidenote: _Peace between the Indians and New Englanders._]

The foremost French emissary among the Abenaki Indians at this time was a Jesuit priest, Sebastian Rasle, keen in controversy, uncompromising in zeal, a bitter foe of the English, but not so utterly inhuman as were some of his colleagues. His mission was among the Norridgewocks, high up on the Kennebec river, where the head waters of that river flowing down to the Atlantic are at no very great distance from the Chaudiere river which runs into the St.

Lawrence. Against this place, in August, 1724, a strong body of men was sent from Ma.s.sachusetts. They rowed up the Kennebec in whaleboats, and, landing at some distance below the Indian village, marched on it, and took it by surprise. Rasle was shot dead, the Indians were killed or dispersed, their homes were burnt to the ground; and the expedition returned in safety, having struck a strong and relentless blow at a centre of French and Indian hostility to the English colonists. War went on for some little time longer, and the English raided the tribes of the Pen.o.bscot. At length, in 1726, the Indians came to terms; and a peace was concluded which lasted for many years, depots being established at various points, where the natives could to their advantage barter furs with the traders of New England.

[Sidenote: _The Indians were the tools of the French Government and its agents._]

The princ.i.p.al point to notice in the dreary record of {196} murder and pillage is the att.i.tude of the Canadian Government and their superiors in France. Letters were intercepted, proving beyond dispute that the Indians were acting under the direct encouragement of the French authorities. In time of peace and nominal friends.h.i.+p the old struggle was ever going on. North America was a chessboard. On the French side the Indians were in front, p.a.w.ns in the game. Behind them was the King temporarily in check, bishops or their representatives, half-breed knights of tortuous movement, and the castles of Louisbourg and Quebec.

[Sidenote: _Oswego._]

[Sidenote: _Fort Rouille or Toronto._]

The mouth of the Niagara river had long been held in intermittent fas.h.i.+on by the French, and by 1720, in spite of jealous opposition on the part of the Five Nation Indians, a permanent fort was built there. The English in their turn, in the year 1727, established and garrisoned a trading fort at Oswego, on the southern sh.o.r.e of Lake Ontario,[3] Burnet, the Governor of New York, finding the necessary funds, as the colonial Legislature would not vote the money. The establishment of this station was a serious blow to French trade, nullifying to a large extent the advantage of holding Niagara. In vain the Canadians tried to incite the Five Nations to destroy it; and in vain, in 1749, they planted a rival post, Fort Rouille, at Toronto,[4] on the other side of the lake, to command the direct route to Lake Huron by Lake Simcoe. To Oswego the Indians brought their furs, and the traffic enriched the Iroquois and their English neighbours in New York.

[Footnote 3: See the letter from Governor Burnet to the Board of Trade, dated New York, May 9, 1727: 'I have this spring sent up workmen to build a stone house of strength at a place called Oswego, at the mouth of the Onnondage river, where our princ.i.p.al trade with the far Nations is carried on. I have obtained the consent of the Six Nations to build it.' Papers relating to Oswego in O'Callaghan's _Doc.u.mentary History of New York_, vol. i, p. 447.]