On the Genesis of Species Part 16

The above extract has, however, such a theistic aspect that some readers may think the opposition here offered superfluous; it may be well, therefore, to quote two other sentences. In another place he observes,[249]

"Pa.s.sing over the consideration of credibility, and confining ourselves to that of conceivability, we see that atheism, pantheism, and theism, when rigorously a.n.a.lysed, severally prove to be absolutely unthinkable;" and speaking of "every form of religion," he adds,[250] "The a.n.a.lysis of every possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient but that no hypothesis is even thinkable." The unknowable is admitted to be a power which cannot be regarded as having sympathy with us, but as one to which no emotion whatever can be ascribed, and we are expressly {247} forbidden "by _duty_," to affirm personality of G.o.d as much as to deny it of Him. How such a being can be presented as an object on which to exercise religious emotion it is difficult indeed to understand.[251] Aspiration, love, devotion to be poured forth upon what we can never know, upon what we can never affirm to know, or care for, us, our thoughts or actions, or to possess the attributes of wisdom and goodness! The wors.h.i.+p offered in such a religion must be, as Professor Huxley says,[252] "for the most part of the silent sort"--silent not only as to the spoken word, but silent as to the mental conception also. It will be difficult to distinguish the follower of this religion from the follower of none, and the man who declines either to a.s.sert or to deny the existence of G.o.d, is practically in the position of an atheist. For theism enjoins the cultivation of sentiments of love and devotion to G.o.d, and the practice of their external expression. Atheism forbids both, while the simply non-theist abstains in conformity with the prohibition of the atheist and thus practically sides with him. Moreover, since man cannot imagine that of which he has no experience in any way whatever, and since he has experience only of _human_ perfections and of the powers and properties of _inferior_ existences; if he be required to deny human perfections and to abstain from making use of such conceptions, he is thereby necessarily reduced to others of an inferior order. Mr. H. Spencer says,[253] "Those who espouse this {248} alternative position, make the erroneous a.s.sumption that the choice is between personality and something lower than personality; whereas the choice is rather between personality and something higher. Is it not just possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending intelligence and will, as these transcend mechanical motion?"

"It is true we are totally unable to conceive any such higher mode of being. But this is not a reason for questioning its existence; it is rather the reverse." "May we not therefore rightly refrain from a.s.signing to the 'ultimate cause' any attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not elevations but degradations?" The way however to arrive at the object aimed at (_i.e_. to obtain the best attainable conception of the First Cause) is not to refrain from _the only conceptions possible to us_, but to seek the very highest of these, and then declare their utter inadequacy; and this is precisely the course which has been pursued by theologians. It is to be regretted that before writing on this matter Mr. Spencer did not more thoroughly acquaint himself with the ordinary doctrine on the subject. It is always taught in the Church schools of divinity, that nothing, not even _existence_, is to be predicated _univocally_ of "G.o.d" and "creatures;"

that after exhausting ingenuity to arrive at the loftiest possible conceptions, we must declare them to be _utterly inadequate_; that, after all, they are but accommodations to human infirmity; that they are in a sense objectively false (because of their inadequacy), though subjectively and very practically true. But the difference between this mode of treatment and that adopted by Mr. Spencer is wide indeed; for the practical result of the mode inculcated by the Church is that each one may freely affirm and act upon the highest human conceptions he can attain of the{249} power, wisdom, and goodness of G.o.d, His watchful care, His loving providence for every man, at every moment and in every need; for the Christian knows that the falseness of his conceptions lies only in their _inadequacy_; he may therefore strengthen and refresh himself, may rejoice and revel in conceptions of the goodness of G.o.d, drawn from the tenderest human images of fatherly care and love, or he may chasten and abase himself by consideration of the awful holiness and unapproachable majesty of the Divinity derived from a.n.a.logous sources, knowing that no thought of man can ever be _true enough_, can ever attain the incomprehensible reality, which nevertheless really _is_ all that can be conceived, _plus_ an inconceivable infinity beyond.

A good ill.u.s.tration of what is here meant, and of the difference between the theistic position and Mr. Spencer's, may be supplied by an example he has himself proposed. Thus,[254] he imagines an intelligent watch speculating as to its maker, and conceiving of him in terms of watch-being, and figuring him as furnished with springs, escapements, cogged wheels, &c., his motions facilitated by oil--in a word, like himself. It is a.s.sumed by Mr. Spencer that this necessary watch conception would be completely false, and the ill.u.s.tration is made use of to show "the presumption of theologians"--the absurdity and unreasonableness of those men who figure the incomprehensible cause of all phenomena as a Being in some way comparable with man. Now, putting aside for the moment all other considerations, and accepting the ill.u.s.tration, surely the example demonstrates rather the unreasonableness of the _objector himself_! It is true, indeed, that a man is an organism indefinitely more complex and perfect than any watch; but if the watch could only conceive of its maker in watch terms, or else in terms altogether inferior, the watch would plainly be right in speaking of its maker as a, to it, inconceivably {250} perfect kind of watch, acknowledging at the same time, that this, its conception of him, was _utterly inadequate_, although the best its inferior nature allowed it to form. For if, instead of so conceiving of its maker, it refused to make use of these relative perfections as a makes.h.i.+ft, and so necessarily thought of him as amorphous metal, or mere oil, or by the help of any other inferior conception which a watch might be imagined capable of entertaining, that watch would he wrong indeed. For man can much more properly be compared with, and has much more affinity to, a perfect watch in full activity than to a mere piece of metal, or drop of oil. But the watch is even more in the right still, for its maker, man, virtually _has_ the cogged wheels, springs, escapements, oil, &c., which the watch's conception has been supposed to attribute to him; inasmuch as all these parts must have existed as distinct ideas in the human watchmaker's mind before he could actually construct the clock formed by him. Nor is even this all, for, by the hypothesis, the watch _thinks_. It must, therefore, think of its maker as "a thinking being," and in this it is _absolutely and completely right_.[255] Either, therefore, the hypothesis is _absurd_ or it actually _demonstrates the very position it was chosen to refute_.

Unquestionably, then, on the mere ground taken by Mr. Herbert Spencer himself, if we are compelled to think of the First Cause either in human terms (but with human imperfections abstracted and human perfections carried to the highest conceivable degree), or, on the other hand, in terms decidedly inferior, such as those are driven to who think of Him, but decline to accept as a help the term "personality;" there can be no question but that the first conception is immeasurably nearer the truth than the second. Yet the latter is the one put forward and advocated by that author in spite of its unreasonableness, and in spite also of its{251} conflicting with the whole moral nature of man and all his n.o.blest aspirations.

Again, Mr. Herbert Spencer objects to the conception of G.o.d as "first cause," on the ground that "when our symbolic conceptions are such that no c.u.mulative or indirect processes of thought can enable us to ascertain that there are corresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made whose fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether vicious and illusive, and in no way distinguishable from pure fictions."[256]

Now, it is quite true that "symbolic conceptions," which are not to be justified either (1) by presentations of sense, or (2) by intuitions, are invalid as representations of real truth. Yet the conception of G.o.d referred to _is_ justified by our primary intuitions, and we can a.s.sure ourselves that it _does_ stand for an actuality by comparing it with (1) our intuitions of free-will and causation, and (2) our intuitions of morality and responsibility. That we _have_ these intuitions is a point on which the Author joins issue with Mr. Spencer, and confidently affirms that they cannot logically be denied without at the same time complete and absolute scepticism resulting from such denial--scepticism wherein vanishes any certainty as to the existence both of Mr. Spencer and his critic, and by which it is equally impossible to have a thought free from doubt, or to go so far as to affirm the existence of that very doubt or of the doubter who doubts it.

It may not be amiss here to protest against the intolerable a.s.sumption of a certain school, who are continually talking in lofty terms of "science,"

but who actually speak of primary religious conceptions as "unscientific,"

and habitually employ the word "science," when they should limit it by the prefix "physical." This is the more amazing as not a few of this school adopt the idealist philosophy, and affirm that "matter and force" are but names for certain "modes of consciousness." It might be expected of them at least to admit that opinions which repose on primary and fundamental {252} intuitions, are especially and _par excellence_ scientific.

Such are some of the objections to the Christian conception of G.o.d. We may now turn to those which are directed against G.o.d as the Creator, _i.e._ as the absolute originator of the universe, without the employment of any pre-existing means or material. This is again considered by Mr. Spencer as a thoroughly illegitimate symbolic conception, as much so as the atheistic one--the difficulty as to a _self-existent Creator_ being in his opinion equal to that of a _self-existent universe_. To this it may be replied that both are of course equally _unimaginable_, but that it is not a question of facility of conception--not which is easiest to conceive, but which best accounts for, and accords with, psychological facts; namely, with the above-mentioned intuitions. It is contended that _we have_ these primary intuitions, and that with these the conception of a self-existent Creator is perfectly harmonious. On the other hand, the notion of a self-existent universe--that there is no real distinction between the finite and the infinite--that the universe and ourselves are one and the same things with the infinite and the self-existent; these a.s.sertions, in _addition to_ being unimaginable, _contradict_ our primary intuitions.

Mr. Darwin's objections to "Creation" are of quite a different kind, and, before entering upon them, it will be well to endeavour clearly to understand what we mean by "Creation," in the various senses in which the term may be used.

In the strictest and highest sense "Creation" is the absolute origination of anything by G.o.d without pre-existing means or material, and is a _supernatural_ act.[257]

In the secondary and lower sense, "Creation" is the formation of anything by G.o.d _derivatively_; that is, that the preceding matter has been created with the potentiality to evolve from it, under suitable conditions, {253} all the various forms it subsequently a.s.sumes. And this power having been conferred by G.o.d in the first instance, and those laws and powers having been inst.i.tuted by Him, through the action of which the suitable conditions are supplied, He is said in this lower sense to create such various subsequent forms. This is the _natural_ action of G.o.d in the physical world, as distinguished from His direct, or, as it may be here called, supernatural action.

In yet a third sense, the word "Creation" may be more or less improperly applied to the construction of any complex formation or state by a voluntary self-conscious being who makes use of the powers and laws which G.o.d has imposed, as when a man is spoken of as the creator of a museum, or of "his own fortune," &c. Such action of a created conscious intelligence is purely natural, but more than physical, and may be conveniently spoken of as hyperphysical.

We have thus (1) direct or supernatural action; (2) physical action; and (3) hyperphysical action---the two latter both belonging to the order of nature.[258] Neither the physical nor the hyperphysical actions, however, exclude the idea of the Divine concurrence, and with every consistent theist that idea is necessarily included. Dr. Asa Gray has given expression to this.[259] He says, "Agreeing that plants and animals were produced by Omnipotent fiat, does not exclude the idea of natural order and what we call secondary causes. The record of the fiat--'Let the earth bring forth gra.s.s, the herb yielding seed,' &c., 'let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind'--seems even to imply them," and leads to the conclusion that the various kinds were produced through natural agencies.

{254} Now, much confusion has arisen from not keeping clearly in view this distinction between _absolute_ creation and _derivative_ creation. With the first, physical science has plainly nothing whatever to do, and is impotent to prove or to refute it. The second is also safe from any attack on the part of physical science, for it is primarily derived from psychical not physical phenomena. The greater part of the apparent force possessed by objectors to creation, like Mr. Darwin, lies in their treating the a.s.sertion of derivative creation as if it was an a.s.sertion of absolute creation, or at least of supernatural action. Thus, he asks whether some of his opponents believe "that at innumerable periods in the earth's history, certain elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash into living tissues."[260] Certain of Mr. Darwin's objections, however, are not physical, but _metaphysical_, and really attack the dogma of secondary or derivative creation, though to some perhaps they may appear to be directed against absolute creation only.

Thus he uses, as an ill.u.s.tration, the conception of a man who builds an edifice from fragments of rock at the base of a precipice, by selecting for the construction of the various parts of the building the pieces which are the most suitable owing to the shape they happen to have broken into.

Afterwards, alluding to this ill.u.s.tration, he says,[261] "The shape of the fragments of stone at the base of our precipice may be called accidental, but this is not strictly correct, for the shape of each depends on a long sequence of events, all obeying natural laws, on the nature of the rock, on the lines of stratification or cleavage, on the form of the mountain which depends on its upheaval and subsequent denudation, and lastly, on the storm and earthquake which threw down the fragments. But in regard to the use to which the fragments may be put, their shape may strictly be said to be{255} accidental. And here we are led to face a great difficulty, in alluding to which I am aware that I am travelling beyond my proper province."

"An omniscient Creator must have foreseen every consequence which results from the laws imposed by Him; but can it be reasonably maintained that the Creator intentionally ordered, if we use the words in any ordinary sense, that certain fragments of rock should a.s.sume certain shapes, so that the builder might erect his edifice? If the various laws which have determined the shape of each fragment were not predetermined for the builder's sake, can it with any greater probability be maintained that He specially ordained, for the sake of the breeder, each of the innumerable variations in our domestic animals and plants--many of these variations being of no service to man, and not beneficial, far more often injurious, to the creatures themselves? Did He ordain that the crop and tail-feathers of the pigeon should vary, in order that the fancier might make his grotesque pouter and fantail breeds? Did He cause the frame and mental qualities of the dog to vary, in order that a breed might be formed of indomitable ferocity, with jaws fitted to pin down the bull for man's brutal sport?

But, if we give up the principle in one case---if we do not admit that the variations of the primeval dog were intentionally guided, in order that the greyhound, for instance, that perfect image of symmetry and vigour, might be formed,--no shadow of reason can be a.s.signed for the belief that the variations, alike in nature, and the result of the same general laws, which have been the groundwork through Natural Selection of the formation of the most perfectly adapted animals in the world, man included, were intentionally and specially guided. However much we may wish it, we can hardly follow Professor Asa Gray in his belief that 'variation has been led along certain beneficial lines,' like a stream 'along definite and useful lines of irrigation.'"

"If we a.s.sume that each particular variation was from the beginning of{256} all time pre-ordained, the plasticity of the organization, which leads to many injurious deviations of structure, as well as that redundant power of reproduction which inevitably leads to a struggle for existence, and, as a consequence, to the Natural Selection and survival of the fittest, must appear to us superfluous laws of nature. On the other hand, an omnipotent and omniscient Creator ordains everything and foresees everything. Thus we are brought face to face with a difficulty as insoluble as is that of freewill and predestination."

Before proceeding to reply to this remarkable pa.s.sage, it may be well to remind some readers that belief in the existence of G.o.d, in His primary creation of the universe, and in His derivative creation of all kinds of being, inorganic and organic, do not repose upon physical phenomena, but, as has been said, on primary intuitions. To deny or ridicule any of these beliefs on physical grounds is to commit the fallacy of _ignoratio elenchi_. It is to commit an absurdity a.n.a.logous to that of saying a blind child could not recognize his father because he could not _see_ him, forgetting that he could _hear_ and _feel_ him. Yet there are some who appear to find it unreasonable and absurd that men should regard phenomena in a light not furnished by or deducible from the very phenomena themselves, although the men so regarding them avow that the light in which they do view them comes from quite another source. It is as if a man, A, coming into B's room and finding there a b.u.t.terfly, should insist that B had no right to believe that the b.u.t.terfly had not flown in at the open window, inasmuch as there was nothing about the room or insect to lead to any other belief; while B can well sustain his right so to believe, he having met C, who told him he brought in the chrysalis and, having seen the insect emerge, took away the skin.

By a similarly narrow and incomplete view the a.s.sertion that human conceptions, such as "the vertebrate idea," &c., are ideas in the mind of G.o.d, is sometimes ridiculed; as if the a.s.sertors either on the one {257} hand pretended to some prodigious acuteness of mind--a far-reaching genius not possessed by most naturalists--or, on the other hand, as if they detected in the very phenomena furnis.h.i.+ng such special conception evidences of Divine imaginings. But let the idea of G.o.d, according to the highest conceptions of Christianity, be once accepted, and then it becomes simply a truism to say that the mind of the Deity contains all that is _good_ and _positive_ in the mind of man, _plus_, of course, an absolutely inconceivable infinity beyond. That thus such human conceptions may, nay must, be a.s.serted to be at the same time ideas in the Divine mind also, as every real and separate individual that has been, is, or shall be, is present to the same mind. Nay, more, that such human conceptions are but faint and obscure adumbrations of corresponding ideas which exist in the mind of G.o.d in perfection and fulness.[262]

The theist, having arrived at his theistic convictions from quite other sources than a consideration of zoological or botanical phenomena, {258} returns to the consideration of such phenomena and views them in a theistic light without of course a.s.serting or implying that such light has been derived _from them_, or that there is an obligation of reason so to view them on the part of others who refuse to enter upon or to accept those other sources whence have been derived the theistic convictions of the theist.

But Mr. Darwin is not guilty of arguing against metaphysical ideas on physical grounds only, for he employs very distinctly metaphysical ones; namely, his conceptions of the nature and attributes of the First Cause.

But what conceptions does he offer us? Nothing but that low anthropomorphism which, unfortunately, he so often seems to treat as the necessary result of Theism. It is again the dummy, helpless and deformed, set up merely for the purpose of being knocked down.

It must once more be insisted on, that though man is indeed compelled to conceive of G.o.d in human terms, and to speak of Him by epithets objectively false, from their hopeless inadequacy, yet nevertheless the Christian thinker declares that inadequacy in the strongest manner, and vehemently rejects from his idea of G.o.d all terms distinctly implying infirmity or limitation.

Now, Mr. Darwin speaks as if all who believe in the Almighty were compelled to accept as really applicable to the Deity conceptions which affirm limits and imperfections. Thus he says: "Can it be reasonably maintained that the Creator intentionally ordered" "that certain fragments of rock should a.s.sume certain shapes, so that the builder might erect his edifice?"

Why, surely every theist must maintain that in the first foundation of the universe--the primary and absolute creation--G.o.d saw and knew every purpose which every atom and particle of matter should ever subserve in all suns and systems, and throughout all coming aeons of time. It is almost incredible, but nevertheless it seems necessary to think that the difficulty thus proposed rests on a sort of notion that amidst the boundless profusion of nature there is too much for G.o.d to superintend; that the number of objects is too great for an infinite and {259} _omnipresent_ being to attend singly to each and all in their due proportions and needs! In the same way Mr. Darwin asks whether G.o.d can have ordered the race variations referred to in the pa.s.sage last quoted, for the considerations therein mentioned. To this it may be at once replied that even man often has _several_ distinct intentions and motives for a _single_ action, and the theist has no difficulty in supposing that, out of an infinite number of motives, the motive mentioned in each case may have been an exceedingly subordinate one. The theist, though properly attributing to G.o.d what, for want of a better term, he calls "purpose" and "design," yet affirms that the limitations of human purposes and motives are by no means applicable to the Divine "purposes." Out of many, say a thousand million, reasons for the inst.i.tution of the laws of the physical universe, some few are to a certain extent conceivable by us; and amongst these the benefits, material and moral, accruing from them to men, and to each individual man in every circ.u.mstance of his life, play a certain, perhaps a very subordinate, part.[263] As Baden Powell observes, "How can we {260} undertake to affirm, amid all the possibilities of things of which we confessedly know so little, that a thousand ends and purposes may not be answered, because we can trace none, or even imagine none, which seem to our short-sighted faculties to be answered in these particular arrangements?"[264]

The objection to the bull-dog's ferocity in connexion with "man's brutal sport" opens up the familiar but vast question of the existence of evil, a problem the discussion of which would be out of place here. Considering, however, the very great stress which is laid in the present day on the subject of animal suffering by so many amiable and excellent people, one or two remarks on that matter may not be superfluous. To those who accept the belief in G.o.d, the soul and moral responsibility; and recognize the full results of that acceptance--to such, physical suffering and moral evil are simply incommensurable. To them the placing of non-moral beings in the same scale with moral agents will be utterly unendurable. But even considering physical pain only, all must admit that this depends greatly on the mental condition of the sufferer. Only during consciousness does it exist, and only in the most highly-organized men does it reach its acme. The Author has been a.s.sured that lower races of men appear less keenly sensitive to physical pain than do more cultivated and refined human beings. Thus only in man can there really be any intense degree of suffering, because only in him is there that intellectual recollection of past moments and that antic.i.p.ation of future ones, which const.i.tute in great part the bitterness of suffering.[265] The momentary pang, the present pain, which beasts endure, though real enough, is yet, doubtless, not to be compared as {261} to its intensity with the suffering which is produced in man through his high prerogative of self-consciousness.[266]

As to the "beneficial lines" (of Dr. Asa Gray, before referred to), some of the facts noticed in the preceding chapters seem to point very decidedly in that direction, but all must admit that the actual existing outcome is far more "beneficial" than the reverse. The natural universe has resulted in the development of an unmistakable harmony and beauty, and in a decided preponderance of good and of happiness over their opposites.

Even if "laws of nature" did appear, on the theistic hypothesis, to be "superfluous" (which it is by no means intended here to admit), it would be nothing less than puerile to prefer rejecting the hypothesis to conceiving that the appearance of superfluity was probably due to human ignorance; and this especially might be expected from naturalists to whom the interdependence of nature and the harmony and utility of obscure phenomena are becoming continually more clear, as, _e.g._, the structure of orchids to their ill.u.s.trious expositor.

Having now cleared the ground somewhat, we may turn to the question what bearing Christian dogma has upon evolution, and whether Christians, as such, need take up any definite att.i.tude concerning it.

As has been said, it is plain that physical science and "evolution" _can_ have nothing whatever to do with absolute or primary creation. The Rev.

Baden Powell well expresses this, saying: "Science demonstrates incessant past changes, and dimly points to yet earlier links in a more vast series of development of material existence; but the idea of a _beginning_, or of _creation_, in the sense of the original operation of the Divine volition to const.i.tute nature and matter, is beyond the province of physical {262} philosophy."[267]

With secondary or derivative creation, physical science is also incapable of conflict; for the objections drawn by some writers seemingly from physical science, are, as has been already argued, rather metaphysical than physical.

Derivative creation is not a supernatural act, but is simply the Divine action by and through natural laws. To recognize such action in such laws is a religious mode of regarding phenomena, which a consistent theist must necessarily accept, and which an atheistic believer must similarly reject.

But this conception, if deemed superfluous by any naturalist, can never be shown to be _false_ by any investigations concerning natural laws, the constant action of which it presupposes.

The conflict has arisen through a misunderstanding. Some have supposed that by "creation" was necessarily meant either primary, that is, absolute creation, or, at least, some supernatural action; they have therefore opposed the dogma of "creation" in the imagined interest of physical science.

Others have supposed that by "evolution" was necessarily meant a denial of Divine action, a negation of the providence of G.o.d. They have therefore combated the theory of "evolution" in the imagined interest of religion.

It appears plain then that Christian thinkers are perfectly free to accept the general evolution theory. But are there any theological authorities to justify this view of the matter?

Now, considering how extremely recent are these biological speculations, it might hardly be expected _a priori_ that writers of earlier ages should have given expression to doctrines harmonizing in any degree with such very modern views,[268] nevertheless such most certainly is the case, and {263} it would be easy to give numerous examples. It will be better, however, only to cite one or two authorities of weight. Now, perhaps no writer {264} of the earlier Christian ages could be quoted whose authority is more generally recognized than that of St. Augustin. The same may be said of the mediaeval period, for St. Thomas Aquinas; and, since the movement of Luther, Suarez may be taken as a writer widely venerated as an authority and one whose orthodoxy has never been questioned.

It must be borne in mind that for a considerable time after even the last of these writers no one had disputed the generally received view as to the small age of the world or at least of the kinds of animals and plants inhabiting it. It becomes therefore much more striking if views formed under such a condition of opinion are found to harmonize with modern ideas regarding "Creation" and organic life.

Now St. Augustin insists in a very remarkable manner on the merely derivative sense in which G.o.d's creation of organic forms is to be understood; that is, that G.o.d created them by conferring on the material world the power to evolve them under suitable conditions. He says in his book on Genesis:[269] "Terrestria animalia, tanquam ex ultimo elemento mundi ultima; nihilominus _potentialiter_, quorum numeros tempus postea visibiliter explicaret."

Again he says:--

"Sicut autem in ipso grano invisibiliter erant omnia simul, quae per tempora in arborem surgerent; ita ipse mundus cogitandus est, c.u.m Deus _simul omnia creavit_, habuisse simul omnia quae in illo et c.u.m illo facta sunt quando factus est dies; non solum coelum c.u.m sole et luna et sideribus ... ; sed etiam illa quae aqua et terra produxit potentialiter atque causaliter, priusquam per temporum moras ita exorirentur, quomodo n.o.bis jam nota sunt in eis operibus, quae Deus usque nunc operatur."[270]

"Omnium quippe rerum quae corporaliter visibiliterque nasc.u.n.tur, {265} occulta quaedam semina in istis corporeis mundi hujus elementis latent."[271]

And again: "Ista quippe originaliter ac primordialiter in quadam textura elementorum cuncta jam creata sunt; sed acceptis opportunitatibus prodeunt."[272]

St. Thomas Aquinas, as was said in the first chapter, quotes with approval the saying of St. Augustin that in the first inst.i.tution of nature we do not look for _Miracles_, but for the _laws of Nature_: "In prima inst.i.tutione naturae non quaeritur miraculum, sed quid natura rerum habeat, ut Augustinus dicit."[273]

Again, he quotes with approval St. Augustin's a.s.sertion that the kinds were created only derivatively, "_potentialiter tantum_."[274]

Also he says, "In prima autem rerum inst.i.tutione fuit principium activum verb.u.m Dei, quod de materia elementari produxit animalia, vel in actu vel _virtute_, secundum Aug. lib. 5 de Gen. ad lit. c. 5."[275]

Speaking of "kinds" (in scholastic phraseology "substantial forms") latent in matter, he says: "Quas quidam posuerunt non incipere per actionem naturae sed prius in materia exst.i.tisse, ponentes lat.i.tationem formarum. Et hoc accidit eis ex ignorantia materiae, quia nesciebant distinguere inter potentiam et actum. Quia enim formae praeexistunt eas simpliciter praeexistere."[276]

Also Cornelius a Lapide[277] contends that at least certain animals were not absolutely, but only derivatively created, saying of them, "Non fuerunt creata formaliter, sed potentialiter."