Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 Part 17

If the admiral hoist up a white flag at the mizen yard-arm or topmast-head, all the small frigates in his squadron are to come under his stern for orders.

Instruction XXII.[20] In case it should please G.o.d that any s.h.i.+ps of his majesty's fleet be lamed in fight, and yet be in no danger of sinking, nor encompa.s.sed by the enemy, the following s.h.i.+ps shall not stay, under pretence of succouring them, but shall follow their leaders, and endeavour to do what service they can against the enemy; leaving the succouring of the lame s.h.i.+ps to the sternmost of the fleet; being a.s.sured that nothing but beating the body of the enemy's fleet can effectually secure the lame s.h.i.+ps,

Nevertheless, if any s.h.i.+p or s.h.i.+ps shall be distressed or disabled, by loss of mast, shot under water, or the like, so that it is really in danger of sinking or taking; that or those s.h.i.+p or s.h.i.+ps thus distressed shall make a sign by the weft of his or their jack or ensign, and those next to them are strictly required to relieve them.

And if any s.h.i.+ps or squadron shall happen to be overcharged or distressed, the next squadron, or s.h.i.+ps, are immediately to make towards their relief and a.s.sistance.

And if any s.h.i.+p shall be necessitated to bear away from the enemy, to stop a leak, or mend what is amiss (which cannot otherwise be repaired), he is to put a pennant on the mizen peak, or ensign staff, whereby the rest of that s.h.i.+p's squadron may have notice what it is for.

If the admiral or any flags.h.i.+p should be so, then the s.h.i.+ps of the fleet, or of the respective squadrons, are to endeavour to get up as close into a line between him and the enemy as they can; having always an eye to defend him in case the enemy should come to annoy him in that condition.

And in case any flags.h.i.+p, or any other s.h.i.+p in the fleet, shall be forced to go out of the line, for stopping of leaks, or repairing of any other defect, then the next immediate s.h.i.+ps are forthwith to endeavour to close the line again, either by making or shortening sail, or by such other ways and means as they shall find most convenient for doing of it; and all the small craft shall come in to that s.h.i.+p's a.s.sistance, upon a signal made of her being disabled.

And if any of the chief flags.h.i.+ps, or other flags.h.i.+ps shall happen to be so much disabled as that they shall be unfit for present service, in such a case any chief flag officer may go on board any other s.h.i.+p of his own squadron, as he shall judge most convenient; and any other flag officer, in that case, may go on board any s.h.i.+p in his division.[21]

Instruction XXIII.[22] In case of fight, none of his majesty's s.h.i.+ps shall chase beyond sight of the admiral; and at night all chasing s.h.i.+ps are to return to the fleet.

Instruction XXIV.[23] If any engagement by day shall continue till night, and the admiral shall please to anchor, all the fleet are, upon a signal, to anchor, in as good, order as may be, which signal will be the same as in the 'Instructions for Sailing' _(vid._ Instr.

XVIII.); that is to say, the admiral fires two guns, a small distance one from another, &c.

And if the admiral please to retreat without anchoring, then he will fire four guns, one after another, so as the report may only be distinguished; and about three minutes after he will do the like with four guns more.[24]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The later _Admiralty MS._ is prefaced by the following _Observation_: 'There have happened several misfortunes and disputes for want of a sufficient number of signals to explain the general's pleasure, without which it is not to be avoided; and whereas it hath often happened for want of a ready putting forth and apprehending to what intent the signals are made, they are contracted into a shorter method so that no time might be lost. It is most certain that in all sea battles the flags or admiral-generals are equally concerned in any conflict, and no manner of knowledge can be gained how the rest of the battle goes till such time as it is past recovery. To prevent this let a person fitly qualified command the reserve, who shall by signals make known to the general in what condition or posture the other parts of the fleet are in, he having his station where the whole can best be discovered, and his signals, answering the general's, may also be discerned by the rest of the fleet.'

[2] The _Admiralty MS._ has this _Observation_: 'Unless you can outstretch their headmost s.h.i.+ps there is hazard in breaking through the enemy's line, and [it] commonly brings such disorders in the line of battle that it may be rather omitted unless an enemy press you near a lee sh.o.r.e. For if, according to this instruction, when you have got the wind you are to press the enemy, then those s.h.i.+ps which are on each side of them shall receive more than equal damages from each other's shot if near, and in case the enemy but observed the seventh instruction--that is, to tack with equal numbers with you--then is your fleet divided and not the enemy's.

[3] The _Admiralty MS._ here inserts an additional instruction, numbered 5, as follows: 'If in time of fight any flags.h.i.+p or squadron ahead of the fleet hath an opportunity of weathering any of the enemy's s.h.i.+ps, they shall put abroad the same signal the general makes them for tacking, which, if the general would have them go about, he will answer by giving the same again, otherwise they are to continue on the same line or station.'

_Observation_.--'For it may prove not convenient in some cases to break the line.'

[4] The _Admiralty MS._ adds, 'And as soon as they have the wind to observe what other signals the general makes; and in case they lose sight of the general, they are to endeavour to press the headmost s.h.i.+ps of the enemy all they can, or a.s.sist any of ours that are annoyed by them.' The whole makes Instruction VI. of the _Admiralty MS._ An _Observation_ is attached to the old instruction as follows:--'This signal was wanting in the battle fought 11th August, 1673. The fourth squadron followed this instruction and got the wind of the enemy about four in the afternoon, and kept the wind for want of another signal to bear down upon the enemy, as Monsieur d'Estrees alleged at the council of war the next day. For want of this the enemy left only five or six s.h.i.+ps to attend their motion, and pressed the other squadrons of ours to such a degree they were forced to give way.' _Cf._ note, p. 181.

[5] The _Admiralty MS._ makes of the three paragraphs of this instruction three separate instructions, numbered 7, 9, and 10, and inserts after the first paragraph a new instruction numbered 8, with an _Observation_ appended. It is as follows: _Additional Instruction, No.

VIII.:_ 'When any of his majesty's s.h.i.+ps that have gained the wind of the enemy, and that the general or admiral would have them bear down and come to a close fight, he will put abroad the same signal as for their tacking, and hoist and lower the same till it be discerned; at which, they that are to windward shall answer by bearing down upon the enemy.

_Observation_.--The same in the battle of Solebay, Sir Joseph Jordan got the wind and kept it for want of a signal or fires.h.i.+ps.' This _Observation_ appears to be intended as a continuation of the previous one, the new instruction supplies the missing signal there referred to.

[6] The _Admiralty MS._ has this _Observation_: 'The 28th May, '73, the battle fought in the Schooneveld, the rear-admiral of their fleet commanded by Bankart (? Adriaen Banckers) upon a signal from De Ruyter gave way for some time, and being immediately followed by Spragge and his division, it proved only a design to draw us to leeward, and that De Ruyter might have the advantage of weathering us. So that for any small number giving way it is not safe for the like number to go after them, but to press the others which still maintain the fight according to the article following.

[7] No.11 in the _Admiralty MS_. with the following _Observation_: 'In bearing down upon an enemy when you have the wind, or standing towards them and they towards you, if it is in your power to fall upon any part of their s.h.i.+ps, those to windward will be the most exposed; therefore you must use your utmost endeavour to ruin that part. The battle fought in _1666_, the headmost or winderly s.h.i.+ps were beaten in three hours and put to run before half the rest of the fleet were engaged. We suffered the like on the 4th of June, for Tromp and De Ruyter never bore down to engage the body of our fleet, but pressed the leading s.h.i.+ps where Spragge and his squadron had like to have been ruined.'

[8] _Admiralty MS._ No. 12.

[9] For 'headmost of the enemy's s.h.i.+ps' the _Admiralty MS_. has 'windmost s.h.i.+ps of the enemy's fleet, and endeavour all that can be to force them to leeward.' Also this _Observation_: 'It may happen that the headmost of their fleet may be the most leewardly, then in such case you are to follow this instruction, whereas before it was said to stand with the headmost s.h.i.+ps of the enemy.'

[10] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 13 and 14. It has the _Observation_: 'This ought to be for each squadron apart.'

[11] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 15 and l6. To the first paragraph, or No. 15, it has the _Observation_: 'It may happen that by the winds s.h.i.+fting there may be neither van nor rear; then in that case a signal for each squadron would be better understood, so that you are to follow the 14th and 15th of the "Sailing Instructions." For in the battle of August '73 the wind s.h.i.+fted and put the whole line out of order.'

[12] The _Admiralty MS_. here inserts a new article, No. 17: 'If the general would have those s.h.i.+ps to windward of the enemy to bear down through their line to join the body of the fleet, he will put abroad a white flag with a cross from corner to corner where it can best be discovered.'

[13] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 18 to 23.

[14] _Admiralty MS_. Nos, 18 to 23.

[15] _Admiralty MS_. adds: 'having regard to press the weathermost s.h.i.+ps and relieve such as are in distress.' It is worth noting that this important relaxation of strict line tactics practically embodies the idea of Rupert's Additional Instruction of 1666. _Supra_, p. 129.

[16] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 24 to 26.

[17] _Admiralty MS_. No. 27. It adds this _Observation_: 'When the fleet is to leeward of the enemy you to take care to put yourself in such a station as that you may (when any signal is given) without loss of time tack and stand in to the line. And when any part of the fleet or s.h.i.+ps wherein you are concerned are ordered to tack and gain the wind of the enemy, you are to make all the sail you can and keep up with the headmost s.h.i.+ps that first tack.'

[18] _Admiralty MS. 'Observation_: The reward of saving a friend to be equal to that of destroying an enemy.'

[19] _Admiralty MS._ Nos. 28 and 29.

[20] _Admiralty MS._ No. 30.

[21] The _Admiralty MS._ has the _Observation:_ 'in changing s.h.i.+ps be as careful as you can not to give the enemy any advantage or knowledge thereof by striking the flag. In case of the death of any flag officer, the flag to be continued aloft till the fight be over, notice to be given to the next commander-in-chief, and not to bear out of the line unless in very great danger. It hath been observed what very great encouragement the bare shooting of an admiral's flag gives the enemy, but this may be prevented by taking in all the flags before going to engage. It was the ruin of Spragge in the battle of August '73 by taking his flag in his boat, which gave the enemy an opportunity to discover his motion, when at the same [time] we saw three flags flying on board the main topmast-head of three s.h.i.+ps which Tromp had quitted.'

[22] _Admiralty MS._ No. 31.

[23] _Admiralty MS._ Nos. 32 and 33.

[24] The _Admiralty MS._ has the _Observation_: 'By reason that guns are not so well to be distinguished at the latter end of a battle from chose of the enemy, sky-rockets would be proper signals.' This appears to be the earliest recorded suggestion for the use of rockets for naval signalling.

II

MEDITERRANEAN ORDERS, 1678

INTRODUCTORY

In 1677 Narbrough had been sent for the second time as commander-in-chief to the Mediterranean, to deal with the Barbary corsairs. To enable him to operate more effectively against Tripoli, arrangements were on foot to establish a base for him at Malta, and meanwhile he had been using the Venetian port of Zante. It was at this time that Charles II, in a last effort to throw off the yoke of Louis XIV, had married his eldest niece, the Princess Mary, to the French king's arch-enemy William of Orange, and relations between France and England were at the highest tension. Preparations were set on foot in the British dockyards for equipping a 'grand fleet' of eighty sail; on February 15 was issued a new and enlarged commission to Narbrough making him 'admiral of his majesty's fleet in the Straits'; Sicily, which the French had occupied, was hurriedly evacuated; Duquesne, who commanded the Toulon squadron, was expecting to be attacked at any moment, and Colbert gave him strict orders to keep out of the British admiral's way.[1]

It will be seen that it was in virtue of his new commission, and in expectation of encountering a superior French force, that Narbrough issued his orders, and they may be profitably compared with those of Lord Sandwich on the eve of the Second Dutch War as the typical Fighting Instructions for a small British fleet. No collision however occurred; for Louis could not face the threatened coalition between Spain, Holland, and England, and was forced to a.s.sent to a general peace, which was signed at Nymwegen in the following September.

FOOTNOTE:

[1] Corbett, _England in the Mediterranean_, ii. 97-104. The official correspondence will be found in Mr. Tanner's _Calendar of the Pepys MSS._, vol. i., and in the _Lettres de Colbert_, vol. iii.

_SIR JOHN NARBROUGH_, 1678.

[+Egerton MSS. 2543, f. 839+.]