Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 Part 21

Art. XVIII.--[_Same as the remainder of Russell's XVII_.] When the admiral would have the s.h.i.+p that leads the van ... by the flags.h.i.+ps of the fleet.

Arts. XIX. to XXIII.--[_Same as Russell's XVIII. to XXII_.]

Art. XXIV.--[_Replacing Russell's XXIII. and XXVIII_.] No s.h.i.+p in the fleet shall leave his station upon any pretence whatsoever till he has acquainted his flag or the next flag officer to him with the condition of his s.h.i.+p and received his direction herein. But in case any s.h.i.+p shall do so, the next s.h.i.+ps are to close up the line.[3]

And if any commander shall be wanting in doing his duty, his flag or the next flag officer to him is immediately to send for the said, commander from his s.h.i.+p and appoint another in his room.[4]

Arts. XXV. to XXVII., XXIX. and x.x.x.--[_Same as Russell's_.]

Art. x.x.xI.--When the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle one astern of the other with a large wind, and if he would have those lead who are to lead with their starboard tacks aboard by a wind, he will hoist a red and white flag at the mizen peak and fire a gun; and if he would have those lead who are to lead with their larboard tacks aboard by a wind, he will hoist a Genoese flag at the same place and fire a gun; which is to be answered by the flags.h.i.+ps of the fleet.

Art. x.x.xII.--When the fleet is in the line of battle, the signals that are made by the admiral for any squadron or particular division are to be repeated by all the flags that are between the admiral and that squadron or division to whom the signal is made.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The modifications consist mainly in adding a gun to several of the flag signals, and enjoining the flags.h.i.+ps to repeat them.

[2] The undated admiralty copy (_post_ 1744) has 'flagstaves.'

[3] This manoeuvre was finely executed by Sir Clowdisley Shovell with the van squadron at the battle of Malaga.

[4] Burchett, the secretary of the navy, in his _Naval History_ censures Benbow for not having acted on this instruction in 1702 or rather on No. 28 of 1691.

PART VIII

ADDITIONAL FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

I. ADMIRAL VERNON, _circa_ 1740

II. LORD ANSON, _circa_ 1747

III. SIR EDWARD HAWKE, 1756

IV. ADMIRAL BOSCAWEN, 1759

V. SIR GEORGE RODNEY, 1782

VI. LORD HOOD, 1783

ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS

INTRODUCTORY

Although, as we have seen, the 'Fighting Instructions' of 1691 continued in force with no material alteration till the end of the next century, it must not be a.s.sumed that no advance in tactics was made. From time to time important changes were introduced, but instead of a fresh set of 'Fighting Instructions' being drawn up according to the earlier practice, the new ideas were embodied in what were called 'Additional Fighting Instructions.' They did not supersede the old standing form, but were intended to be read with and be subsidiary to it. It is to these 'Additional Instructions,' therefore, that we have to look for the progress of tactics during the eighteenth century. By one of those strange chances, however, which are the despair of historians in almost every branch and period of their subject, these Additional Instructions have almost entirely disappeared. Although it is known in the usual way--that is, from chance references in despatches and at courts-martial--that many such sets of Additional Instructions were issued, only one complete set actually in force is known to exist. They are those signed by Admiral Boscawen on April 27, 1759, in Gibraltar Bay, and are printed below.

After his capture of Louisbourg in the previous year, Boscawen had been chosen for the command of the Mediterranean fleet, charged with the important duty of preventing the Toulon squadron getting round to Brest, and so effecting the concentration which the French had planned as the essential feature of their desperate plan of invasion. He sailed with the reinforcement he was taking out on April 14, and must therefore have issued these orders so soon as he reached his station. There is every reason to believe, however, that he was not their author; that they were, in fact, a common form which had been settled by Lord Anson at the admiralty. In the shape in which they have come down to us they are a set of eighteen printed articles, to which have been added in ma.n.u.script two comparatively unimportant articles relating to captured chases and the call for lieutenants.

These may have been either mere 'expeditional' orders, as they were called, issued by Boscawen in virtue of his general authority as commander-in-chief on the station, or possibly recent official additions. More probably they were Boscawen's own, for, strictly speaking, they should not appear as 'Additional Fighting Instructions'

at all. From the series of signal books and other sources we know there already existed a special set of 'Chasing Instructions,' and yet another set in which officers' calls and the like were dealt with, and both of Boscawen's articles were subsequently incorporated into these sets. The printed articles to which Boscawen attached them were certainly not new. Either wholly or in part they had been used by Byng in 1756, for at his court-martial he referred to the 'First article of the Additional Fighting Instructions as given to the fleet by me at the beginning of the expedition,' and this article is identical with No. 1 of Boscawen's set.

How much older the articles were, or, indeed, whether any were issued before the Seven Years' War, has never yet been determined. From the illogical order in which they succeed one another it would appear that they were the result of a gradual development, during which one or more orders were added from time to time by the incorporation of 'expeditional' orders of various admirals, as experience suggested their desirability. Thus Article I. provides, in the case of the enemy being inferior in number, for our superfluous s.h.i.+ps to fall out of the line and form a reserve, but it is not till Article VIII. that we have a scientific rule laid down for the method in which the reserve is to employ itself. Still, whatever may have been the exact process by which these Additional Instructions grew up, evidence is in existence which enables us to trace the system to its source with exact.i.tude, and there is no room for doubt that it originated in certain expeditional orders issued by Admiral Vernon when he was in command of the expedition against the Spanish Main in 1739-40. Amongst the 'Mathews and Lestock' pamphlets is one sometimes attributed to Lestock himself, but perhaps more probably inspired by him. It is dedicated to the first lord of the admiralty, and ent.i.tled _A Narrative of the Proceedings of his majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean_, 1741-4, including, amongst other matter relating to Mathews's action, 'some signals greatly wanted on the late occasion.'

At p. 108 are some 'Additional signals made use of by our fleet in the West Indies,' meaning that of Admiral Vernon, which Lestock had recently left. These signals relate to sailing directions by day and by night, to 'seeing s.h.i.+ps in the night' and to 'engaging an enemy in the night,' and immediately following them are two 'Additional Instructions to be added to the Fighting Instructions.' The inference is that these two 'Additional Instructions' were something quite new and local, since they were used by Vernon and not by Mathews. They are given below, and will be found to correspond closely to Articles I. and III. of the set used by Boscawen in the next war. Since, therefore, in all the literature and proceedings relating to Mathews and Lestock there is no reference to any 'Additional Instructions,' we may conclude with fair safety that these two articles used by Vernon in the West Indies were the origin and germ of the new system.

Nor is it a mere matter of inference only, for it is confirmed by a direct statement by the author of the pamphlet. At p. 74 he has this interesting pa.s.sage which practically clears up the history of the whole matter. 'Men in the highest stations at sea will not deny but what our sailing and fighting instructions might be amended, and many added to them, which by every day's experience are found to be absolutely necessary. Though this truth is universally acknowledged and the necessity of the royal navy very urgent, yet since the inst.i.tution of these signals nothing has been added to them excepting the chasing signals, excellent in their kind, by the Right Honourable Sir J---- N----.[1] Not but that every admiral has authority to make any additions or give such signals to the captains under his command as he shall judge proper, which are only expeditional. Upon many emergencies our signals at this juncture [_i.e._ in the action before Toulon] proved to be very barren. There was no such signal in the book, expressing an order when the admiral would have the s.h.i.+ps to come to a closer engagement than when they begun. After what has been observed, it is unnecessary now to repeat the great necessity and occasion there was for it; and boats in many cases, besides their delay and hindrance, could not always perform that duty.

'Mr. V[ernon], that provident, great admiral, who never suffered any useful precaution to escape him, concerted some signals for so good a purpose, wisely foreseeing their use and necessity, giving them to the captains of the squadron under his command. And lest his vigilance should be some time or other surprised by an enemy, or the exigencies of his master's service should require him to attack or repulse by night, he appointed signals for the line of battle, engaging, chasing, leaving off chase, with many others altogether new, excellent and serviceable, which show his judgment, abilities, and zeal. The author takes the liberty to print them for the improvement of his brethren, who, if they take the pains to peruse them, will receive benefit and instruction.'

Here, then, we have indisputable evidence that the system which gave elasticity to the old rigid Fighting Instructions began with Admiral Vernon, who as a naval reformer is now only remembered as the inventor of grog. The high reputation he justly held as a seaman and commander amongst his contemporaries has long been buried under his undeserved failure at Cartagena; but trained in the flags.h.i.+ps of Rooke and Shovell, and afterwards as a captain under Sir John Norris in the Baltic, there was no one till the day of his death in 1757, at the age of 73, who held so high a place as a naval authority, and from no one was a pregnant tactical reform more likely to come. The Lestock pamphlet, moreover, makes it clear that through all the time of his service--the dead time of tactics as we regard it now--tacticians so far from slumbering had been striving to release themselves from the bonds in which the old instructions tied them.

This is confirmed by two ma.n.u.script authorities which have fortunately survived, and which give us a clear insight into the new system as it was actually set on foot. The first is a MS. copy of some Additional Instructions in the Admiralty Library. They are less full and clearly earlier than those used by Boscawen in 1759, and are bound up with a printed copy of the regular Fighting Instructions already referred to, which contain in ma.n.u.script the additions made by Mathews during his Mediterranean command.[2] In so far as they differ from Boscawen's they will be found below as notes to his set.

The second is a highly interesting MS. copy of a signal book dated 1756, in which the above instructions are referred to. It is in the United Service Inst.i.tution (_Register No._ 234). At the end it contains a memorandum of a new article by which Hawke modified the established method of attack, and for the first time introduced the principle of each s.h.i.+p steering for her opposite in the enemy's line. It is printed below, and as will be seen was to be subst.i.tuted for 'Articles V. and VI. of the Additional Fighting Instructions by Day' then in force, which correspond to Articles XV. and XVI. of Boscawen's set. It does not appear in the Boscawen set, and how soon it was regularly incorporated we do not know. No reference has been found to it till that by Rodney, in his despatch of April 1780 referred to below.

Of even higher interest for our purpose is another entry in the same place of an article also issued by Hawke for forming 'line of bearing.' Here again the older form of the Additional Fighting Instructions is referred to, and the new article is to be inserted after Article IV., which was for forming the line ahead or abreast. The important point however is that the new article is expressly attributed to Lord Anson. Now it is known that when Anson in April 1747 was cruising off Finisterre for De la Jonquiere he kept his fleet continually exercising 'in forming line and in manoeuvres of battle till then absolutely unknown.'[3]

The 'line of bearing' or 'quarter line' must have been one of these, and we therefore reach two important conclusions: (1) that this great tactical advance was introduced by Anson during the War of the Austrian Succession, and (2) that the older set of Additional Fighting Instructions was then in existence. Another improvement probably a.s.signable to this time was Article IV. (of Boscawen's set) for battle order in two separate lines. Articles V., VI., VII., for extended cruising formations certainly were then issued, for in his despatch after his defeat of De la Jonquiere Anson says: 'At daybreak I made the signal for the fleet to spread in a line abreast, each s.h.i.+p keeping at the distance of a mile from the other [Article V.] that there might not remain the least probability for the enemy to pa.s.s by us undiscovered.'[4]

Then we have the notable Article XVIII., not in the earlier sets, enjoining captains to pursue any s.h.i.+p they force out of the line, regardless of the contrary order contained in Article XXI. of the regular Fighting Instructions. We have seen the point discussed already in the anonymous commentary on the Duke of York's final instructions, and it remained a bone of contention till the end. Men like Sir Charles H. Knowles were as strongly in favour of immediately following a beaten adversary as the anonymous commentator was in favour of maintaining the line. Knowles's idea was that it was folly to check the ardour of a s.h.i.+p's company at the moment of victory, and he tells us he tried to persuade Howe to discard the old instruction when he was drawing up his new ones.[5]

As to the further tactical progress which the Boscawen instructions disclose, and which nearly all appear closely related to the events of the War of the Austrian Succession, when Anson was supreme, we may particularly note Article I., for equalising the lines and using superfluous s.h.i.+ps to form a reserve; Article III. for closer action; Article VIII. for the reserve to endeavour to 'Cross the T,' instead of doubling; and Articles IX. and X. for bringing a flying enemy to action.

With these internal inferences to corroborate the direct evidence of our doc.u.ments the conclusion is clear--that during the War of the Austrian Succession the new system initiated by Vernon was developed by Anson as a consequence of Mathews's miserable action off Toulon in 1744, and that its first fruits were gathered in the brilliant successes of Hawke and Anson himself in 1747.

Though no complete set later than those used by Boscawen is known to exist, we may be certain from various indications that they continued to be issued as affording a means of giving elasticity to tactics, and that they were constantly issued in changing form. Thus Rodney, in his report after the action off Martinique in April 1780, says, 'I made the signal for every s.h.i.+p to bear down and steer for her opposite in the enemy's line, agreeable to the twenty-first article of the Additional Instructions.' Again in a MS. signal book in the Admiralty Library, which was used in Rodney's great action of April 12, 1782, and drawn up by an officer who was present, a similar article is referred to. But there it appears as No. XVII. of the Additional Instructions, and its effect is given in a form which closely resembles the original article of Hawke:--'When in a line of battle ahead and to windward of the enemy, to alter the course to lead down to them; whereupon every s.h.i.+p is to steer for the s.h.i.+p of the enemy, which from the disposition of the two squadrons it may be her lot to engage, notwithstanding the signal for the line ahead will be kept flying.' It is clear, therefore, that between 1780 and 1782 Rodney or the admiralty had issued a new set of 'Additional Instructions.' The amended article was obviously designed to prevent a recurrence of the mistake that spoiled the action of 1780. In the same volume is a signal which carries the idea further. It has been entered subsequently to the rest, having been issued by Lord Hood for the detached squadron he commanded in March 1783. There is no reference to a corresponding instruction, but it is 'for s.h.i.+ps to steer for (independent of each other) and engage respectively the s.h.i.+ps opposed to them.' In Lord Howe's second signal book, issued in 1790,[6] the signal reappears in MS. as 'each s.h.i.+p of the fleet to steer for, independently of each other, and engage respectively the s.h.i.+p opposed in situation to them in the enemy's line.' And in this case there is a reference to an 'Additional Instruction, No. 8,' indicating that Hood, who had meanwhile become first sea lord, had incorporated his idea into the regular 'Additional Fighting Instructions.'

Take, again, the case of the manoeuvre of 'breaking the line' in line ahead. This was first practised after its long abandonment by a sudden inspiration in Rodney's action of April 12, 1782. In the MS. signal book as used by Rodney in that year there is no corresponding signal or instruction. But it does contain one by Hood which he must have added soon after the battle. It is as follows:--

'When fetching up with the enemy to leeward and on the contrary tack to break through their line and endeavour to cut off part of their van or rear.' It also contains another attributed to Admiral Pigot which he probably added at Hood's suggestion when he succeeded to the command in July 1782. It is for a particular s.h.i.+p 'to cut through the enemy's line of battle, and for all the other s.h.i.+ps to follow her in close order to support each other.' But in both cases there is no corresponding instruction, so that the new signals must have been based on 'expeditional' orders issued by Pigot and Hood. The same book has yet another additional signal 'for the leading s.h.i.+p to cut through the enemy's line of battle,' apparently the latest of the three, but not specifically attributed either to Pigot or Hood.

With the Additional Instructions used by Rodney the system culminated.

For officers with any real feeling for tactics its work was adequate.

The criticisms of Hood and Rodney on Graves's heart-breaking action off the Chesapeake in 1781 show this clearly enough. 'When the enemy's van was out,' wrote Hood, 'it was greatly extended beyond the centre and rear, and might have been attacked with the whole force of the British fleet.' And again, 'Had the centre gone to the support of the van and the signal for the line been hauled down ... the van of the enemy must have been cut to pieces and the rear division of the British fleet would have been opposed to ... the centre division.'

Here, besides the vital principle of concentration, we have a germ even of the idea of containing, and Rodney is equally emphatic. 'His mode of fighting I will never follow. He tells me that his line did not extend so far as the enemy's rear. I should have been sorry if it had, and a general battle ensued. It would have given the advantage they wished and brought their whole twenty-four s.h.i.+ps of the line against the English nineteen, whereas by watching his opportunity ... by contracting his own line he might have brought his nineteen against the enemy's fourteen or fifteen, and by a close action have disabled them before they could have received succour from the remainder.'[7]

Read with such remarks as these the latest Additional Fighting Instructions will reveal to us how ripe and sound a system of tactics had been reached. The idea of crus.h.i.+ng part of the enemy by concentration had replaced the primitive intention of crowding him into a confusion; a swift and vigorous attack had replaced the watchful defensive, and above all the true method of concentration had been established; for although a concentration on the van was still permissible in exceptional circ.u.mstances, the chief of the new articles are devoted to concentrating on the rear. Thus our tacticians had worked out the fundamental principles on which Nelson's system rested, even to breaking up the line into two divisions. 'Containing'

alone was not yet clearly enunciated, but by Hood's signals for breaking the line, the best method of effecting it was made possible. Everything indeed lay ready for the hands of Howe and Nelson to strike into life.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Admiral Sir John Norris had been commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean 1710-1, in the Baltic 1715-21 and 1727, in the Downs in 1734, and the Channel 1739 and following years. Professor Laughton tells me that Norris's papers and orders for 1720-1 contain no such signals.

He must therefore have issued them later.

[2] Catalogue, 252/24. The reason this interesting set has been overlooked is that the volume in which they are bound bears by error the label 'Sailing and Fighting Instructions for H.M. Fleet, 1670. Record Office Copy.' The Instructions of 1670 were of course quite different.