Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 Part 3

Galleys and s.h.i.+ps of the left wing:

The Anne Gallant.

The Unicorn.

The Falcon.

The Dragon.

The Sacre.

The Merlin.

The Rae.

The Reniger pinnace.

The Foyst.

Two boats of Rye.

= 11.

_The Fighting Instructions_.

_Item_. It is to be considered that the ranks must keep such order in sailing that none impeach another. Wherefore it is requisite that every of the said ranks keep right way with another, and take such regard to the observing of the same that no s.h.i.+p pa.s.s his fellows forward nor backward nor slack anything, but [keep] as they were in one line, and that there may be half a cable length between every of the s.h.i.+ps.

_Item_. The first rank shall make sail straight to the front of the battle and shall pa.s.s through them, and so shall make a short return to the midwards as they may, and they [are] to have a special regard to the course of the second rank; which two ranks is appointed to lay aboard the princ.i.p.al s.h.i.+ps of the enemy, every man choosing[3]

his mate as they may, reserving the admiral for my lord admiral.

_Item_. That every s.h.i.+p of the first rank shall bear a flag of St. George's cross upon the fore topmast for the s.p.a.ce of the fight, which upon the king's determination shall be on Monday, the 10th of August, _anno_ 1545.[4]

And every s.h.i.+p appointed to the middle rank shall for the s.p.a.ce of the fight bear a flag of St. George's cross upon her mainmast.

And every s.h.i.+p of the third rank shall bear a like flag upon his mizen[5] mast top, and every of the said wings shall have in their tops a flag of St. George.

_Item_. The victuallers shall follow the third rank and shall bear in their tops their flags. Also that neither of the said wings shall further enter into fight; but, having advantage as near anigh[6] as they can of the wind, shall give succour as they shall see occasion, and shall not give care to any of the small vessels to weaken our force. There be, besides the said s.h.i.+ps mentioned, to be joined to the foresaid battle fifty sail of western s.h.i.+ps, and whereof be seven great hulks of 888 ton apiece, and there is also the number of 1,200 of soldiers beside mariners in all the said s.h.i.+ps.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] A similar list of s.h.i.+ps is in a MS. in the Cambridge University Library.

[2] This paper gives the order of the wings and vanguard only. The fifty west-country s.h.i.+ps that were presumably to form the rearguard had not yet joined.

[3] MS. 'closing.'

[4] The fleets did not get contact till August 15.

[5] MS. 'messel.'

[6] MS. 'a snare a nye.' The pa.s.sage is clearly corrupt. Perhaps it should read 'neither of the said wings shall further enter into the fight but as nigh as they can keeping advantage of the wind [_i.e._ without losing the weather-gage of any part of the enemy's fleet] but shall give succour,' &c.

_LORD LISLE, No. 2._

[+Record Office, State Papers, Henry VIII.+]

_The Order for the said Fleet taken by the Lord Admiral the 10th day of August, 1545_.[1]

1. First, it is to be considered that every of the captains with the said s.h.i.+ps appointed by this order to the vanward, battle and wing shall ride at anchor according as they be appointed to sail by the said order; and no s.h.i.+p of any of the said wards or wing shall presume to come to an anchor before the admiral of the said ward.

2. _Item_, that every captain of the said wards or wing shall be in everything ordered by the admiral of the same.

3. _Item_, when we shall see a convenient time to fight with the enemies our vanward shall make with their vanward if they have any; and if they be in one company, our vanward, taking the advantage of the wind, shall set upon their foremost rank, bringing them out of order; and our vice-admiral shall seek to board their vice-admiral, and every captain shall choose his equal as near as he may.

4. _Item_, the admiral of the wing shall be always in the wind with his whole company; and when we shall join with the enemies he shall keep still the advantage of the wind, to the intent he with his company may the better beat off the galleys from the great s.h.i.+ps.[2]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The articles are preceded, like the first ones, by a list of s.h.i.+ps or 'battle order,' showing an organisation into a vanward, main body (battle), and one wing of oared craft. See Introductory Note, p. 19.

[2] Of the remaining seven articles, five relate to distinguis.h.i.+ng squadronal flags and lights as in the earlier instructions, and the last one to the Watchword of the night. It is to be 'G.o.d save King Henry,'

and the answer, 'And long to reign over us.'

PART II

ELIZABETHAN AND JACOBEAN

SIR WALTER RALEGH, 1617

THE ELIZABETHAN ORIGIN OF RALEGH'S INSTRUCTIONS

INTRODUCTORY

No fighting instructions known to have been issued in the reign of Elizabeth have been found, nor is there any indication that a regular order of battle was ever laid down by the seamen-admirals of her time.[1] Even Howard's great fleet of 1588 had twice been in action with the Armada before it was so much as organised into squadrons. If anything of the kind was introduced later in her reign Captain Nathaniel Boteler, who had served in the Jacobean navy and wrote on the subject early in the reign of Charles I, was ignorant of it. In his _Dialogues about Sea Services_, he devotes the sixth to 'Ordering of Fleets in Sailing, Chases, Boardings and Battles,' but although he suggests a battle order which we know was never put in practice, he is unable to give one that had been used by an English fleet.[2] It is not surprising. In the despatches of the Elizabethan admirals, though they have much to say on strategy, there is not a word of fleet-tactics, as we understand the thing. The domination of the seamen's idea of naval warfare, the increasing handiness of s.h.i.+ps, the improved design of their batteries, the special progress made by Englishmen in guns and gunnery led rapidly to the preference of broadside gunfire over boarding, and to an exaggeration of the value of individual mobility; and the old semi-military formations based on small-arm fighting were abandoned.

At the same time, although the seamen-admirals did not trouble or were not sufficiently advanced to devise a battle order to suit their new weapon, there are many indications that, consciously or unconsciously, they developed a tendency inherent in the broadside idea to fall in action into a rough line ahead; that is to say, the practice was usually to break up into groups as occasion dictated, and for each group to deliver its broadsides in succession on an exposed point of the enemy's formation. That the armed merchantmen conformed regularly to this idea is very improbable. The faint pictures we have of their well-meant efforts present them to us attacking in a loose throng and masking each other's fire. But that the queen's s.h.i.+ps did not attempt to observe any order is not so clear. When the combined fleet of Howard and Drake was first sighted by the Armada, it is said by two Spanish eye-witnesses to have been _in ala_, and 'in very fine order.' And the second of Adams's charts, upon which the famous House of Lords' tapestries were designed, actually represents the queen's s.h.i.+ps standing out of Plymouth in line ahead, and coming to the attack in a similar but already disordered formation. Still there can be no doubt that, however far a rudimentary form of line ahead was carried by the Elizabethans, it was a matter of minor tactics and not of a battle order, and was rather instinctive than the perfected result of a serious attempt to work out a tactical system. The only actual account of a fleet formation which we have is still on the old lines, and it was for review purposes only. Ubaldino, in his second narrative, which he says was inspired by Drake,[3] relates that when Drake put out of Plymouth to receive Howard 'he sallied from port to meet him with his thirty s.h.i.+ps in equal ranks, three s.h.i.+ps deep, making honourable display of his masterly and diligent handling, with the pinnaces and small craft thrown forward as though to reconnoitre the s.h.i.+ps that were approaching, which is their office.' Nothing, however, is more certain in the unhappily vague accounts of the 1588 campaign than that no such battle order as this was used in action against the Armada.

It is not till the close of the West Indian Expedition of 1596, when, after Hawkins and Drake were both dead, Colonel-General Sir Thomas Baskerville, the commander of the landing force, was left in charge of the retreating fleet, that we get any trace of a definite battle formation. In his action off the Isla de Pinos he seems, so far as we can read the obscure description, to have formed his fleet into two divisions abreast, each in line ahead. The queen's s.h.i.+ps are described at least as engaging in succession according to previous directions till all had had 'their course.' Henry Savile, whose intemperate and enthusiastic defence of his commander was printed by Hakluyt, further says: 'Our general was the foremost and so held his place until, by order of fight, other s.h.i.+ps were to have their turns according to his former direction, who wisely and politicly had so ordered his vanguard and rearward; and as the manner of it was altogether strange to the Spaniard, so might they have been without hope of victory, if their general had been a man of judgment in sea-fights.'

Here, then, if we may trust Savile, a definite battle order must have been laid down beforehand on the new lines, and it is possible that in the years which had elapsed since the Armada campaign the seamen had been giving serious attention to a tactical system, which the absence of naval actions prevented reaching any degree of development. Had the idea been Baskerville's own it is very unlikely that the veteran sea-captains on his council of war would have a.s.sented to its adoption. At any rate we may a.s.sert that the idea of s.h.i.+ps attacking in succession so as to support one another without masking each other's broadside fire (which is the essential germ of the true line ahead) was in the air, and it is clearly on the principle that underlay Baskerville's tactics that Ralegh's fighting instructions were based twenty years later.[4]

These which are the first instructions known to have been issued to an English fleet since Henry VIII's time were signed by Sir Walter Ralegh on May 3, 1617, at Plymouth, on the eve of his sailing for his ill-fated expedition to Guiana. Most of the articles are in the nature of 'Articles of War' and 'Sailing Instructions' rather than 'Fighting Instructions,' but the whole are printed below for their general interest. A contemporary writer, quoted by Edwards in his _Life of Ralegh_, says of them: 'There is no precedent of so G.o.dly, severe, and martial government, fit to be written and engraven in every man's soul that covets to do honour to his king and country in this or like attempts.' But this cannot be taken quite literally. So far at least as they relate to discipline, some of Ralegh's articles may be traced back in the _Black Book of the Admiralty_ to the fourteenth century, while the illogical arrangement of the whole points, as in the case of the Additional Fighting Instructions of the eighteenth century, to a gradual growth from precedent to precedent by the accretion of expeditional orders added from time to time by individual admirals. The process of formation may be well studied in Lord Wimbledon's first orders, where Ralegh's special expeditional additions will be found absorbed and adapted to the conditions of a larger fleet. Moreover, there is evidence that, with the exception of those articles which were designed in view of the special destination of Ralegh's voyage, the whole of them were based on an early Elizabethan precedent. For the history of English tactics the point is of considerable importance, especially in view of his twenty-ninth article, which lays down the method of attack when the weather-gage has been secured. This has. .h.i.therto been believed to be new and presumably Ralegh's own, in spite of the difficulty of believing that a man entirely without experience of fleet actions at sea could have hit upon so original and effective a tactical design. The evidence, however, that Ralegh borrowed it from an earlier set of orders is fairly clear.

Amongst the _Stowe MSS._ in the British Museum there is a small quarto treatise (No. 426) ent.i.tled 'Observations and overtures for a sea fight upon our own coasts, and what kind of order and discipline is fitted to be used in martialling and directing our navies against the preparations of such Spanish Armadas or others as shall at any time come to a.s.sail us.' From internal evidence and directly from another copy of it in the _Lansdown MSS._ (No. 213), we know it to be the work of 'William Gorges, gentleman.' He is to be identified as a son of Sir William Gorges, for he tells us he was afloat with his father in the Dreadnought as early as 1578, when Sir William was admiral on the Irish station with a squadron ordered to intercept the filibustering expedition which Sir Thomas Stucley was about to attempt under the auspices of Pope Gregory XIII. Sir William was a cousin of Ralegh's and brother to Sir Arthur Gorges, who was Ralegh's captain in the Azores expedition of 1597, and who in Ralegh's interest wrote the account of the campaign which Purchas printed. Though William, the son, freely quotes the experiences of the Armada campaign of 1588, he is not known to have ever held a naval command, and he calls himself 'unexperienced.' We may take it therefore that his treatise was mainly inspired by Ralegh, to whom indeed a large part of it is sometimes attributed. This question, however, is of small importance. The gist of the matter is a set of fleet orders which he has appended as a precedent at the end of his treatise, and it is on these orders that Ralegh's are clearly based. They commence with fourteen articles, consisting mainly of sailing instructions, similar to those which occur later in Ralegh's set. The fifteenth deals with fighting and bloodshed among the crews, and the sixteenth enjoins morning and evening prayer, with a psalm at setting the watch, and further provides that any man absenting himself from divine service without good cause shall suffer the 'bilboes,' with bread and water for twelve hours. The whole of this drastic provision for improving the seamen's morals has been struck out by a hurried and less clerkly hand, and in the margin is subst.i.tuted another article practically word for word the same as that which Ralegh adopted as his first article. The same hand has also erased the whole numbering of the articles up to No. 16, and has noted that the new article on prayers is to come first.[5]

The articles which follow correspond closely both in order and expression to Ralegh's, ending with No. 36, where Ralegh's special articles relating to landing in Guiana begin. Ralegh's important twenty-ninth article dealing with the method of attack is practically identical with that of Gorges. Ralegh, however, has several articles which are not in Gorges's set, and wherever the two sets are not word for word the same, Ralegh's is the fuller, having been to all appearances expanded from Gorges's precedent. This, coupled with the fact that other corrections beside those of the prayer article are embodied in Ralegh's articles, leaves practically no doubt that Gorges's set was the earlier and the precedent upon which Ralegh's was based.

An apparent difficulty in the date of Gorges's treatise need not detain us. It was dedicated on March 16, 1618-9, to Buckingham, the new lord high admiral, but it bears indication of having been written earlier, and in any case the date of the dedication is no guide to the date of the orders in the Appendix.

The important question is, how much earlier than Ralegh's are these orders of Gorges's treatise? Can we approximately fix their date?