The Fighting Governor Part 5

It has been pointed out already that when La Barre a.s.sumed office the problems arising from these two sources were more difficult than at any previous date; but the situation which was serious in 1682 and had become critical by 1685 grew desperate in the four years of Denonville's sway. The one {104} over-shadowing question of this period was the Iroquois peril, rendered more and more acute by the policy of the English.

The greatest mistake which Denonville made in his dealings with the Iroquois was to act deceitfully. The savages could be perfidious themselves, but they were not without a conception of honour and felt genuine respect for a white man whose word they could trust.

Denonville, who in his private life displayed many virtues, seemed to consider that he was justified in acting towards the savages as the exigency of the moment prompted. Apart from all considerations of morality this was bad judgment.

In his dealings with the English Denonville had little more success than in his dealings with the Indians. Dongan was a thorn in his side from the first, although their correspondence opened, on both sides, with the language of compliment. A few months later its tone changed, particularly after Dongan heard that Denonville intended to build a fort at Niagara. Against a project so unfriendly Dongan protested with emphasis. In reply Denonville disclaimed the intention, at the same time alleging that Dongan was giving shelter at Albany to French deserters. A {105} little later they reach the point of sarcasm.

Denonville taxes Dongan with selling rum to the Indians. Dongan retorts that at least English rum is less unwholesome than French brandy. Beneath these epistolary compliments there lies the broad fact that Dongan stood firm by his principle that the extension of French rule to the south of Lake Ontario should not be tolerated. He ridicules the basis of French pretensions, saying that Denonville might as well claim China because there are Jesuits at the Chinese court.

The French, he adds, have no more right to the country because its streams flow into Lake Ontario than they have to the lands of those who drink claret or brandy. It is clear that Dongan fretted under the restrictions which were imposed upon him by the friends.h.i.+p between England and France. He would have welcomed an order to support his arguments by force. Denonville, on his side, with like feelings, could not give up the claim to suzerainty over the land of the Iroquois.

The domain of the Five Nations was not the only part of America where French and English clashed. The presence of the English in Hudson Bay excited deep resentment at {106} Quebec and Montreal. Here Denonville ventured to break the peace as Dongan had not dared to do. With Denonville's consent and approval, a band of Canadians left Montreal in the spring of 1686, fell upon three of the English posts--Fort Hayes, Fort Rupert, Fort Albany--and with some bloodshed dispossessed their garrisons. Well satisfied with this exploit, Denonville in 1687 turned his attention to the chastis.e.m.e.nt of the Iroquois.

The forces which he brought together for this task were greatly superior to any that had been mustered in Canada before. Not only were they adequate in numbers, but they comprised an important band of coureurs de bois, headed by La Durantaye, Tonty, Du Lhut, and Nicolas Perrot--men who equalled the Indians in woodcraft and surpa.s.sed them in character. The epitaph of Denonville as a governor is written in the failure of this great expedition to accomplish its purpose.

The first blunder occurred at Fort Frontenac before mobilization had been completed. There were on the north sh.o.r.e of Lake Ontario two Iroquois villages, whose inhabitants had been in part baptized by the Sulpicians and {107} were on excellent terms with the garrison of the fort. In a moment of insane stupidity Denonville decided that the men of these settlements should be captured and sent to France as galley slaves. Through the ruse of a banquet they were brought together and easily seized. By dint of a little further effort two hundred Iroquois of all ages and both s.e.xes were collected at Fort Frontenac as prisoners--and some at least perished by torture. But, when executing this dastardly plot, Denonville did not succeed in catching all the friendly Iroquois who lived in the neighbourhood of his fort. Enough escaped to carry the authentic tale to the Five Nations, and after that there could be no peace till there had been revenge. Worst of all, the French stood convicted of treachery and falseness.

Having thus blighted his cause at the outset, Denonville proceeded with his more serious task of smiting the Iroquois in their own country.

Considering the extent and expense of his preparations, he should have planned a complete destruction of their power. Instead of this he attempted no more than an attack upon the Senecas, whose operations against the Illinois and in other quarters had made {108} them especially objectionable. The composite army of French and Indians a.s.sembled at Irondequoit Bay on July 12--a force brought together at infinite pains and under circ.u.mstances which might never occur again.

Marching southwards they fought a trivial battle with the Senecas, in which half a dozen on the French side were killed, while the Senecas are said to have lost about a hundred in killed and wounded. The rest of the tribe took to the woods. As a result of this easy victory the triumphant allies destroyed an Iroquois village and all the corn which it contained, but the political results of the expedition were worse than nothing. Denonville made no attempt to destroy the other nations of the confederacy. Returning to Lake Ontario he built a fort at Niagara, which he had promised Dongan he would not do, and then returned to Montreal. The net results of this portentous effort were a broken promise to the English, an act of perfidy towards the Iroquois, and an insignificant success in battle.

In 1688 Denonville's decision to abandon Fort Niagara slightly changed the situation. The garrison had suffered severe losses through illness and the post proved too remote for {109} successful defence. So this matter settled itself. The same season saw the recall of Dongan through the consolidation of New England, New York, and New Jersey under Sir Edmund Andros. But in essentials there was no change.

Andros continued Dongan's policy, of which, in fact, he himself had been the author. And, even though no longer threatened by the French from Niagara, the savages had reason enough to hate and distrust Denonville.

Yet despite these untoward circ.u.mstances all hope of peace between the French and the Five Nations had not been destroyed. The Iroquois loved their revenge and were willing to wait for it, but caution warned them that it would not be advantageous to destroy the French for the benefit of the English. Moreover, in the long course of their relations with the French they had, as already mentioned, formed a high opinion of men like Le Moyne and Lamberville, while they viewed with respect the exploits of Tonty, La Durantaye, and Du Lhut.

Moved by these considerations and a love of presents, Grangula, of the Onondagas, was in the midst of negotiations for peace with the French, which might have ended happily but {110} for the stratagem of the Huron chief Kondiaronk, called 'The Rat.' The remnant of Hurons and the other tribes centring at Michilimackinac did not desire a peace of the French and Iroquois which would not include themselves, for this would mean their own certain destruction. The Iroquois, freed of the French, would surely fall on the Hurons. All the Indians distrusted Denonville, and Kondiaronk suspected, with good reason, that the Hurons were about to be sacrificed. Denonville, however, had a.s.sured Kondiaronk that there was to be war to the death against the Iroquois, and on this understanding he went with a band of warriors to Fort Frontenac. There he learned that peace would be concluded between Onontio and the Onondagas--in other words, that the Iroquois would soon be free to attack the Hurons and their allies. To avert this threatened destruction of his own people, he set out with his warriors and lay in ambush for a party of Onondaga chiefs who were on their way to Montreal. Having killed one and captured almost all the rest, he announced to his Iroquois prisoners that he had received orders from Denonville to destroy them. When they explained that they were amba.s.sadors, he {111} feigned surprise and said he could no longer be an accomplice to the wickedness of the French. Then he released them all save one, in order that they might carry home this tale of Denonville's second treachery. The one Iroquois Kondiaronk retained on the plea that he wished to adopt him. Arrived at Michilimackinac, he handed over the captive to the French there, who, having heard nothing of the peace, promptly shot him. An Iroquois prisoner, whom Kondiaronk secretly released for the purpose, conveyed to the Five Nations word of this further atrocity.

The Iroquois prepared to deliver a hard blow. On August 5, 1689, they fell in overwhelming force upon the French settlement at Lachine.

Those who died by the tomahawk were the most fortunate. Charlevoix gives the number of victims at two hundred killed and one hundred and twenty taken prisoner. Girouard's examination of parish registers results in a lower estimate--namely, twenty-four killed at Lachine and forty-two at La Chesnaye, a short time afterwards. Whatever the number, it was the most dreadful catastrophe which the colony had yet suffered.

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Such were the events which, in seven years, had brought New France to the brink of ruin. But she was not to perish from the Iroquois. In October 1689 Frontenac returned to take Denonville's place.

[1] See _The Jesuit Missions_ in this Series, chap. vi.

[2] Grangula's speech is an example in part of Indian eloquence, and in part of the eloquence of Baron La Hontan, who contributes many striking pa.s.sages to our knowledge of Frontenac's period.

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CHAPTER VII

THE GREAT STRUGGLE

During the period which separates his two terms of office Frontenac's life is almost a blank. His relations with his wife seem to have been amicable, but they did not live together. His great friend was the Marechal de Bellefonds, from whom he received many favours of hospitality. In 1685 the king gave him a pension of thirty-five hundred livres, though without a.s.signing him any post of dignity.

Already a veteran, his record could hardly be called successful. His merits were known to the people of Canada; they believed him to be a tower of strength against the Iroquois. At Versailles the fact stood out most plainly that through infirmities of temper he had lost his post. His pension might save him from penury. It was far too small to give him real independence.

Had either La Barre or Denonville proved equal to the government of Canada, it is almost {114} certain that Frontenac would have ended his days ingloriously at Versailles, ascending the stairs of others with all the grief which is the portion of disappointed old age. Their failure was his opportunity, and from the dreary antechambers of a court he mounts to sudden glory as the saviour of New France.

There is some doubt, as we have seen, concerning the causes which gave Frontenac his appointment in 1672. At that time court favour may have operated on his behalf, or it may have seemed desirable that he should reside for a season out of France. But in 1689 graver considerations came into play. At the moment when the Iroquois were preparing to ravage Canada, the expulsion of James II from his throne had broken the peace between France and England. The government of New France was now no post for a court favourite. Louis XIV had expended much money and effort on the colony. Through the mismanagement of La Barre and Denonville everything appeared to be on the verge of ruin. It is inconceivable that Frontenac, then in his seventieth year, should have been renominated for any other cause than merit. Times and conditions had changed. The task now was not to work peaceably with bishop {115} and intendant, but to destroy the foe. Father Goyer, the Recollet who delivered Frontenac's funeral oration, states that the king said when renewing his commission: 'I send you back to Canada, where I expect you will serve me as well as you did before; I ask for nothing more.' This is a bit of too gorgeous rhetoric, which none the less conveys the truth. The king was not reappointing Frontenac because he was, on the whole, satisfied with what he had done before; he was reappointing him because during his former term of office and throughout his career he had displayed the qualities which were called for at the present crisis.

Thus Frontenac returned to Quebec in the autumn of 1689, just after the Iroquois ma.s.sacred the people of Lachine and just before they descended upon those of La Chesnaye. The universal mood was one of terror and despair. If ever Canada needed a Moses this was the hour.

It will be seen from the dates that Denonville's recall was not due to the Lachine ma.s.sacre and the other raids of the Iroquois in 1689, for these only occurred after Frontenac had been appointed. Denonville's dismissal was justified by the general results of {116} his administration down to the close of 1688. Before Frontenac left France a plan of campaign had been agreed upon which it was now his duty to execute. The outlines of this plan were suggested by Callieres, the governor of Montreal,[1] who had been sent home by Denonville to expound the needs of the colony in person and to ask for fresh aid.

The idea was to wage vigorous offensive warfare against the English from Albany to New York. Success would depend upon swiftness and audacity, both of which Frontenac possessed in full measure, despite his years. Two French wars.h.i.+ps were to be sent direct to New York in the autumn of 1689, while a raiding party from Canada should set out for the Hudson as soon as Frontenac could organize it.

In its original form this plan of campaign was never carried out, for on account of head winds Frontenac reached Quebec too late in the autumn. However, the central idea remained in full view and suggested the three war-parties which were sent out during the winter of 1690 to attack the English colonies.

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Louis XIV had given Denonville important reinforcements, and with war clouds gathering in Europe he was unwilling or unable to detach more troops for the defence of Canada. Hence, in warring against the Iroquois and the English Frontenac had no greater resources than those at the disposal of Denonville when he attacked the Senecas. In fact, since 1687 there had been some wastage in the number of the regulars from disease. The result was that Frontenac could not hope for any solid success unless he received support from the Canadian militia.

In this crisis the habitants and their seigneurs accepted with courage the duties laid upon them. In the narrower sense they were fighting for their homes, but the spirit which they displayed under Frontenac's leaders.h.i.+p is not merely that which one a.s.sociates with a war of defence. The French soldier, in all ages, loved to strike the quick, sharp blow, and it was now necessary for the salvation of Canada that it should be struck. The Iroquois had come to believe that Onontio was losing his power. The English colonies were far more populous than New France. In short, the only hope lay in a swift, spectacular campaign which would disorganize {118} the English and regain the respect of the Iroquois.

The issue depended on the courage and capacity of the Canadians. It is to their honour and to the credit of Frontenac that they rose to the demand of the hour. The Canadians were a robust, prolific race, trained from infancy to woodcraft and all the hards.h.i.+ps of the wilderness. Many families contained from eight to fourteen sons who had used the musket and paddle from early boyhood, and could endure the long tramps of winter like the Indians themselves. The frontiersman is, and must be, a fighter, but nowhere in the past can one find a braver breed of warriors than mustered to the call of Frontenac.

Francois Hertel and Hertel de Rouville, Le Moyne d'Iberville with his brothers Bienville and Sainte-Helene, D'Aillebout de Mantet and Repentigny de Montesson, are but a few representatives of the militiamen who sped forth at the call of Frontenac to destroy the settlements of the English.

[Ill.u.s.tration: PIERRE LE MOYNE, SIEUR D'IBERVILLE. From an engraving in the John Ross Robertson Collection, Toronto Public Library]

What followed was war in its worst form, including the ma.s.sacre of women and children. The three bands organized by Frontenac at the beginning of 1690 set out on snowshoes from Montreal, Three Rivers, and Quebec. {119} The largest party contained a hundred and fourteen French and ninety-six Indians. It marched from Montreal against Schenectady, commanded by D'Aillebout de Mantet and Le Moyne de Sainte-Helene. The second party, proceeding from Three Rivers and numbering twenty-six French and twenty-nine Indians under the command of Francois Hertel, aimed at Dover, Pemaquid, and other settlements of Maine and New Hamps.h.i.+re. The Quebec party, under Portneuf, comprised fifty French and sixty Indians. Its objective was the English colony on Cas...o...b..y, where the city of Portland now stands. All three were successful in accomplis.h.i.+ng what they aimed at, namely the destruction of English settlements amid fire and carnage. All three employed Indians, who were suffered, either willingly or unwillingly, to commit barbarities.

It is much more the business of history to explain than to condemn or to extenuate. How could a man like Francois Hertel lead one of these raids without sinking to the moral level of his Indian followers? Some such question may, not unnaturally, rise to the lips of a modern reader who for the first time comes upon the story of Dover and Salmon {120} Falls. But fuller knowledge breeds respect for Francois Hertel. When eighteen years old he was captured by the Mohawks and put to the torture. One of his fingers they burned off in the bowl of a pipe.

The thumb of the other hand they cut off. In the letter which he wrote on birch-bark to his mother after this dreadful experience there is not a word of his sufferings. He simply sends her his love and asks for her prayers, signing himself by his childish nickname, 'Your poor Fanchon.' As he grew up he won from an admiring community the name of 'The Hero.' He was not only brave but religious. In his view it was all legitimate warfare. If he slew others, he ran a thousand risks and endured terrible privations for his king and the home he was defending.

His stand at the bridge over the Wooster river, sword in hand, when pressed on his retreat by an overwhelming force of English, holding the pa.s.s till all his men are over, is worthy of an epic. He was forty-seven years old at the time. The three eldest of his nine sons were with him in that little band of twenty-six Frenchmen, and two of his nephews. 'To the New England of old,' says Parkman, 'Francois Hertel was the abhorred chief of Popish {121} malignants and murdering savages. The New England of to-day will be more just to the brave defender of his country and his faith.'

The atrocities committed by the French and Indians are enough to make one shudder even at this distance of time. As Frontenac adopted the plan and sent forth the war-parties, the moral responsibility in large part rests with him. There are, however, some facts to consider before judgment is pa.s.sed as to the degree of his culpability. The modern distinction between combatants and non-combatants had little meaning in the wilds of America at this period. When France and England were at open war, every settler was a soldier, and as such each man's duty was to keep on his guard. If caught napping he must take the consequences.

Thus, to fall upon an unsuspecting hamlet and slay its men-folk with the tomahawk, while brutal, was hardly more brutal than under such circ.u.mstances we could fairly expect war to be.

The ma.s.sacre of women and children is another matter, not to be excused on any grounds, even though Schenectady and Salmon Falls are paralleled by recent acts of the Germans in Belgium. Still, we should not forget that European warfare in the age of {122} Frontenac abounded with just such atrocities as were committed at Schenectady, Dover, Pemaquid, Salmon Falls, and Cas...o...b..y. The sack of Magdeburg, the wasting of the Palatinate, and, perhaps, the storming of Drogheda will match whatever was done by the Indian allies of Frontenac. These were unspeakable, but the savage was little worse than his European contemporary. Those killed were in almost all cases killed outright, and the slaughter was not indiscriminate. At Schenectady John Sander Glen, with his whole family and all his relations, were spared because he and his wife had shown kindness to French prisoners taken by the Mohawks. Altogether sixty people were killed at Schenectady (February 9, 1690), thirty-eight men, ten women, and twelve children. Nearly ninety were carried captive to Canada. Sixty old men, women, and children were left unharmed. It is not worth while to take up the details of the other raids. They were of much the same sort--no better and no worse.

Where a garrison surrendered under promise that it would be spared, the promise was observed so far as the Indians could be controlled; but English and French alike when they used Indian allies knew well that their {123} excesses could not be prevented, though they might be moderated. The captives as a rule were treated with kindness and clemency when once the northward march was at an end.

Meanwhile, Frontenac had little time to reflect upon the probable att.i.tude of posterity towards his political morals. The three war-parties had accomplished their purpose and in the spring of 1690 the colony was aglow with fresh hope. But the English were not slow to retaliate. That summer New York and Ma.s.sachusetts decided on an invasion of Canada. It was planned that a fleet from Boston under Sir William Phips should attack Quebec, while a force of militia from New York in command of John Schuyler should advance through Lake Champlain against Montreal. Thus by sea and land Canada soon found herself on the defensive.

Of Schuyler's raid nothing need be said except that he reached Laprairie, opposite Montreal, where he killed a few men and destroyed the crops (August 23, 1690). It was a small achievement and produced no result save the disappointment of New York that an undertaking upon which much money and effort had been expended should terminate so ingloriously. But the siege of Quebec by {124} Phips, though it likewise ended in failure, is a much more famous event, and deserves to be described in some detail.

The colony of Ma.s.sachusetts mustered its forces for a great and unusual exploit. Earlier in the same year a raid upon the coasts of Acadia had yielded gratifying results. The surrender of Port Royal without resistance (May 11, 1690) kindled the Puritan hope that a single summer might see the pestiferous Romanists of New France driven from all their strongholds. Thus encouraged, Boston put forth its best energies and did not shrink from incurring a debt of 50,000, which in the circ.u.mstances of Ma.s.sachusetts was an enormous sum. Help was expected from England, but none came, and the fleet sailed without it, in full confidence that Quebec would fall before the a.s.sault of the colonists alone.

The fleet, which sailed in August, numbered thirty-four s.h.i.+ps, carrying twenty-three hundred men and a considerable equipment. Sir William Phips, the leader of the expedition, was not an Englishman by birth, but a New Englander of very humble origin who owed his advancement to a robust physique and unlimited a.s.surance. He was unfitted for his command, both because he lacked experience {125} in fighting such foes as he was about to encounter, and because he was completely ignorant of the technical difficulties involved in conducting a large, miscellaneous fleet through the tortuous channels of the lower St Lawrence. This ignorance resulted in such loss of time that he arrived before Quebec amid the tokens of approaching winter. It was the 16th of October when he rounded the island of Orleans and brought his s.h.i.+ps to anchor under the citadel. Victory could only be secured by sudden success. The state of the season forbade siege operations which contemplated starvation of the garrison.

Hopeful that the mere sight of his armada would compel surrender, Phips first sent an envoy to Frontenac under protection of the white flag.

This messenger after being blindfolded was led to the Chateau and brought before the governor, who had staged for his reception one of the impressive spectacles he loved to prepare. Surrounding Frontenac, as Louis XIV might have been surrounded by the grandees of France, were grouped the aristocracy of New France--the officers of the French regulars and the Canadian militia. Nothing had been omitted which could create an impression of dignity and strength. {126} Costume, demeanour, and display were all employed to overwhelm the envoy with the insulted majesty of the king of France. Led into this high presence the messenger delivered his letter, which, when duly interpreted, was found to convey a summary ultimatum. Phips began by stating that the war between France and England would have amply warranted this expedition even 'without the destruction made by the French and Indians, under your command and encouragement, upon the persons and estates of their Majesties' subjects of New England, without provocation on their part.' Indeed, 'the cruelties and barbarities used against them by the French and Indians might, upon the present opportunity, prompt unto a severe revenge.' But seeking to avoid all inhumane and unchristian-like actions, Phips announces that he will be content with 'a present surrender of your forts and castles, undemolished, and the King's and other stores, unimbezzled, with a seasonable delivery of all captives; together with a surrender of all your persons and estates to my dispose; upon the doing whereof, you may expect mercy from me, as a Christian, according to what shall be found for their Majesties' service and the subjects' security. Which, {127} if you refuse forthwith to do, I am come provided and am resolved, by the help of G.o.d in whom I trust, by force of arms to revenge all wrongs and injuries offered, and bring you under subjection to the Crown of England, and, when too late, make you wish you had accepted of the favour tendered. Your answer positive in an hour, returned by your own trumpet, with the return of mine, is required upon the peril that will ensue.'

To this challenge Frontenac at once returned the answer which comported with his character. When Phips's envoy took out his watch to register the hour permitted by the ultimatum, Frontenac rejoined that he required no time for deliberation, but would return his answer by the mouth of the cannon. The ground which he a.s.signed for the invasion of New England was that its people had rebelled against their lawful prince, the ally of France. Other more personal observations were directed towards the manner in which Phips had behaved at Port Royal.

No word in writing would Frontenac send. The envoy (who was only a subaltern) received his conge, was blindfolded and led back to his boat.