The Transvaal from Within Part 18

Throughout the week His Honour continued to make the homely dog work to good purpose, but the interview with the released Reformers was, it is believed, the first occasion upon which he made use of it. Certainly on no other occasion did the President do such ample justice to his reputation as a finished diplomat.

In the mean time negotiations had been proceeding for obtaining the release of the leaders. The friends and representatives of the four prisoners had become subject to all manner of attentions from numbers of people in Pretoria; near relations of the President himself, high-placed Government officials, their relatives, hangers-on, prominent Boers, and persons of all sorts and descriptions, all offered their services and indicated means by which the thing could be arranged. All wanted money-personal bribes. The prisoners themselves were similarly approached, and they who a month previously had been condemned to death witnessed with disgust a keen compet.i.tion among their enemies for the privilege of effecting-at a price-their release. Day after day they were subjected to the disgusting importunities of these men-men who a little while before had been vaunting their patriotism and loudly expressing a desire to prove it by hanging these same Reformers.

The gaoler Du Plessis, representing himself as having been sent by the President, suggested to the four men that they should 'make a pet.i.tion.' They declined to do so. Du Plessis was then reinforced by the Chief Commissioner of Police, and the two officials again urged this course but stated that they did not wish it to be known that they had been sent by the Executive and therefore could not consent to their names being used. Upon these terms the prisoners again declined. They said that if they were to hold any communication with the Government they required to have it on record that they did so at the suggestion of the two responsible gaol officials who represented themselves as expressing the wish of the Executive Council. After further delay and consultations with the President and others the two officials above named consented to allow their names to be used in the manner indicated. Not content with this the prisoners demanded that they should be allowed to send an independent messenger to the President to ascertain whether he really required a written appeal for revision of sentence. Having received confirmation in this manner the four men addressed a letter to the Executive Council. In this letter they stated that they had been sentenced to death; that the death-sentence had been commuted; and that they understood-but had received no authoritative information on the subject-that they were to suffer instead a term of fifteen years' imprisonment. They suggested the imposition of a monetary penalty in place of the imprisonment; they stated that they held and represented important interests in the State and that they believed their release would tend to the restoration of confidence and favourable conditions in the business community of the Rand; and they concluded by saying that, if the Executive saw fit to adopt this suggestion, they the prisoners would return to their business in good faith.

It had frequently been intimated to these men that it would be impossible for the Government to impose a fine in place of the death-sentence because money so obtained would be blood-money. Reference had been made in the Executive Council to Biblical precedents, notably the case of Judas, and the opinion was held that if blood-money were taken the Lord would visit His wrath upon the people.

The Boers are in their way a very religious people. But they are also essentially practical; and it is difficult to find an instance in which the religious principle has operated to their commercial disadvantage. This at any rate was not one. The train of reasoning which led them to justify the imposition of a fine was somewhat in this wise: To impose a fine would be to take blood-money, and would be immoral and iniquitous: to accept the offer of a present on condition that the sentence should be entirely remitted however would be quite another thing.

So negotiations were set on foot to induce the prisoners to make the necessary offer; and the prisoners, as has been shown, did so. This satisfied the religious scruple of the Boer, but the terms of the offer were not satisfactory to his commercial requirements. It became necessary to make a definite offer. Further negotiations followed, and the prisoners gathered that an offer of 10,000 apiece would be viewed with favour by the President and his advisers; and it was stated by members of the Volksraad and prominent officials who were in the confidence of and in communication with the Government that, in the event of such a contingency arising as the prisoners making an offer of cash, the Executive would not take the money for the benefit of the State but would accept it for charitable purposes-an educational inst.i.tute or a hospital or some such object.

This was communicated to the prisoners by the personages referred to, and an offer was accordingly made of 10,000 apiece. The matter was discussed in the Executive Council, and the Boer, true to his instinct and record, perceived an opportunity to improve his position. The religious gentlemen who would not take blood-money now objected that the amount proposed was altogether too small, and the President with that readiness so characteristic of him observed that he thought the prisoners must have made a mistake, and meant 40,000 apiece instead of 40,000 for the lot.

Another delay ensued, and in the meanwhile more and more deputies flocked to Pretoria, and stronger grew the feeling, and more angry, disappointed, and disgusted grew the communities of Johannesburg and Pretoria. The President, however, played his game unmoved by any such considerations.

The next announcement from the Executive was a wholly unexpected one. It was that they felt it necessary to consult Judge Gregorowski as to the amount of money which ought to be taken as a donation to charities. The matter of a.s.sessing the value of a death-sentence in cash might perhaps be deemed a perplexing and a difficult one from lack of precedent, yet n.o.body supposed the Executive Council to be unequal to the task. It might also seem unfair to impose this further burden of responsibility upon a judge; but Mr. Gregorowski had proved himself superior to precedent and untrammelled by custom; and there was much to be said in favour of continuing an a.s.sociation which had worked very satisfactorily so far.

When however the President, with that resolute determination to be generous which was so well advertised, at last overcame all obstacles and succeeded in holding a meeting of his advisers to receive Mr. Gregorowski's report, and when it was found that that gentleman a.s.sessed capital punishment at 25,000 per head, the Executive Council with one accord avowed themselves to be so utterly taken by surprise by the announcement that they required time to think the matter over and decide upon a course of action.

No doubt this opinion of Mr. Gregorowski's took them quite as much by surprise as did his original sentences. However in the course of a day or two they had recovered sufficiently to intimate to the prisoners that, if they would amend their first offer of 40,000 for the four and make it one of 40,000 apiece, the Executive would decline to accept so large a sum, as being greater than they considered equitable and would reply that in the opinion of the Government 25,000 apiece would be sufficient. It was quite plainly intimated that this procedure presented certain attractions to the President, who desired for political purposes to exhibit further magnanimity. The prisoners who by this time had gained some insight into Mr. Kruger's methods, who knew from past experience the value of his promises, and who could find no record in history to encourage them in partic.i.p.ating to this extent in the confidence trick, point-blank refused to have anything to do with it.

They agreed to make a formal offer of a 'reasonable' fine, leaving the interpretation of this to the Government, but only on the distinct understanding that the amount should not exceed 25,000 each. They had learned that Mr. Gregorowski had fixed this amount and that the Executive had agreed to accept it, and they would not offer a penny more for magnanimity or anything else. They stated in plain terms that they looked upon this matter simply as a bargain; that if they should get out they were paying their way out, and that in so far as their release from the position was concerned the transaction was closed upon business terms and there should be no question afterwards as to grat.i.tude or magnanimity. The fines were paid,{39} and on July 11 the leaders were released.

Messrs. Phillips, Farrar, and Hammond, who were compelled through their business ties to continue their a.s.sociation with the Transvaal, signed the same undertaking concerning politics as that given by the rest of the prisoners-with the difference that in their case it operates for a period of fifteen years. Colonel Rhodes however declined to give the required undertaking and elected to take his sentence of fifteen years' banishment. On the night of June 11 therefore he was sent across the border under escort, and pa.s.sing through the Free State proceeded at once to Matabeleland to render what a.s.sistance he could to his brother in the suppression of the rebellion. As though the excitement of the past few months had not been sufficient, it may be added that in the first engagement in which he took part on his arrival at Buluwayo his horse was shot, and he narrowly escaped the same fate himself.

From time to time adverse comment has been made on the subject of this undertaking of the Reformers to abstain from further partic.i.p.ation in politics. The position of the Reformers was this: They had entered upon the movement to obtain the redress of certain matters closely affecting their feelings as men and their interests and business as settlers in the country. They were disarmed and placed at the mercy of the Boer Government by the action of England's Representative. To decline to give the pledge required would entail banishment, which would in many cases mean ruin to them and in all cases would remove them from the sphere in which they might yet contribute to the attainment of the ends they had in view. The only compensating consideration possible in such a course would be that the redress desired would be effected through the influence of the Imperial Government; but since the Imperial Government had shown that under the circ.u.mstances they were neither willing nor able to maintain to a logical conclusion the position which they took up when they secured disarmament, the Reformers concluded that their obvious course was to give the required undertaking. It is true that several among them did decline to give this undertaking, saying that they would prefer to serve their terms of imprisonment; but they received the answer that after the term of two years' imprisonment the Government would still require the undertaking or enforce the banishment clause, so that it appeared to them there was no way out of it but to sign what was required and wait patiently.

It is perfectly obvious that one of two alternatives will present itself. Either the Government will come to regard this provision as a dead letter, and wholly ignore it; or some of the men, in the course of their business and in dealing with economic questions such as they are morally ent.i.tled to discuss will fall foul of the 'opinion of the Executive.' The issue will then be a very clear one, and many of those who were strongly opposed to the Reformers on the premisses on which they started will find themselves in cordial agreement with them in later developments.{40}

The Reform movement closed for the time being with the release of the leaders. Sixty-four men had been committed for trial. From four of them the Government had received 100,000, and from fifty-six others 112,000. One was dead; one had fallen so seriously ill before the trial that he was unable to present himself with the rest, but on recovering and announcing his intention to plead 'Not guilty' and fight it out, the case against him was withdrawn.

There remained two men, Messrs. Sampson and Davies, whose case the Government had refused to consider because they declined to appeal. They had been sentenced on April 28 to two years' imprisonment and 2,000 fine, or failing payment to another year's imprisonment, and to three years' banishment; and under that sentence do they lie at the present moment in the Pretoria gaol, at the mercy of the Boer Government and its very competent representative Mr. Du Plessis.{41}

Much kudos has accrued to Mr. Kruger for his magnanimity and much profit for his astuteness! Great credit is also given to Mr. Chamberlain for his prompt impartiality. And surely some day a tribute of sympathy and admiration will go out from a people who like pluck and who love fair play to two Englishmen who hold that a solemn pledge is something which even a Boer should hold to, whilst self-respect is more than liberty and beyond all price.

Footnotes for Chapter IX

{35} This was done on the second day-after a night without any ventilation at all.

{36} See Appendix E.

{37} (July, 1899.) They were released in June, 1897.

{38} Du Plessis' threats regarding Messrs. Sampson and Davies were made so openly and vengefully that Colonel F.W. Rhodes deemed it to be his duty as soon as he was released to report the matter to the High Commissioner, with a view to ensuring some measure of protection for the two gentlemen above referred to. After the release of the other prisoners, Du Plessis was for a time suspended, owing to charges laid against him by the Inspector of Prisons. No investigation appears however to have been made, and the man was reinstated. During the month of September, after Messrs. Sampson and Davies had already done five months of their sentence in Pretoria Gaol, this man, finding himself unable to break their spirit by other means, made a proposal to the Government to separate the two and to place them in two small country gaols at wide distances apart and far removed from the friendly offices and watchful eyes of their friends, and thus deprive them of such benefit as they may be able in the future to get from proximity to the official representative of England. In the past they have certainly derived none.

{39} It seems like reflecting on the reader's intelligence to add that nothing more has been heard of the 'charities.'

{40} (July, 1899.) A clear indication of the Government's disposition towards the Reformers was given by the treatment accorded to Mr. Lionel Phillips. In consequence of a publication by Sir John Willoughby of an article on the subject of the Raid, which failed to accurately represent the facts as they were present to the minds of the Reformers, Mr. Phillips wrote an article in the Nineteenth Century magazine, which was purely historical, moderate in tone, and obviously designed only as an answer to the allegations which had been made. The Executive Council arrived at the conclusion that it was a breach of his undertaking to abstain from interference in politics, and they issued a decree of banishment against him. As Mr. Phillips had taken up his residence permanently in Europe, and as it was well known that it would be extremely inconvenient for him to return to South Africa in order to dispute this action it was generally considered that the object of the move was to establish a precedent, so to say, on the cheap, and in the same spirit to intimidate others among the Reformers who were believed not to have lost their interest in the cause of reform nor to have abandoned their intention to begin again as soon as they were free to do so. It is no exaggeration to say that scarcely a week could have pa.s.sed during the last two and a half years in which some or all of the half dozen Uitlanders most prominent in the cause of reform have not been in receipt of a warning of one kind or another, ranging from apparently friendly advice not to take too keen an interest in certain matters, up to the giddy eminence of being black listed in the Dutch papers as one of those to be dragged out and shot without trial as a traitor and a rebel. Such are the conditions under which the unarmed Uitlanders labour for reform.

{41} (July, 1899.) Du Plessis was promoted to be Chief Inspector of Prisons shortly after the release of Messrs. Sampson and Davies, and still holds that post!

PART II.

A POSTSCRIPT.

CHAPTER X.

THREE YEARS' GRACE.

Very seldom has any community been in a position so unsatisfactory as that in which the people of Johannesburg found themselves in the year 1896. Judgments pa.s.sed in the heat of the moment upon matters which had not been properly explained, and which in many cases were completely obscured by deliberate misrepresentation, had incurred for the community dislike contempt and mistrust which were wholly undeserved. Those who knew the facts and who were able and willing to speak, the Reformers themselves, were bonded to abstain from politics for three years under penalty of banishment. Betrayed, deserted, muzzled, helpless, hopeless, and divided, no community could have been in a more unsatisfactory condition. It was abundantly clear that the time had been allowed to pa.s.s when the Imperial Government might have insisted upon reforms and the fulfilment of the President's promises-not in the spirit in which they had been made, but in the spirit in which the President himself had intended the world to construe them. The impact of the revelations was too great to permit of public judgment quickly recovering its balance. It was realized that Mr. Kruger's effects had been admirably stage-managed and that for the time being, and possibly for a very considerable time, the Uitlanders were completely out of court. There were a few-but how few!-whose faith was great and whose conviction that the truth must prevail was abiding, who realized that there was nothing for it but to begin all over again-to begin and to persevere upon sound lines; and they took heart of such signs as there were and started afresh.

It has been an article of faith with them that Mr. Kruger missed his supreme chance at the time of the trial of the Reformers, and that from the date of the death-sentence his judgment and his luck have failed him. He abused his good fortune and the luck turned, so they say; and the events of the last three years go to support that impression. To his most faithful ally amongst the Uitlanders the President, in the latter days of 1896, commented adversely upon the ingrat.i.tude of those Reformers who had not called to thank him for his magnanimity; and this man replied: 'You must stop talking about that, President, because people are laughing at you. You made a bargain with them and they paid the price you asked, so now they owe you nothing.' But his Honour angrily repudiated that construction: nothing will convert him to that view.

It has been said that Dr. Jameson is the best friend Paul Kruger ever had, and with equal truth it may be said that, in 1896, President Kruger proved himself to be the best friend of the Reformers. Not even the most sanguine of his enemies could have expected to witness the impolitic and unjust acts by which the President revealed himself, vindicated the Reformers, and undermined a position of unparalleled strength in an incredibly short time. The bargaining and the bad grace which marked the release of the Reformers had prepared the world to view Mr. Kruger's action and att.i.tude a little more critically than it had hitherto been disposed to do. The real conditions of Dr. Jameson's surrender had also become known, and although the action of the Boer leaders was regarded as far too trifling a matter to be seriously considered as against the Raid itself, nevertheless a residuum of impression was left which helped to form opinion at a later stage. There followed, too, an irritating correspondence between the Transvaal and Imperial Governments, in the course of which Dr. Leyds successfully established his skill as a smart letter writer and his limitations as a statesman. The Munic.i.p.al Law, the first product of the 'forget and forgive' proclamation-which proclamation, by-the-bye, had already begun to prove itself an awkward weapon placed in the hands of his enemies by President Kruger himself-had been exposed and denounced as farcical, and it now required but little to convince the once admiring world of the President's real character and intentions. That little was forthcoming in a touch of ridicule more potent than all arguments.

The Transvaal Government formulated their demand for damages for the Raid in a form which made everyone smile-677,938 3s. 3d. for actual outlay, and 1,000,000 for 'Moral and Intellectual Damages.' What with the fines of the Reformers, and the seizure of the provisions of all sorts acquired by them for the purposes of the Reform movement, which latter must have exceeded 50,000 in value, the Boer Government had already received upwards of a quarter of a million, and had, in fact, made a profit on the Raid; so that this demand came as a surprise even to the Uitlanders, as much perhaps due to the extraordinary phrasing of the demand as to the amount claimed.

It may be wondered why, under provocation so great as that of complete abandonment by the country whose representative had placed them in their then hopeless position, no distinct movement took place-no tendency even developed itself-among the Uitlanders generally to unite with the Boers in favour of a Republican movement throughout South Africa, to the exclusion of the Imperial power. In answer to this it must be said that such an idea undoubtedly did take strong hold of the non-British portion of the Uitlander population, as witness the manner in which the Cape Colony Dutchmen, Hollanders, Germans, and individuals of other European nationalities a.s.sociated themselves with the Boer party, almost invariably by open declaration, and in many cases even by naturalization, thus forfeiting their own national rights and obtaining nothing but vague promises and the liability to military service in return. But the Republican movement made no further headway than this because British subjects formed the large majority of the Uitlanders. They had, it is true, a great grievance against the Imperial Government; but against the Transvaal Government they had one greater still; and it would take a great deal to kill the pa.s.sionate loyalty of the British South African. It would be idle to discuss what might have happened had Mr. Kruger seized his opportunity and let in a considerable section of the then unenfranchised to strengthen the ranks of the Republican party; that can only be a matter of individual conjecture. What is certain, however, is that he did not do so and never intended to do so; wherein his lack of statesmans.h.i.+p is again made manifest.

Mr. Kruger has carried out in its fullest (its best or its worst) the characteristic principle of his people already referred to, that of giving too little and asking too much. It is doing only bare justice to the determination with which he adheres to the policy of his life to say that he gives nothing to anybody. From the most distant to the nearest he deals alike with all. With the people of Europe, he has taxed their investments, disregarded their interests, and flouted their advice; but nevertheless he has for years commanded their moral support. In his dealings with the British Government, pushed as they have been some half a dozen times to the very verge of war, he has invariably come off with something for nothing. In his dealings with the Uitlanders he has bartered promises and in return-circ.u.mspice! In the matter of the events of 1895-6 he came out with a quarter of a million in cash, a claim for 1,677,938 3s. 3d. odd (including Moral and Intellectual Damages), and a balance of injured innocence which may not be expressed in figures. In his dealings with Cape Colony he has taxed the products of their land and industry, he went to the verge of war to destroy their trade in the case of the closing of the Vaal River drifts, he has permitted the Netherlands Railway to so arrange its tariffs as to divert traffic from them to other parts, he has refused to their people (his own flesh and blood, among whom he was born) the most elementary rights when they settle in his country! And yet in his need he calls upon them, and they come! His treatment of the Orange Free State has been exactly the same. Their grievance against him is incomparably worse, because of their liability to become involved in the consequences of a policy which they are not allowed to influence. But President Kruger is, above all things, practical. Everything is gauged by the measure of the advantage which it can bring to him; and his treatment of the Free State is determined by their utility to him and his power over them, and is not influenced by their moral claims upon his good will. Natal and Portugal have their experience of broken agreements and strained interpretations, of intrigues with native subjects and neighbours for the extension of rights or boundaries, all designed to benefit the Transvaal and to undermine them. All, all with the same result! Something for nothing! Within the borders of the Transvaal the policy is the same. Moral rights and the claims of justice are unrecognized. For services rendered there may be some return; a privilege, a contract, an appointment. But this cannot be properly regarded as a neglect of principle upon Mr. Kruger's part, for after all the reward is at the expense of the Uitlanders. It is usually the least price at which the service could be secured; and it is generally in such form as to give the recipient a profit in which the members of the Government party largely share, but it never confers a power to which the President himself is not superior; indeed, it is almost invariably hedged about by such conditions as to make its continuance dependent upon the President's good will. If any one should think this description of conditions in the Transvaal and of the President's policy to be unduly harsh, let him satisfy himself by an investigation of those matters which appear on merely superficial examination to support opinions contrary to those expressed by the writer. Let him examine the terms of the closer union with the Free State, the circ.u.mstances leading to the closing of the Vaal River drifts, the condition of the Dutch subjects of Cape Colony and of the Orange Free State in the Transvaal, the Netherlands Railway tariffs as they operate against Cape Colony and the Free State, the Railway Agreement with Natal, the disputes with Portugal, the attempts to acquire native territory on the East Coast, the terms of the Netherlands Railway Concession, Selati Railway Concession, Dynamite Concession-in fact, all other concessions, monopolies, contracts, privileges, appointments, and rights, made, granted, or entered into by President Kruger to or with his friends. Let him recall the treatment and the fate of some of those to whom ampler reference will be made later on; for instance, Chief Justice Kotze and Judge Ameshof, who in the dealings with the Reformers rendered valuable-but perhaps injudicious and unjudicial-service, as already sufficiently described; the treatment of Dr. Coster, the State Attorney, who also deserved better of the President; the public repudiation of Mr. J.B. Robinson, whose friends.h.i.+p for President Kruger had been frequently and amply evidenced to the grave dissatisfaction of the Uitlander population; the public and insulting repudiation of Sir Henry de Villiers, the Chief Justice of Cape Colony, after he had served his purpose! The result of any such inquiry must confirm the conclusion that 'something for nothing' is the President's policy and achievement.

A policy or a movement which is to involve the cooperation of thousands of intelligent men cannot be carried out upon such terms, and this may be regarded as the main reason why the spirit of Republicanism did not generally itself develop under circ.u.mstances apparently so favourable to it. The President's policy may be considered astute or unwise according to the point of view from which it is regarded. Viewed from the standpoint of the State itself, undoubtedly it fails lamentably in statesmans.h.i.+p. In the interests of the Boer party, however, or of the man Paul Kruger, it may well be doubted whether the policy may not be a token of remarkable sagacity. He knows his own limitations and the limitations of his people. He knows that to freely admit to a share in the Government a number of intelligent people, would make a continuance of himself or his party in absolute power for any length of time a matter of utter impossibility. In these circ.u.mstances the problem which President Kruger had set himself was a remarkably difficult one. To republicanize South Africa, to secure the support of the majority of the white inhabitants, and yet to yield no whit of power to those by whose aid he would achieve his object, would indeed be carrying to sublime heights the policy of 'something for nothing.'

Many years before the Raid Mr. Kruger had a well-defined policy to republicanize South Africa, and the Uitlanders of the Transvaal were quite alive to it, as may be gathered by reference to their newspapers. But the voice was as a voice crying in the wilderness in those days, and, as has been said, it required the Jameson Raid to advertize the conditions in the Transvaal and to direct attention to what had been proclaimed unheeded for many years. Immediately prior to the Raid Mr. Kruger was floundering in a mora.s.s of difficulties. The policy of 'something for nothing' had been exposed, and it was seen through by all the Dutchmen in South Africa and was resented by all save his own little party in the Transvaal; but the Jameson Raid gave the President a jumping-off place on solid ground, and he was not slow to take advantage of it.

It is not too much to say that the vast majority of people in Europe and America are indebted to Dr. Jameson for any knowledge which they may have acquired of the Transvaal and its Uitlander problem. Theirs is a disordered knowledge, and perhaps it is not unnatural that they should in a manner share the illusion of the worthy sailor who, after attending divine service, a.s.saulted the first Israelite he met because he had only just heard of the Crucifixion. A number of worthy people are still disposed to excuse many things in the Transvaal because of the extreme provocation given by the Jameson Raid. The restrictions upon English education are considered to be 'not unnatural when one remembers the violent attempt to swamp the Dutch.' The excessive armaments are held to be 'entirely justifiable considering what has happened.' The building of forts is 'an ordinary precaution.' The prohibiting of public meetings is 'quite wrong, of course, but can you wonder at it?' Many of these worthy people will, no doubt, learn with pained surprise that all these things were among the causes which led to the Reform movement of 1895-6, and are not the consequences of that movement as they erroneously suppose. The Press Law and Public Meetings Act had been pa.s.sed; arms had been imported and ordered in tens of thousands; machine guns and quant.i.ties of ammunition also; forts were being built;{42} the suppression of all private schools had been advocated by Dr. Mansvelt-all long, long before the Jameson Raid. So also had the republican propaganda been at work, but it had not caught on outside the two Republics.

Difficult as his task might appear, Mr. Kruger had now command of the two great persuasive forces-money and sentiment. With the money he pushed on the forts, and imported immense quant.i.ties of big guns, small arms, and ammunition-far in excess of what could possibly be used by the whole of the Boer population of the Transvaal after making every allowance for spare arms in reserve; and such an extraordinary supply was not unnaturally believed to be designed for the use of others outside the Transvaal. More than this, an army of emissaries, agents, and spies in the pay of the Transvaal Government were spread about the Free State, Cape Colony, and Natal. Newspapers were supported in different parts of South Africa and a considerable amount of money was spent upon the Press in France and Germany.

It would be absurd to suggest and it would be unjust to let it be inferred that all those who were drawn into sympathy with the Boers supported or were even cognizant of President Kruger's ultimate aim. It is an everyday experience that the scope of work and ambition expands as one progresses. Whether the strong man really sees his ultimate goal and tackles with magnificent courage the innumerable and seemingly insurmountable obstacles which lie between him and it, or whether in the wisdom and mercy of Providence there is such an adjustment of courage and foresight as prevents him from seeing more than he is able to face, who can say? But what is beyond all doubt is that, given the one strong man who does know his mind, he will lead as the Pied Piper led, and there is no thought in his following to ask the whither and the why.

Given the sympathy and the means, the difficulty of President Kruger's self-imposed task was not so great as at first appeared. To some it was advisable to do no more than point to the Jameson Raid and say: 'We only wish to live in peace and to be left alone.' To some again that act is construed as a sign that the British people wish to upset the two Republics, therefore they must strengthen and be prepared. To others the appeal is made: 'We Dutch are the settlers and owners of the country, we wish for peace, of course, but we must dominate-you under your form of government, we under ours.' To others again it is further advanced: 'Let us negotiate the elimination of the Imperial power; we do not suggest fight, but if we present a united front they must retire peacefully and concede our demands.' And lastly comes the appeal to those who are in sympathy with the advanced republicans: 'Arm and prepare. Some day we shall find England in a difficulty, divided by party or hampered by external complications; it has often happened before and we have always profited. That will be our time to drive them out.'

It would be very unjust to some of the most prominent men on the Dutch side in Cape Colony to leave the slenderest grounds for the inference that they are to be a.s.sociated with the extreme and actively disloyal aim. All that it is intended to do is to indicate the fine gradations in arguments by which a number are drawn together-under a leaders.h.i.+p which they do not realize, and going they know not where! The strongest of these arguments and appeals are particularly popular with the younger generation of Dutch South Africans who entertain a visionary scheme of independence suggested by the history of the United States. But there is something more serious in it than this, as may be deduced from the fact that in December, 1896, the writer was approached by Mr. D.P. Graaff, formerly a prominent member of the Cape Legislative Council and now as always a prominent Afrikander Bondsman, with the suggestion that all the South African born should combine in the effort to create the United States of South Africa, 'upon friendly terms with England, but confining the direct Imperial right in South Africa to a naval base at Simonstown and possibly a position in Natal.' This concession-from South Africa to England-would not, it was argued, involve disadvantage to the former, because for a considerable time it would be necessary to preserve friendly relations with England and to have the protection of her fleet for the coast.

It is of course quite easy to attach too much importance to the opinions of individual politicians of this cla.s.s, who are as a rule merely shouters with the biggest crowd; but the prominent a.s.sociation of such an apostle of republicanism with the Bond, and the fact that he should have gone so far with a Reformer of known strong British sympathies seem to warrant the attaching of some importance to the suggestion.{43} A similar suggestion was made to several of the Reformers at the time of the judicial crisis by one of the judges of the Transvaal High Court, when it was hoped to enlist the sympathies of the Uitlanders with a movement to curtail President Kruger's power and to establish republicanism on a firmer basis in South Africa. In order to forestall an obvious comment, it may be said that discussion was in both cases declined on the ground that it would be partic.i.p.ating in politics in the sense forbidden by President Kruger's three years' ban.

The year 1896 was a very bad one for the whole of South Africa. Besides the Raid and the suspense and disorganization entailed by the prolonged trial, the terrible dynamite explosion in Johannesburg,{44} the still more terrible rebellion and ma.s.sacre in Rhodesia, and the crus.h.i.+ng visitation of the great cattle scourge, the Rinderpest, helped to produce a deplorable state of affairs in the Transvaal.

Then there was another thing which rankled badly: Messrs. Sampson and Davies were still in gaol.{45} The feeling throughout South Africa was reflected in the monotonous announcement which appeared in the Cape Times week by week for thirteen months:-'To-day Messrs. Sampson and Davies complete the-week of their imprisonment in Pretoria gaol for the crime of not signing a pet.i.tion.' It seemed scarcely credible that the President should still harbour any illusions about his magnanimity; nevertheless, for some weeks before the celebration of the Queen's Record reign it was rumoured that the two prisoners were to be released upon that occasion as a mark of his Honour's sympathy. Opinion had not been unanimous upon the att.i.tude of either the President or the prisoners; but an ugly incident silenced most of the President's apologists. Gold stealing and the purchase of stolen gold were being carried on such a scale and with such impunity that at last, in desperation, the directors and officials of one of the big mining companies (the City and Suburban G.M. Co.), at the risk of being shot by desperadoes, took upon themselves the functions of the detectives and police. They caught 'red-handed' two notorious characters and delivered them over, with the gold in their possession, to the authorities. The thieves actually boasted then that nothing would happen to them as they had 'made it all right;' and a few days later one of them was allowed to escape out of the Court-house buildings which stand in the middle of a large square. The other was convicted and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. He was a criminal of a bad and dangerous type, the head of a gang known to be concerned in gold stealing and burglary as a profession. The penalty was regarded by all parties as most inadequate and the judge himself commented adversely upon the drafting of the law which tended to screen the prisoner. Not one mitigating circ.u.mstance was forthcoming! And yet, whilst ignoring a fresh outburst of protest against the detention of Messrs. Sampson and Davies, and whilst the Industrial Commission was exposing the gold thefts and denouncing the complicity of the police, Mr. Kruger decided to remit three-fourths of the sentence and to discharge the thief unconditionally. Is it to be wondered that such ill-advised action called to mind the prisoners' boast, and that it was contrasted prominently with the treatment of the two Reformers?

Three events of importance marked the year 1897 in the history of the Transvaal. The first was the High Court crisis in February; the second, the appointment of the Industrial Commission of Inquiry; the third, the Queen's Record Reign celebration.