Infantry Drill Regulations, United States Army, 1911 Part 22

358. The art of leaders.h.i.+p consists of applying sound tactical principles to concrete cases on the battle field.

Self-reliance, initiative, aggressiveness, and a conception of teamwork are the fundamental characteristics of successful leaders.h.i.+p.

359. A correct grasp of the situation and a definite plan of action form the soundest basis for a successful combat.

A good plan once adopted and put into execution should not be abandoned unless it becomes clear that it can not succeed.

Afterthoughts are dangerous, except as they aid in the execution of details in the original plan.

360. Combats that do not promise success or some real advantage to the general issue should be avoided; they cause unnecessary losses, impair the morale of one's own troops, and raise that of the enemy.

361. Complicated maneuvers are not likely to succeed in war. All plans and the methods adopted for carrying them into effect must be simple and direct.

362. Order and cohesion must be maintained within the units if success is to be expected.

363. Officers must show themselves to be true leaders. They must act in accordance with the spirit of their orders and must require of their troops the strictest discipline on the field of battle.

364. The best results are obtained when leaders know the capacity and traits of those whom they command; hence in making detachments units should not be broken up, and a deployment that would cause an intermingling of the larger units in the firing line should be avoided.

365. Leading is difficult when troops are deployed. A high degree of training and discipline and the use of close order formations to the fullest extent possible are therefore required.

366. In order to lighten the severe physical strain inseparable from infantry service in campaign, constant efforts must be made to spare the troops unnecessary hards.h.i.+p and fatigue; but when necessity arises, the limit of endurance must be exacted.

367. When officers or men belonging to fighting troops leave their proper places to carry back, or to care for, wounded during the progress of the action, they are guilty of skulking. This offense must be repressed with the utmost vigor.

368. The complete equipment of the soldier is carried into action unless the weather or the physical condition of the men renders such measure a severe hards.h.i.+p. In any event, only the pack[2] will be laid aside. The determination of this question rests with the regimental commander. The complete equipment affords to men lying p.r.o.ne considerable protection against shrapnel.

[Footnote 2: The "pack" includes blanket, poncho, and shelter tent.]

369. The post of the commander must be such as will enable him to observe the progress of events and to communicate his orders.

Subordinate commanders, in addition, must be in position to transmit the orders of superiors.

Before entering an action the commander should be as far to the front as possible in order that he personally may see the situation, order the deployment, and begin the action strictly in accordance with his own wishes.

During the action, he must, as a rule, leave to the local leaders the detailed conduct of the firing line, posting himself either with his own reserve or in such a position that he is in constant, direct, and easy communication with it.

A commander takes full and direct charge of his firing line only when the line has absorbed his whole command.

When their troops are victorious, all commanders should press forward in order to clinch the advantage gained and to use their reserves to the best advantage.

370. The lat.i.tude allowed to officers is in direct proportion to the size of their commands. Each should see to the general execution of his task, leaving to the proper subordinates the supervision of details, and interfering only when mistakes are made that threaten to seriously prejudice the general plan.

_Teamwork._

371. The comparatively wide fronts of deployed units increase the difficulties of control. Subordinates must therefore be given great lat.i.tude in the execution of their tasks. The success of the whole depends largely upon how well each subordinate coordinates his work with the general plan.

A great responsibility is necessarily thrown upon subordinates, but responsibility stimulates the right kind of an officer.

372. In a given situation it is far better _to do any intelligent thing_ consistent with the aggressive execution of the general plan, than to search hesitatingly for the ideal. This is the true rule of conduct for subordinates who are required to act upon their own initiative.

A subordinate who is reasonably sure that his intended action is such as would be ordered by the commander, were the latter present and in possession of the facts, has enough encouragement to go ahead confidently. He must possess the loyalty to carry out the plans of his superior and the keenness to recognize and to seize opportunities to further the general plan.

373. Independence must not become license. Regardless of the number of subordinates who are apparently supreme in their own restricted spheres, there is but one battle and but one supreme will to which all must conform.

Every subordinate must therefore work for the general result. He does all in his power to insure cooperation between the subdivisions under his command. He transmits important information to adjoining units or to superiors in rear and, with the a.s.sistance of information received, keeps himself and his subordinates duly posted as to the situation.

374. When circ.u.mstances render it impracticable to consult the authority issuing an order, officers should not hesitate to vary from such order when it is clearly based upon an incorrect view of the situation, is impossible of execution, or has been rendered impracticable on account of changes which have occurred since its promulgation. In the application of this rule the responsibility for mistakes rests upon the subordinate, but unwillingness to a.s.sume responsibility on proper occasions is indicative of weakness.

Superiors should be careful not to censure an apparent disobedience where the act was done in the proper spirit and to advance the general plan.

375. When the men of two or more units intermingle in the firing line, all officers and men submit at once to the senior. Officers and platoon guides seek to fill vacancies caused by casualties. Each seizes any opportunity to exercise the functions consistent with his grade, and all a.s.sist in the maintenance of order and control.

Every lull in the action should be utilized for as complete restoration of order in the firing line as the ground or other conditions permit.

376. Any officer or noncommissioned officer who becomes separated from his proper unit and can not rejoin must at once place himself and his command at the disposal of the nearest higher commander.

Anyone having completed an a.s.signed task must seek to rejoin his proper command. Failing in this, he should join the nearest troops engaged with the enemy.

377. Soldiers are taught the necessity of remaining with their companies, but those who become detached must join the nearest company and serve with it until the battle is over or reorganization is ordered.

_Orders._

378. Commands are deployed and enter the combat by the orders of the commander to the subordinate commanders.

The initial combat orders of the division are almost invariably written; those of the brigade are generally so. The written order is preferable and is used whenever time permits.

If time permits, subsequent orders are likewise written, either as field orders or messages.

379. The initial combat orders of regiments and smaller units are given verbally. For this purpose the subordinates for whom the orders are intended are a.s.sembled, if practicable, at a place from which the situation and plan can be explained.

Subsequent orders are verbal or in the form of verbal or written messages. Verbal messages should not be used unless they are short and unmistakable.

380. The initial combat order of any commander or subordinate is based upon his definite plan for executing the task confronting him.

Whenever possible the formation of the plan is preceded by a personal reconnaissance of the terrain and a careful consideration of all information of the enemy.

381. The combat order gives such information of the enemy and of neighboring or supporting friendly troops as will enable subordinates to understand the situation.

The general plan of action is stated in brief terms, but enough of the commander's intentions is divulged to guide the subsequent actions of the subordinates.

Clear and concise instructions are given as to the action to be taken in the combat by each part of the command. In this way the commander a.s.signs tasks, fronts, objectives, sectors or areas, etc., in accordance with his plan. If the terms employed convey definite ideas and leave no loopholes, the conduct of subordinates will generally be correspondingly satisfactory.

Such miscellaneous matter relating to special troops, trains, ammunition, and future movements of the commander is added as concerns the combat itself.

Combat orders should prescribe communication, reconnaissance, flank protection, etc., when some special disposition is desired or when an omission on the part of a subordinate may reasonably be feared.

382. When issuing orders, a commander should indicate clearly _what_ is to be done by each subordinate, but not _how_ it is to be done. He should not encroach upon the functions of a subordinate by prescribing details of execution unless he has good reason to doubt the ability or judgment of the subordinate, and can not subst.i.tute another.