US Economic Statecraft for Survival 1933-1991 Part 15

48 Carter Lib., Staff Offices, Counsel Cutler, box 74, folder: Export Control 1/79 8/80, 6 Jan. draft issued 7 Jan. 1980, memo to Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Agriculture.

49 Ibid., Cutler and Brzezinski to Carter, 8 Jan. 1980, subject: Directive on High Technology Transfers.

50 Ibid., Agenda of the Meeting on Technology Transfers to the USSR, 9 Jan. 1980.

51 Mastanduno, Economic Containment, p. 230.

52 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 88. Mastanduno, Economic Containment, p. 227, points out that, for other reasons, the British had decided before the invasion of Afghanistan not to renew the credit agreement, but that does not detract from the impact of the reason that the British gave publicly: that they were not going to renew because of Afghanistan.

53 Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 486.

54 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 462, Carter to Vance and Brzezinski, Feb. 1980.

55 Ibid., p. 462; and interview with former Prime Minister (and now Lord) Callaghan by the author, 26 Feb. 1987.

56 Martin, Coercive Cooperation, p. 203.

57 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 435.

58 Westad (ed.) Collapse of Detente, pp. 3517, at p. 3556, Marshall Shulman to Vance on US-Soviet Relations after Afghanistan, 15 Feb. 1980, source, Vance Doc.u.ments, Carter-Brezhnev Collection, National Security Archive.

59 Ibid.

60 Carter Lib., Staff Offices Counsel Cutler, folder: Export Control 1/798/80, Cutler to Senator Thurmond, undated.

61 Mastanduno, Economic Containment, p. 227.

62 Ibid., p. 233; OEC Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade Series A.

63 Robert Dallek, Ronald Reagan: The Politics of Symbolism (Harvard UP, Cambridge MA, 1984); Joel Krieger, Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1986); Geoffrey Smith, Reagan and Thatcher, (Bodley Head, London, 1990); Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1991); 'President Reagan, who may have had cynical advisers was not cynical himself...took the principle of "negotiation from strength" literally: once one had built strength, one negotiated', John L.Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (OUP, New York, 1992), p. 125. With a man such as Reagan it may take some time for any kind of objective consensus to emerge.

64 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Unwin Hyman, London, 1988).

65 Nye, Bound to Lead.

66 Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 232.

67 Hedrick Smith et al., Reagan the Man, the President (Pergamon, Oxford, 1980), pp. 1201, sources International a.s.sociated Press interview, 1 Oct. 1980.

68 Reagan, An American Life, p. 588; Garthoff's judgement echoes this, and even includes Reagan's more extreme colleagues: 'Reagan was not disposed to take confrontational courses of action that risked a direct clash with the Soviet Union, nor were any of his princ.i.p.al advisers', Detente and Confrontation, p. 1013.

69 Davy (ed.), European Detente; K.Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform (Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1990); David Ryall, The Cross and the Bear: The Vatican's Cold War Diplomacy in East Central Europe', and Robert Bideleux, 'Soviet and Russian Perspectives on the Cold War', in Dobson (ed.) with Malik and Evans Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Cold War.

70 The issue here is more complex than a straightforward inventory of US military power. As Hyland argues, both US weakness in 1981 and US strength in 1985 were exaggerated, but by 1985 Reagan had managed to change perceptions and, most crucially of all, so far as Soviet a.s.sessments were concerned, he had set in train a trend of US military build-up. Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 232.

71 Steven Elliott, 'The Distribution of Power and the US Politics of East-West Energy Trade Controls', in Bertsch (ed.), Controlling East-West Trade, p. 78. Brady had been fired by the Carter Administration for publicly criticising lax implementation of export controls: Reagan reappointed him at a higher level, Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, p. 175.

72 Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Was.h.i.+ngton to Bush (Harper Perennial, New York, 1996), p. 468, citing Reagan, An American Life, pp. 316, 320, Diary, 26 March 1982; Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 324, and on the wisdom of Reagan holding out at Reykjavik, p. 471; Reagan, American Life, p. 66, and Donald T. Regan, For the Record: From Wall Street to Was.h.i.+ngton (Hutchinson, London, 1988), pp. 2958.

73 Most notably the leading scholars in this field, Mastanduno, Economic Containment, pp. 2334 and elsewhere in his various publications; Philip Hanson, 'Soviet Responses to Western Trade Policies', in David A.Baldwin and Helen V. Milner (eds), East-West Trade and the Atlantic Alliance (Macmillan, London, 1990), p. 50; Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, p. 175.

74 Dumbrell, American Foreign Policy, p. 59; the disagreements and feuds were not just between departments and agencies, but within them as well, for example see the role of Michael Pillsbury, Acting Director of the Arms Control Agency in the Department of State, as portrayed in Strobe Talbot, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Deadlock in Nuclear Arms Control (Knopf, New York, 1984), p. 45.

75 George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (Scribner, New York, 1993), p. 690.

76 Dumbrell, American Foreign Policy, p. 117; Boyle, American-Soviet Relations; p. 207 77 Mastanduno, 'CoCom and American Export Control Policy: the Experience of the Reagan Administration', in Baldwin and Milner (eds), East-West Trade, p. 213.

78 To be fair to Mastanduno, for whose work I have the utmost respect, at times he seems to be arguing that the intent of the Reagan Administration was to develop and wage a strategy of economic warfare, rather than that it actually succeeded, see ibid., and Economic Containment, pp. 2336 and 2634. But at other points he seems to suggest that economic warfare was actually practised, see ibid., p. 13, where he identifies 194958 and 198084 as periods of US economic warfare, which he defines thus: 'Economic warfare is aimed to weaken the military capabilities of a target state by weakening the state's economy.' My own view, as developed here, argues that a strategy for economic warfare was never firmly established in the Reagan Administration because of bureaucratic in-fighting and a number of key people who did not subscribe to the policy. In the latter category were Haig, Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, US Trade Representative William Brock, and Secretary of Commerce Baldridge. Haig described the last three as 'always sensible', Alexander Haig, Caveat (Macmillan, New York, 1984), p. 255. Furthermore, actual policy never approached the scope, effectiveness or consistency required for economic warfare. On this latter point, the area of difference between Mastanduno and my position does seem to hinge on different understandings of economic warfare.

79 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 255; Haig, Caveat, pp. 2556.

80 Smith, Reagan and Thatcher, pp. 1002.

81 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 691.

82 Mastanduno, in Baldwin and Milner (eds), East-West Trade, p. 195.

83 Smith, Reagan and Thatcher, pp. 467. In her memoirs Mrs Thatcher simply says that she expressed caution about an early summit with the Soviets and that she and Reagan were of one mind on the problem of theatre nuclear weapons in Europe, Downing Street Years, p. 159.

84 Talbot, Deadly Gambits, pp. 49 and 233.

85 Andrew, For The President's Eyes Only, p. 468; Mastanduno, Economic Containment, p. 238; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 1012.

86 Gaddis, United States and the and End of the Cold War, p. 125.

87 Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, p. 170.

88 Ibid., p. 210; Hanson, Western Economic Statecraft, p. 43, quoting Shultz from New York Times, 14 Sept. 1983, 'Trade sanctions, particularly agriculture, would not be invoked unless we got Canada, Australia, and Argentina to go along with us.'

89 Hufbauer and Schott, Economic Sanctions, pp. 683711.

90 Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (Warner, New York, 1990) p. 25.

91 Haig, Caveat, p. 96.

92 CWIHP Bulletin, 11, Winter 1998, Malcolm Byrne, 'New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 198081', p. 3.

93 Ibid.

94 Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, p. 462. The CIA agent was Colonel Ryczard Kuklinski of the Polish General Staff.

95 Ibid., p. 468.

96 Smith, Reagan and Thatcher, p. 73.

97 Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, p. 466, citing Reagan, An American Life, p. 303. 98 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 253, the letter arrived 19 Dec. 1981. 99 Public Papers of the President: Ronald Reagan 1981 (US Government Printing Office, Was.h.i.+ngton, 1981) p. 1202 100 CWIHP Bulletin, 11, Mark Kramer, 'Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981', and Jaruzelski's reply, pp. 3240.

101 Bruce W.Jentleson, 'The Western Alliance and East-West Energy Trade', in Bertsch (ed.), Controlling East-West Trade, p. 331; Mastanduno, Economic Containment, p. 246.

102 Smith, Reagan and Thatcher, p. 73.

103 Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, 173.

104 Haig, Caveat, p. 240; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 137.

105 Stephen E.Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1988), p. 316.

106 In actual fact the tone of the speech was much more moderate than one might think from the reports. Most of the speech was not about the Soviets. Ironically, Reagan used the phrase 'evil empire' in the midst of a plea for toleration for the opening of negotiations with the Soviets. Source: The Greatest Speeches of All Time [this speech certainly does not merit such an accolade], Jerden Records, 1996, Ronald Reagan, 'Evil Empire' extract.

107 Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 51112.

108 Crockatt, Fifty Years War, p. 317; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 1013; Gaddis, United States and the End of the Cold War, p. 125.

109 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 545; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan 1984 (Government Printing Office, Was.h.i.+ngton, 1986), pp. 404.

110 Quoted from Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, Reagan's speech to the UN General a.s.sembly, citing Presidential Doc.u.ments, vol. 20, (October 1, 1984), p. 1356.

111 Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (Pan, London, 1995), p. 350 112 Ibid.; and Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 4548. 113 Smith, Reagan and Thatcher, p. 123. 114 Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 4767; Reagan, An American Life, pp. 5889.

115 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 463.

116 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 564.

117 Haig, Caveat, pp. 57, 801, 210.

118 Fungiello, American-Soviet Trade, p. 196.

119 Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology (1982); Soviet Acquisition of Military Significant Western Technology: An Update (US Department of Defense, Was.h.i.+ngton DC, 1985).

120 Quoted from Smith, Reagan and Thatcher, p. 53. Smith comments: At Ottawa her [Thatcher's] interest was to save him from political embarra.s.sment without endorsing his entire position on East-West trade.'

121 Mastanduno, 'The Management of Alliance Export Control Policy' in Bertsch, East-West Trade, pp. 3023; Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 3545; Haig, Caveat, p. 255.

122 Both are quoted from Bertsch, Pipeline Politics, pp. 17 and 21, citing as sources, Perle testimony before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-Committee on International Economic Policy and Trade, 12 Nov. 1981, Weinberger speech, Foreign Policy a.s.sociation, New York, 21 May 1982.

123 Haig, Caveat, p. 254.

124 Mastanduno, Economic Containment, p. 260.

125 Mastanduno, in Baldwin and Milner, East-West Trade, p. 195.

126 Alam, 'Russia and Western Technology Controls', pp. 46991, p. 477, citing source, National Academy of Sciences, Balancing the National Interest: US National Security Export Controls and Global Economic Compet.i.tiveness (National Academy Press, Was.h.i.+ngton DC, 1987).

127 Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, p. 180.

128 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 255.

129 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 137.

130 Haig, Caveat, p. 305.

131 Ibid., p. 312.

132 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 138. However, on 9 Oct. 1982 US disregard for legalities was demonstrated when it withdrew MFN status from Poland, contrary to the rules of GATT, see James Mayall, 'The Western Alliance, GATT and East-West Trade', in Baldwin and Milner, East-West Trade, p. 28.

133 Ibid., p. 141.

134 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 1035.

135 Hufbauer and Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, pp. 699700, citing sources, Congressional Quarterly, 20 Nov. 1982, p. 2883; Department of State Bulletin Jan. 1983, p. 28.

136 Malloy, Economic Sanctions, p. 69, EAAA, PL 9964, 99 stat. 120, 1985.

137 Long, US Export Control Policy, p. 84; Mastanduno, Economic Containment, pp. 28896; James M.Montgomery, 'The c.u.mbersome Apparatus', in Cullen (ed.), Post-Containment Handbook, pp. 3441; Elliott, in Bertsch (ed.), Controlling East-West Trade, p. 81, sums up the EAAA: 'the act increased the Pentagon's role by establis.h.i.+ng a national security control office under a Defense under secretary, included provisions to strengthen COCOM, continued the NSC's overseer function, and incorporated the import ban provision'.

138 Carter, International Economic Sanctions, p. 80.

139 Ibid., pp. 778; and Malloy, Economic Sanctions, p. 70.

140 Mastanduno, in Baldwin and Milner, East-West Trade, p. 199. Shultz visited China in February 1983 and was followed by Reagan in April 1984, after China had been recla.s.sified as an export destination to allow a more liberal trade flow. It was not, however, recla.s.sified in COCOM, and hence the problem with the large number of exception requests.

141 Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, p. 241; Bertsch (ed.), Controlling East-West Trade, p.

142 This argument was again repeated by the National Academy of Sciences, 'Balancing the National Interest: US National Security Export Controls and Global Economic Compet.i.tion', in Jan. 1987, see Montgomery, 'c.u.mbersome Apparatus', in Cullen, Post-Containment Handbook, pp. 413.

143 Malloy, Economic Sanctions, p. 76.

144 Mastanduno, Economic Containment, p. 299.

145 Quoted from: Michael R.Beschloss and Strobe Talbot, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Little Brown, Boston, 1993), p. 19, News Conference 27 Jan. 1989. 146 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (Vintage Books, New York, 1999), p. 540.

11 Economic statecraft: theoretical considerations 1 Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory (Pantheon, New York, 1992), p. 52.

2 These are the four kinds of force presently identified by scientists. For explanation of them and of string theory, see Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe (Vintage, London, 2000).

3 I do not wish to suggest here that theory has nothing to do with historical explanations, because it does. Historical evidence-led narratives are, of course, underpinned by theoretical a.s.sumptions concerning the status of evidence and the nature of reason-giving as a form of explanation. The past is also a metaphysical a.s.sumption that historians make, as the past by definition is lost to them. Their narratives use correspondence with existing evidence for what the past might have been, but they can never tell if their narratives actually do correspond with the past.

4 Renwick, Economic Sanctions; James Barber, 'Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument', International Affairs, 1979, 55, pp. 36784; Hufbauer and Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered; Ethan Barnaby Kapstein, The Political Economy of National Security: A Global Perspective (South Carolina UP, Columbia, 1992); Nincic and Wallensteen, Dilemmas of Economic Coercion; Martin, Coercive Cooperation; Margaret P.Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective (Macmillan, London, 1996); K.J.Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for a.n.a.lysis (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1988); Baldwin, Economic Statecraft; Rodman, Sanctions Beyond Borders; Thomas WaZlde, 'Managing the Risk of Sanctions in the Global Oil and Gas Industry: Corporate Response Under Political, Legal, and Commercial Pressures', Texas International Law Journal, 2001, 36, pp. 183228; Daniel Denzer, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge UP, New York, 1999).

5 Nincic and Wallensteen, Dilemmas of Economic Coercion, p. 2; contributing to the same work, David A.Deese in 'The Vulnerability of Modern Nations: Economic Diplomacy in East-West Relations', was one of the first to challenge the conventional wisdom that sanctions were ineffective. He argued that those who judged them to be ineffective often made a.s.sumptions that were formulated too narrowly. Had their criteria for success included the impact on the sanctioning state's own domestic const.i.tuency, and intent to punish, discredit and embarra.s.s rather than change the target state's policies, then sanctions would be seen to be more successful. Baldwin made a similar argument even more forcefully in his Economic Statecraft. 6 Doxey, International Sanctions, p. 9; David Mitrany, The Problem of International Sanctions (Oxford UP, London, 1925).

7 Doxey, International Sanctions, p. 9.

8 Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Blackwell, Oxford, 1995); Chris Brown, International Relations: New Normative Approaches (Harvester/Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1992).

9 Doxey, International Sanctions, p. 126.

10 Ibid., p. 9; FRUS 1950, vol. 1, pp. 2523, NSC 68, 14 April 1950. Doxey argues that economic warfare should be distinguished from sanctions when it has no 'moral or legal basis', but the US strategic embargo/cold economic warfare did have a legal basis, and often, if not always, had a moral connotation to it. I am sure that throughout the existence of the strategic embargo there was always at least one senior US official involved who saw it in a moralistic light: would this qualify as a moral basis for the strategic embargo?