US Economic Statecraft for Survival 1933-1991 Part 6

This recommendation positioned US policy on the cusp between a strategic embargo and cold economic warfare. It was a strategic embargo more broadly construed than before and unavoidably involved the intense ambiguities of the fungibility of dual-purpose technology.

Huntington developed a third position that, despite his arguments to the contrary, largely amounted to a recasting of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of linkage, now to be developed through a more muscular use of executive discretion, and with the determination to gain more substantial quid pro quos. This policy was embodied in PD18, and, according to Huntington, meant that US 'economic capabilities and economic relations must serve the basic US foreign policy objectives of encouraging East-West cooperation, containing Soviet expansion, and promoting American values'.91 These objectives certainly seem no different to Kissinger's.

Huntington rejected both the strategy of trying to limit Soviet economic and military capabilities in the crude way that they had been pursued at the height of the Cold War and the seduction strategy involving a laissez-faire approach to trade. The former approach had unravelled with detente and was presumably not now viable because the allies would not co-operate in pursuing it-and, in any case, the underlying a.s.sumption that war was imminent had now changed. Nor was the laissez-faire approach suitable, because it failed to take into account that the Soviets had a centrally controlled economy that gave them advantages that needed to be counteracted with a more pro-active US policy: failure to do this in the past had resulted in a scenario from which the Soviets 'clearly benefited more...than has the United States'. Detente had not kept them from building up their nuclear a.r.s.enal, exporting arms to Third World countries, and interfering in Africa. The Soviets had also been able to ease the problems caused by deep-seated structural flaws in their economy with the $ 18 billion of machinery imports primarily for the auto-motive, petrochemical and energy industries between 1965 and 1973. 'What is needed...is a new approach of conditioned flexibility in which changes in the scope and character of US-Soviet economic relations are linked to and conditioned by progress in the achievement of US political and security objectives...detente must be comprehensive and reciprocal.'92 Huntington believed that the Soviets were vulnerable to economic leverage, particularly in the oil industry, and wanted to devise US policies so that they could take advantage of these vulnerabilities more effectively.93 He believed that economic carrot-and-stick diplomacy worked, and cited the 1972 wheat and SALT deals and the coincidence of liberal Soviet emigration policy and the extension of generous US credits in 1973 as examples. But the Carter Administration had inherited a position in which neither carrots nor sticks were available-there were legal prohibitions on credits and MFN, and there were no effective controls over high technology except for items of direct military use. Huntington was astute and well aware of the difficulties in implementing the policy he was advocating.

Harnessing economic power to foreign policy goals presents formidable obstacles: bureaucratic pluralism and inertia; congressional and interest group politics; the conflicting pulls of alliance diplomacy; and most important, in dramatic contrast to military power, a pervasive ideology that sanctifies the independence, rather than the subordination, of economic power to government.94 Huntington believed that inflexibility was at the heart of US problems in its economic diplomacy with the Soviets. He wanted the President to be granted more discretionary power, particularly to use credits in economic relations with the Soviets. The USA should centralise its control of East-West economic relations and review the existing embargo lists and reintroduce the 1962 criteria of economic significance to deny high technology items to the Soviets on foreign policy grounds. It should reinvigorate COCOM and build on the allies' 1976 'gentlemen's agreement' to abide by agreed rules for extending credits to the Soviets. Huntington summed up the overall nature of his argument: 'I am saying that we should be prepared to engage in economic diplomacy.'95 There were good reasons why the Carter Administration wanted to present itself as different to its predecessors, but in fact Huntington and his boss Brzezinski only differentiated themselves from Kissinger's linkage policy with their rhetoric. Instead of using the term linkage, they adopted the term 'conditioned flexibility'. In practice, what they wanted to do was simply to execute linkage policy more effectively.

There was no clear outcome to this debate before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and thereafter the situation was transformed so dramatically that a further rethinking of strategy took place within both the Carter and Reagan Administrations. In the meantime, policy developed rather erratically. Aspects of all three positions flourished at varying times and uneasily coexisted.

Economic defence policy: developments 19779.

During the first year of the Carter Administration trade policy was permissive, largely by default. Carter gave priority to matters other than to relations with the Soviets, except with regard to SALT. However, even here he was determined to keep SALT isolated. In September 1977 both he and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 'agreed that we did not want to link SALT 2 to any other issue'.96 As we have seen, detente did not prosper through SALT, largely because of Carter's deep cuts proposal, but neither did trade change significantly. PD-18 and the reasoning of both Huntington and Brzezinski, not to mention the Bucy Report, took time to take effect and needed a catalyst to really get things moving. In the meantime worries about the overall trade deficit and suspicions that any further restrictions on US trade would simply provide Western allies with more opportunities to replace American suppliers left US policy on trade with the Soviets unchanged. With the existing credit restrictions and lack of MFN for the Soviets, that already meant substantial slippage in US-Soviet trade volumes. In June 1977 Secretary Kreps was told by the Soviets that US imports were down 50 per cent and overall trade down 25 per cent because of the lack of MFN and credit restrictions. But, the Soviets were not going without. They had simply transferred to Western European and j.a.panese suppliers.97 For Huntington this was the worst of all worlds. US trade needed to be used more effectively: more trade and profits needed to be made out of the Soviets, and that trade could also be used as leverage in the political relations.h.i.+p. In particular, controls over equipment for the Soviet oil and energy industry, or some items of which the USA had an effective monopoly, could be used or threatened to be used to good effect. These convictions were the result of intelligence reports in 1977, which indicated grave problems for the Soviet oil industry and its dependence on Western technology.98 They were further confirmed by the December 1977 Plenum of the Soviet Central Committee, which created an emergency commission on the economy and gave special attention to the problems of the oil industry.99 Despite having a more pro-active policy formulated, despite recommendations still under consideration from the Bucy Report, despite evidence of Soviet vulnerability, and despite continuing fears of Soviet military build-up and activity in the Third World, Brzezinski and Huntington were unable to s.h.i.+ft US policy to a more aggressive line. From January 1977 to July 1978 exports of energy equipment were freely permitted, and a report from the Administration to Congress on International Transfer of Technology set its face firmly against suggestions implicit in the Bucy Report that the USA should seek to tighten up on technology transfers within the West. However, Brzezinski's frustration with this state of affairs was alleviated in the summer of 1978.

The Soviet involvement in Ethiopia and the threat of destabilising the whole Horn of Africa became of greater concern to the USA as 1977 pa.s.sed away Brzezinski wanted to link Soviet behaviour with SALT and trade, but Vance, Kreps and Blumenthal conspired to resist this tactic, at least temporarily. Nevertheless, pressure within the Administration mounted for more positive and possibly more forceful US responses. In March 1978, over Vance's objections, Brzezinski finally persuaded Carter to allow him to visit China in May and build on the relations.h.i.+p that had been initiated by Nixon and Kissinger and quietly developed by Brzezinski, as a way to balance Soviet power effectively in Asia.100 This was the first move towards a more a.s.sertive policy towards the Soviets.

Soviet behaviour in Africa and renewed persecution of dissidents finally moved Carter to action. In speeches at Wake Forrest University on 17 March and at the Annapolis Naval Academy on 7 June 1978, he warned of the stark international options that the Soviets must face. The President raised the spectre of linkages, the dangers of US-Soviet compet.i.tion and, in the clear and unmis-takable language of Brzezinski, the imperative that 'detente must be broadly defined and truly reciprocal'.101 Tensions were clearly mounting. The USA was becoming more a.s.sertive, and the drive for new linkages-or, as Huntington put it, for 'conditioned flexibility'-was gaining momentum. In mid-May, at a meeting to discuss Brzezinski's pending visit to China, Carter recorded: 'We all agreed that a better relations.h.i.+p with China would help us with SALT.'102 Linkage was back on the agenda, and economics was again about to enter high politics.

The key development was the campaign against dissidents in the Soviet Union. Evidence suggests that even in 1978 the Soviet leaders.h.i.+p was still insen-sitive to just how important human rights were-not just to Carter, but to the American public in general, and as a tool for promoting the policies of Brzezinski, the Defense Department, and of the hard-liner John Schlesinger, now Secretary for Energy.103 In July 1978 the Soviets announced that Anatoly Shcharansky and Alexander Ginsberg were both to go to trial. There was a popular outcry in the USA that influenced Carter's domestic advisers, in particular Hamilton Jordan, his White House Chief of Staff, and convinced them that it was politically necessary for the USA to make a strong response. This provided Brzezinski, Schlesinger and Defense Secretary Brown with powerful allies to help overcome the softer line preferred by Vance and the economic departments.

On 8 July Brzezinski chaired an interdepartmental meeting, attended by Marshall Shulman for the State Department, and it was resolved that the USA should take action to tighten up on transfers of high technology items. The following day Vance overruled his own deputy and declared that the State Department did not agree with the proposed action. There now developed a confrontation between Brzezinski, Brown, Schlesinger and Carter's domestic advisers, led by Jordan, on the one hand, and Vance, Blumenthal, Kreps and Bergland on the other.104 On 18 July Carter came down on the side led by Brzezinski. He denied the Soviets a Sperry Univac computer needed by the Ta.s.s news agency for the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, re-established controls on oil production technology, which had been abandoned in 1972, and deferred a decision on a contract for Dresser Industries to supply a drill-bit factory and an electron-beam welder to the Soviets. Brzezinski later smugly observed: 'c.u.mulatively, these steps meant that our highly permissive att.i.tude towards technology transfer to the Soviet Union was now being reversed.'105 In fact things were not so clear-cut. Oil production technology was not automatically embargoed; it was simply put back on the Commercial Commodity List and subject to licensing. And in fact no licences were refused, partly because the Western allies were not prepared to take parallel action, and partly because of bureaucratic inertia and disagreement within the Administration about the appropriateness of such action.106 The State and Commerce departments subsequently tried to conjure up new trade initiatives, but they were thwarted by Brzezinski and the Defense Review Board, which suspended an August decision by the Commerce Department to allow the Dresser contracts to go forward. These contracts then remained in limbo until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, after which they were revoked, losing the USA $144 million.107 Brzezinski, in his memoirs, gives the impression that the final move in this game came in November, when Vance, Blumenthal and Kreps tried to initiate a new review of US embargo policy. Brzezinski successfully stymied that effort by persuading Carter that US-Soviet relations did not warrant it. He concluded: 'the firm principle that there was linkage between politics and trade was finally established.'108 The reintroduction of oil-industry equipment to the control list may have had more immediate effect than Brzezinski expected. The Soviets soon changed their tactics for dealing with dissidents and switched to letting them emigrate, rather than putting them behind bars. The Soviets issued over 31,000 exit visas in 1978, which was a ma.s.sive turn-around and something like the volume achieved at the height of detente. Without effecting any substantive changes to US-Soviet trade, the Americans had managed to get the message across by re-categorising certain items, but continuing to license them. By the winter of 19789 relations had improved quite dramatically, and the Americans continued to pressurise the Soviets by developing their relations with China. Furthermore, the revolution in Iran made Soviet oil look very attractive. On 9 January it was decided to suspend export licences, pending a review in four to six weeks time. There was still pressure to develop a new denials list and revoke some existing contracts, but there was also concern about the effect of this on world oil prices; in short, impairing the Soviet oil industry might not be in US interests if one result were higher prices. Also, the Soviets supplied oil to NATO countries such as Italy, and if the USA were to clamp down on technology exports it might seriously aggravate relations and give the Soviets 'even greater incentive to move into the Middle East'.109 The Americans were increasingly concerned about the growing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, on balance, the auguries for US-Soviet relations seemed more favourable than for some time and reinvigorated plans for a Carter-Brezhnev summit. It was now scheduled for Vienna in June 1979.

On the US economic front things were still very seriously amiss: 1978 witnessed a $42-billion trade deficit, and the disruption of oil supplies because of the Iranian revolution was all set to raise oil prices and add to America's trade deficit burden. On 26 September 1978 Carter announced several export initiatives, but they were palliatives at best. Under such difficult conditions trade with the Soviets and Eastern Europe was important, and from the autumn of 1978 the USA again began to promote rather than restrict energy-industry exports. In 1978 overall US-Soviet trade amounted to $2.8 billion, and in December Kreps and Blumenthal went to Moscow to try to bolster that trade even more. By March 1979 it became public knowledge that Carter wanted to move ahead with developing trade with the Soviets. The Was.h.i.+ngton Post reported his intention of moving in tandem on MFN for both the Soviet Union and China. The reason given was the improvement in emigration practices, which impressed Carter and resulted in a softer line from Charles Vanik. Jackson on the other hand was still adamantly opposed to any change. He argued that the Soviets had only changed because of US pressures, which he believed should be sustained.110 Nevertheless, on 27 April Vance and Blumenthal met Dobrynin and told him that there were signs that Vanik would withdraw his objections to US-Soviet trade after the summit in June and that Stevenson had new legislative proposals that would give the President discretion to extend credits up to $2 billion.111 In May the Was.h.i.+ngton Post reported: The Carter administration has decided to push toward resumption of US trade and tariff benefits for the Soviet Union and has launched a diplomatic initiative aimed at taking action by the time of next month's summit meeting.112.

At the summit Carter and Brezhnev signed SALT 2, and the President told Brezhnev that he intended to seek MFN authority for both the Soviets and the Chinese.113 Developments outside his control prevented him from making good that commitment.

Although problems still severely troubled relations with the Soviets, the US relations.h.i.+p with China was forging ahead, and full diplomatic relations with the PRC were established on 1 January 1979. There followed a number of developments, pushed on by Brzezinski in his desire to develop relations with China as a counterbalance to Soviet power. This became ever more important for him as the Soviets continued their aggressive action in the Horn of Africa and, ominously, involved themselves in Afghanistan. In January 1979 Carter and Teng Hsiao-ping signed an Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology, and at the Guadaloupe Conference that same month Carter informed Western allies that the USA would not object to a more relaxed att.i.tude to arms sales to China. The following month Blumenthal went ahead with his trade talks visit to Peking despite the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. By April Brzezinski had persuaded Vance to allow the British to sell arms to China, and London was told that it might be better not to submit their sales to COCOM for approval. On 7 July the USA signed a trade agreement with China, and on 1 January 1980 it came into effect, with MFN and $2 billion of credits over five years. By this time the USA and its allies were either negotiating for or already delivering high-technology goods with clear dual-purpose use and weapons that were embargoed for the Soviets.114 The tandem approach to MFN had broken down, but this rapid expansion of trade with the Chinese was consistent with the pattern of policy championed for so long by Brzezinski, of aggressively seeking to drive a wedge between the Soviets and the Chinese and engage the latter in the business of power-balancing the former. In November 1979 his triumph was not yet complete. There were still possibilities of inst.i.tutional and legal changes that would help foster better relations with the Soviets and expand trade. In 1979 US-Soviet trade rose to over $4.5 billion with a US surplus of $2.7 billion, and there was an increase of close to 100 per cent in US oil-technology sales to the Soviets, amounting to total sales of $164 million.115 The US Congress, while not willing to repeal Jackson-Vanik did alter the legislative framework in which trade took place. With trade still flouris.h.i.+ng, with increased US interest in the prospects for energy trade with the Soviets, and the SALT 2 agreement signed, there was still hope for detente despite all the criticisms from Jackson, Nitze and their allies and the ongoing problems with the Soviets in Africa and the Middle East.

In 1979 the 1969 EAA was due for renewal, and some significant changes were made reflecting the concerns and ambitions of the Carter Administration and members of the Congress. Effects of the act were more wide-ranging than just matters to do with East-West trade. As we have noted on several occasions, the overall economic situation of the USA created a very great concern that exports should not be unnecessarily restricted, and that legislative controls should not be such that US exporters suffered from de facto discrimination vis-a-vis their counterparts in Western Europe and j.a.pan. Action to establish a uniform Western policy on credits to the Soviet Union had borne some fruit in 1978 with the 'Arrangements on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits', but it was only a gentlemen's agreement, and, contrary to US wishes, the allies insisted that the Soviet Union should be cla.s.sified under the less restrictive category of a middle-income country, rather than as a rich country. Although this removed some of the disadvantage US exporters worked under, before any real benefit could be felt the Stevenson credit restrictions would have to be removed.116 At the same time as legislation edged towards encouraging a growth in US trade, additional control powers to combat international crime and terrorism and high-technology leakages to the communist world were also given high priority.

The act thus tried to develop policy in two rather contradictory ways. It tried to facilitate and promote US exports by specifying more precisely the grounds upon which controls should be based, thus reducing-or at least questioning-the President's discretionary power, but it also addressed problems raised by the Bucy Report on technology transfers, which gave more strength to the voice of the Defense Department and its desire to tighten up on technology transfers.117 The act specified four categories of reasons for controls: national security; foreign-policy goals; short supply; and countering terrorism. It also 'for the first time in the export control context, clearly addressed the President's authority to impose embargoes and the relations.h.i.+p of the authority for foreign policy controls to economic sanctions'.118 It is the first two categories of reasons that concern us here.

The act treated national-security and foreign-policy grounds for embargoing exports under two separate sections, highlighting the different criteria that should be applied. The national-security criterion remained unchanged and depended on whether it was judged that export 'would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental to the United States'.119 However, important procedural changes were made which would create a potentially more restrictive policy on technology transfers. The Bucy Report recommendations were followed in that the Department of Defense was mandated to draw up a critical technologies list by 1 August 1980.120 This in itself gave the Defense Department more say in the content of policy, and it was to continue to make decisions on licences in conjunction with the Commerce Department.121 The Defense Department was now clearly positioned to take a more restrictive line on technology exports if it so wished, or if events unfolded in such a way as to persuade it that a tighter policy was justified.

The story of foreign-policy controls is rather different. Initially the Congress tried to insert severe controls on Presidential discretionary power and set limits to the kinds of justification allowable for imposing controls. The White House lobbied hard against the imposition of such limiting criteria and was largely successful. One scholar has described the new requirements placed on the President as 'nothing more than procedural nuisances'.122 The act confirmed that, as in the past, controls were justified 'to restrict the export of goods and technology...to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfil its declared international obligations'.123 These nuisances consisted of requiring the President to a.s.sess foreign availability and to try to get other Western countries to co-operate. He had to gauge the impact on the US economy, a.s.sess his ability to enforce controls, whether they would succeed, and their impact on other US foreign political objectives. But, when all is said and done, these were indeed simply nuisances: they did not in effect restrict the President's freedom of action. However, another provision of the act did have the potential to do so. It stipulated that export controls, introduced under the rubric of foreign-policy grounds, could be repealed by a concurrent resolution in both houses of Congress. This was to cause considerable concern within the Administration in January 1980, when Carter imposed the grain embargo as one of his measures of retaliation against the Soviets for their invasion of Afghanistan.124 In the late summer and early autumn of 1979, US economic relations hung in an uneasy balance. Brzezinski had not won the day outright. Vestiges of detente remained, and there were still strong forces pus.h.i.+ng for more trade and the development of the Soviet oil industry to offset oil price rises in the Middle East resulting from the Iranian revolution and the on-going impact of OPEC. The repositioning of the Department of Defense in the bureaucracy of export licensing had still not been fully exploited, and the signing of SALT 2 had rekindled hope among those not adamantly pitted against detente; the treaty was now before the Senate. At the same time troubles with the Soviets intensified in other spheres. The USA kept up pressure through its rearmament programme and its development of relations with China, but, the Soviets continued not to respond, at least in a favourable way, to US arguments and pressures. They continued both their activities in Africa and their development of relations with Afghanistan. Of most immediate concern was a crisis in relations between the two countries caused by the 'discovery' of a Soviet brigade on Cuba. Domestic politics combined forces with the media to make such a serious issue out of this that it delayed ratification of SALT 2 in the Senate. Later Was.h.i.+ngton conceded that the Soviet military presence on Cuba was no different from that agreed upon by the Kennedy Administration shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.125 That discovery came too late to help SALT 2, or what was now a very frail process of detente. A conversation between Brezhnev and the East German leader Eric Honecker on 4 October revealed just how frail. The Soviet leader explained: It is our impression that until recently those who supported ratification of this treaty [SALT 2] had the upper hand. Now the situation has become more complicated. The hysterical clamor in the United States-in which the Carter Administration directly partic.i.p.ated-over the stationing of a Soviet brigade in Cuba has become a serious impediment, [also]...Was.h.i.+ngton is increasingly actively playing its China card.126 The Soviets were no longer sanguine about detente. They increasingly saw the Americans as wis.h.i.+ng to abandon it for political reasons, and thus they calculated that they had less to lose from aggressive action on the periphery: for example, in Afghanistan.

After the murder of their protege President Taraki in Kabul in October and the coming to power of Hafizullah Amin, the Soviets began to consider military intervention in Afghanistan. Their growing involvement there did not go unno-ticed by the Americans. Furthermore, when Iranian revolutionaries seized 53 members of the US emba.s.sy in Teheran on 4 November 1979, US views about the instability of the whole Middle Eastern region became even more pessimistic.127 Their inability to take effective action to end the humiliation of the hostages also created a credibility problem for the Carter Administration. These problems were vastly compounded on 25 December when troops from the 103rd and 105th Soviet airborne divisions flew into Kabul. Two days later Soviet ground troops crossed the Afghan border. Meanwhile, Soviet troops and KGB officers stormed the presidential palace, executed Amin and installed Babrak Karmal as the new President.128 This changed everything for Carter: the Soviets had miscalculated the extent of likely US retaliation. Soviet Amba.s.sador to Was.h.i.+ngton Anatoly Dobrynin later rhetorically asked, 'Why was the American reaction to the introduction of Soviet troops in faraway Afghanistan so disproportionately strong when compared, for example, to the reaction in Europe in 1968 to the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia, where much more vital interests were involved?' The answer to that question has much to do with the prevailing view within the USA of its own new-found vulnerability. The disproportionately strong response was communicated largely in economic terms, which leads the story of modern US economic defence strategy literally and figuratively into its last chapter.

10 Through the second Gold War to liberation.

unless the Soviets recognize that it [the invasion of Afghanistan] has been counter-productive for them, we will face additional serious problems with invasions or subversion in the future.

President Carter, Diary 3 January 19801.

Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans. Maybe this shouldn't have surprised me but it did.

Ronald Reagan2.

The fact that most embargoes are considered failures is largely explained by the decentralised decision-making of the market economies. Unless there is state trade or perfect cooperation between exporters and importers, trade flow accommodation eventually occurs. This favours the target country and makes the embargo inefficient. There are other effects which also contribute to inefficiency, but trade flow accommodation is the major one.3 The Carter Administration responded promptly to the Soviet military action in Afghanistan. It was determined to convey to the world at large its moral outrage at the invasion, to make the Soviets suffer, and to draw its allies together in order to take stronger precautionary measures against the dangers of both the strategic build-up in the Soviet Union and its expansive tendencies.

On 2 January Carter recalled the US amba.s.sador from Moscow for consultations, as a public sign of disapproval; others followed. On 3, 4, 8, 11, 20 and 21 January announcements came in staccato succession: the President asked the Senate to suspend consideration of the SALT 2 agreement; he boycotted US grain exports to the Soviet Union above the guaranteed 8 million tons stipulated in the 1975 agreement; he restricted Soviet fis.h.i.+ng rights in US waters and Aeroflot landings in the USA; all validated export licences were suspended pending a 46 week review; the USA would not take part in the Moscow Olympics; and computer licences for the Kama River truck factory were revoked-even this list does not exhaust the range of responses. US rhetoric directed at the Soviets hardened dramatically. The China card was played with even more gusto. A range of measures to strengthen the West's military position in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean included taking steps to provide military aid both to anti-Soviet forces within Afghanistan and to the government of Pakistan. And diplomatic efforts were made to persuade allies to support the US stance and to tighten the strategic embargo through a reinvigoration of COCOM. On the evening of the 23 January, in his State of the Union Address to Congress, the President p.r.o.nounced what became known as the Carter Doctrine.

Let our position be absolutely clear; an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an a.s.sault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an a.s.sault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.4 The first Soviet invasion of a non-communist bloc country, fears that it could be a preliminary to others, and the Iranian revolution (which transformed a client state into a mortal enemy) plunged the whole Middle East and US policy for the region into turmoil. Western oil supplies, communications, the US strategic position, and its allies were all under threat, and there was fear of more possible Soviet adventurism. On 3 January the President noted in his diary that the Soviets 'might be tempted toward further aggression'.5 Carter and his advisers judged resolute action to be vital. New and higher defence spending targets were set, the Administration pushed ahead with the Rapid Deployment Force, and progress along the path towards PD-59 was accelerated: it was promulgated in July 1980.

These military steps simply followed the direction that had already been set by those who were dissatisfied with detente and fearful of the deteriorating US strategic position. The clearest departure points from immediate past practice were in the economic and political spheres. Here the actions might be characterised as symbolic, punitive and long-term strategic measures.6 The most important symbolic action was the Olympic boycott, but this was not as powerful as it might have been, because many US allies either would not follow suit or, for legal reasons, could not. The grain embargo was meant to be the key punitive measure: 'an a.n.a.lysis of possible sanctions revealed that this was the only one which would significantly affect the Soviet economy.'7 And yet during 197980 the Soviets managed to increase their imports to a record high of 30 million tons, and their livestock levels were higher at the end of 1980 than at the start of the year; this was achieved by paying more for their imports in the short term, but the Soviet consumer did not suffer. Meanwhile, grain and rice contracts with Argentina, Brazil, India and Canada exposed divisions among the free-world countries, strengthened the Soviet position in the long-term through supply diversification, and lost US farmers much of the Eastern bloc market.8 The long-term US goal of reinvigorating the Western multilateral embargo and expanding its scope had only limited success, and this also exposed differences and caused much friction among the Western allies.

On the basis of these consequences one might be tempted to agree with those who, like Lundborg, conclude that sanctions and embargoes are extremely difficult tools to wield effectively, and that Carter might have done better to adopt a lower-key approach, like Johnson had done at the time of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, this would be to fall into error: it would oversimplify the kind of response that Carter wanted to make by using inappropriately narrow criteria to a.n.a.lyse the goals of his actions. Such an appraisal of the situation would overemphasize quantifiable observable consequences, rather than weighing in the balance the 'inside' meanings of these three forms of action. My objective here is not to pa.s.s judgement on whether what Carter did was morally correct, appropriate or effective; it is to explain what actions his Administration thought were necessary, and to point out that some of them were not dependent upon strictly defined instrumental results. It is also important to note that the Administration's decision-making power was not totally autonomous: at least on the margin, domestic political pressures were significant in decisions about how the USA should respond. What Carter and his a.s.sociates did cannot be reduced to neat calculations in simple instrumental terms about the effectiveness of the grain embargo or the longer-term strategic measures. Here, no less than in the symbolism of the Olympic boycott, the Administration was determined to convey messages to the Soviets, to allies, to the rest of the world, and to its own domestic audience. Only by appreciating these factors can one fully understand what Carter did. The grain embargo was not just a sanction to hurt the Soviets, nor were the longer-term economic defence measures solely intended to restrict their military capability; like so many other measures embodied in US economic defence policies over the years, these were multi-faceted instruments of economic statecraft, and they had an inner dimension as well as aiming for visible and quantifiable instrumental effects. These complexities are revealed in the way the members of the Administration discussed what actions to take and why they should take them. Another way of emphasising the point is to suggest that-even if Carter could have been fully aware of just how limited the immediate economic effects the embargo would be on the Soviets, and if he had calculated that in the longer term his actions would have strengthened Soviet economic autarky and weakened US agricultural exports-he would still have gone ahead with the embargo.9 Sanctions, economic defence policy and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan The distinction between sanctions and economic defence strategies is not easy to sustain. The grain embargo was meant to send out a clear message of disapproval to the Soviet Union and of resolve to Western allies. It was designed to hurt or sanction the Soviets and communicate a deterrent effect, warning the Soviets of how seriously the USA took their aggression. These aspects of the grain embargo are cla.s.sic characteristics of sanctions: sending messages, punis.h.i.+ng and affecting the target state's policy, either to try to reverse it or to deter further developments. Here, it was a case of deterrence against further aggression, as no one in the Administration believed that the grain embargo would cause the Soviets to with-draw.10 However, the grain embargo was also inst.i.tuted for other reasons that were directly connected with broader issues to do with both affecting the Soviets' overall mind-set (in terms of how they perceived US resolve and intentions) and strengthening the US and allied economic defence policy. The Americans concluded that the allies would be unlikely to respond positively in COCOM to proposals for tighter controls on high-technology items if the USA were not paying a price itself, such as the one involved in the grain embargo. And fungibility, too, came into the calculation: imposing costs on the Soviets by embargoing grain would force them to reallocate resources that could otherwise have been deployed for military or strategic purposes. For these reasons the grain embargo (sanctions) and moves to tighten technology transfer controls (economic defence policies) are dealt with together, albeit with an awareness that different emphases are applicable with regard to their respective main purpose.

The key meetings that formulated US policy were held between 30 December and 3 January. At these meetings-as Carter, Brzezinski and others have noted-the State Department officials were uncharacteristically hawkish, while the NSA was equally uncharacteristically quiet and cautious. This was partly because of Brzezinski's concern to strike the right balance in the US response (it had to be firm but not over-provocative) and partly because he was effective behind the scenes. He quickly saw that his long-held views were in the ascendancy among key members of the Administration. Most importantly of all, Carter favoured a more aggressive response than either the embittered State Department officials or even his NSA. There was thus little need for Brzezinski vociferously to champion a position that had already won the day.

His reticence in the meetings was certainly not due to lack of concern, as a lengthy memorandum to Carter on 26 December reveals. Brzezinski had already expressed his anxieties about the regional crisis in the Middle East because of the collapse of the pro-Western regime in Iran and growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Now, with a prospect of Soviet military control of Afghanistan, he feared for Pakistan and dreaded the eventuality of the Soviets gaining direct access to the Indian Ocean and a 'presence right down on the edge of the Arabian and Oman Gulfs'.11 He also feared that the Chinese would compare Soviet decisiveness in Afghanistan unfavourably with US impotence in Iran. He knew that similar judgements among the US public would arouse critics on both the Left and the Right, and damage the prospects for SALT 2. He was also concerned that general instability in the Middle East would make it more difficult than ever for the USA to act effectively there, especially in trying to resolve the hostage crisis in Teheran. He took some consolation from the facts that the Western allies would probably see more need to tend to their own defences in the light of blatant Soviet aggression, and that Afghanistan could turn out to be the Soviets' Vietnam.12 In the meantime, he suggested that the USA should work with China and Islamic countries to support the Afghan resistance movement, give support and aid to Pakistan, and consider taking the issue to the UN as a threat to world peace. Throughout, Brzezinski was deeply concerned that the Soviets should receive the right message from Was.h.i.+ngton.

Unless we tell the Soviets directly and very clearly that our relations will suffer, I fear that the Soviets will not take our 'expressions of concern' very seriously, with the effect that our relations will suffer, without the Soviets ever having been confronted with the need to ask the question whether such local adventurism is worth the long-term damage to the US-Soviet relations.h.i.+p.13 The question of how the USA should get its message across to the Soviets became even more acute after the overthrow of Amin and the installation of Karmal. Carter was determined to appear strong and resolute. 'I [Carter] sent Brezhnev on the hot line the sharpest message of my Presidency, telling him that the invasion of Afghanistan was "a clear threat to the peace" and "could mark a fundamental and long-lasting turning point in our relations". On 28 December he rang his closest ally, Margaret Thatcher of Britain, and sought to engage her support in getting a consolidated and strong Western message across to the Kremlin. While a number of a.n.a.lyses in the 1980s and early 1990s concluded that the USA only got lukewarm support from allies,15 Thatcher's account in her memoirs certainly gives a different impression. Although Britain had felt unable to support US policy towards Iran, Thatcher 'was determined that we should follow America's lead now' and she a.s.sured Carter accordingly.16 However, words without actions would not, as Brezezinski had observed, impress the Soviets. The Americans knew that they must back up words with both US and allied actions, but without dangerously escalating the crisis out of control and into the realm of a direct military confrontation. These considerations were why economic responses were deemed to be so important and appropriate as they were non-military forms of punis.h.i.+ng, of low-level coercing, and of expressing moral outrage.

Like scorned lovers, those who had strongly supported detente now reacted with outrage at Soviet aggression. At the NSC meeting on 30 December Vance proposed registration for a military draft and deep cuts in grain s.h.i.+pments to the Soviet Union.17 Both were political dynamite. The proposal for the draft was never acted upon, and a decision about a grain embargo was postponed for further consideration after Vice President Mondale pointed out its political dangers for the 1980 presidential election campaign.

Embargoing grain was a highly charged issue for several reasons. First, Carter had declared in his 1976 campaign that he would not embargo grain except for national security reasons: how he would get round that without political damage as he entered the 1980 election year was a real problem. Secondly, if he did embargo on national security grounds, he would have to make a case that selling grain to the Soviets threatened US security-an argument that did not have immediate plausi-bility. On the other hand, invoking foreign-policy grounds for an embargo would breach his 1976 campaign promise, and his action would be vulnerable to a concurrent veto vote in Congress. Such a reversal would severely undermine US foreign policy and suggest to the Soviets that the USA was incapable of taking decisive action. Thirdly, the Iowa caucus was about to take place, and Carter did not wish to damage his popularity in that great corn-producing state by embargoing grain sales to the Soviets.18 In particular, Carter's domestic policy advisers were worried that a grain embargo would transfer more support to Senator Edward Kennedy's challenge to Carter's bid for reselection as the Democrat Party presidential candidate. Fourthly, as always on this issue, while the farming community would cry foul at a grain embargo, organised labour (particularly the longsh.o.r.emen) would cry foul at the Soviet invasion and might once again take to inst.i.tuting its own embargo, irrespective of what the President decided to do. The domestic political situation was therefore of real significance here. Garthoff goes so far as to claim that 'The risks he [Carter] saw were not so much in terms of future relations with the Soviet Union, as in terms of domestic US politics.'19 The overall character of the US response was decided in two NSC meetings on 2 and 4 January. At the 2 January meeting there was lengthy discussion, and, according to Brzezinski, no less than 26 specific measures were agreed.20 However, three crucial issues still remained unresolved: the possibilities of a grain embargo and of an Olympic boycott, and relations with China. Carter 'was not sure that what we decided today will deter the Soviet [sic] from going into Pakistan and Iran'.21 Everyone in the meeting was clearly looking for positive actions, but differences arose about how severe and how extensive they should be.

The meeting meandered around. Then, after considering various possibilities, the issue of a grain embargo surfaced, and Secretary of Labor Dunlop warned that the longsh.o.r.emen were already considering a strike, which would impose a de facto grain embargo upon the Soviets. This sparked off a number of concerns. Presidential Chief of Staff Jody Powell pointed out that the government would have to buy and store US grain if the Soviet market were closed. Mondale worried about confrontation between the longsh.o.r.emen and the farmers, and was in fact strongly against the whole idea of a grain embargo. One of the leading hawks was Lloyd Cutler, Legal Counsel to the President. He took a strong line throughout and advised that it would be better for the President independently to impose a grain embargo rather than have it thrust upon him by the longsh.o.r.emen. At this point Carter asked his domestic adviser, Stuart Eizenstat, to look into the position of the longsh.o.r.emen and report back as quickly as possible. However, this was not before Secretary of State Vance had made his position clear, and it was a position that rather surprised both Brzezinski and Carter by its resolve and firmness.

The Secretary of State said he thought that we have to cut back on grain s.h.i.+pments to the 8 million tons [guaranteed]...Without such action we do not believe our allies would do anything in the way of economic restrictions or penalties to the Soviet Union. He knew this would be a high price to pay but it would be necessary.22 The meeting gradually moved on, with Brzezinski mentioning the possibility of an Olympic boycott. While the State Department's position on the grain embargo had been surprisingly hard-line, discussion on the Olympic boycott revealed a less combative position. Vance and his deputy Warren Christopher opposed a boycott, claiming that it would be unnecessary if a grain embargo were imposed. 'Lloyd Cutler took a contrary view. He felt we could only boycott the Olympics if we took strong economic sanctions, otherwise we would trivi-alize our actions by only focusing on the Olympics.'23 Cutler was supported by Defence Secretary Brown, who then led the discussion on into the question of allied support on trade and credit restrictions. This issue again showed that, while State was prepared to take strong action, it was by no means the most hard-line exponent of sanctions, as Brzezinski and Carter have implied in their memoirs. Christopher commented that he thought the allies might be supportive and, for example, refuse to renew credit agreements with the Soviets, providing that the USA took strong measures itself. Christopher clearly thought that the 'strong measures' condition could be met by the grain embargo. Cutler and Brown had a more comprehensive view about how to fulfil the 'strong measures' condition. This was also a matter of deep concern to the President who said that the USA should 'make a maximum effort to get our allies behind us'.24 In short, one of the factors pus.h.i.+ng those who sought a hard line was fear that, if they failed to be resolute and implement harsh policies, then the allies would fail to cooperate. Carter favoured a tightening of the multilateral embargo on a case-by-case basis and was prepared to widen the gap between the USA and the COCOM embargo list so long as it did not damage US companies. Brzezinski later instructed the Defence and Commerce departments to explore this.

By now the meeting had been in progress for some time, and Carter became agitated by the fact that they did not appear to have decided much. a.s.serting a more decisive tone: 'The President said that we ought to explore with our allies the possible curtailment of both grain and industrial s.h.i.+pments.'25 Eizenstat and Cutler were delegated the responsibility for putting things on paper for the President to help him decide these matters. The meeting closed with the President still clearly unhappy that the USA was not going to appear as strong and decisive as he wanted it to. As things came to a close he mused that 'he was inclined to go ahead on a grain embargo in order to give the Soviets a signal on their behaviour'.26 This comment both summed up the main preoccupation of the meeting and gave an indicator of what was eventually to come.

Apart from Mondale, there was surprisingly little opposition in the NSC to the idea of a grain embargo. Indeed, on 4 January it became apparent that Agriculture Secretary Bergland was actually prepared to restrict grain s.h.i.+pments to below the 8-million-ton guarantee of the 1975 agreement.27 However, Stuart Eizenstat, presidential adviser on domestic affairs and policy, and someone whose judgement was much trusted by Carter, shot a vehemently argued critique across the bows of the pro-embargo consensus on 3 January. Eizenstat had been requested, along with Cutler, to put things on paper for the President concerning the grain embargo. Whether the following memorandum to the President was Eizenstat's response to that request or whether it was a separate letter of counsel is unclear. What is clear is Eizenstat's vehement opposition to the grain embargo: 'I would like to recommend strongly against your proposing such action.'28 His memorandum is important because it spelt out clearly the dangers and risks involved, and in doing so he made Carter fully aware of them. Eizenstat essentially thought that the embargo would be politically damaging for Carter. It would repudiate commitments he had previously made, when, in Eizenstat's view, there was no national security interest to justify that. He was worried that if the action were justified on foreign-policy grounds that there would be a congressional veto. The USA would also be in breach of contract and acquire a reputation for commercial unreliability. The overall impact the embargo might have on the Soviet Union was unclear, but he was convinced that the impact of the embargo in the USA would be 'very severe'.29 Carter remained unmoved.

The next day the President decided to go ahead with both the grain embargo and moves to tighten up on high technology transfers. A decision on the Olympics was still left in abeyance: it was not until 20 January that Carter announced a boycott. On playing the China card, Carter resisted the pleas from Brzezinski and Brown to initiate a formal defence relations.h.i.+p, which was also strongly opposed by Vance, Christopher and Cutler, but he said that Brown could offer the Chinese over-the-horizon radar and more favourable trade arrangements during his forthcoming visit to Beijing. For the time being, however, there were to be no arms sales.30 These meetings disclosed that, while the State Department favoured a vigorous response, it was actually Carter who pushed for the widest range of strong measures, with Cutler, Brown and Brzezinski close behind him in their support. Carter announced the range of measures that the USA intended to implement against the Soviets on the evening of 4 January. His diary of that day discloses precisely what he intended: We discussed how far we wanted to go with economic measures against the Soviet Union. I want to go the maximum degree-interrupting grain sales, high technology, cancelling fis.h.i.+ng rights, re-examining our commerce guidelines, establis.h.i.+ng a difference in COCOM...between the Soviet Union and China, cancelling visits to the Soviet Union, restricting any sort of negotiations on culture trade and so forth...possibly withdrawing from the Olympics.31 The next day Jordan advised Carter of the public response in terms of White House phone-ins, which were 2:1 in favour. Those against were split between those opposed to the grain embargo and those who wanted even firmer action. In Iowa support for Carter had slumped from 66 per cent to 45 per cent, but there was comfort in the news that most of those who had swung away were now undecided, rather than falling in with Carter's main Democrat opponent, Edward Kennedy.32 The idea of linking the grain boycott with measures to restrict industrial/high-technology exports seemed to have worked. Public opinion was generally very supportive, but there was still a serious domestic problem to be resolved: how to justify the grain embargo under the provisions of the EAA. On 10 January the Attorney General's Office urged Cutler to rely on the foreign-policy grounds of Section 6, rather than national security under Section 5-otherwise the President would provoke opposition in Congress and it would be difficult to justify grain as being important to Soviet military potential. Joe Onek, Deputy Counsel to the President, provided Cutler with some arguments to counter that advice, indicating that the wording of the EAA was susceptible to an interpretation that the President had discretion to use national-security grounds to control non-military goods.33 Subsequent expert judgement on that interpretation found it to be contrary to the clear intent of the 1979 EAA.34 After the removal of items of significant economic potential from the embargo scope of the EAA, and in the light of Congress's wish to draw a clear distinction between foreign-policy and national-security grounds for an embargo, one could only conclude that the use of Section 5 was stretching discretionary Presidential power beyond its strict legal limits. Nevertheless, Cutler argued strongly that Carter should justify the embargo on the grounds of both Section 6 and Section 5 of the EAA.

There is at least one strong reason. If the action is taken under section 6 alone this would increase the chance of a significant effort to organize a two-House veto as the statute permits in the case of section 6 actions. As you know, the statute does not permit a legislative veto of section 5 actions.... A serious veto effort, of course, would be most unfortunate. It would put in question this government's determination to convince the Soviets that we will impose a cost for invasions of neighboring countries, and encourage them to believe that we are too divided to make any such action stick.35 By 18 January, despite the arguments from the Attorney General's office, the decision had been taken to justify the grain embargo on the grounds of both Sections 5 and 6.

Cutler reiterated to the President, 'we hope that reliance on both grounds will diminish the chances of a serious effort to veto.'36 The Administration's strategy was never seriously challenged, and the grain embargo went into operation.37 It was accompanied by measures to cus.h.i.+on US farmers against loss of income from unsold grain,38 and a search for new markets. The volume of US grain exports actually rose 22 per cent in 197980 and continued to rise the following year.39 The other main factor in ensuring the success of the embargo was to prevent grain getting through to the Soviets. Secretary Bergland had led Carter and the NSC to believe that only the USA could supply the quant.i.ties of grain the Soviets were seeking to buy,40 and restricting US exports to 8 million tons would leave them 17 million tons short on what they had contracted for with the USA. However, it soon became clear that Bergland had not got this right, and that it was now necessary to secure the co-operation of other free-world grain producers. The USA tried to capitalise on the reaction against the Soviets' use of blatant aggression. Britain at least gave verbal support, culminating in Prime Minister Thatcher's strong anti-Soviet stance in the House of Commons at the end of January, of which Brzezinski later commented: 'Frankly I consider this to be the best statement on this subject.'41 But, unfortunately for Carter, tangible support from the free-world grain producers was not so forthcoming. At a meeting called by the USA in Was.h.i.+ngton on 12 January, the EC, Australia and Canada initially agreed to keep grain sales to the Soviets to normal levels. However, Argentina would agree to no such thing, and only attended the meeting on the understanding that it would not boycott grain to the Soviets.

A joker in the pack made it all the more difficult to keep the others in play. The Americans now considered the possibility of controlling US sales to all free-world destinations in order to prevent leakage-or trade flow accommodation, as Lundborg more technically terms it. But the conclusion sent to Carter was: 'Your advisers all agree that attempting to limit Soviet imports from other sources by controlling US grain exports to all destinations is unworkable, unwise, and likely to have no significant effect on the USSR.'42 As Argentine sales rose quickly from 12 million tons up to 8 million, and rumours spread of a long-term contract, Canada became increasingly restive. Only a personal telephone appeal from Carter directly to Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau forestalled accelerated Canadian grain sales.43 However, in October, when the USA announced a deal to sell 6 million tons of grain a year to China, one of Canada's main markets, Trudeau's loyalty gave way. Canadian sales were no longer held in check, and the following year a long-term Canadian-Soviet grain deal was struck.44 As early as June 1980 the view of key Carter advisers was that: 'Unless we have a high degree of international cooperation or the Soviets have a poor crop, both of which seem unlikely, the suspension will lose much of its effectiveness.... [however] total abandonment of the suspension is probably not advisable.'45 Once inst.i.tuted, it was always going to be difficult to change the embargo without looking weak and irresolute. Such considerations were now more significant than ever for the Carter Administration, not just because of the presidential election campaign or for generally maintaining credibility in Carter's foreign policy, but because of yet another specific setback to US standing in the world. On 24 April a helicopter-borne special-forces team set out to rescue the American hostages in Teheran. It failed. The whole episode was a humiliating fiasco, and, among other things, the rescue plan prompted the resignation of Vance on 21 April and his replacement by Edmund Muskie.

Despite evidence that the embargo was only having a marginal economic effect on the Soviets, that the free world had broken ranks on grain exports to them, and that, justified or not, the US farming community was politically restless about the embargo, Carter continued with it until the end of his presidency. Even after his defeat at the polls by Reagan, he stuck firmly to the embargo. On 12 November Eizenstat, in response to a letter from Senator Pressler, explained that only two things would change the President's mind, a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, or the embargo becoming ineffective.46 However, he did not elaborate on what 'becoming ineffective' actually meant. Many a.s.sumed an effective embargo was one that economically hurt the Soviets by denying them grain, but, as we have seen, the issue was far more complex. The embargo was always largely an exercise in sending messages to the Soviets and to allies. It was a deterrent message, an expression of American moral condemnation, and it was deemed to be necessary to show the allies that the USA was prepared to accept costs in restricting its economic relations with the Soviets if it were to have any chance of convincing them to take effective action in controlling high-technology transfers. Dismantling the embargo in late 1980 would have damaged all these objectives-indeed, dismantling it then would have been more damaging for Carter, both politically at home and for his foreign policy abroad, than if the embargo had never been inst.i.tuted in the first place. It was not until April 1981 that the embargo was lifted by Carter's successor Ronald Reagan. 'The US negotiated a new grain agreement with the USSR in August 1983, which included the humiliating provision that the US would not impose export controls for foreign-policy reasons. Even that has done little to boost grain sales to Moscow.'47 Although new grain sales may only have been possible by accepting 'humiliating' provisions, nevertheless, Carter's main objectives were furthered by the embargo. It helped to s.h.i.+ft US policy towards a more restrictive strategic embargo, gave the Soviets grounds to pause for both thought and more caution, and went at least some way towards raising a modic.u.m of allied support for changes in COCOM.

While the grain embargo and the Olympic boycott were the Carter Administration's most visible responses, moves to tighten controls on technology transfers were important and had longer-term effects. Once it had been decided that the USA ought to act in conjunction with its allies to restrict technology transfers, Carter instructed the Secretary of Commerce to suspend licensing and review those recently granted 'particularly those involving oil and gas production goods and technology'. 'Finally, I direct you, in consultation with the Secretary of State and other appropriate officials, to conduct a comprehensive review of all commercial transactions with the Soviet Union, including those now not subject to validated license requirements, to determine whether further action is appropriate.'48 The Secretary of State and the Department of Defense were given the job of following this up in COCOM. The determination of Cutler and Brzezinski to implement new and effective controls was clear from longhand written advice on an 8 January memorandum to Carter: 'It is important that the bureaucracy not dilute your publicly announced posture.'49 While the publicly announced posture indicated the President's strong line, it did not encompa.s.s everything. That was only revealed by the comprehensive reforms that the Administration wanted to effect in COCOM. The agenda for a meeting on high-technology transfers on 9 January clearly indicated the full ramifications of what the Carter Administration was now after. It aimed to reverse COCOM's exemption policy and sought support for US proposals for new denials and the revoking of licences recently granted, a review of the COCOM lists, and the selection of new embargo items on the basis of foreign-policy criteria, rather than the narrower security criteria.50 With regard to the more restrictive technology transfer policy the USA wished to promote, there are two significant matters of interpretation at issue. The first concerns the extent to which the Americans wanted to change existing policy. Did this, as Mastanduno claims (along with others), amount to a switch from a strategic embargo to (cold) economic warfare? Second, just how responsive were the allies to America's proposals? While these can be posed as separate questions, we shall see that they are not separate issues.

Mastanduno's judgement on the response from allies seems apt enough: '[it] demonstrated both their willingness in principle to bolster the strategic embargo and their sentiment that Afghanistan did not justify allowing security concerns to be given overriding priority in the export control system.'51 But even this disguises the differentiated responses from the West Europeans. Prime Minister Thatcher was keen to be supportive, and Britain did not renew the Anglo-Soviet credit agreement when it expired in early 1980, was willing to see technology transfer rules in COCOM tightened, and did its best to mobilise support in other European countries.52 Carter later described Britain, along with a clutch of other friendly countries, as staunch and helpful, but 'others