Sophisms of the Protectionists Part 24

Still, let the monopolists rea.s.sure themselves. These robberies, by means of bounties or tariffs, even if they do violate equity as much as robbery, do not break the law; on the contrary, they are perpetrated through the law. They are all the worse for this, but they have nothing to do with _criminal justice_.

Besides, w.i.l.l.y-nilly, we are all _robbers_ and _robbed_ in the business.

Though the author of this book cries _stop thief_, when he buys, others can cry the same after him, when he sells. If he differs from many of his countrymen, it is only in this: he knows that he loses by this game more than he gains, and they do not; if they did know it, the game would soon cease.

Nor do I boast of having first given this thing its true name. More than sixty years ago, Adam Smith said:

"When manufacturers meet it may be expected that a conspiracy will be planned against the pockets of the public." Can we be astonished at this when the public pay no attention to it?

An a.s.sembly of manufacturers deliberate officially under the name of _Industrial League_. What goes on there, and what is decided upon?

I give a very brief summary of the proceedings of one meeting:

"A s.h.i.+p-builder. Our mercantile marine is at the last gasp (warlike digression). It is not surprising. I cannot build without iron. I can get it at ten francs _in the world's market_; but, through the law, the managers of the French forges compel me to pay them fifteen francs. Thus they take five francs from me. I ask freedom to buy where I please.

"An Iron Manufacturer. _In the world's market_ I can obtain transportation for twenty francs. The s.h.i.+p-builder, through the law, requires thirty. Thus he _takes_ ten francs from me. He plunders me; I plunder him. It is all for the best.

"A Public Official. The conclusion of the s.h.i.+p-builder's argument is highly imprudent. Oh, let us cultivate the touching union which makes our strength; if we relax an iota from the theory of protection, good-bye to the whole of it.

"The s.h.i.+p-builder. But, for us, protection is a failure. I repeat that the s.h.i.+pping is nearly gone.

"A Sailor. Very well, let us raise the discriminating duties against goods imported in foreign bottoms, and let the s.h.i.+p-builder, who now takes thirty francs from the public, hereafter take forty.

"A Minister. The government will push to its extreme limits the admirable mechanism of these discriminating duties, but I fear that it will not answer the purpose.

"A Government Employe. You seem to be bothered about a very little matter. Is there any safety but in the bounty? If the consumer is willing, the tax-payer is no less so. Let us pile on the taxes, and let the s.h.i.+p-builder be satisfied. I propose a bounty of five francs, to be taken from the public revenues, to be paid to the s.h.i.+p-builder for each quintal of iron that he uses.

"Several Voices. Seconded, seconded.

"A Farmer. I want a bounty of three francs for each bushel of wheat.

"A Weaver. And I two francs for each yard of cloth.

"The Presiding Officer. That is understood. Our meeting will have originated the system of _drawbacks_, and it will be its eternal glory.

What branch of manufacturing can lose hereafter, when we have two so simple means of turning losses into gains--the _tariff_ and _drawbacks_.

The meeting is adjourned."

Some supernatural vision must have shown me in a dream the coming appearance of the _bounty_ (who knows if I did not suggest the thought to M. Dupin?), when some months ago I wrote the following words:

"It seems evident to me that protection, without changing its nature or effects, might take the form of a direct tax levied by the State, and distributed in indemnifying bounties to privileged manufacturers."

And after having compared protective duties with the bounty:

"I frankly avow my preference for the latter system; it seems to me more just, more economical, and more truthful. More just, because if society wishes to give gratuities to some of its members, all should contribute; more economical, because it would save much of the expense of collection, and do away with many obstacles; and, finally, more truthful, because the public could see the operation plainly, and would know what was done."

Since the opportunity is so kindly offered us, let us study this _robbery by bounties_. What is said of it will also apply to _robbery by tariff_, and as it is a little better disguised, the direct will enable us to understand the indirect, cheating. Thus the mind proceeds from the simple to the complex.

But is there no simpler variety of robbery? Certainly, there is _highway robbery_, and all it needs is to be legalized, or, as they say now-a-days, _organized_.

I once read the following in somebody's travels:

"When we reached the Kingdom of A---- we found all industrial pursuits suffering. Agriculture groaned, manufactures complained, commerce murmured, the navy growled, and the government did not know whom to listen to. At first it thought of taxing all the discontented, and of dividing among them the proceeds of these taxes after having taken its share; which would have been like the method of managing lotteries in our dear Spain. There are a thousand of you; the State takes a dollar from each one, cunningly steals two hundred and fifty, and then divides up seven hundred and fifty, in greater or smaller sums, among the players. The worthy Hidalgo, who has received three-quarters of a dollar, forgetting that he has spent a whole one, is wild with joy, and runs to spend his s.h.i.+llings at the tavern. Something like this once happened in France. Barbarous as the country of A---- was, however, the government did not trust the stupidity of the inhabitants enough to make them accept such singular protection, and hence this was what it devised:

"The country was intersected with roads. The government had them measured, exactly, and then said to the farmers, 'All that you can steal from travelers between these boundaries is yours; let it serve you as a _bounty_, a protection, and an encouragement.' It afterwards a.s.signed to each manufacturer and each s.h.i.+p-builder, a bit of road to work up, according to this formula:

Dono tibi et concedo, Virtutem et puissantiam, Robbandi, Pillageandi, Stealandi, Cheatandi, Et Swindlandi, Impune per totam istam, Viam.

"Now it has come to pa.s.s that the natives of the Kingdom of A---- are so familiarized with this regime, and so accustomed to think only of what they steal, and not of what is stolen from them, so habituated to look at pillage but from the pillager's point of view, that they consider the sum of all these private robberies as _national profit_, and refuse to give up a system of protection without which, they say, no branch of industry can live."

Do you say, it is not possible that an entire nation could see an _increase of riches_ where the inhabitants plundered one another?

Why not? We have this belief in France, and every day we organize and practice _reciprocal robbery_ under the name of bounties and protective tariffs.

Let us exaggerate nothing, however; let us concede that as far as the _mode of collection_, and the collateral circ.u.mstances, are concerned, the system in the Kingdom of A---- may be worse than ours; but let us say, also, that as far as principles and necessary results are concerned, there is not an atom of difference between these two kinds of robbery legally organized to eke out the profits of industry.

Observe, that if _highway robbery_ presents some difficulties of execution, it has also certain advantages which are not found in the _tariff robbery_.

For instance: An equitable division can be made between all the plunderers. It is not thus with tariffs. They are by nature impotent to protect certain cla.s.ses of society, such as artizans, merchants, literary men, lawyers, soldiers, etc., etc.

It is true that _bounty robbery_ allows of infinite subdivisions, and in this respect does not yield in perfection to _highway robbery_, but on the other hand it often leads to results which are so odd and foolish, that the natives of the Kingdom of A---- may laugh at it with great reason.

That which the plundered party loses in highway robbery is gained by the robber. The article stolen remains, at least, in the country. But under the dominion of _bounty robbery_, that which the duty takes from the French is often given to the Chinese, the Hottentots, Caffirs, and Algonquins, as follows:

A piece of cloth is worth a _hundred francs_ at Bordeaux. It is impossible to sell it below that without loss. It is impossible to sell it for more than that, for the _compet.i.tion_ between merchants forbids.

Under these circ.u.mstances, if a Frenchman desires to buy the cloth, he must pay a _hundred francs_, or do without it. But if an Englishman comes, the government interferes, and says to the merchant: "Sell your cloth, and I will make the tax-payers give you _twenty francs_ (through the operation of the _drawback_)." The merchant, who wants, and can get, but one hundred francs for his cloth, delivers it to the Englishman for eighty francs. This sum added to the twenty francs, the product of the _bounty robbery_, makes up his price. It is then precisely as if the tax-payers had given twenty francs to the Englishman, on condition that he would buy French cloth at twenty francs below the cost of manufacture,--at twenty francs below what it costs us. Then bounty robbery has this peculiarity, that the _robbed_ are inhabitants of the country which allows it, and the _robbers_ are spread over the face of the globe.

It is truly wonderful that they should persist in holding this proposition to have been demonstrated: _All that the individual robs from the ma.s.s is a general gain._ Perpetual motion, the philosopher's stone, and the squaring of the circle, are sunk in oblivion; but the theory of _progress by robbery_ is still held in honor. _A priori_, however, one might have supposed that it would be the shortest lived of all these follies.

Some say to us: You are, then, partisans of the _let alone_ policy?

economists of the superannuated school of the Smiths and the Says? You do not desire the _organization of labor_? Why, gentlemen, organize labor as much as you please, but we will watch to see that you do not organize _robbery_.

Others say, _bounties_, _tariffs_, all these things may have been overdone. We must use, without abusing them. A wise liberty, combined with moderate protection, is what _serious_ and practical men claim. Let us beware of _absolute principles_. This is exactly what they said in the Kingdom of A----, according to the Spanish traveler. "Highway robbery," said the wise men, "is neither good nor bad in itself; it depends on circ.u.mstances. Perhaps too much freedom of pillage has been given; perhaps not enough. Let us see; let us examine; let us balance the accounts of each robber. To those who do not make enough, we will give a little more road to work up. As for those who make too much, we will reduce their share."

Those who spoke thus acquired great fame for moderation, prudence, and wisdom. They never failed to attain the highest offices of the State.

As for those who said, "Let us repress injustice altogether; let us allow neither _robbery_, nor _half robbery_, nor _quarter robbery_,"

they pa.s.sed for theorists, dreamers, bores--always parroting the same thing. The people also found their reasoning too easy to understand. How can that be true which is so very simple?

X.

THE TAX COLLECTOR.

JACQUES BONHOMME, Vine-grower.

M. LASOUCHE, Tax Collector.