History of the Nineteenth Army Corps Part 16

On the 20th of July at Carter's Farm, three miles north of Winchester, Averell, who was following Early, met and routed Ramseur, who had been sent back to check the pursuit. Early continued his retreat to Strasburg on the 22d, but when the next day he learned that Wright was gone, he turned back to punish the weak force under Hunter, and on the 24th overwhelmed Crook at Kernstown. Crook retreated through Martinsburg into Maryland, and marching by Williamsport and Boonsborough, took post at Sharpsburg, while Averell stayed at Hagerstown to watch the upper fords of the Potomac.

To break up the Baltimore and Ohio railway and to ravage the borders of Pennsylvania were favorite ideas with Early. He now entered with zest on the unopposed gratification of both desires, and while he himself bestrode the railway at Martinsburg with his army engaged in its destruction, he sent McCausland with his own brigade of cavalry and Bradley Johnson's on the famous marauding expedition that culminated in the wanton burning of Chambersburg in default of an impossible ransom, and at last resulted in the flight of McCausland's whole force, with Averell at his heels, and its ultimate destruction or dispersion by Averell, after a long chase, at Moorefield far up the south branch of the Potomac.

When on the 23d of July he saw Wright back at Was.h.i.+ngton and Early at Strasburg in retreat, as was imagined, up the valley, Grant partly changed his mind about recalling the troops he had spared for the defence of Was.h.i.+ngton, and determining to content himself with Wright's corps, directed Emory to stay where he was. Emory now had 253 officers and 5,320 men for duty.

As one turn of the wheel had given the Nineteenth Corps to Butler, restoring to his command some of the regiments that had gone with him to the capture of New Orleans, so the next turn was to bring the corps under Augur, who since leaving Louisiana had been in command of the department of Was.h.i.+ngton. So at least run the orders of the 23d of July, yet hardly had Emory reported his division to Augur, when the whole arrangement was suddenly broken up, and the army that had just marched back to Was.h.i.+ngton with Wright was once more hurried off to meet what was supposed to be a fresh invasion by Early. In fact Early was quietly reposing at Bunker Hill, where he easily commanded the approaches and debouches of the Shenandoah valley, the fords of the Potomac, from Harper's Ferry to Williamsport, and the whole line of the railway across the great bend of the Potomac.

By this time Grant had found out that it often took twenty-four hours to communicate with Was.h.i.+ngton by telegraph, and that it was consequently impossible to control from the James the movements of his forces on the upper Potomac. On his suggesting this, the government confided to Halleck the direction of Wright's operations against Early. The Sixth Corps marched from Tennallytown on the morning of the 26th of July, and immediately afterwards the Nineteenth Corps broke up its camp near the chain bridge and followed the Sixth. The line of march followed the road to Rockville, where Wright divided the column, sending a detachment to the left by way of Poolesville, while the main body pursued the direct road towards Frederick. Emory encamped that night on the Frederick road, four miles north of Rockville, after a march of nineteen miles. The next day, the 27th of July, Emory, leading the column, marched at three in the morning, moved fifteen miles, and encamped beyond Hyattstown. On the 28th Emory took the road at five, marched to Monocacy Junction, where the Sixth Corps crossed the Monocacy, then filed to the right, and crossed at the upper ford, and pa.s.sing through Frederick went into bivouac four miles beyond. The distance made was thirteen miles. On the 29th, an intensely hot day, Emory marched at eight, following the Sixth Corps, crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, marched nineteen miles, and went into bivouac at Halltown. Here Wright was joined by Crook, who came from Sharpsburg by way of Shepherdstown.

It was on the 30th of July that McCausland burned Chambersburg. In the confusion caused by his rapid movements, Halleck imagined that Early's whole force was in Pennsylvania. Therefore he ordered Wright back into Maryland, first to Frederick and them to Emmettsburg, to hold the pa.s.ses of the South Mountain against the supposed invader. About noon Wright faced about, taking Crook with him, and recrossed the Potomac. Toward evening Crook and Wright covered the pa.s.ses, while Emory crossed the Catoctin and at one in the morning of the 31st halted near Jefferson after a hard day's march of thirteen miles, during which the men and animals of all the corps suffered terribly from the heat and dust, added to the acc.u.mulated fatigue they had already undergone from a succession of long days and short nights. Reveille was sounded at five o'clock, and at six the march was resumed. Emory pa.s.sed through Frederick, moved about two miles on the Emmettsburg road and went into bivouac, having made thirteen miles during the day. The army was now concentrated at Frederick, holding the line of the Monocacy and observing the pa.s.ses of the South Mountain. Fortunately for the men and horses, Halleck now learned from Couch, who commanded in Pennsylvania, with rather less than a handful of troops, the exact dimensions of McCausland's raid. Accordingly Wright's troops were allowed to rest where they were.

Grant ordered up a division of cavalry from the Army of the Potomac, and on the 4th of August set out in person for Frederick, avoiding Was.h.i.+ngton, to see for himself just what the situation was, and to make better arrangements for the future. On the 5th of August he joined Hunter on the Monocacy, and at once ordered him to take Wright, Emory, and Crook across the Potomac, to find the enemy, and to attack him.

Grover's division and the parts of Emory's that had been at Bermuda Hundred embarked on the James on the 31st of July, and pa.s.sed up the Potomac to Was.h.i.+ngton, but too late to join Emory on the Monocacy. Thus, before beginning the new movement, Emory had of his own division 4,600 effective and eight regiments of Grover's, numbering 2,750. These, being part of four brigades, were temporarily organized into two, and as Grover himself had not yet joined, their command was given to Molineux.

About this time, Battery L, 1st Ohio, was relieved from duty with the Nineteenth Corps, and four other batteries joined it from the reserve park at Was.h.i.+ngton. Of these Taft's 5th New York was a.s.signed to the First division, Bradbury's 1st Maine, an old friend, to the Second division, Lieutenant Chase's D, 1st Rhode Island and Miner's 17th Indiana to the Artillery Reserve, commanded at first by Captain Taft, afterward by Major Bradbury.

Crook led the way across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry on the evening of the 5th of August, Emory followed the next morning, and Ricketts with the Sixth Corps brought up the rear. Averell with the cavalry, as will be remembered, was still far away, engaged in the long chase after McCausland. Hunter took up his position covering Halltown and proceeded to strengthen it by entrenchments. Crook's left rested on the Shenandoah, Emory extended the line to the turnpike road, and Wright carried it to the Potomac.

On the very day Grant left City Point, Early marched north from Bunker Hill, meaning to cover McCausland's retreat and to destroy Hunter, and so, curiously enough, it happened that Early's whole army actually crossed the Potomac into Maryland at Martinsburg and Shepherdstown a few hours before Crook pa.s.sed over the ford at Harper's Ferry into Virginia; and, still more curiously, while, ten days before, the groundless apprehension of another invasion by Early had thrown the North into a fever and the government into a fright, here was Early actually in Maryland on the battle-field of Antietam without producing so much as a sensation. As soon as Early got the first inkling of what was going on behind him, he tripped briskly back to Martinsburg, and finding Hunter at Halltown resumed his old position at Bunker Hill.

Grant had already proposed to unite in a single command the four distinct departments covering the theatre of war on the Shenandoah and on the upper Potomac; as the commander he had first suggested Franklin and afterward Meade. Now, since no action had followed either suggestion, he sent up Sheridan, meaning to place him in command of all the active forces of these four departments, for the purpose of overthrowing Early or expelling him from the Shenandoah. Upon learning this, Hunter, to remove the difficulty, asked to be relieved; and thus, on the 7th of August, Grant gained his wish, and an order was issued by the War Department, creating the Middle Military Division, to include Was.h.i.+ngton, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and part of Ohio, and Sheridan was a.s.signed to the command.

Amusing though it may have been to Early and his followers to note the panic and confusion into which McCausland's predatory riders once more threw the capital and the border States, this absurd freak produced far-reaching consequences that were not in the thoughts of any one on either side. Its first effect was to stop the withdrawal of the Sixth Corps, and to put Wright and Emory once more in march toward the Shenandoah. It determined Lee to keep Early in the valley, where his presence seemed so effective; and this shortly led to the concentration there, under a single commander, and that commander Sheridan, of the largest and best appointed Union army that had ever occupied that theatre of war, and thus at last in one short campaign worked the destruction of Early's army and the elimination of the valley as a feature in the war.

Upon the officers and men of the Nineteenth Corps the change from the enervating climate of Louisiana to the bracing air, the crystal waters, the rolling wheatfields, and the beautiful blue mountains of the Shenandoah acted like a tonic. Daily their spirits rose and their numbers for duty increased. The excellence of the roads and the openness of the country on either side enabled them to achieve long marches with ease and comfort. Nor were they slow in remarking that they had never had a commissary and quartermaster so good as Sheridan.

(1) About three miles N.-N.-E. from the Capitol, overlooking the Baltimore road and railway.

(2) In Major William F. Tiemann's truly admirable "History of the 159th New York," he says: "July 26th we were camped near Major-General Birney's headquarters, not far from Hatcher's house between batteries 'five' and 'six,' one of which enjoyed the euphonious t.i.tle of 'Fort Slaughter.' ... The works were built more strongly and with more art than at Port Hudson, but were not nearly as strong in reality, as Port Hudson was fortified naturally and the obstructions were much harder to overcome." (P. 87.) I think this book a model of everything that a regimental history ought to be; above all, for the rare gifts of modesty and accuracy.

CHAPTER x.x.xI. IN THE SHENANDOAH.

The fourth year of the war was now well advanced, and the very name of the Shenandoah valley had long since pa.s.sed into a byword as the Valley of Humiliation, so often had those fair and fertile fields witnessed the rout of the national forces; so often had the armies of the Union marched proudly up the white and dusty turnpike, only to come flying back in disorder and disgrace. With the same rough humor of the soldier, half in grim jest, half in sad earnest, yet always with a grain of hard sense lying at the bottom, the Union veterans had re-named as Harper's Weekly the picturesque landscape that appeared to them so regularly; and Lee's annual invasion of the country beyond the Potomac had come to be known among them as the Summer Excursion and Picnic into Maryland.

To mete out the blame for this state of things; to apportion the precise share of the mortifying result due to each one of several contributing causes; to show how much should be ascribed to division and subdivision of councils; how much to the unfitness of commanders, too often disqualified alike by nature and training, for the leaders.h.i.+p of men in emergencies, or even for their temporary profession, and in truth owing their commissions, in Halleck's phrase, to "reasons other than military;" and how much finally to a dense ignorance or a fine disregard of the very elements and first principles of the art of war; all this lies outside the scope of this history, curious, entertaining, and instructive though the inquiry would be. Certain it is that at no period was the problem at once comprehended and controlled until Grant took it in hand, and equally so that the work was never done until he confided it to Sheridan. To this, in fairness, must be added three considerations of great moment. No commander had previously enjoyed the undivided confidence of the government as Grant did at this period; the relations between Grant and Sheridan were those of perfect trust and harmony; and the Army of the Shenandoah was for the first time made strong enough for its work. Moreover, though Early was a good and useful general, and was soon to prove himself the master of resources and resolution equal to the occasion, he was not Jackson; and even had he been, no second Jackson could ever have fallen heir to the prestige of the first.

The parallel ranges of the Blue Ridge, extending from the head-waters of the James to the Susquehanna in mid-course, presented peculiar strategic conditions of which the Confederates were as quick as the government of the United States was slow to take advantage. Rising in the southwest, the twin forks of the Shenandoah, wedged apart by the long and narrow range, or rather ranges, known as the Ma.s.sanutten, unite near Front Royal, where the valley begins to widen to a plain, and pour their waters into the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. Of the two valleys thus formed, the easternmost, through which runs the South Fork, takes the name of Luray, or, in local usage, Page, from its chief county, while the more western and more important, in the lap of which lies the North Fork, preserves the name of Shenandoah, as well for the river as the county. Through this valley lies the course of the great macadamized highway that before the days of steam formed the chief avenue of communication between Pennsylvania and Virginia. Soon after the valley begins to widen, beyond Strasburg and Front Royal, the Opequon takes its rise in the western range, here known as Little North Mountain, and, flowing northeast, falls into the Potomac below Williamsport. The c.u.mberland valley continues the valley of Virginia into Pennsylvania, the two being separated by the Potomac, which in this part of its course is usually fordable at many points. Topography was by no means Grant's strong suit, yet he was not long in perceiving that the southwesterly trend of this great valley led and must always lead an invading column at every step farther away, not only from its base on the Potomac, but practically also from its objective at Richmond. Wherefore this zone was useless to the armies of the Union, while for the Confederates it had the triple advantage of a granary, an easy and secure way into Maryland and Pennsylvania, and on the flank toward Was.h.i.+ngton a mountain wall, cut by numerous gaps, of equal convenience in advance or retreat, besides being a constant menace to Was.h.i.+ngton as well as to the Union army operating between the Blue Ridge and the Potomac. Thus it was that the Confederate force was able to move speedily and un.o.bserved to the north bank of the Potomac at Williamsport, and there, ninety miles north of Was.h.i.+ngton, equally distant from Baltimore and from Was.h.i.+ngton, and actually nearer to the Susquehanna than the capital is, held the whole country at its mercy until the Army of the Potomac could be hurried to the rescue.

Grant's first orders to Sheridan were twofold: he was to move south by the valley, no matter where Early might be, or what he might be doing, in full confidence that Early would surely be found in his front; and he was to devastate the valley so far as to destroy its future usefulness as a granary and a storehouse of the Confederate army of Northern Virginia.

Following the instructions turned over to him by Hunter, Sheridan moved out from Halltown on the 10th of August, and marching through Charlestown, took up a position threatening the crossing of the Opequon and Early's communications at Winchester. Crook, on the left, rested on Berryville, Emory held the centre, and Wright prolonged the line to Clifton. Torbert covered the right flank at Summit Point, which lies eleven miles east-northeast from Winchester, and the left, with the main body of the cavalry, nine miles south by east from Winchester, at White Post, where his presence strongly emphasized the menace to Early's rear. The position thus held presently became known as the Clifton-Berryville line. While worthless for defence, it had the double advantage of covering the short roads to Was.h.i.+ngton through Snicker's Gap and Ashby's Gap, and of elbowing Early out of his favorite position at Bunker Hill, at the same time that by throwing back the right flank toward Clifton, Sheridan's road to Charlestown and Harper's Ferry was made safe. Early quietly let go his hold on the Baltimore and Ohio railway, and, just as Grant had antic.i.p.ated, hastened to place himself across Sheridan's path at Winchester.

On the morning of the 11th of August, Sheridan took ground to the left, meaning to seize and hold the fords of the Opequon, Wright at the turnpike road between Berryville and Winchester, Emory farther up the creek at the Senseny road, and Crook on Emory's left, probably at the Millwood pike. The cavalry covered the right of the Sixth Corps, and on both flanks threatened Winchester. Early, who had moved on the previous day from Bunker Hill to a position covering Winchester from the south, was in the act of retiring on Strasburg when Torbert ran into his cavalry. Sharp skirmis.h.i.+ng resulted without bringing on a general engagement. At night Early held and covered the valley turnpike between Newtown and Middletown, while Sheridan, who before crossing the Opequon had heard of Early's movement, and had simply continued his own march up the right or east bank, rested between the Millwood crossing of the Opequon and Stony Point on the road to Front Royal.

The melancholy failure attending the explosion of the mine before Petersburg and the continued reduction of Grant's forces, brought about by Early's diversions, coming on top of the losses since crossing the Rapidan, had brought affairs on the James to a dead-lock. While Grant in this situation was willing to spare the Sixth corps and the Nineteenth and even to strengthen them by two divisions of cavalry from the Army of the Potomac, Lee on his part not only gave up all present thought of recalling Early, as had been the custom in former years, but even sent Anderson with Kershaw's division of infantry, Fitzhugh Lee's division of cavalry, and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery, to strengthen Early, so as to enable him to hold his ground, and thus to cover the gathering of the crops in the valley, and perhaps to encourage still further detachments from the investing forces before Richmond and Petersburg. The first week of August found Anderson on the march and he was now moving down the valley. Therefore Early very properly drew back through Strasburg to wait for Anderson, and on the night of the 12th of August took up a strong position at Fisher's Hill. Its natural advantages he proceeded to increase by entrenchments.

Sheridan, following, encamped in the same order as before on the left bank of Cedar Creek. On the 13th Wright crossed Cedar Creek and occupied Hupp's Hill, and sending his skirmishers into Strasburg, discovered Early in position as described; but at nightfall Sheridan, who now had information that caused him to suspect Anderson's movement, drew back and set the cavalry to guard the Front Royal road. Then Early advanced his outposts to Hupp's Hill, and so for the next three days both armies rested.

On the 14th of August, Sheridan received from Grant authentic, rather than exact, information of Anderson's movement, for this was supposed to include two infantry divisions, instead of one. Coupled with this was Grant's renewed order to be cautious.

With his quick eye for country, Sheridan soon saw that he had but one even tolerable position for defence, and that this was at Halltown. The Confederate defence, on the other hand, rested on Fisher's Hill, and between these two positions the wide plain lay like a chess-board between the players. And now began a series of moves, during which each side watched and waited for the adversary to weaken himself, or to make a mistake, or for some chance encounter to bring about an unlooked-for advantage. Finding his position at Cedar Creek, to use his own words, "a very bad one," Sheridan was about to retire to the extreme limit of the valley at the confluence of the Potomac and the Shenandoah; and this was but to be the beginning of a series of seesaw movements, in which, as often as Sheridan went back to Halltown, Early would advance to Bunker Hill. Early, having taken the offensive, was bound to keep it, or lose his venture. Now, at this time, Early's objective was the Baltimore and Ohio railway; but Sheridan's was Early. Thus, whenever he found Early at Bunker Hill, wreaking his pleasure on the railway and the ca.n.a.l, Sheridan had only to take a step forward to the Clifton-Berryville line in order to force Early to hasten back to Winchester, and to lay hold of the Opequon; and so this alternating play might have continued as long as the war lasted, if other causes and events had not intervened.

At eleven o'clock on the night of the 15th of August, Sheridan's retreat began, Emory moving to Winchester, where he went into bivouac at six o'clock on the morning of the 16th. At eight o'clock on the evening of the 16th, Wright and Crook followed, and on the 17th Early, who had now been joined by Anderson, marched in pursuit. The same evening Sheridan took up the Clifton-Berryville position in the old order; the cavalry, now strengthened by the arrival of Wilson's division, covering the rear and flanks. At Berryville, at midnight, Grover joined Emory, from Was.h.i.+ngton by Leesburg and Snicker's Gap, with the remainder of the Nineteenth Corps from the James (1); and since the receipt of these reinforcements formed Sheridan's only reason for staying at Berryville, on the 18th he fell back to Charlestown, holding the roads leading thence to Berryville and to Bunker Hill.

On the 19th and 20th of August, Sheridan stood still while Early occupied Bunker Hill and Winchester; but, on the 21st, Early from Bunker Hill and Anderson from Winchester moved together to the attack. Rodes and Ramseur had a sharp fight with Wright, which caused Sheridan to bring up Crook on the left and Emory on the right; but neither came into action, because Merritt and Wilson stood so stiffly that Anderson got no farther than Summit Point. During the night Sheridan fell back to Halltown.

In retreating from Cedar Creek Sheridan began to put in force Grant's new policy of making the valley useless to the Confederate armies by burning all the grain and carrying off all the animals above Winchester. "I have destroyed everything eatable," are Sheridan's words.

On the 25th of August, after three days spent in skirmis.h.i.+ng, Early left Anderson to mask Halltown, and sent Fitzhugh Lee by Martinsburg to Williamsport, marching himself to Shepherdstown. A rough fight with Torbert's cavalry resulted near Kearneysville, in which Custer narrowly avoided the loss of his brigade by a rapid flight across the Potomac at Shepherdstown. Sheridan sent two divisions of cavalry under Averell and Wilson over the Potomac to watch the fords and to hold the gaps of the South Mountain. Thus when Fitzhugh Lee got to the Potomac, he found Averell waiting for him, and Anderson being pressed back by Crook on the 26th, Early fell back behind the Opequon to Bunker Hill and Stephenson's Depot. On the 28th of August Sheridan advanced to Charlestown, and waiting there five days while his cavalry was concentrating and feeling the enemy, he again moved forward to the Clifton-Berryville line on the 3d of September, and encamped in the usual order.

Two marked features had now become regularly established: as often as the troops halted, no matter for how short a time, of their own accord they instantly set about protecting their front with the spade and the axe; and, secondly, the depots of the army were fixed behind the strong lines of Halltown with a sufficient force to guard them, and thence, as needed, supplies were sent forward to the troops in the field by strongly guarded trains, and these, as soon as unloaded, were returned to Halltown, thus reducing to a minimum the impedimenta of the army as well as the detachments usually demanded for their care. For the Nineteenth Corps, Currie's brigade of Dwight's division performed this service during the campaign.

The contingency for which Grant and Sheridan were waiting was now close at hand. Anderson had been nearly a month away from Lee, and meanwhile Grant had not only kept Lee on the watch on both banks of the James, as well as for Richmond as for Petersburg, but had taken a fast hold on the Weldon railway. Unable to shake off Grant's clutch either on the James or on the Shenandoah, Lee greatly needed Anderson back with him. Accordingly, on the very day when Sheridan went back to Berryville, Anderson, seeking the shortest way to Richmond, ran into Crook in the act of going into camp, and darkness shortly put an end to a sharp fight that might otherwise have proved a pitched battle. This brought Early in haste from Stephenson's to Anderson's help, but when the next day Early saw how strongly posted Sheridan was, he fell back across the Opequon to cover Winchester, and finally, on the 14th of September, sent off Anderson by Front Royal and Chester Gap, but this time without Fitzhugh Lee.

The interval was occupied in continual skirmishes and reconnoissances. Meanwhile Crook changed over from the left flank to the right at Summit Point, the cavalry covering the front and flanks from Snicker's Gap by way of Smithfield and Martinsburg to the Potomac. On the 16th of September, Grant, pressed by the government in behalf of the business interests disturbed by the enemy's control of the railway and the ca.n.a.l, went to Charlestown to confer with Sheridan. In the breast-pocket of his coat Grant carried a complete plan of the campaign he meant Sheridan to carry out; but when, having asked Sheridan if he could be ready to move on Tuesday, Sheridan promptly answered he should be ready whenever the General should say "Go in"-at daylight on Monday, if necessary,-so delighted was Grant that he said not a word about the plan, but contented himself with echoing the words, "Go in!"

(1) Grover's men made the hard march of 69 miles from Was.h.i.+ngton in three days; the last 33 miles in 13 hours, actual time. See Major Tiemann's "History of the 159th New York," pp. 91, 92.

CHAPTER x.x.xII. THE OPEQUON.(1)

Grant's approval of Sheridan's attack was founded on the withdrawal of Kershaw; but on the 18th of September, just as Sheridan was about to move on Newtown, meaning to offer Early the choice of being turned out of Winchester, or being overwhelmed if he should stay, news came from Averell that he had been driven out of Martinsburg by two divisions of infantry. These were the divisions of Rodes and Gordon, with which, enticed at last into a grave error by the temptation of hearing that the railway was being repaired, Early had marched on the 17th to Bunker Hill and Martinsburg. When Sheridan heard of this, and perceived that Early's forces, already diminished, were strung along all the way from Winchester to Martinsburg, he stopped the execution of the orders he had already issued for the movement at four o'clock in the afternoon of that day, the 18th of September, and replaced them by fresh arrangements which led to the battle of the Opequon on the 19th. Since last moving to the Clifton-Berryville line, Sheridan had used his cavalry to preserve in his front an open s.p.a.ce fully six miles in depth, extending to the banks of the Opequon, meaning not only to have the first tidings of any offensive movement by the enemy, but also that when himself ready to move he might be able to take the enemy by surprise.

On the evening of the 18th of September, part of Early's cavalry was at Martinsburg, Gordon occupied Bunker Hill, Wharton was at Stephenson's, with Rodes closing back on him, while Ramseur alone covered Winchester in the path of Sheridan's advance. Sheridan naturally supposed that in a quick movement he would have two divisions to deal with after crossing the Opequon.

At two o'clock on the morning of Monday, the 19th of September, on the very day when Sheridan had told Grant he would be ready to move, but just three hours earlier, Sheridan put his army in motion toward the Opequon, covering his flank by directing Merritt and Averell on Stephenson's. He sent Wilson rapidly ahead on the Berryville road to carry the ford and to seize the long and deep defile on the left or east bank through which the main column would have to advance. Wright was to lead the infantry, closely followed by Emory, who, in order to solidify the movement, was instructed to take his orders from Wright after reaching the ford. Crook, coming in from his more distant position, would naturally fall in the rear of the others, and he was to ma.s.s his men in reserve, covering the ford. Wright had to move partly across country, and had farther to go than Emory. Although both started punctually at the appointed hour, it happened that, about five o'clock, the head of Wright's column ran into Emory's in march near the crest, whence the road sweeps down to the Opequon. There Emory halted, by Wright's orders, to let the Sixth Corps pa.s.s. Unfortunately, minute and thorough as Sheridan's plans and instructions were, he appears to have underrated the double difficulty of crossing the ford and threading the long defile, for to this cause must be attributed the presence of Wright's entire wagon-train in the rear of his corps, as well as the excess of artillery for the work and the field. The head of the column could move but slowly; thus the rear was so long r.e.t.a.r.ded, that, although the crossing began about six o'clock, and the whole movement was urged on by Sheridan, Wright, and Emory, and indeed by every one, it wanted but twenty minutes of noon when the line of battle was finally formed on the rolling ground overlooking the vale of the Opequon to the rear and Winchester to the front. Even as it was, Sheridan's eagerness being great, and the delay seeming interminable, Emory felt obliged to take upon himself the responsibility of departing from the strict order of march, and directed Dwight to move his men to the right of the road and pa.s.s the train. Thus it had taken six hours to advance three miles and to form in order of battle, and the immediate effect of this delay was that Sheridan had now to deal, not only with Ramseur, or with the two divisions counted on, but with the whole of Early's army; for between five and six o'clock in the morning Gordon, Rodes, and Wharton were all at Stephenson's, distant only five miles from Winchester or from the field of battle, toward which they all moved rapidly at the sound of the first firing, due to Wilson's advance.

Opequon Creek flows at the foot of a broad and thickly wooded gorge, with high and steep banks. The ravine through which the Berryville road rises to the level of the rolling plain, in the middle of whose western edge stands Winchester, is nearly three miles long. Here and there the high ground is covered with large oaks, pines, and undergrowth, and is intersected by many brooks, called runs. Of these the largest is Red Bud Run, which forms a smaller parallel ravine flanking the defile on the north, while a still larger stream, called Abraham's Creek, after pursuing a nearly parallel course on the south side of the defile, crosses the road not far from the ford, and just below it falls into the Opequon.

Wilson, after crossing the Opequon and completing his task of covering the advance of the infantry through the defile, had turned to the left on the high ground and taken post to cover the flank on the Senseny road, which, after crossing the Opequon about a mile and a quarter above the main ford, reaches the outskirts of Winchester at a point little more than three hundred yards from the Berryville road. The Sixth Corps formed across the Berryville road, Getty on its left, Ricketts on its right. Getty rested his left on Abraham's Creek. Behind him Russell stood in column in support. Emory prolonged the line of battle to the Red Bud on the right by posting Sharpe's and Birge's brigades of Grover, with Molineux and Shunk in the second line, the 9th Connecticut deployed as skirmishers to cover the right flank of Birge. Dwight's two brigades formed on the right and rear of Grover in echelon of regiments on the right, in order not only to support Grover's line, but to cover the flank against any turning movement by the Confederates or an attack by their reinforcements coming straight from Stephenson's. Beal's brigade held the right of Dwight's line, and the brigade line from right to left was formed in order of the 114th New York, 153d New York, 116th New York, 29th Maine, and 30th Ma.s.sachusetts. Beal covered his right flank by a detail of skirmishers taken from all his regiments and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Strain, of the 153d New York. McMillan, on the left and rear of Beal, formed in order of the 47th Pennsylvania, 8th Vermont, 160th New York, and 12th Connecticut, with five companies of the 47th Pennsylvania deployed to cover the whole right flank of his brigade and to move forward with it by the flank left in front. Crook had by this time crossed the ford and was ma.s.sed on the left or west bank.

In climbing the hill the Berryville road follows nearly a northwesterly course, but soon after reaching the high ground bends rather sharply toward the left, crosses the ravine called Ash Hollow forming the head of Berryville Canon, and runs for nearly a mile almost westerly. Wright was following the road, but as Emory guided upon Wright, the alignment was to be preserved by Sharpe's keeping his left in touch with the right of Ricketts. While the ground in Wright's front was for the most part open, Emory was chiefly in the dense wood, where the heavy leaf.a.ge and undergrowth prevented him from seeing not only the enemy before him, but also the full extent of his own line. It should be observed with care that Ricketts was between Sharpe and the Berryville road, while the road was between Getty and Ricketts, and formed the guide for both; for these facts, of slight importance though they may seem, were destined presently to exert an influence wellnigh fatal on the fortunes of the day.

During the early hours of the morning Ramseur, on the Berryville road, and the cavalry of Lomax on the Senseny road, had been the only Confederate force between Sheridan and Winchester. But first Gordon came up at nine o'clock, and placed himself opposite Emory's right, his own left resting on the line of the Red Bud; then Rodes, closely following Gordon, formed between him and Ramseur against the right of Emory and the left of Wright.

About a quarter before twelve o'clock, at the sound of Sheridan's bugle, repeated from corps, division, and brigade headquarters, the whole line moved forward with great spirit, and instantly became engaged. Wilson pushed back Lomax, Wright drove in Ramseur, while Emory, advancing his infantry rapidly through the wood, where he was unable to use his artillery, attacked Gordon with great vigor. Birge, charging with bayonets fixed, fell upon the brigade of Evans, forming the extreme left of Gordon, and without a halt drove it in confusion through the wood and across the open ground beyond to the support of Braxton's artillery, posted by Gordon to secure his flank on the Red Bud road. In this brilliant charge, led by Birge in person, his lines naturally became disordered, and Grover, foreseeing the effect of an advance so swift and tumultuous, ordered Birge to halt and re-form in the wood. This order Birge tried to execute; but whether the words of command were not heard or were misunderstood, or in the wild excitement of the moment were wilfully disregarded by the men, certain it is that their officers found it impossible to restrain their ardor until they had followed on the run the broken fragments of Evans quite through the wood and beyond its farther skirt, where Braxton, using his guns with energy and skill, brought them to a stand.

Sharpe, advancing simultaneously on Birge's left, tried in vain to keep the alignment with Ricketts and with Birge; for now the peculiar feature of the long alignment across the swerving road began to work, yet, by reason of the screen of timber, without the cause being immediately observed by any one. At first the order of battle formed a right angle with the road, but the bend once reached, in the effort to keep closed upon it, at every step Ricketts was taking ground more and more to the left, while the point of direction for Birge, and equally for Sharpe, was the enemy in their front, standing almost in the exact prolongation of the defile, from which line, still plainly marked by Ash Hollow, the road, as we have seen, was steadily diverging. In short, to continue the march parallel with the road compelled a left half-wheel, while the battle was with the enemy straight in front, so that even had it been possible for Emory to execute his orders literally he must have offered his wheeling flank fairly to Rodes and to Gordon.

Sharpe, seeing that the gap between himself and Ricketts was growing every moment wider, in vain tried to cover it by more than one oblique movement to the left, and Keifer, whose brigade formed the right of Ricketts, being also among the first to perceive the fault, tried to make it good by deploying three of his regiments across the interval.

Birge's advance had borne him far to the right, and as Sharpe, in the vain attempt to keep his alignment with Ricketts, was always drifting to the left, there came a second and smaller gap between the two leading brigades of Grover. Into this Molineux was quickly thrust, and, deploying in parade order, under a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, at once began firing in return with great effect on the advancing columns of the enemy. But, shortly before this happened, the interval between Ricketts and Sharpe had grown to be nearly four hundred yards wide, and Birge's advance being stayed at nearly the same instant, Early saw his opportunity and seized it by throwing against the diverging flanks of Sharpe and Ricketts the fresh brigade that Battle had that moment brought up from Stephenson's. This new impulse once more carried forward the rest of Rodes's division; Ramseur rallied; Early restored his formation; and the whole Confederate line swept forward with renewed impetuosity, broke in the whole right of Ricketts and the left of Sharpe, surged around both flanks of Molineux, and swept back Birge. Sharpe's line, thus taken fairly in flank, was quickly rolled up. By this, the left regiment of Molineux, the gallant 22d Iowa, being in quite open ground, was greatly exposed, so that it, too, was presently swept back. The 159th New York and the 13th Connecticut, after holding on stiffly for a time under the partial cover of a sort of gully, were in like manner swept away, and on the right Birge's men paid the penalty of their own impetuosity. The left of Ricketts, less exposed to the shock, stood firm, and the right of Molineux, isolated as it was, held its ground; but otherwise the whole front of the battle, from the road to the Red Bud, was gone. As the Confederates charged down upon a section of Bradbury's 1st Maine Battery, posted about the centre of the division, Day, who under many drawbacks had brought up his regiment, the 131st New York, to a high standard of discipline and efficiency, took prompt and full advantage of the slight cover afforded by the little wooded ravine in which he happened to be. With equal coolness and readiness he changed front forward on his tenth company, yet held his fire until he could see the shoulders and almost the backs of the enemy; then, pouring in a hot fire, and being immediately supported by the 11th Indiana, part of the 3d Ma.s.sachusetts, and the 176th New York, which had quickly rallied from Sharpe's reverse, the attacking force was driven back in disorder; but unfortunately, in retiring it swept across the remains of Molineux's left centre, which had been cut off in the gully, and took many prisoners, especially from among the officers who had stood to their posts through everything.

Just as when victory had seemed about to alight on the standard of the Union, the very perch itself had been suddenly and rudely shaken by the tread of Early's charging columns; so now, at the precise moment when defeat-bitter, perhaps disastrous defeat-seemed inevitable, the fortunes of the battle were once more reversed, and the day was suddenly saved by the prompt and orderly advance of Russell into the fatal gap. As he changed front from the wood to the right and swept on in splendid array, it happened that the charging line of Early, already disarranged by its own success, offered its right flank to Russell's front. Russell himself, bravely leading his division, fell, yet not until he had struck the blow that gave the victory to the defenders of his country,-a n.o.ble sacrifice in a n.o.ble cause.

But on the right a danger almost equally serious menaced the flank of Emory, for when Birge's men came streaming back, Shunk, who had been supporting Birge without having men enough to cover the whole ground, found his left uncovered to Gordon by the giving way of Sharpe, while at the same time his line was nearly enfiladed from the right by a section or battery of Fitzhugh Lee's horse artillery on the north bank of the Red Bud. Seeing all this, Emory instantly ordered his own old division to deploy at the top of its speed, and to make good the broken line. "Have this thing stopped at once," were the terse words of his command to Dwight. Once more, as at the Sabine Cross-Roads, the 1st brigade was called upon the yield up its leading regiment for a sacrifice, and again the lot fell to New York, yet this time upon the 114th, and upon not one of all the good veteran battalions that held the field on that 19th of September-if indeed upon any in all the armies of the Union-could the choice have rested more securely. To the left and front, far into the open field, through the wreck of Grover's right, into the teeth of the pursuing lines of Gordon, Per Lee led his regiment. No sooner had his men emerged from the cover of the wood than they came under the fire of Gordon's infantry and artillery, crossed with the fire of Fitzhugh Lee's guns beyond the Red Bud; yet they were not able to fire a musket in return until their own defeated comrades had pa.s.sed to the rear. Cruel as the situation was, the 114th marched steadily forward nearly two hundred yards in front of the forest; then, finding itself quite alone and unsupported, confronted by the line of battle of the enemy at the skirt of the timber opposite, Per Lee made his men lie down without other cover than the high gra.s.s, and there, loading on their backs and at every moment losing heavily, without yielding an inch, they held off the enemy until support came. That this was longer than usual in coming was no fault of their comrades, but a mere accident of the situation; for Dwight's division being formed in echelon of battalions on the right, just as it had in the first instance been necessary to bring the 114th into action obliquely to the left, so now Beal was forced to form the line of battle of his brigade by inversion, and this, moreover, in the woods, with the steep bank of the Red Bud hampering his right. Slow though it must have seemed to Per Lee, standing out there alone, this difficult movement was in reality executed by Beal with great promptness and rapidity and in admirable order. As regiment after regiment, beginning with the 153d, came into the new line at the double-quick by the shortest path, each advanced with a shout to the rail fence on Per Lee's right and somewhat toward his rear, and, throwing down the rails, opened a rapid fire. This checked the enemy. Finding Beal unable to cover all the ground he was now trying to hold, Emory made Dwight take the 160th New York from McMillan's brigade and posted it on the right of Beal's.

McMillan had been ordered to move forward at the same time as Beal, and to form on his left. The five companies of the 47th Pennsylvania that had been detached to form a skirmish line on Red Bud Run, to cover McMillan's right flank, had somehow lost their way on the broken ground among the thickets, and, not finding them in place, McMillan had been obliged to send the remaining companies of the regiment to do the same duty. This detail and the employment of the 160th New York in Beal's line left McMillan but two of his battalions, the 8th Vermont and the 12th Connecticut; but although McMillan, holding the left of the formation in echelon, had farther to go to reach his position, it was only necessary for him to move straight to the front, and thus the 8th Vermont formed the right of his line and the 12th Connecticut the left. Not a moment too soon did Thomas and Peck bring their good regiments to the support of Molineux's diminished and almost exhausted brigade, and thus complete the restoration of Emory's line of battle. Almost at the first fire Lieutenant-Colonel Peck, the brave, accomplished, and spirited soldier who had led the 12th Connecticut in every action, fell mortally wounded by the fragment of a sh.e.l.l.