The Medallic History of the United States of America 1776-1876 Part 90

Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by 9 o'clock A.M., I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly.

Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified from firing upon your men.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, _Major-General_.

_____

_General Pemberton to General Grant._

To Headquarter, Vicksburg, MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, July 4, 1863.

Commanding United States Forces before Vicksburg.

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this day, and in reply to say that the terms proposed by you are accepted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. C. PEMBERTON, _Lieutenant-General_.

_____

_General Grant to the a.s.sistant Adjutant-General._

Headquarters, Military Division of the Mississippi, To In the Field, Chattanooga, Tennessee, COLONEL J. C. KELTON, December 23d, 1863.

a.s.sistant Adjutant-General, Was.h.i.+ngton, D. C.

Colonel: In pursuance of General Orders, No. 337, War Department, of date Was.h.i.+ngton, October 16th, 1863, delivered to me by the Secretary of War, at Louisville, Kentucky, on the 18th of the same month, I a.s.sumed command of the "Military Division of the Mississippi," comprising the Departments of the Ohio, the c.u.mberland, and the Tennessee, and telegraphed the order (p. 395) a.s.suming command, together with the order of the War Department, referred to, to Major-General A. E. Burnside, at Knoxville, and to Major-General W. S. Rosecrans, at Chattanooga.

My action in telegraphing these orders to Chattanooga in advance of my arrival there, was induced by information furnished me by the Secretary of War, of the difficulties with which the Army of the c.u.mberland had to contend in supplying itself over a long, mountainous, and almost impa.s.sable road from Stevenson, Alabama, to Chattanooga, Tennessee, and his fears that General Rosecrans would fall back to the north side of the Tennessee river. To guard further against the possibility of the Secretary's fears, I also telegraphed to Major-General Thomas on the 19th of October, from Louisville, to hold Chattanooga at all hazards; that I would be there as soon as possible. To which he replied, on same date, "I will hold the town till we starve."

Proceeding directly to Chattanooga, I arrived there on the 23d of October, and found that General Thomas had immediately, on being placed in command of the Department of the c.u.mberland, ordered the concentration of Major-General Hooker's command at Bridgeport preparatory to securing the river and main wagon road between that place and Brown's Ferry, immediately below Lookout Mountain.

The next morning after my arrival at Chattanooga, in company with Thomas and Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, I made a reconnoissance of Brown's Ferry and the hills on the south side of the river, and at the mouth of Lookout Valley. After the reconnoissance, the plan agreed upon was for Hooker to cross at Bridgeport to the south side of the river with all the force that could be spared from the railroad, and move on the main wagon road by way of Whitesides to Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley.

Major-General J. M. Palmer was to proceed by the only practicable route north of the river from his position opposite Chattanooga, to a point on the north bank of the Tennessee river, and opposite Whitesides, there to cross to the south side to hold the road pa.s.sed over by Hooker. In the meantime and before the enemy could be apprised of our intentions, a force under the direction of Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, was to be thrown across the river at or near Brown's Ferry to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley, covering the Brown's Ferry road, and orders were given accordingly.

It was known that the enemy held the north end of Lookout Valley with a brigade of troops, and the road leading around the foot of the mountain from their main camps in Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley. Holding these advantages, he would have had little difficulty in concentrating a sufficient force to have defeated or driven Hooker back. To remedy this the seizure of the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley and covering the Brown's Ferry road was deemed of the highest importance. This, by the use of pontoon bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's Ferry, would secure to us by the north bank of the river, across Moccasin Point, a shorter line by which to re-enforce our troops in Lookout Valley, than the narrow and tortuous road around the foot of Lookout Mountain afforded the enemy for re-enforcing his.

The force detailed for this expedition consisted of four thousand men, under command of General Smith, Chief Engineer, eighteen hundred of which under Brigadier-General W. B. Hagen, in sixty pontoon boats, containing thirty armed men each, floated (p. 396) quietly from Chattanooga past the enemy's pickets to the foot of Lookout Mountain on the night of the 27th of October, landed on the south side of the river at Brown's Ferry, surprised the enemy's pickets stationed there, and seized the hills covering the ferry, without the loss of a man killed and but four or five wounded. The remainder of the force, together with the material for a bridge, was moved by the north bank of the river across Moccasin Point to Brown's Ferry, without attracting the attention of the enemy, and before day dawned the whole force was ferried to the south bank of the river; 2nd the almost inaccessible heights rising from Lookout Valley, at its outlet to the river and below the mouth of Lookout creek were secured. By ten o'clock A.M. an excellent pontoon bridge was laid across the river at Brown's Ferry, thus securing to us the end of the desired road nearer the enemy's forces, and the shorter line over which to pa.s.s troops if a battle became inevitable. Positions were taken up by our troops from which they could not have been driven except by vastly superior forces, and then only with great loss of the enemy. Our artillery was placed in such position as to completely command the roads leading from the enemy's main camps in Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley.

On the 28th Hooker emerged into Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie by the direct road from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides to Chattanooga, with the 11th Army Corps, under Major-General Howard, and Geary's Division of the 12th Army Corps, and proceeded to take up positions for the defence of the road from Whitesides, over which he had marched, and also the road leading from Brown's Ferry to Kelly's Ferry, throwing the left of Howard's Corps forward to Brown's Ferry. The Division that started under command of Palmer for Whitesides, reached its destination, and took up the position intended in the original plan of this movement. Three movements so successfully executed, secured to us two comparatively good lines by which to obtain supplies from the terminus of the railroad at Bridgeport, namely, the main wagon road by way of Whitesides, Wauhatchie, and Brown's Ferry, distant but twenty-eight miles, and the Kelly's Ferry and Brown's Ferry road, which, by the use of the river from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry, reduced the distance for wagoning to but eight miles.

Up to this period our forces at Chattanooga were practically invested, the enemy's lines extending from the Tennessee river above Chattanooga to the river at and below the point of Lookout Mountain below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river picketed to near Bridgeport, his main force being fortified in Chattanooga Valley, at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a brigade in Lookout Valley. True, we held possession of the country north of the river, but it was from sixty to seventy miles over the most impracticable of roads to any supplies. The artillery horses and mules had become so reduced by starvation that they could not have been relied on for moving anything. An attempt at retreat must have been with men alone, and with only such supplies as they could carry. A retreat would have been almost certain annihilation, for the enemy, occupying positions within gunshot of, and overlooking our very fortifications, would unquestionably have pursued our retreating forces. Already more than ten thousand animals had perished in supplying half rations to the troops by the long and tedious route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chattanooga, over (p. 397) Waldron's Ridge. They could not have been supplied another week.

The enemy was evidently fully apprised of our condition in Chattanooga, and of the necessity of our establis.h.i.+ng a new and shorter line by which to obtain supplies, if we would maintain our position, and so fully was he impressed of the importance of keeping from us these lines, lost to him by surprise, and in a manner he little dreamed of, that in order to regain possession of them, a night attack was made by a portion of Longstreet's forces on a portion of Hooker's troops (Geary's Division of the 12th Corps) the first night after Hooker's arrival in the valley.

This attack failed, however, and Howard's Corps, which was moving to the a.s.sistance of Geary, finding that it was not required by him, carried the remaining heights held by the enemy west of Lookout Creek. This gave us quiet possession of the line of communication heretofore described south of the Tennessee river.

Of these operations I cannot speak more particularly, the sub-reports having been sent to Was.h.i.+ngton without pa.s.sing through my hands.

By the use of two steamboats, one of which had been left at Chattanooga by the enemy and fell into our hands, and one that had been built by us at Bridgeport, plying between Bridgeport and Kelly's Ferry, we were enabled to obtain supplies with but eight miles of wagoning. The capacity of the railroad and steamboats was not sufficient, however, to supply all the wants of the army, but actual suffering was prevented.

Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching Longstreet from the front and moving him in the direction of Knoxville, Tennessee, evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the necessity of some move that would compel him to retain all his forces and recall those he had detached, directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge with a view of carrying it, and threatening the enemy's communication with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside by telegraph on the 7th of November. After a thorough reconnoissance of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman could get up, because of the inadequacy of our force and the condition of the animals then at Chattanooga, and I was forced to leave Burnside, for the present, to contend against superior forces of the enemy until the arrival of Sherman with his men and means of transportation. In the meantime reconnoissances were made and plans matured for operations. Despatches were sent to Sherman, informing him of the movement of Longstreet and the necessity of his immediate presence at Chattanooga. On the 14th of November, I telegraphed to Burnside as follows:

"To "MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.

"Your despatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct.

With your showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment, and save the most productive part of your possessions.

Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's forces across the river just at and below the mouth of Chicamauga creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge (p. 398) and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain, The enemy now seem to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from Whitesides to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pa.s.s over a new road just made from Whitesides to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.

"Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th, as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired.

"Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until that time.

I can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at Kingston and pus.h.i.+ng for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution.

"Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain, if they have started and inform you. It will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how could they be fed after they got even one day east of here.

"U. S. GRANT, "_Major-General_."

On the 15th, having received from the General-in-Chief a despatch of date the 14th, in reference to Burnside's position, the danger of his abandonment of East Tennessee, unless immediate relief was afforded, and the terrible misfortune such a result would be to our arms; and also despatches from Mr. C. A. Dana, a.s.sistant Secretary of War, and Colonel Wilson, of my Staff, sent at the instance of General Burnside, informing me more fully of the condition of affairs as detailed to them by him, I telegraphed him as follows:

"To Chattanooga, November 15th, 1863.

"MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.

"I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on to East Tennessee in strong enough terms. According to the despatches of Mr. Dana and Colonel Wilson, it would seem that you should, if pressed to do it, hold on to Knoxville and that portion of the valley which you will necessarily possess, holding to that point. Should Longstreet move his whole force across the Little Tennessee, an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on that stream, even if it sacrificed half the cavalry of the Ohio army. By holding on and placing Longstreet between the Little Tennessee and Knoxville, he should not be allowed to escape with an army capable of doing anything this winter. I can hardly conceive of the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee. If I did so at all, it would be after losing most of the army, and then necessity would suggest the route. I will not attempt to lay out a line of retreat. Kingston, looking at the map, I thought of more importance than any one point in East Tennessee. But my attention being called more closely to it, I can see that it might be pa.s.sed by, and Knoxville and the rich valley about it possessed, ignoring that place entirely. I should not think it advisable to concentrate a force near the Little Tennessee; (p. 399) to resist the crossing of it would be in danger of capture, but I would hara.s.s and embarra.s.s progress in every way possible, reflecting on the fact that the Army of the Ohio is not the only army to resist the onward progress of the enemy.

"U. S. GRANT, "_Major-General_."

Previous reconnoissances, made first by Brigadier-General W. F.

Smith, Chief Engineer, and afterward by Thomas Sherman, and myself in company with him, of the country opposite Chattanooga and north of the Tennessee river, extending as far east as the mouth of the North Chicamauga, and also of the mouth of the South Chicamauga, and the north end of Missionary Ridge, so far as the same could be made from the north bank of the river, without exciting suspicions on the part of the enemy, showed good roads from Brown's Ferry up the river and back of the first range of hills opposite Chattanooga, and out of view of the enemy's positions. Troops crossing the bridge at Brown's Ferry could be seen and their numbers estimated by the enemy, but not seeing anything further of them as they pa.s.sed up in rear of these hills, he would necessarily be at a loss to know whether they were moving to Knoxville or held on the north side of the river for further operations at Chattanooga. It also showed that the north end of Missionary Ridge was imperfectly guarded, and that the banks of the river from the mouth of South Chicamauga Creek, westward to his main line in front of Chattanooga, were watched only by a small cavalry picket. This determined the plan of operations indicated in my despatch of the 14th to Burnside.

Upon further consideration, the great object being to ma.s.s all the force possible against one given point, namely Missionary Ridge, converging toward the north end of it, it was deemed best to change the original plan, so far as it contemplated Hooker's attack on Lookout Mountain, which would give us Howard's Corps of his command to aid in this purpose, and on the 18th the following instructions were given Thomas:

"To "MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS.

"All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by Sat.u.r.day at daylight. Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountain and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him, strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee river just below the mouth of the Chicamauga, his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel, before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move whereon ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as (p. 400) possible on the most practical line for making an attack up the valley Your effort will then be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well toward the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The junction once formed and the ridge carried, communication will at once be established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's Division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old army of the c.u.mberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga, or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. All the troops will be provided with two days cooked rations in haversacks and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that no ammunition is wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You will call on the Engineer Department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek.

"U. S. GRANT, "_Major-General_."

A copy of these instructions was furnished Sherman with the following communication:

"To "MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.

"Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to Major-General Thomas. You having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with the South; but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected, until the result of our first effort is known. I will add, however, what is not now shown in my instructions to Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above Chicamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts.

"U. S. GRANT, "_Major-General_."

Sherman's forces were moved from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides, our division threatening the enemy's left flank in the direction of Trenton, crossing at Brown's Ferry, up the north bank of the Tennessee to near the mouth of South Chicamauga, where they were kept concealed from the enemy until they were ready to force a crossing. Pontoons for throwing a bridge across the river were built and placed in the North Chicamauga, near its mouth, a few miles further up, without attracting the attention of the enemy.

It was expected we would be able to effect the crossing on the 21st of November, but owing to heavy rains, Sherman was unable to get up until the afternoon of the 23d, and then only with (p. 401) Generals Morgan L. Smith's, John E. Smith's, and Hugh Ewing's divisions of the 15th Corps, under command of Major-General Frank P. Blair, of his army. The pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry having been broken by the drift consequent upon the rise in the river and rafts sent down by the enemy, the other division (Osterhaus') was detained on the south side, and was on the night of the 23d ordered, unless it could get across by eight o'clock the next morning, to report to Hooker, who was instructed, in this event, to attack Lookout Mountain, as contemplated in the original plan.

A deserter from the rebel army, who came into our lines on the night of the 22d November, reported Bragg falling back. The following letter from Bragg, received by flag of truce on the 20th, tended to confirm this report:

"To "Headquarters, Army of the Tennessee, "MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, "In the Field, 20th November, 1863.

"Commanding United States Forces, Chattanooga.

"General: As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.