And the Kaiser abdicates Part 7

The Austro-Hungarian Government saw the trend of events. Premier Baron Burian told Berlin that the Dual Monarchy could not keep up the struggle much longer. The people, he said, were starving, and disloyalty and treachery on the part of subject non-German races in Hungary, Bohemia and the Slav population had attained alarming proportions.

"If the rulers do not make peace the people will make it over their heads," said the Premier, "and that will be the end of rulers."

He appealed to Germany to join with Austria-Hungary in making an offer of peace. Berlin counseled against such a step. The German Government had long lost any illusions it might have cherished in respect to Austria-Hungary's value as an ally, and it was fully informed of the desperateness of the situation there. Despite this it realized that such a step as Vienna proposed would be taken by the enemy as a confession of weakness, and it clung desperately to the hope that the situation on the west front might still be saved.

Burian, however, cherished no illusions. Austria asked for peace, but made it clear that she did not mean a separate peace. The German people saw in Vienna's action the shadow of coming events, and their despondency was increased.

Prince Lichnowsky, Germany's Amba.s.sador at the Court of St. James at the out-break of the war, had earlier confided to a few personal friends copies of his memoirs regarding the events leading up to the war.

Captain von Beerfelde of the German General Staff, into whose hands a copy came, had a number of copies made and circulated them generally.

The memoirs were a frank disclosure of Germany's great share of the guilt for the war. The authorities tried to stop their circulation, but they were read by hundreds of thousands, and did much to destroy general confidence in the justice of Germany's cause.

Count Hertling, trying blunderingly to redeem his democratic promises, made a tactlessly nave speech in the Prussian House of Lords in favor of the government's franchise-reform measures. These bills, although representing a decided improvement of the existing system, had been bitterly criticized by all liberal elements because they did not go far enough, but had finally been reluctantly accepted as the best that could be hoped for in the circ.u.mstances. A majority existed for them in the Prussian Diet, but the Junkers and n.o.ble industrialists of the House of Lords would hear of no surrender of their ancient rights and privileges.

The Chancellor in his speech warned the Lords that they could avoid the necessity of making still more far-reaching concessions later by adopting the government's measures as they stood. To reject them, he declared, would be seriously to imperil the crown and dynasty. He closed with an appeal to his hearers to remember the services rendered to the Fatherland by men of all political creeds, including the Socialists.

Count Hertling's speech displeased everybody. The Conservative press a.s.sailed him bitterly. The _Deutsche Tageszeitung_, chief organ of the Junkers, called him "the gravedigger of the Prussian monarchy." The _Kreuzzeitung_ charged him with minimizing the crown's deserts and exaggerating the services of the Socialists. The liberal _bourgeois_ and the Socialist press said in effect: "And so this is our new democratic Chancellor who advises the House of Lords to block an honest democratic reform of Prussia's iniquitous franchise system." The _Germania_, chief organ of the Clericals, Hertling's own party, d.a.m.ned the speech with faint praise.

Talk of a "chancellor crisis" was soon heard, and by the middle of September there was little doubt that Hertling's days were numbered.

Nothing else can so adequately indicate the reversal of conditions in Germany as the fact that one of the men named oftenest even in _bourgeois_ circles as a likely successor to Count Hertling was Philip Scheidemann, a leader of the Majority Socialists. The _vaterlandslose Gesellen_ were coming into their own.

The crisis became acute on September 20th. The government unofficially sounded the Majority Socialists as to their willingness to partic.i.p.ate in a coalition government. The question was discussed on September 22d, at a joint conference of the Socialist Reichstag deputies and the members of the party's executive committee. Although one of the cardinal tenets of Socialism had always forbidden partic.i.p.ation in any but a purely Socialist government, the final vote was nearly four to one in favor of abandoning this tenet in view of the extraordinary situation confronting the empire. With eighty votes against twenty-two the conference decided to send representatives into a coalition government under the following conditions:

1. The government shall unqualifiedly accept the declaration of the Reichstag of July 19, 1917,[18] and declare its willingness to enter a League of Nations whose fundamental principles shall be the peaceful adjustment of all conflicts and universal disarmament.

[18] _Vide_ chapter vi.

2. The government shall make an absolutely unambiguous declaration of its willingness to rehabilitate (_wiederherstellen_) Belgium and reach an understanding regarding compensation to that land, and also to rehabilitate Serbia and Montenegro.

3. The peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest shall not be permitted to stand in the way of a general treaty of peace; civil government shall be immediately established in all occupied territories; occupied territories shall be evacuated when peace is concluded; democratic representative a.s.semblies shall be established at once.

4. Autonomy shall be granted to Alsace-Lorraine; general, equal, secret and direct right of franchise shall be granted in all German federal states; the Prussian Diet shall be dissolved if the deliberations of the House of Lords do not immediately result in the adoption of the franchise-reform bills.

5. There shall be uniformity in the imperial government, and irresponsible unofficial auxiliary governments (_Nebenregierungen_) are to be eliminated; representatives of the government shall be chosen from the majority of the Reichstag or shall be persons who adhere to the policies of this majority; political announcements by the crown or by military authorities shall be communicated to the Imperial Chancellor before they are promulgated.

6. Immediate rescission of all decrees limiting the right of a.s.sembly or the freedom of the press; the censors.h.i.+p shall be employed only in purely military matters (questions of tactics and strategy, movements of troops, fabrication of munitions of war, etc.); a political control shall be inst.i.tuted for all measures resorted to under the authority of the state of siege; all military inst.i.tutions that serve to exert political influence shall be abolished.

On the whole this was a program which appealed to the vast majority of the German people. The Conservatives and one wing of the National Liberals would have none of it, but the conviction that nothing but a change of system would save Germany had been making rapid headway in the last few weeks. Even many of those opposed in principle to democratic government began to recognize that nothing else could unite the people.

An article in the _Vorwarts_ by Scheidemann and another in the International Correspondence, an ably conducted news agency, pointing out the vital necessity of making any sacrifices that would save the country, were widely reprinted and made a strong appeal.

Chancellor Count Hertling, addressing the Reichstag on September 24th, made a speech which, read between the lines, was a veiled admission of the desperateness of the situation and the increasingly discouraged condition of the people. He admitted frankly that the German armies had met serious reverses on the west front. But Germany, he declared, had met and triumphed over more serious situations. Russia and Roumania had been eliminated from the list of enemies, and he was confident that the people would not lose heart because of temporary setbacks and that the soldiers would continue to show their old spirit. Austria's peace _demarche_ had been taken in the face of serious doubts on the part of the German Government regarding its advisability, but Germany, now as always, was ready to conclude a just peace.

General von Wrisberg, said the Chancellor, reported that the English successes against the Marne position and between the Ancre and the Aisne had been due to fog and the extensive employment of tanks.

Counter-measures had been taken and there was no reason for uneasiness.

The Germans had lost many prisoners and guns, but the enemy's losses had been frightful.

"The American armies need not frighten us," said Count Hertling. "We shall take care of them."[19]

[19] The German Government deceived its own people grossly in the matter of the American forces in France. Hans Delbruck, editor of the _Preussische Jahrbucher_, published on December 10, 1918, a statement that the government had forbidden him to publish Secretary Baker's figures of the American strength, as republished in the London _Times_. In response to his protest, the Supreme Army Command declared that Baker's figures were "purely American bluff, calculated and intended to mislead the German people." But the government not only concealed the truth; it lied about the number of Americans in France and even compelled the press to lie. A confidential communication issued to the press in the middle of May, 1918, declared that "the number of American combatant troops in France is about ten divisions, of which only four are at the front. The total of all troops, both at the front and behind the lines, does not exceed 150,000 to 200,000.

Press notices concerning these matters should state that America has not been able to fulfil its expectations in the way of sending troops, and that the earlier estimates of the German General Staff as to what America could accomplish have proved to be true. The actual figures given above should in no case be mentioned." At this time there were nearly one million Americans in France, and it is inconceivable that the German Supreme Army Command did not know it.

Captain von Bruninghaus of the Admiralty reported that the U-boats were sinking much more tonnage than was being built, and that the losses of submarines were much smaller than those reported by the enemy.

The tone of the aged Chancellor's speech was such that his words carried no conviction. The war-weary, discouraged people could not but see in them an admission that all was lost.

And then came a blow that was felt by everybody. Bulgaria surrendered.

The first breach had been made in the alliance of the Central Powers; the collapse had begun and its significance was plain to the humblest German. Bulgaria's defection came as no surprise to the government, which had known for nearly a week that such an event was at least probable. On September 23d, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria had summoned a grand council to consider the situation. The result was that a formal demand was made on Berlin and Vienna for immediate a.s.sistance. Germany and Austria recognized the urgency of the situation, but they were unable to meet Bulgaria's demands. Both governments promised help in the near future and besought King Ferdinand to keep up the struggle for a short time.

The King realized the emptiness of these promises. There was, moreover, a powerful personal dynastic interest at stake. Revolution of the reddest type already threatened his crown. Workmen and soldiers were organizing soviets in Sofia on the familiar Bolshevik plan, and riotous demonstrations had been held in front of the royal palace. Help from Berlin and Vienna was obviously out of the question. Ferdinand turned to the Entente.

The negotiations were brief. Bulgaria surrendered unconditionally. Her railways and all other means of transportation were handed over to the Allies to be used for military or any other purposes. All strategic points in the kingdom were likewise given into the control of Germany's enemies, and Bulgaria undertook to withdraw immediately all her troops from Greece and Serbia and disarm them.

As an ally Bulgaria had long ceased to play a decisive part in Germany's military operations, but her surrender, apart from its moral effect, was nevertheless disastrous for Germany. General Mackensen's army suddenly found itself in a hostile land, with its route of retreat threatened.

Thousands of German locomotives and cars, badly needed at home, stood on tracks now handed over to the control of Germany's enemies.

Worst of all, completed enemy occupation of Bulgaria meant the isolation of Germany from another ally, for the only route to Constantinople ran through Bulgaria. The days of the Balkan Express, whose initial trip had been acclaimed as the inauguration of what would some day become the Berlin-to-Bagdad line, were numbered. Turkey, isolated, would no longer be able to carry on the war, and reports were already current that Turkey would follow Bulgaria's example. British troops were but a few miles from Damascus, and Bonar Law, reporting in a speech at Guildhall the surrender of Bulgaria, added:

"There is also something in connection with Turkey which I cannot say, but which we can all think."

Uneasy rumors that Austria was also about to follow the lead of Bulgaria spread through Germany.

The Kaiser, wiser than his reactionary advisers, issued on the last day of September a proclamation, in which he declared it to be his will that "the German people shall henceforth more effectively cooperate in deciding the destinies of the Fatherland."

But the destinies of the Fatherland had already been decided by other than political forces. The iron wall in the West that had for more than four years withstood the shocks of the armies of a great part of the civilized world was disintegrating or bending back. In the North the Belgians, fighting on open ground, were encircling Roulers, lying on the railway connecting Lille with the German submarine bases in Zeebrugge and Ostende, and another junction on this important route, Menin, was menaced by the British. Unless the enemy could be stopped here, all the railways in the important triangle of Lille, Ghent, and Bruges must soon be lost, and their loss meant the end of the U-boats as an important factor in the war.

To the north and west of Cambrai the British, only a mile from the center of the city, were forcing their way forward relentlessly, and the French were closing in from the south on the doomed city, which was in flames. British and American troops were advancing steadily on St.

Quentin and the French were approaching from the south. The American forces between the Argonnes and the Meuse were moving ahead, but slowly, for the Germans had weakened their lines elsewhere in order to concentrate heavy forces against the men from across the sea.

Count Hertling confessed political s.h.i.+pwreck by resigning the chancellors.h.i.+p. With him went Vice Chancellor von Payer and Foreign Minister von Hintze. The Kaiser asked Prince Max (Maximilian), heir to the throne of the Grand Duchy of Baden, to accept the post. He complied.

The choice of Prince Max was plainly a concession to and an acknowledgement of the fact that Germany had become overwhelmingly democratic, and it was at the same time a virtual confession that the military situation was desperate and that peace must soon be sought.

Baden had always been one of the most democratic of the German federal states, and the Prince was, despite his rank, a decidedly democratic man. In the first years of the war he had distinguished himself as a humane enemy, and had well earned the tribute paid to him by Amba.s.sador James W. Gerard in the Amba.s.sador's book, _My Four Years in Germany_.

This tribute was paid in connection with a proposal to place Prince Max at the head of a central organization for prisoners of war in Germany.

The appointment, said Gerard, would have redounded to the benefit of Germany and the prisoners.

Prince Max had for some years been recognized as the leader of the Delbruck group of moderates, and his name had been considered for the chancellors.h.i.+p when Dr. Michaelis resigned. That he was not then appointed was due chiefly to his own reluctance, based upon dynastic reasons. He had never been in sympathy with _Schrecklichkeit_ in any of its manifestations, and was known to be out of sympathy with the ruling caste in Prussia. Early in 1918 he had made public a semi-official interview outlining his ideas as to what Germany's peace terms should be. These were in general in accordance with the resolution of the majority _bloc_ of the Reichstag of July 19, 1917, and condemned all annexations of foreign territory and all punitive indemnities. He declared also that the interests of Europe and America would be best served by a peace which should not disrupt the Anglo-Saxon-Teutonic peoples, since Germany must be maintained as a bulwark against the spread of Bolshevism to the nations westward. The conclusion seems justified that the government believed that Prince Max, uncompromised and with known democratic leanings, could secure a more favorable peace for Germany than any other man who could be named.

And the government knew that peace must be had. It had heard so on October 2, the day before Prince Max's appointment, from the lips of a man who brought a message from Hindenburg and Ludendorff. What had long been feared had become a reality--an armistice must be requested. The bearer of these calamitous tidings was Major von Busche. Word had been sent that he was coming, and the leaders of the various Reichstag parties a.s.sembled to hear his message. Nominally the message came from Hindenburg, as commander-in-chief, but really it was Ludendorff speaking through Hindenburg and his emissary.

The message was brief; Hindenburg, said Major von Busche, had become convinced that a request for an armistice must be made. The General Field Marshal had declared, however, that if the request should be refused, or if dishonoring conditions should be imposed, the fight must and could go on. He had no intention of throwing his rifle into the ditch. If necessary, Germany could continue fighting in enemy territory for months. Von Busche did not admit in so many words that all hope of an eventual victory had been lost, but that was the effect of his message.

The men who heard from the highest military authorities in this blunt manner that the situation was even worse than they had feared were dumfounded. If Hindenburg and Ludendorff had given up, there was nothing to be said. It was decided to ask for an armistice.

Prince Max was inclined to refuse to become Imperial Chancellor if it meant that his first act must be a confession of the impossibility of carrying on the war longer--for that, he perceived clearly, would be the natural and logical deduction from a request for an armistice. He particularly disapproved of making the request as the first act of his chancellors.h.i.+p. This, he pointed out, would give a needless appearance of desperate haste and increase the depressing effect of the action, which would in any event be serious enough.

Prince Max's att.i.tude at this crisis was explained by him in an article in the _Preussische Jahrbucher_ following the armistice. He wrote then:

"My peace policy was gravely hampered by the request for an armistice, which was presented to me completely formulated when I reached Berlin. I opposed it on practical political grounds.

It seemed to me to be a great mistake to permit the new government's first step toward peace to be followed by such a surprising confession of German weakness. Neither our own people nor the enemy countries estimated our military situation to be such that a desperate step of this kind was necessary. I made a counter-proposal. The government should as its first act draw up a detailed program of its war-aims, and this program should demonstrate to the whole world our agreement with Wilson's principles and our honest willingness to make heavy national sacrifices for these principles.